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Congressional Information Service, Inc.
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CIS

# RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA

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# HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
## UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

## S. 1853

A BILL TO AUTHORIZE SUPPORT TO RADIO BROADCASTING
TO CUBA, INCORPORATED

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JULY 1, 27, AND AUGUST 19, 1982

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PART 1

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# RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA

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THURSDAY, JULY 1, 1982

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Boschwitz, Pell, Zorinsky, and Dodd.

The Chairman. The committee is meeting this morning to hear administration witnesses on the subject of Radio Broadcasting to Cuba. We are pleased to see that we have long-time friends of this committee as witnesses this morning, and we certainly welcome you very much indeed. I understand that Senator Grassley will be here, and our former colleague, Senator Stone, Ambassador Enders, Mr. Ikle, Mr. White, and Mr. Schaefer of the Federal Communications Commission will be here.

Radio Broadcasting to Cuba is a major undertaking for this administration. I understand that interviews with recently departed Cubans, especially the refugees of spring 1980, show that in Cuba there is minimal understanding of and information on how life in Cuba compares to life elsewhere, or on what Cuba's role in the international scene actually is.

In announcing the purpose of Radio Marti, the administration stated:

> The truth about the costs borne by the Cuban people as a result of their government's grandoise international involvement and repression of basic human rights has been shrouded in lies and half-truths. The truth about underdevelopment and mismanagement, despite massive Soviet subsidies and direction of the economy, is not known in Cuba.

I certainly support the notion that the Cuban people have a right to know the truth. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have played important roles in bringing the truth, accurate information to the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We know that in times of crisis their listenership increases tremendously. Eastern Europeans know that their own government simply does not tell them the truth.

In contrast, we are not sure that Cubans are even aware that their government does not tell them the full story. If Radio Marti can help bring the truth to Cubans, then I support the proposal.

I am also concerned about some negative consequences of Radio Marti. There are reports of possible retaliatory interference with United States clear channel AM stations. Also, there are allegations that the Cubans may try to implement their own propaganda broadcast to this country. I am also concerned that Radio Marti maintain credible factual program content in all its broadcasts. That, of course, has been a source of concern to the committee ever since radio broadcasts began in Europe. We have monitored those programs carefully.

Over the years in which I have been involved, the quality of programing and the credibility of U.S. Government broadcasting has increased, and I think the audience has expanded tremendously as a result of responsible conduct. I commend all of those who have been involved in that process for doing an absolutely outstanding job.

Finally, I sincerely believe in the concept that dialog is the best way to resolve differences. I have supported this notion in the context of Central America. Recently, the Cubans have not been forthcoming on issues which trouble us. However, I believe we should make an effort to reopen the dialog at some future date. Many are worried that by undertaking this broadcasting program, we may make it more difficult to bridge differences in the future.

This is a very complex issue. Yet when we look back a few years at our own country, it was hard to understand what was going on among our young people in Detroit and in many of our cities, in the urban upheavals we experienced. It is not difficult to understand why we are having trouble sorting out the complexities of this bill.

I will comment later, before we close, on a study we requested to be made, as a committee, by the Library of Congress to give us an objective and analytical brief on the problems and issues raised by this proposal.

[Text of S. 1853 follows:]

97TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

# S. 1853

To authorize support to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 16 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 2), 1981

Mr. PERCY (by request) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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# A BILL

To authorize support to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. The Congress hereby finds and declares—

(a) that it is the policy of the United States to support the right of the people of Cuba "to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers," in accordance with article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) that, consonant with this policy, Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, in its planned broadcasting to Cuba, may be effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas to the people of Cuba, and in particular accurate information about Cuba; and

(c) that such broadcasting by Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, operating in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States and in accordance with high professional standards, would be in the national interest.

SEC. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the purpose of this Act $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1982, and for fiscal year 1983 such funds as may be necessary.

SEC. 3. Funds or other support authorized by the Act may be granted to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, only upon the following conditions:

(a) that Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, is operating in a manner not inconsistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States and in accordance with high professional standards and in the national interest; and

(b) that Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, keeps records which fully disclose the source and use of support provided pursuant to this Act, or from any other person or organization. which are available at all times to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller General for the purpose of audit or examination for any other purpose.

SEC. 4. Pending the statutory designation of an appropriate Federal granting and oversight agency, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for making grants of funds and for approving other support authorized by this Act. The Secretary shall determine when the conditions of section 3 have been met and shall have authority to establish such other terms and conditions as he deems appropriate.

SEC. 5. When Federal funds have been made available to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, pursuant to this Act, any agency or instrumentality of the United States is authorized to sell, loan, lease, or grant property (including interests therein) to and to perform administrative and technical support and services for the operations of Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, and the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba on a reimbursable basis or, at the direction of the President, without reimbursement. Any reimbursement shall be credited to the appropriation from which the support or services were derived.

SEC. 6. The Secretary of State is authorized to accept and use, on behalf of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, donations of funds, property, and services of any kind, which may be made available for the purposes of the Commission and of this Act.

[The CRS report referred to follows:]

# RADIO MARTI

Prepared in Response to an Inquiry
from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

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June 28, 1982

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## I. SUMMARY

This report examines the controversy over the Reagan Administration's proposal to establish a radio station to provide a "surrogate home service" for Cuba. This station, to be named Radio Marti, would broadcast information to Cubans about their country which is allegedly not provided through Cuba's exclusively state-controlled media. According to the Administration, the purpose of the station would be to promote the gradual evolution of the Cuban system. Radio Marti is perceived to be something of a counterpart of Radio Free Europe.

The administration has proposed that Congress appropriate $10 million in FY82 and $7 million in FY83 to broadcast about 14 hours per day of news, analysis, and entertainment to Cuba, transmitting on an AM frequency, 1040 kilohertz (kHz) at 50 kilowatts (kw) of power. As proposed, the station would be operated by "an independent, non-profit entity, Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc." 1/ financed by federal and perhaps some private funds.

In deciding whether to appropriate the requested funds, Congress may wish to consider the following questions:

1). Are the administration's stated objectives in providing the service realistic?

- Doubts have been raised concerning the degree of dissatisfaction with the Castro regime on the part of the mass of the Cuban population.

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1/ Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, opening statement, House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 3, 1982, Unpublished statement, pp. 8-9.

- It is questioned whether the U.S. government has sufficient, continuing reliable information on Cuban domestic developments to give Radio Marti credibility.
- The general Cuban population may not be responsive to implications from the U.S. that there is a need for change in the Cuban system.

2). Will the station's operation have unintended political or other ramifications?

- To the extent that they increase dissatisfaction in Cuba, the broadcasts could spark more waves of emigration rather than political change.
- Castro may use the station to consolidate his backing. If perceived as politically threatening, the broadcasts could cause the Castro government to tighten its security apparatus. Or, stricter accountability might strengthen the system, if Cuban media respond by sharpening their own coverage and the central Havana government respons by correcting reported malpractices and corruption by local government.
- Short-term problems in starting the system may be outweighed by long-term benefits as the station adapts to the needs of its potential audience. If the station develops widespread credibility as a nationalist voice, it could play a role when Cuba faces chosing a successor to Castro.

— If Castro fears Radio Marti, its operation may provide a bargaining chip in future disscussions on a range of foreign policy and commercial issues.

— Radio Marti's necessary function of collecting and analyzing information on Cuba may expand U.S. and world knowledge of Cuba.

3). Will any private or public U.S. interests be affected, particularly U.S. AM radio station broadcasters?

— AM radio station broadcasters in the United States may be affected by increased radio interference from Cuban stations if Radio Marti is put into operation, although there is no guarantee that they would not experience increased interference without the implementation of Radio Marti.

## II. INTRODUCTION 2/

### A. BACKGROUND: RECENT PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR BROADCASTING TO CUBA

The genesis of the idea for a surrogate home broadcast service to Cuba appears to have been contained in the "Santa Fe" report, prepared in 1980 by a group of scholars and security analysts to formulate a new policy toward Latin America. Two members of that group, Roger Fontaine and Lt. General (Ret.) Gordon Summer, Jr., now serve with the Reagan Administration. Among the report's policy recommendations for dealing with Cuba was the establishment of a "Radio Free Cuba" to hold the Castro regime "to account for its policies of agression against its sister states in the Americas." The recommendation is to establish

> a Radio Free Cuba, under open U.S. government sponsorship, which will beam objective information to the Cuban people that, among other things, details the costa (sic) of Havana's unholy alliance with Moscow. If propaganda fails, a war of national liberation against Castro must be launched." 3/

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2/ Prepared by Nina Serafino, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

3/ Tambs, Lewis, ed. A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties. Council on Inter-American Security, Washington. 1980. Tambs and the authors of the report are identified as "The Committee of Santa Fe," hence the designation "Santa Fe Report." Besides Tambs, the other contributers were L. Francis Bouchey, Roger Fontaine, David C. Jordan, and Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Gordon Sumner. Fontaine is now the Latin American specialist at the National Security Council, and Lt. Gen. Sumner is a special advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

In the spring of 1981, a member of the Reagan Administration's transition team espoused the idea of special broadcasting to Cuba as part of a "confrontational" policy approach toward the island. As proposed by Kenneth L. Adelman, the Voice of America (VOA) in a special program for Cubans would broadcast "the casualty rates of Cuban troops in Africa and their discontent at being there, and the declining fortunes of Cubans at home." He also suggested broadcasting interviews with Cuban refugees, Castro's remarks on the country's economic difficulties, and World Bank statistics showing a decline in Cuba's per capita gross national product by 0.2 percent per year since 1960, which Adelman claimed dropped Cuba from the country with the third highest per capita income in the hemisphere to among the bottom ranking countries. "Twenty years after the revolution," Adelman wrote, "stringent rationing continues, the economy is declining and unemployment is on the rise. In sum, there is grist enough for a public diplomacy campaign toward Cuba, should policymakers adopt a more confrontational approach." 4/

A Congressional initiative regarding radio broadcasting to Cuba was made in June 1980 by Senator Jesse Helms. 5/ The Senate adopted his amendment to a supplemental authorization bill for the Department of State and the Board for International Broadcasting (S. 2727) declaring that "any program of the United States Government involving radio broadcasts to Cuba for which funds are authorized to be appropriated under this Act

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4/ Adelman, Kenneth L. Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time. Foreign Affairs. Spring 1981. p. 932. Mr. Adelman now serves as the U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations.

5/ See the Congressional Record for June 16, 1980, p. S7051.

or any other Act shall be designated as 'Radio Free Cuba'." The bill passed the Senate, but was not enacted into law.

## B. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL

### 1. History

On Sept. 22, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12323 creating a presidential commission to "develop recommendations with respect to broadcasting of information and ideas to Cuba." 6/ The Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba was then mandated by a charter 7/ to advise on possible program content; information gathering, writing and editing needs; staffing requirements; legal structure for a broadcasting organization; proposed legislation; sample budgets; and the location, structure and function of possible broadcasting stations. The station's purpose is defined as promoting open communication of information and ideas to Cuba

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6/ Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. Executive Order 12323. September 22, 1981. Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents. Vol. 17, No. 39. September 28, 1981. p. 1019.

7/ A charter for the commission was signed January 15, 1982 by Richard T. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management. On January 19, President Reagan named members to the commission. As reported in the Washington Post of January 20, 1982, p. A2, they are: F. Clifton White, a public affairs counselor in Greenwich, Conn. and advisor to Senator Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign; William B. Bayer, political editor of WINZ radio in Miami; Joseph Coors, president of Coors Brewers of Golden, Colorado; Jorge L. Mas, president and chief executive officer of Church and Tower of Florida, a Miami-based engineering company; Richard M. Scaife, a publishing magnate from Pittsburgh, Pa.; Herbert Schmertz, public affairs vice president for Mobil Oil Corp.; Richard B. Stone, former Senator from Florida; Tirso del Junco, chairman of the California Republican Party; Charles Z. Wick, director of the U.S. International Communication Agency; and George Jacobs, former director of engineering for the U.S. Board for International Broadcasting.

and in particular broadcasting to the Cuban people accurate information about Cuba. The delivery of recommendations from the Commission to the President and the Department of State was set for October 1, 1982.

On September 28, 1981, Radio Broadcasting to Cuba (RBC), which the administration plans to be eventually responsible for Radio Marti, was incorporated in the District of Columbia as a private non-profit corporation. 8/ This allows the potential station to receive private funds before it is authorized by Congress. In its interim report of May 24, the presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba recommended that RBC be allowed to use private funds for planning before federal authorization and that it begin to hire key personnel.

Legislation was introduced in Congress upon the administration's request to authorize federal support for RBC, Inc. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Charles Percy submitted S. 1853 on November 16, 1981 at the request of the administration; House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki submitted a similar bill, H.R. 5427 on February 2, 1982. 9/

## 2. Stated Objectives

Radio Marti should be judged in light of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which asserts the right "to seek, receive and

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8/ The trustees of RBC, Inc. are Midge Decter, Ambassador William Stedman and Ambassador Robert Zimmerman.

9/ See Appendix I for a legislative history.

impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers," claims F. Clifton White, chairman of the presidential Commission for Broadcasting to Cuba.

The Reagan Administration has disavowed any belligerent or propaganda role for Radio Marti. The station nas been described as intended to promote domestic pressure for change over the long run, not to incite revolt. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 3, 1982, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders stated "it would be immoral, irresponsible to set a people against a government that monopolizes the means of coercion." Conditions in Cuba are "provocation enough," Enders asserted, claiming there is "redistributed poverty," austerity, unemployment and underemployment, and rigid regimentation, all of which Cubans would know of from their own experiences. Enders also said that Radio Marti's role would be to "give Cubans the means they now lack to know what kind of society has been imposed on them." It would provide a source of news and information not manipulated by the state. He proposed telling Cubans "why so many have to go off to foreign military duty not always to return, and what the state does with the wealth of the Cuban people." In comparing Radio Marti's operation to that of Radio Free Europe, (RFE), Enders indicates that the purpose of the station is to effect changes in the Cuban government over the long run. 10/

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10/ Enders, Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 3, 1982. pp 4-5.

Nevertheless, Enders declared that Radio Marti would not broadcast propaganda: "We will not succeed in attracting an audience in Cuba if we offer them propaganda. If there are false reports, the listeners will react. If false reports continue, they will turn off.... So it must be the creature of no political tendency, of no action group, of no vested interest." To the contrary, Enders testified that he expects that Radio Marti will have to work years, as did Radio Free Europe (RFE), to earn its audience.

### 3. Programming and Operation Plan

The Reagan Administration's proposal calls for a broadcast of 14-15 hours per day 11/ with programming which includes news, commentary, and entertainment. The exact programming has not been decided. According to Yale Newman, acting as director of programming of Radio Marti, 12/ Gaither International has been contracted to perform an audience survey which will be used to help decide on programming. 13/

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11/ According to Yale Newman, who says he is acting as Radio Marti's programming director, the broadcast may be expanded to 24 hours per day in the future. Interview of May 25, 1982.

12/ Newman, ibid., said that the survey is being paid for by a private source and should be ready in mid-summer. According to an information sheet provided by Gaither International, the firm was incorporated in 1971, although key members of its executive staff have been involved in international research for more than 20 years." The sheet states that Gaither does market research abroad for multinational companies and has two offices in Latin America, one in Mexico and one in Venezuela. In a telephone interview, company president George Gaither said that the firm has conducted media studies for the Reader's Digest and is now doing one for Vision, an important Mexican magazine.

13/ This was also a prominent point of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba's Interim Report of May 24, 1982.

Newman said that the "heart of the operation" would be news and information with a special emphasis on Cuban developments, especially Cuban adventurism in Africa or Central America and the mismanagement of domestic affairs. 14/ He said the station would try to assess how these circumstances affect the average Cuban. Among the other suggested programs are: recorded excerpts of Castro's past speeches on political and economic pledges he has not kept, political satire programs on contemporary Cuban life; and a radio drama series on the history of a Cuban family covering several generations. 15/ The presidential commission's interim report also mentioned: the reading and analysis of politically and culturally important documents and works which have been censored; news and analysis of communist countries and parties; political, economic, social and cultural developments in Latin America and in the Cuban exile community; and reminders of international standards of human rights.

Radio Marti will also broadcast entertainment in order to attract listeners. Newman said that Radio Marti will program baseball, soap operas, and music for all tastes. Newman said that the managers of the New York Yankees and the Los Angeles Dodgers have agreed to allow Radio Marti to use their Spanish language network broadcasts free of charge. 16/

The standards of the U.S. professional press will be those followed by Radio Marti, according to Newman. He said the station's information "journalistically will be responsible, will be comprehensive, and will

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14/ From a Q & A information sheet on Radio Marti provided by Newman.

15/ Ibid.

16/ Newman interview, see footnote 11.

be verifiable." The standards cited in the interim report of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba are:

> The news must be accurate, objective, timely, interesting and relevant to the concerns of Cuban listeners. Materials made available for newscasts should be thoroughly verified by news personnel as to facts and sources, as well as to avoid any suggestin (sic) of bias or sensationalism. Confirmation by two independent sources is required when facts appear to be in doubt. Clear attribution to the source is required when the information content clearly constitutes opinion or can be considered partial or self-serving. 17/

A policy office will overseee commentaries and issue policy guidance, Newman said, and whenever possible material would be verified in Cuba.

To mitigate pressures on Radio Marti to become a Cuban exile station, Newman said that station will be headquartered in Washington, D.C. There will also be bureaus in Florida and New York, and one-correspondent offices in the Midwest, the Southwest, and on the West Coast. Staffing the first year (which the administration would like to be FY82) would be 168 persons; an additional 14 persons would be added to the library, support, and technical staff in FY83. The administrative staff is numbered at 20, the programming and editorial staff at 109.

The management, to be selected from "the journalistic world," according to Newman, would be selected by Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc. Plans are for the staff to be comprised of fluent, and if possible native, Spanish-speaking professional broadcasters with a special emphasis on hispanic, including Cuban, experience. According to the presidential commission's interim report, "it will be essential to include staff with knowledge of

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17/ Ibid.

Cuba, and to use Cuban voice talent..." Staff would be paid in line with the Civil Service salary structure of the Voice of America.

Newman said that there are "a large number" of good professional Spanish-speakering journalists available, and that the pool Radio Marti would chose from includes those who are not native born Americans. Radio Marti does not intend to provide on-the-job training. The staff would be screened and cleared, a procedure Newman said could be done in 35-45 days. 18/

### 4. Budget

The budget requested for Radio Marti is $10 million in FY82 and $7 million in FY83: 19/

| | 1982 Estimate | | 1983 Estimate | | Increase or Decrease (-) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pos. | Funds | Pos. | Funds | Pos. | Funds |
| A. Programming | 148 | $2,962,000 | 148 | $5,078,000 | — | $ 2,116,000 |
| B. Engineering: | | | | | | |
| 1. Operations | — | 1,282,000 | 14 | 842,000 | 14 | -440,000 |
| 2. Construction | — | 2,970,000 | — | — | — | -2,970,000 |
| Sub-Total Engineering | — | 4,252,000 | 14 | 842,000 | 14 | -3,410,000 |
| C. Administration | 20 | 2,786,000 | 20 | 1,780,000 | — | -1,006,000 |
| TOTAL: | 168 | 10,000,000 | 182 | 7,700,000 | 14 | -2,300,000 |

One-time engineering expenses include $1.2 million to purchase an antenna,

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18/ Newman interview, op. cit.

19/ Presented by the Administration to Congress. Printed in U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983. Hearings, 97th Congress, 2nd session. Part 6. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. p. 520.

transmitter and related equipment, and approximately $1 million for headquarters and studio facilities. 20/ Enders said that the $10 million in start-up funds for Radio Marti would be reprogrammed from already budgeted funds, but did not elaborate. 21/

### 5. Technical Operation

The presidential commission states in its interim report that several medium wave transmitters would be required to cover the island with a good signal. It lists sites for two: one in south Florida for transmission to western Cuba including Havana, and possibly another in the Caribbean for transmission to Eastern Cuba, the most heavily populated part of the island. Transmitters in the U.S. would not exceed 50 kw power and would have highly directional antennas.

## C. CURRENT STATUS

Despite the lack of Congressional authorization for Radio Marti, the U.S. Navy reportedly has begun construction four 250 foot transmitting antennas for the station 12 miles north of Key West, Florida. Two are reportedly completed and the other two will finished by late summer. A Navy spokesman reportedly confirmed that they were designed for Radio Marti. 22/

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20/ Interim report of the presidential Commission on Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, May 24, 1982. See Appendix II for Congressional Budget Office paper on costs.

21/ Enders. Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 3, 1982, p. 8.

22/ See: Martinez, Guillermo and Jay Ducassi. Radio Marti Towers Provoke Suspicions. Miami Herald, June 16, 1982. pp. 1A and 19A; and U.S. Is Said to Build Antennas for Radio to Transmit to Cuba. New York Times.

## III. OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING [23]

### A. INTRODUCTION

The United States government currently funds three radio systems which broadcast news and entertainment to mass citizen audiences in foreign countries, each with a separate mission and with distinct problems. Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcasts a surrogate home service to the five Eastern European countries; Radio Liberty (RL) broadcasts a comparable service to the Soviet Union. The Voice of America (VOA), part of the U.S. International Communications Agency, broadcasts international news, U.S. news and cultural material, and a U.S. government viewpoint throughout the world. The experiences of these stations are relevant to Radio Marti, first, because the Reagan Administration states that Radio Marti is to be modeled after RFE/RL, secondly, because the Voice of America has been suggested as alternative sponsor for Radio Marti, and thirdly, because Radio Marti may encounter similar problems.

The United States also covertly funded two radio stations with broadcasting targeted at Cuba during the 1960s, Radio Swan and its successor, Radio America. Both were part of Central Intelligence Agency operations against the Castro government. From 1961 through 1974, the VOA broadcast "Cita Con Cuba," an anti-Castro news, commentary, and information program. Cita Con Cuba was cancelled as U.S. policy towards

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[23] Prepared by Nina Serafino.

Castro became less confrontational. The history of these programs is relevant as some fear that Radio Marti may prove a reincarnation of them.

## B. RFE/RL

RFE and RL were founded separately during the early 1950's as part of the cold war effort to "liberate" the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. When that proved unfeasible, both changed their operations to conform to U.S. policy objectives of the long-term "liberalization" of those governments and societies. Their broadcasting was then intended to compete, as far as possible, with the programming of the communist regimes. Both stations were established as ostensibly private organizations, although they were largely funded until 1971 by the Central Intelligence Agency. 24/ Since 1974, RFE and RL have operated under the oversight of and are funded through grants from an independent government monitoring agency, the federally-chartered Board for International Broadcasting, Inc. This gives them a measure of autonomy from the executive branch.

In July, 1950, RFE began transmitting, ostensibly under the aegis of the National Committee for a Free Europe founded in 1949, from 10 to 20 hours per day to each of the five Eastern European countries. It was largely staffed by East European exiles.

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24/ Price, James R. Radio Free Europe—A Survey and Analysis. Congressional Research Service. Washington, March 22, 1972. p. 1; and, Adelman, Kenneth L. Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time. Foreign Affairs. Spring 1981. p. 921; and Marchetti, Victor and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York, Alfred A. Knopf. 1974. p. 135.

In 1951, the American Committee for Freedom of the Peoples of the USSR, Inc. was formed with the sole purpose of sponsoring shortwave broadcasts by former Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union. RL began transmitting on a small scale in 1953.

Although originally intended to serve the same purpose, RFE/Rl, run from Munich, Germany, have developed different audiences. 25/ RL, which broadcasts to the U.S.S.R., "particularly targets the narrow but politically important Soviet dissident community, which has become its clearest audience." 26/ RFE, which broadcasts to the other communist countries in Eastern Europe, attempts to reach the entire Eastern European population. Foreign policy analyst Kenneth L. Adelman claims that "for the past two years, an impressive 55 per cent of adults in Poland and Romania — and a third to a half in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria—tuned into RFE at least once a week. During a crisis, the listenership may soar to a staggering 80 per cent of those over 14 years old." 27/ RFE serves in Eastern European countries to reinforce the traditions, values, and opinions, of its listeners in opposition to the policies of the Communist governments, and to form new opinions. To some, this process simply plays on existing dissent; to others it is credited with creating destabilizing sentiments. 28/

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25/ Adelman, Speaking of America. p. 922.

26/ Ibid.

27/ Ibid.

28/ See among others, Hart, Henry O. Emergent Collective Opinion and Upheaval in East Europe and the Role of Radio Communication. March 1980, and Adelman, Speaking of America. p. 930.

RFE is credited by the Reagan Administration and others with important assistance to the opposition in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, during the past decades. 29/ A recent European report states that "knowledgeable observers of Eastern Europe and the communist leadership are certain that events in Poland would have taken a different course if the populace in Silesia, Warsaw and Poland had not been kept constantly informed by Western radio stations (including the VOA, RFE, the BBC and Deutsche Welle) about developments in Gdansk and Szczecin. 30/ Also, both RFE and RL have been irritants in U.S.-Soviet relations.

## C. RADIO SWAN AND RADIO AMERICA 31/

As part of its attempts to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro, the Central Intelligence Agency set up Radio Swan in the summer of 1960, under cover of the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation. The station's broadcasting facilities were located in Miami, Florida; the 50 kw transmitter on Great Swan Island in the Caribbean off the Honduran coast. Exiled Cuban broadcasters staffed the station, which broadcast inflamatory propaganda to Cuba. During the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961, the station aided invading forces and local resisters, and urged the Cuban people to revolt.

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29/ See: Enders. Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 3, 1982, pp 4-5.

30/ Stamm, Rudolf. Foreign Broadcasts to Eastern Europe. Swiss Review of World Affairs. December 1980. p. 31.

31/ For information on these stations, see: Wyden, Peter. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1979; Wise, David, and Thomas B. Ross. The Invisible Government. New York, Random House, 1964; and Marchetti and Marks talks of the CIA's problems with the station at first as different factions of the Cuban exile community aired their disputes over Radio Swan.

After the invasion failed, the radio's name was changed to Radio Americas, and the proprietary firm's name to the Vanguard Service Company. It was discontinued a few years later.

D. VOA

With a staff of 54, VOA operates Spanish and Portuguese language services which reach an estimated three to four million listeners in 19 Latin American countries, including Cuba. Reportedly, many Cuban government officials tune into VOA for the morning news. VOA officials also feel they probably have a fair number of non-government listeners in Cuba. Broadcasts which cover the area which includes Cuba are transmitted on mediumwave signal from Marathon, Florida, (and sometimes known as "Radio Marathon") which Cuba apparently sometimes jams. 32/

The Spanish language service broadcasts morning and evening shows with news, commentary, analysis, sports, features, and music totaling five and

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32/ Frederick, Howard H. La Guerra Radial: Radio Wars Between Cuba and the United States. Draft of a chapter in a forthcoming work, Critical Communication Review, Vol. II: Changing Patterns of Communication Control, edited by Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko. Norwood, N.J. Ablex Publishing. Planned for 1982. On page 38-39, of the draft, Frederick writes that WHAM(AM) in Rochester, New York, which transmits on the same frequency as the Marathon facility, has complained that Cuban jamming interferes with the WHAM signal. Frederick writes that Radio Marathon, as the transmitter was called, was not reported as required to the International Frequency Registration Board of the International Telecommunications Union in Geneva until 1981. At that point, it had been operating for 18 years. During hearings of the House Government Operations subcommittee, witness George Jacobs indicated that Cuba doesn't normally jam VOA, but does occasionally if there is a particular event which the government doesn't want heard. See U.S. Congress, International Broadcasting: Direct Broadcast Satellites. Hearing. Oct. 23, 1981. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1981. p. 66.

one-half hours per day, but covers news on Cuba infrequently, although it has sometimes covered events concerning Cuba in other formats. From 1961 until 1974, however, VOA did air programs directed specifically at Cuba.

In 1961, the first anti-Castro programming included an hour-long documentary, "Anatomy of a Broken Promise," in which five prominent Cuban exiles talked of Castro's unkept pledges for free elections and a free press. "Cita Con Cuba" 33/ broadcast morning and evening programs of news, features, Cuban music, and vitriolic commentary. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the VOA Spanish-language service, stepped up to 24 hours per day, was sent from two U.S. government transmitters in the Florida Keys and ten commercial stations. The purpose reportedly was to "flood the Cuban AM band with American reports." 34/ Reportedly, one reason for ending the program, over and above the general softening of U.S. policy toward the Castro government, was a lack of news on Cuba. 35/ In testimony to Congress, Enders said the reason for dropping the program was because it "was not consistent with the VOA mission." 36/

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33/ When anti-Castro material began broadcasting in a specific show with this name is variously reported. Josefina Martinez of the VOA Spanish service, who was one of the original staff, said it began in 1961.

34/ Frederick. La Guerra Radial. pp. 36-38 of draft. According to Frederick, the government facility at Tortuga transmitted on 1040 kHz and the one at Marathon on 1180 kHz. Frederick writes that complaints from WHO(AM) in Des Moines, Iowa, of interference with the Tortuga station eventually led to its shutdown.

35/ U.S. Congress. International Shortwave Broadcasting and Direct Broadcast Satellites: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti. Twentieth Report by the Committee of Government Operations. House Report No. 243. Washington, 1981. p. 23.

36/ U.S. Congress. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. House. Part 6. p. 567.

He said that the charter, officially adopted in 1976, does not "provide the authority to mount a radio programming of the kind that we are talking about." 37/ There does not, however, appear to be anything in the VOA charter that prohibits one. In fact, the charter is so general that it would not cover anything so specific as Radio Marti.

## E. BRIEF SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS WHICH ALSO MIGHT BE ENCOUNTERED BY RADIO MARTI

Systematic U.S. government broadcasting to foreign lands during the past three decades has entailed a number of problems, although it generally is favorably viewed. The goals and operating methods of the broadcasts have changed as the times have changed, creating new problems. Some of these may be relevant to Radio Marti.

The first major problem of RFE/RL and Radio Swan was their unrealistic "liberation" goal. The adoption of the "liberalization" theme in RFE/RL broadcasting reflected the change in official U.S. policy to encouraging evolution rather than evolution. Some critics felt that RFE bore some responsibility for fomenting the 1956 Hungarian uprising which was brutally crushed. Radio Swan apparently failed to elicit any popular response in Cuba.

Recently, some Radio Liberty broadcasts have been labeled in a column by Jack Anderson as "chauvinistic" and "anti-democratic," encouraging values antithetical to those of the United States. In the column, Anderson claimed that Russian language RL broadcasts had "echoed the Soviet line on

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37/ Ibid.

on Russian rights to Polish territory," and had been a forum for ethnic Russian chauvinism against Polish and Soviet minority (Ukrainian) interests. 38/ Some critics also charge that RL management has "lost control" over broadcasting, an assertion noted in the Anderson column. Others claim that the RFE staff in Munich has at times fought congressional attempts to increase the policy control exercised by the Board for International Broadcasting. 39/ There are also reports of controversy over the division of responsibilities between the B.I.B. and RFE/RL management. If the reports have merit, it appears these quasi-independent federally-funded radio stations, largely staffed by persons with special language and cultural ties to the area to which they broadcast, must be carefully managed so as to ensure journalistic integrity and conformance to the U.S. national interest.

Operations in the world of government-run foreign broadcasting, with its conflicting demands to serve the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and of journalistic integrity, experience difficulties even with the best of intentions. Problems encountered by VOA in pursuing journalistic integrity have included the need to be responsive to Administration policy. Despite disclaimers, this may also infringe on the standards of accuracy and comprhensiveness which have been proposed for Radio Marti. According to two critics of mixing journalism and diplomacy, VOA broadcasts have been subject to widespread and ongoing diplomatic interference ranging from

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38/ Anderson, Jack. Radio Liberty Making Static on the Air. Washington Post. April 14, 1981. p. B15. Anderson cites a memo prepared for the Board for International Broadcasting by one of its planning and research officers.

39/ Garmet, Suzanne. Trying to Take Hold at Radio Free Europe. The Wall Street Journal. June 12, 1981. p. 21.

State Department restraints on coverage of the fall of Saigon to outright suppression of eye-witness reports from a VOA correspondent in Angola. 40/ Proponents of U.S. broadcast diplomacy such as Adelman, however, claim that such interference is infrequent. 41/

Reported past and current pressures within the VOA for tight conformity to the viewpoint of the executive branch and the possibilities that the radio would become the voice of particular interests raise doubts among supporters and critics that a special broadcast to Cuba, run either by the VOA or under some more independent structure, would be able function with the journalistic integrity of U.S. privately-owned media as proposed. 42/ While favoring the proposal, the Wall Street Journal noted the likely concerns of some that without some direct form of official control, Radio Marti will be dominated by a Cuban emigre group or political fringe group which may espouse its own foreign policy. 43/

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40/ Kelly, Sean, and William H. Read. Shall truth be our guide? A Proposal for Reforming the Voice of America. Foreign Service Journal. February 1977. p. A12. For a short historical account of the problems of balancing diplomacy and journalism, from a journalist's perspective, see: Fisher, Marc. Radio Marti seems both unnecessary, provocative. Miami Herald. January 24, 1982. p. E1. Adelman writes at greater length about broadcasting as a tool of foreign policy with a policymaker's point of view.

41/ Adelman, Speaking of America, p. 918.

42/ See, among others, an editorial "Improve Radio Marti" in the Miami Herald of January 24, 1982. p. 2E

43/ Editorial. Talking to the Cubans. Wall Street Journal. October 27, 1981. p. 32.

Based on the experience of U.S. broadcasting to other foreign countries, it is possible that Radio Marti might not conform to the model presented in the Reagan Administration proposal. Whether any deviation would or would not be desirable would depend on whether a station which is "objective" by U.S. journalism standards or a station which intentionally or unintentionally adopts a specific line toward Cuba is perceived as better serving a U.S. policy role. Testifying before Congress, Enders stated that broadcasting "propaganda" would not be in the U.S. interest. 44/

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44/ Enders, Statement to the House Foriegn Affairs Committee. March 3, 1982. p. 6.

## IV. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES 45/

### A. INTRODUCTION

Radio Marti's potential effects in Cuba and on U.S. foreign policy interests are difficult to assess, but nonetheless crucial to any judgment of its merit. The proposal seems to rest on the following premises: 1) that there is significant potential discontent in Cuba that has few or no outlets for expression in considerable part becaue of heavy repression of information; 2) that the legitimacy of the Castro government and the revolution is now or would be widely questioned if full information were available to the Cuban people; 3) that the Cuban audience will be receptive to a United States perspective on Cuban problems; and 4) that the mobilization of political opinion in Cuba will lead to positive changes in Cuba's internal and foreign policies.

Unfortunately, most information bearing on these premises and questions raised by them is highly subjective and strongly influenced by ideological perspectives. Some of the premises are implicit rather than explicit—for instance, the assumption that Cuban audiences will be responsive to U.S. government sponsored programming. Critics reject many of the implied and explicit premises and claim negative consequences that may follow from the proposal.

This section raises issues that Congress may wish to consider further in evaluating the merits of Radio Marti. Within the constraints noted above, it addresses the major determinants of whether Radio Marti would be an

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45/ Prepared by Nina Serafino.

effective tool of U.S. foreign policy, or whether Radio Marti might have undesired political or foreign policy effects.

## B. OBJECTIVE AND RATIONALE

The Reagan administration's expressed purpose for the station is to "begin a sustained effort, over many years, to help the Cubans know more about their country, and thus to hold their government accountable in ways it is not now." 46/ The Reagan administration finds that the Cuban public lacks "reliable news about Cuban life," and instead receives distorted, censored news and programming that is being offered by a government that rules not for the people, but for itself." 47/ This assertion questions the legitimacy of the Cuban government, denies the veracity of the information it provides, and intends that Radio Marti will in time be viewed by the Cuban people as a "reliable source of news and commentary." 48/

Other proponents of the system express, either directly or indirectly, the belief that Cuban news is highly controlled and distorted, and that the Cuban system is so lacking in legitimacy that it cannot permit open news reportage or dissent. Frank Calzon, executive director of the Cuban American National Foundation, testified to Congress that the Castro regime has a

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46/ Enders. Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 3, 1982. p. 5.

47/ Thomas O. Enders. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, prepared statement, House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Unpublished statement, May 10, 1982. p.1.

48/ Ibid.

"total information monopoly" in Cuba which "exhorts its populace about the evils of the U.S. government, which it describes as fascist, and about the glories of communism. Those who dare to dissent with this view are subject to the harshest means of repression." 49/

Calzon said that radio coverage of both international affairs, and of important domestic developments, such as the state of the economy, airplane crashes and the effects of natural disasters are censored, distorted, or delayed for days while the Cuban Radio Institute "propagandists devise an interpretation." According to Calzon, cultural and educational broadcasting is similarily treated; many of Cuba's most distinguished literary and artistic figures are no longer mentioned in books on Cuba's history and cultural, and on Cuban radio broadcasts. "Because of this domestic radio broadcast system, Cubans hunger for outside sources of information," Calzon testified. 50/

Statements by Reagan Administration officials and Calzon imply that the amount and type of information available in Cuba is not acceptable to Cubans. The implication is that additional information supplied by Radio Marti would discredit government information and create a demand for more information of a different type than currently provided by the Cuban government. In the proposed scenario for Radio Marti, Cubans would then use this information to pressure the Cuban government to modify its political goals, such as encouraging revolution abroad, and to concentrate on bettering economic conditions at home

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49/ Frank Calzon, Executive Director of the Cuban American National Foundation, statement, House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, Unpublished statement, May 10, 1982, p. 2.

50/ Calzon, Frank. U.S. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba: Policy Implications. Washington, The Cuban-American National Foundation. No date. No page.

and liberalizing the domestic political arena. Whether that hypothetical cause and effect sequence is realistic depends on four factors: whether Radio Marti proponents' evaluation of the amount and type of information available in Cuba through the media and cultural freedom is accurate, whether Cubans indeed lack or are dissatisfied with channels to express dissent, whether they regard their government and system as legitimate, and whether discontent with government information and provision of additional information provided through United States government funded broadcasting would create the type of pressure the Reagan Administration envisions.

## C. INFORMATION CONTROL AND DISSENT IN CUBA

### 1. Information Control

A brief survey of materials available on Cuban media and cultural life finds little argument that the Cuban print and broadcast media, and cultural life are anything but restricted. There is, however, disagreement on how tightly they are controlled and how limited the information is. Some evidence exists that a degree of dissent and criticism is permitted, even encouraged. Apparently, some who believe in the revolution feel quite free to criticize it, 51/ although the government has jailed others for merely speaking out against the Cuban system. 52/ As in many underdeveloped countries, it also appears that word of

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51/ Quinn, Sally. Cuba's Housebroken Press. The Washington Post. April 3, 1977. p. C4. The article also notes, however, to a lack of formal outlets to express dissent.

52/ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States. Sixth Report on the Situation of Political Prisoners in Cuba. General Secretariat, Organization of American States. Washington,. 1979. See especially: Conclusions, pg. 39.

mouth is an important means of communicating information in Cuba and may significantly supplement official information. Information on international, U.S. and Florida events and U.S. entertainment is available from South Florida English and Spanish language radio stations which are received in Havana and other, but apparently not all, parts of Cuba. Reportedly, large numbers of Cubans are avid listeners to these stations.

Apparently, there has been some liberalization of political discussion and criticism since the first years of the Cuban revolution. Some believe the trend may continue.

## 2. Political Participation

Jorge I. Dominguez, a noted scholar, has observed in his book, Cuba: Order and Revolution, that during the early 1970's, political participation in Cuba increased dramatically although it was still restricted. People were incorporated into mass organizations; discussion and criticism of specific local issues became more open and relatively unimpeded. Nevertheless, Dominguez writes, restraints remain on criticism of higher levels of government and other types of issues. Participation, he claims, is largely in policy implementation, not policymaking. 53/

Thus, although political participation at the national level is highly controlled, political participation at the local level appears to have been somewhat open for some time. Limiting political participation to

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53/ Dominguez, Jorge I. Cuba: Order and Revolution. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England. 1978. p. 305.

immediate "bread and butter" issues that most affect people is a common device in various kinds of authoritarian countries for mobilizing the population, controlling participation in politics, and giving people a sense of political freedom. John Nichols, Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at The Pennsylvania State University School of Journalism claims this is the level that concerns most Cubans:

> Despite great educational advances in the country, general Cuban audiences are not particularly sophisticated and are not particularly concerned about international geopolitics or national economic policy. Cubans, like most people of the world, are concerned about potholes in their street, availability of certain commodities in their neighborhood store, local social events and other day-to-day concerns. 54/

This may mean that most Cubans find that the opportunities which exist to express dissatisfaction on issues which most concern them are adequate, and that additional information would not substantially change the expression or results of expressing any dissent. Therefore, this could mean that the possibilities of transforming the dissatisfactions of Cubans into new pressures on the government or the system may be less than Radio Marti proponents expect. Or, it could mean that information and education available leave Cubans bored with or unaware of international or national issues. This could mean that Radio Marti might work in Cuba like RFE apparently works in Europe, i.e., increasing citizen awareness and demands to participate more fully.

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54/ Nichols, John Spicer, statement, House Committee on Appropriations, April 21, 1982. Unpublished statement, p. 6.

## 3. The Media

There are, however, other indications that the expression of dissatisfactions and the range of information available in Cuba may be greater than Radio Marti proponents indicate. Nichols writes that the Cuban media is not monolithic and not completely controlled by the highest levels of government. He asserts that while the influential broadcast media (51 radio stations and two television stations) and film production are highly centralized, the print media is less so, and the newspaper medium is not centrally organized. 55/

Nichols finds that the print media's content is diversified, that some publications carry negative comments from readers and reporters on state operations, and that criticism is officially encouraged. In recent years, he claims, diversification of the structure of the government and the Communist party, and an increase in the number of people involved and of power bases, has lead to a somewhat greater but still limited diversity of opinion, which is reflected in the media. A major constraint on information about failures of the system, arises from the actions of government officials, particularly second-echelon bureaucrats who seek to conceal and distort facts that may harm their public image. According to Nichols, this contravenes the desires of the top

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55/ Nichols, John Spicer. Cuban Mass Media: Organization, Control and Functions. Journalism Monographs, no. 77, Lexington, Kentucky, Association for Education in Journalism. 1982. pp. 11-14. According to Nichols, there are over 50 magazines and journals, 12 daily newspapers, and other print publications in Cuba. This publication also notes, however, the integration between media policymakers and the political elite.

top leadership. 56/ On the whole, Nichols finds that Cubans "have only limited opportunities to discuss the tactical operation of the government government and no opportunities to criticize the revolution itself in the mass media." 57/ He predicts, however, a "continuation of the post-1975 trend toward greater press criticism of lower-level government operations" within the constraints of "revolutionary ideology and harsh economic realities." 58/

## 4. Cultural Freedom

The discrepancies of opinion on the availability of information and the expression of dissent in Cuba extend to the cultural arena. Scholar Peter Winn finds that Cuban writers practice a measure of self-censorship, but good art will give a writer the power to irritate the government. 59/ He claims that Cuban authors "speak of significant artistic autonomy" and finds that "the cultural ambience is not Paris, but neither is it Prague." 60/ Carlos

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56/ Information in this paragraph found in the work cited above, and, Nichols, John Spicer. The Mass Media, Their Functions in Social Conflict. To be published in a forthcoming book edited by Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba: Internal and International Affairs. Beverly Hills, Ca., Sage Publications Inc., 1982.

57/ Nichols, John Spicer. Republic of Cuba. In World Press Encyclopedia. Edited by George Thomas Kurian. Washington. Facts on File, Inc. 1982, p. 269.

58/ Ibid.

59/ Winn, Peter. Cuban State and the Arts. In Cuban Communism, 4th edition, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.). Transaction Books, 1981. p. 359. Jose Lezama Lima, the "Cuban Proust" according to Winn, "may not have been a government favorite, but the power of his poetry won him respect and admiration that assured publication of his works."

60/ Winn. Cuban State and the Arts. p. 364.

Ripoll, a Cuban exile, disagrees. He writes that "dissenters in Cuba find themselves in a situation reminiscent of that of writers in Stalinist Russia," and states that even writers who had received state awards have left in recent years. 61/ Since cultural programming may comprise one segment of Radio Marti's broadcasting, these differences of opinion raise questions about the importance and influence of exiled writers to a Cuban home audience.

## D. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND SYSTEM

Appraisals of the legitimacy of Castro's government and the acceptability of a Marxist system in Cuba vary. Evaluations often mix the legitimacy of the regime headed by Fidel Castro with the legitimacy of the concept of the Revolution, with its Marxist-Leninist tenets. Although it is difficult to distinguish between the two, the distinction could make a difference in determining the effects of Radio Marti. Dissent might be channeled against the government if the Cuban people perceive the government and the revolution as illegitimate. Even if the Cuban people perceive the government as legitimate, Radio Marti still might have the administration's desired effect if the broadcasts appealed to values not espoused by the Revolution.

Various U.S. press estimates of those who are so disaffected with life in Cuba that they wish to leave range from one to twenty percent of Cuba's

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61/ Ripoll, Carlos. The Cuban Scene: Censors and Dissenters. Washington. The Cuban-American National Foundation, Inc., 1982. For a similar viewpoint and examples of persecuted writers, see Calzon, Frank. Castro's Gulag: The Politics of Terror. Washington, Council for Inter-American Security, 1979. pp. 13-14.

ten million inhabitants. 62/ This would tend to indicate that at the least, most of the people on the island actively or passively accept the government or its ideology, or both.

Nichols finds that the perception of the legitimacy of the Cuban government is strong.

> The assumption that Castro's rule is tenuous was wrong in 1961 and is wrong today.... U.S. intelligence assessments released in 1968 document that if Castro were to run for election, he would win by a landslide. Some Western diplomats stationed in Havana estimate that he enjoys the full support of 80 per cent of the Cuban people. Moreover, when Cuban people are wronged by or dissatisfied with the government, rather than blame Castro, they are inclined to say, "If only Fidel knew about this. 63/

Calzon, however, believes that if Cubans were better informed, they would press for change. For instance, he asserts that "the elites in the bureaucracy, industry, education, and even the military are largely uninformed of the costs" of Cuba's activities abroad, which he describes as "an aspect of Soviet imperialism." 64/ Radio Marti could play an important

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62/ See: Chardy, Alfonso. Those who missed Mariel exodus still battling the stigma attached. Miami Herald. May 3, 1981. p. 24A; Beth Nissen. Castro's Ragged Revolution. Newsweek. June 8, 1981. p. 62; and, Nichols, John Spicer. Castro needs no Soviet guards. The Evening News, Harrisburg, Pa., Sept. 27, 1979.

63/ Nichols. Castro needs no Soviet guard. Two other academics who visited Cuba in 1979 found both the government of Fidel Castro and the ideals of the Revolution widely accepted. See: Howard and Nancy Handelman. Cuba Today: Impressions of the Revolution in its Twenthieth Year. American Universities Field Staff Reports. 1979, No. 8., p. 9. The Handlemans found most discontent in Havana and wrote that they rarely heard criticism outside of the capital city.

64/ Calzon, Frank. U.S. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Policy Implications.

role in touching Cubans' deep feelings about resisting foreign, in this case Soviet, domination, according to Calzon, who feels that the Cuban government would be undermined if Soviet links were better known in Cuba.

This assessment assumes that the ideology of the revolution, per se, is not widely or deeply held by Cubans; they would turn from promoting revolution abroad if they knew of the costs to Cuba and of Soviet involvement because Cubans do not not strongly embrace communism as their own ideology nor perceive the promotion of it as a desirable goal.

## E. ACCEPTABILITY OF INFORMATION FROM A U.S. SOURCE

### 1. Cuban Attitudes Towards the United States

Whether or not the Cuban government and revolution are widely regarded as legitimate, the success of Radio Marti in achieving its goals will hinge on whether Cubans accept direct or implied criticism of their government from a United States government source. Proponents of Radio Marti presume that in time, with exposure, they will. Others disagree. Nichols argued before Congress that

> Many Cubans, particularly the Cuban youth, are strongly attracted to U.S. culture, including blue jeans, the New York Yankees, and pop music, but at the same time, they are highly nationalistic and, regardless of their level of support for the Castro government, intensely dislike the U.S. government. Even the political marginals who would like to emigrate are distrustful of the U.S. government....
>
> Consequently, Cuban listenership of U.S. radio is highly selective. Cubans of all walks of life have reported to us that 1) they regularly listen to U.S. radio, and 2) they do not find news of Cuban affairs on U.S. stations to be credible. They say that they are fully aware of the failures (and successes) of the Cuban revolution. They experience daily the rationing, scarcity of basic commodities, the dull propaganda of their own media, etc., but also feel that the U.S. radio stations, both government and

> commercial, do not report that reality accurately, and they generally ignore the information content of those stations.
>
> Therefore, while Cubans eagerly will listen to sports, music and other entertainment from the U.S., most Cubans, in my judgment, will physically or mentally tune out Cuban news broadcast from the U.S., particularly if it is a government station. 65/

Nichols believes that "most Cuban listeners will use Radio Marti in the same way that U.S. forces used Tokyo Rose during World War II—enjoying the entertainment and mentally filtering or reinterpreting the political information so as to reinforce their convictions. 66/

### 2. Comparison with the Polish Situation

Proponents of Radio Marti point to the support they perceive that Radio Free Europe (RFE) gives Solidarity forces in Poland as a model for what they believe Radio Marti can accomplish. In testimony before Congress, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Thomas O. Enders alluded to that comparison: "Radio Free Europe now has perhaps 70 per cent of the Polish radio audience. Is there any doubt that that the changes of the last decade could have occurred without that trustworthy, humane outside contact?" 67/ The comparison has been called into question by those who believe that the situation differs in three main respects: the Polish government does not enjoy the same degree of legitimacy as the Cuban

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65/ Nichols, John Spicer, statement, House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, May 10, 1982, Unpublished statement. pp. 5-6.

66/ Nichols. Statement to the House Committee on Appropriations. April 21, 1982. p.4.

67/ Enders. Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 3, 1982. pp. 4-5.

government; Polish nationalism is anti-Soviet, while Cuban nationalism is anti-U.S.; and popular discontent is higher in Poland than it is in Cuba. Another point which must be examined is whether the attitudes of the Cuban and Polish peoples towards their respective systems are similar.

The first three points were addressed in testimony before Congress by a critic of the Reagan administration's foreign policy, William M. LeoGrande, director of political science at American University. LeoGrande argued that the results of RFE and Radio Marti would not be similar as because the situations in the two countries are different.

> Communism came to Poland at the point of a Soviet bayonet, whereas it came to Cuba in the wake of a revolution against a universally despised dictatorship. Even in the worst of times, the Cuban regime has had a degree of legitimacy never enjoyed by Poland's. Moreover, Polish nationalism is anti-Soviet and serves to undermine a regime linked to the USSR, whereas Cuban nationalism is anti-U.S. and reinforces a regime in conflict with Washington. The historic strength and importance of the Catholic Church in Poland provided an institutional and ideological rival to the regime — a focal point for opposition. No such institution exists in Cuba. Finally, while the Polish regime responded to popular disaffection with empty promises, the Cuban regime has acted pragmatically to defuse discontent with real reforms. For all these reasons, any hope of producing a Polish-style revolt in Cuba is illusory. 68/

Another point to consider is whether the underlying ideology of each government is acceptable to its people. While this topic appears to be treated only subjectively for Cuba, information from RFE studies indicates that communism is not acceptable to most people of Eastern Europe. A recent monograph prepared by a member of the RFE/RL Eastern European Area Audience and Opinion Research Department cites RFE survey findings that Eastern Europeans favor Western democracy, capitalism, religion, the

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68/ LeoGrande, William M., statement, House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 4, 1982, Unpublished statement, p. 5.

traditional family and individual freedom, and feel negatively about socialism, people's democracy, and communism as practiced. 69/

There are factors other than ideology to consider in evaluating whether a U.S. government sponsored station will prove acceptable and valuable to the Cuban people. These deal with whether Cubans will find the programming to their liking and whether Radio Marti's reporting and information is accurate.

### 3. Problems of Providing Suitable Programming

Radio Marti has contracted Gaither International Inc. of Stamford, Conn. to study the program tastes of Cuban listeners. 70/ According to George Gaither, the firm is conducting a "classic audience survey" of recent Cuban arrivals designed to ascertain the preferences and life patterns of Cubans. 71/ Nichols questions whether the preferences expressed will be representative 72/ of the Cuban population as a whole because the exiles are

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69/ Hart, Henry O. Emergent Collective Opinion and Upheaval in East Europe and the Role of Radio Communication. pp 16-17.

70/ Newman interview.

71/ Telephone conversation with George Gaither.

72/ Telephone conversation with John Spicer Nichols. June 1982. Two studies published recently by Robert L. Bach. The New Cuban Exodus. Caribbean Review. Winter 1982. pp. 22-25, 58-60, and The new Cuban immigrants, their background and prospects. Monthly Labor Review, vol. 103. Oct. 1980. pp. 39-46) show that most of the Mariel population came from urban areas, many were skilled workers, and most were from the mainstream of the Cuban economy. Although some, as indicated by popular conception, had served prison terms, this apparently was less than a fifth of the immigrants, and many told the INS that they had served time for activities such as refusing to serve in the military or to work for the state, or for participating in the black market, according to Bach. Bach observes in The New Cuban Exodus, p. 25, that the backgrounds of the immigrants "show the complexity of personal motivations and circumstances," although noting that not much is known about their backgrounds and motivations.

atypical, not a randomly selected group, and they are being interviewed outside their normal habitat. Gaither responded that although the survey does not draw on a perfectly representative sample, it will be informative about Cubans' relative interest in music and news, although not in political content.

The other factor is whether the news will be perceived by the Cubans as "accurate and reliable." The Cuban media are not providing full and accurate information to Cuban citizens, but questions have been raised about whether a U.S. funded and based radio station is capable of gathering enough accurate news to supply a "surrogate home service." 73/ Newman said that he thought there would be plenty of information for Radio Marti; among the sources to be used are people returning from trips to Cuba. 74/

One of the problems in presenting information about Cuba to Cubans will be the diverse, sometimes conflicting reports, and sometimes inaccurate reports that are currently gathered by reporters and other sources serving the U.S. audience, all of whom presumably have taken pains to verify the accuracy of their information. For instance, Assistant Secretary of State Enders told Congress that Cuban "improvements in social and health services over the last 20 years are far less impressive than might have been expected." 75/ This view is also held by scholar Thomas

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73/ Nichols. Statement to House Committee on Appropriations. April 21, 1982. pp. 5-6.

74/ Newman interview.

75/ Enders. Statement to House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 3, 1982. p. 2.

D. Anderson, who writes that "there is no evidence that social conditions in Cuba are particularly better than those on most neighboring islands" and that there has been a rise in infant mortality since the 1960's. 76/ Newsweek, however, has reported that Cuba's "first-class educational system has produced a 96 per cent literacy rate" and that "health care is excellent and infant mortality low" although housing is poor, and basic food items and clothing are still rationed. 77/ The Wall Street Journal has reported that food rationing does not mean that Cuban are ill-fed and malnourished, although they must exercise ingenuity and patience to obtain a balanced diet. 78/

There also have been contradictory reports on Cuba's participation 79/ in insurrections in Angola, Ethiopia, and Central America, one of the aspects of the Cuban revolution the Reagan Administration indicates Radio Marti will address. Early reports on Cuban costs and casualties in Angola may have been mistaken, 80/ and at one time U.S. military officers told Congress that the sources of information

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76/ Anderson, Thomas. D. Communism in Cuba: have its benefits been oversold? The Christian Science Monitor. Jul. 30, 1981. p. 23.

77/ Nissen, Beth. Castro's Ragged Revolution. Newsweek. June 8, 1981. p. 62.

78/ Kwitny, Jonathan. With Perseverance, Cubans Eat Well. The Wall Street Journal. December 21, 1981. p. 25.

79/ There have also been conflicting reports of Cubans' desire to participate. While one report (see: Peerman, Dean. Cuba: No Room for Naysayers? Christian Century. September 1977, p. 846) claims that Cubans have complained about being turned down for duty because quotas were filled, another (see: Bach, The New Cuban Exodus, p. 25) reports that many Cubans have refused to serve in the military in Angola, including some mililary men and officials of the Communist Party.

80/ Handleman and Handleman. Cuba Today. Footnote 24 on page 22 claims that "By mid-1978, articles in Time and Newsweek were contradicting their own earlier reports of high Cuban casualties and antiwar discontent."

which they had on the number of casualties in Angola were "questionable." 81/

Even whether the costs of Cuban participation in revolutions abroad have been as high as alleged by the Reagan administration, has been questioned.

> Cuban support for revolutionary movements abroad generally takes the form of advice and some shipments of arms, neither of which entails any significant domestic cost. Thus neither is likely to produce any significant domestic opposition. Except for Angola and Ethiopia, Cuban assistance to friendly governments has taken the form of technical (not financial) aid—i.e., contingents of military advisors and/or civilian workers in the fields of health, education, and construction. Here to, the costs are not great and the potential for opposition is limited.
>
> Only the Cuban combat role in Angola and Ethiopia has produced any significant internal opposition, but even here the potential for exploiting that discontent is limited. At present, Cuban troops are not actively engaged in combat in either country, so casualty rates are presumably low. Most of the costs of maintaining these forces abroad are indirect opportunity costs and are therefore less likely to serve as a focus of popular opposition. 82/

These points raise two major questions. The first has already been mentioned: can even well-intentioned reporters, "objective" by the professional standards of the U.S. press, produce news which Cubans can perceive as accurate as reports vary widely in the United States? And, even if they can, will Radio Marti report news as its reporters see it? Among those raising the second question are newspaper editorial writers 83/ and, reportedly, the State Department's

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81/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Impact of Cuban-Soviet Ties in the Western Hemisphere. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2nd session. March 14 and 15; April 5 and 12. Washington. U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1978. p. 24.

82/ LeoGrande. Statement to House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 4, 1982. p. 4.

83/ Conine, Ernest. Radio Marti: Trouble in the Air. Los Angeles Times. Jan. 25, 1982. p. F41, and editorial in the Miami Herald, Jan. 24, 1982. The Miami Herald advocated that Radio Marti be part of the Voice of America, which has a "long-established reputation for reporting the news fully, factually and fairly." The editorial also expressed concern with the emphasis of VOA's "'commentary, or propaganda, role" under the Reagan Administration. It further stated that "the extreme conservatism of the new Radio Marti commission's appointees gives clear reason for concern."

U.S. Interests Section in Havana. According to a New York Times report, the Interests Section "expressed fears that Radio Marti would be less accurate (than the Voice of America), more vulnerable to rumor, and therefore damaging to American credibility. 84/ Fears also have been expressed that if perceived as propagandistic in performance, Radio Marti could compromise the mission of the VOA and its reputation for objectivity, damaging its credibility in Cuba.

## F. POSSIBLE UNSTATED GOALS OF RADIO MARTI

Fears have also been expressed that the true intent of Radio Marti is to destabilize the Cuban government. LeoGrande noted in congressional testimony that:

> We should not fail to mention the possibility, however remote, that Radio Marti may be part of a wider effort aimed at overthrowing the Cuban government by force of arms. Persistent threats of direct military action against Cuba and reports that the Administration has renewed contacts with anti-Communist Cuban and Nicaraguan exiles in Florida are reminiscent of the 1960's. During that decade, the Central Intelligence Agency endeavored to create anti-Castro paramilitary forces both inside and outside Cuba with the ultimate objective of overthrowing the Cuban government. To prepare the populace for that eventuality, the CIA created Radio Swan...to broadcast into Cuba.
>
> Given the Reagan Administration's obvious preoccupation with and animosity towards Cuba, and its state intention to restore covert action to the arsenal of foreign policy instruments, one cannot dismiss the possibility that Radio Marti is intended to play the same role as Radio Swan was two decades ago. 85/

Although this is not the Reagan administration's declared purpose at at this time, members of the Reagan Administration (as previously

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84/ Crossette, Barbara. U.S. Diplomats in Cuba Dissent on Radio Plan. New York Times. Oct. 29, 1981. p. A3.

85/ LeoGrande. Statement to House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 4, 1982. pp. 5-6.

noted) have in the past implied that purpose for a proposed radio broadcast to Cuba. 86/ The feasibility of achieving that possible objective rests on the same criteria as evaluating the feasibility of the Administration's declared goal. The possible political consequences of such an attempt will not be dealt with here, but they would be much farther reaching than the effects of a Radio Marti operating as stated by the Administration.

## G. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF RADIO MARTI

### 1. Cuban Media Response

Apparently, however, Radio Marti may have already provoked a reaction by the Cuban government. According to one academic observer who finds Cubans "hungry" for news of events, 87/ "Cuba is preparing both domestic and international responses" to Radio Marti. Cuban radio and TV are said to be "expanding local and national public affairs and news coverage." Among other things, the daily 'Revista de la Manana,' a magazine-format program show, is to be expanded to six hours, partly to compete with Radio Marti in the area of "hard news." 88/

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86/ Tambs, ed. A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties.

87/ Conversation with Howard Frederick, May 1982.

88/ Frederick. La Guerra Radial. p. 60.

## 2. Possible Negative Political Consequences of Radio Marti

Three major possible negative political consequences are envisioned if the station were to operate as outlined by the administration: increased immigration from Cuba, strengthening of the Castro regime, and further exacerbation of U.S.-Cuban relations in a way that may be harmful to U.S. interests.

> According to a message sent to the State Department Oct. 14 by the United States Interests Section in the Swiss Embassy in Havana.... the broadcasts might bring unwelcome results, including the stimulation of another Cuban exodus at a time when Washington is trying to cut illegal immigration....
>
> Assuming that there might be a tendancy in programming to raise discontent among Cubans—an intent the State Department here (Washington, D.C.) says has been ruled out—the diplomats said that Cuban discontent translates not into rebellion against the regime, which the message describes as solidly entrenched, but into escape from the island. 89/

Another possibility cited is that Radio Marti may backfire and further enhance Castro's standing with the Cuban people.

> ...For two decades Castro has been extremely effective in translating tangible signs of U.S. hostility into domestic Cuban support for his policies. When U.S. relations with Cuba deteriorate, Castro's internal support tends to improve, and vice versa. Consequently, Radio Marti will supply a highly audible symbol of U.S. hostility that Castro might be able to use for mobilizing Cuban domestic support for the very same policies that the U.S. is trying to undercut. 90/

Radio Marti will no doubt add another irritant to U.S.-Cuban

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89/ Crossette. U.S. Diplomats in Cuba Dissent on Radio Plan.

90/ Nichols. Statement to the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance. May 10, 1982, p. 6. Also mentioned in the LeoGrande statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 4, 1982, p. 6. The Wall Street Journal editorial (see footnote 43), although sympathetic to the idea of Radio Marti, also noted that there are fears that the program could end up so anti-Castro that Cubans will feel "it insults their country and leaves listeners feeling loyally protective about their regime."

relations, as noted by the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Nichols, who charges that the true intent of Radio Marti is political harassment, 91/ told Congress that Castro "considers broadcasting directed at Cuba as more sinister than the trade embargo or sabotage" and would get more attention from Castro than efforts to isolate the island. "The nuisance value of Radio Marti, whether intended or otherwise, cannot be overestimated," Nichols stated. 92/

If the Reagan Administration's foreign policy initiative to pursue talks with the Cuban government is an important objective regarding Cuba, 93/ the effect of Radio Marti on the possibility of encouraging such talks must be weighed. The possible lessening of the isolation of Cuba in the hemisphere because of the Falklands War, 94/ could also raise the status of Radio Marti to a factor in U.S.-Latin American relations.

In the event that the radio station is not managed with the journalistic integrity the Reagan Administration envisions, the station could have another negative consequence. It could, as Radio Swan once reportedly did, become the voice for policy lines that may be at variance with official U.S. policy.

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91/ Nichols. Statement to the House Committee on Appropriations. April 21, 1982, p. 7.

92/ Nichols. Statement to the House Committee on Appropriations. April 21, 1982. p. 6

93/ Enders. Statement to House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 3, 1982. pp. 5-6. Enders gives a brief history of attempts to pursue talks.

94/ DeYoung, Karen. Cuba Says Falkland Crisis Eased Isolation. Washington Post. June 21, 1982. pp. A1, A16.

The point has also been raised that the Cuban government may use coercive measures to block Cubans from listening to Radio Marti, thus making the U.S. government "responsible" for raising the level of repression in Cuba. 95/ Or, the Cuban government may jam other stations in retaliation, thus decreasing the information available to Cuba, which do provide an alternative view even if it is not as comprehensive on Cuban affairs as that which Radio Marti would provide. A final negative possibility deserves listing. Radio Marti may simply fail to develop sufficient audience interest to trigger strong effects of any sort. If its attractions—sports, mustic, entertainment—must compete with U.S. commercial radio from Florida, and its local news service is sparse and unattractive.

## 3. Possible Positive Consequences

Four significant positive consequences could result from the creation of Radio Marti. Two could have long run benefits.

In the short run, the station, if not jammed, will break the Cuban state's monopoly on news, especially domestic news. If most Cubans are ideologically committed to the Cuban system and satisfied with the Cuban government, as some argue, this may only serve a minority of the population. If these assessments are mistaken, the audience may be much larger. In either case, the information will be there for those who want to hear it. The station, if it proves to have

the nuisance value some claim for it, could become a bargaining chip in future discussions on a range of foreign policy and commercial interests. This, could of course, mean foresaking the station's operation over the longer term or changing its format.

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95/ Nichols. Statement to the House Committee on Appropriations. April 21, 1982. p. 3.

The long run benefits could outweigh short term problems which have been anticipated by some, such as a lack of news material and the possibility of initially broadcasting programming that might not appeal to Cuban listeners. Also in the long run, Radio Marti could conceivably become the same kind of center for scholarly research on Cuba as is RFE/RL in respect to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This could greatly expand the amount of public knowledge on Cuba and in the longer term enhance the receptivity of the Cuban audience to Radio Marti's programming.

In the long run if the station does gain a large audience who regard it as a credible and nationalistic voice, it could influence the Cuban government in gradual, non-dramatic ways in the years following Castro's demise. In that period, the government may be viewed more critically by many Cubans now favorably disposed toward Havana more on account of Castro's personal appeal than for the system he has created.

### 4. Ambiguous Consequence

The greater accountability of the Cuban government to its people which the Reagan Administration hopes to achieve with Radio Marti may in the end strengthen Castro's revolutionary system. If Cuba's top leadership would like greater accountability at the lower levels and Radio Marti dealt with problems that occur because of lower level mistakes and concealment, this could aid the Cuban government. This may, or may not, be in the U.S. interest.

## H. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO RADIO MARTI

Whether the Administration's stated purpose for Radio Marti is feasible depends on the evaluation of largely subjective material. Even if feasible, the potential political costs of Radio Marti might outweigh the benefits. And there may be other foreign policy instruments or foreign policy moves which might achieve the same results at a lesser financial and political cost.

One suggestion that has been advanced is to change the charter of the VOA, if necessary, to allow the broadcast or this type of information to Cuba, or simply to expand VOA coverage of Cuba under the current charter. Some feel that this is not the VOA mission. Others feel that a service funded by the U.S. and directed specifically at one country could appear as propagandistic, thus further discrediting the content of the other U.S. funded service, VOA, which the Cubans already receive. 96/ Still others see no reason that VOA could not achieve the objectives of Radio Marti with greater credibility and lesser cost. 97/ Another possibility was suggested six years ago by a journalist:

> Perhaps the only way the Cuban press could change would be in the context of improved relations with the United States. Bureaus (of U.S. international news agencies) could reopen in Havana. Cuban journalists could study journalism here, and Cuban newspapers could timidly assert their function as providers of information. 98/

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96/ Morgan, Ted. The press in Cuba. Columbia Journalism Review. March-April 1975. p. 16.

97/ Nichols. Statement to House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance. May 10, 1982. p. 8.

98/ LeoGrande, Statement to House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 4, 1982. p. 6.

## V. TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO RADIO MARTI 99/

### A. INTRODUCTION

Radio Marti, as proposed by the Reagan Administration, will operate on 1040 kilohertz (kHz), a frequency within the band assigned to AM radio. Long before the advent of the Radio Marti debate, a number of issues concerning AM radio had arisen because of interference between Cuban and American radio stations and the announcement by the Cubans of their intentions to significantly increase both the number of AM radio stations they have on the air and the power at which those stations operate.

AM radio allocations are subject to international agreements established through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 100/ and regional agreements such as the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA). Bi-lateral attempts to work out a solution with Cuba were underway prior to the second session of the ITU's Regional Administrative Radio Conference on Medium Frequency (MF) Broadcasting held in November/December 1981 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil ("the Rio conference"). The Cubans walked out of that meeting without signing its final acts, partially because of Radio Marti. The Cubans also have withdrawn from the NARBA treaty. As a result, Cuba is no longer bound by any international agreements regarding AM radio broadcasts, other than the basic tenets of the ITU charter which provide that members not cause harmful interference to each other's radio services.

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99/ Prepared by Marcia S. Smith, Specialist in Aerospace and Energy Systems, Science Policy Research Division.

100/ The ITU is a specialized agency of the United Nations with responsibility for allocating radio frequencies for all uses throughout the world.

The relationship between Radio Marti and Cuban interference is a matter of intense debate. One point of view is that the Cubans have already demonstrated their indifference regarding their interference with U.S. stations, and Radio Marti will not make the situation any worse. Others argue that Radio Marti will aggrevate the problem, especially if the Cubans decide to counter-broadcast on the 1040 kHz frequency, which Castro has indicated he may do.

## B. THE CUBAN INTERFERENCE PROBLEM

Until recently, Cuba was a signatory to the NARBA treaty which was established to minimize interference and promote the orderly use of the AM radio band in North America. Cuba and the United States signed the agreement (together with Canada, the Dominican Republic, and the Bahama Islands) in 1959. 101/ Despite its status as a treaty signatory, however, Cuba has not abided by the terms of the treaty. Exactly when Cuba began ignoring NARBA is uncertain. Some claim that Castro never really abided by the terms of the treaty (which had been signed by the Battista government), while others say that it has only been in the past two or three years that the interference has become a significant problem. In addition to unintentional interference, Cuba has been deliberately jamming a Miami, Florida station (WQBA) for 13 years which broadcasts in Spanish and can be heard in Cuba. Radio Havana also broadcasts Radio Moscow at power levels not permitted under NARBA, and it has been heard as far away as Connecticut. 102/

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101/ The United States and Mexico have a separate agreement.

102/ The details of Cuban interference, intentional and unintentional, have been extensively discussed in several sets of congressional hearings over (continued)

In 1980, Cuba gave the required one year's notice of its intent to withdraw from NARBA, an action that took effect November 1981.

In a few cases, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has allowed U.S. stations to increase their power to counteract the interference, but such actions must be taken cautiously to avoid interference with other U.S. or foreign stations (primarily in Mexico, Canada and the Caribbean) operating in accordance with international agreements.

## C. CUBAN INTENTIONS TO INCREASE THE NUMBER AND POWER OF AM RADIO STATIONS

In December 1979, as part of its preparations for the two-session ITU MF broadcasting conference, Cuba submitted a list of operating and planned AM radio stations to the ITU. Under the NARBA agreement, Cuba could operate as many as 174 AM stations, although only about 75-80 were on the air at that time. The new plan listed 188 stations, not a substantial change from the existing allotment, but more than double the number of stations actually on the air. Also, the power levels at which the stations would operate had increased substantially. Two stations were listed at 500 kilowatts (kw), compared to the most powerful U.S. AM radio stations which operate at 50 kw. Aggrevating the problem is that Cuba does not use directional antennas, so interference is much greater.

A study by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) specifies over 200 radio stations in 34 States plus the District of Columbia which would experience interference from Cuban stations if the plan is put into effect

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(continued) the past year. See the hearings before: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Operations (June 1981 and Mar. 1982); House Committee on Government Affairs, Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights (Oct. 1981); and House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications (May 1982).

(see appendix III). In particular, the two 500 kw stations, operating on 1040 kHz and 1160 kHz as indicated by the Cubans, would reduce the service area of two U.S. "clear channel" stations on those frequencies 103/ from 1,714,337 square miles to 5,926 square miles in the first case, and from 1,406,910.5 square miles to 9,439.2 square miles in the second. 104/

Whether Cuba actually intends to implement all these changes is questionable. One factor weighing against such plans is the amount of electricity which would be required for these stations. According to Michael Rau of the National Association of Broadcasters, the input power for a radio station is approximately twice that of the output. 105/ Thus, one 500 kw radio station would require 1,000 kw of electric power for operation. The proposed and operating radio stations listed by the Cubans would require a total of 5.4 megawatts (see appendix IV).

## D. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The first session of the ITU conference on MF broadcasting was held in March 1980 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Between that meeting and the second

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103/ WHO, Des Moines, Iowa, and KSL, Salt Lake City, Utah, respectively. Clear channel stations have special characteristics (including 50 kw of power) to provide service to rural areas without local radio stations. They are protected from interference in the NARBA treaty such that they have service areas of at least 750 miles.

104/ National Association of Broadcasters. Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcasting Stations. Washington, NAB, Mar. 1, 1982.

105/ Private communication, June 3, 1982.

session in November 1981, the United States assessed potential solutions to some of the problems created by the proposed Cuban plan.

Two potential solutions were discussed: the first was to reduce channel spacing between adjacent AM radio stations from 10 kHz to 9 kHz, thereby increasing the number of available stations for all countries in Region 2 106/; the second was to provide technical assistance to Cuba to allow them to construct and use directional antennas.

### 1. The 9 Kilohertz Solution

Apart from the question of Cuban interference, some groups in the United States (particularly the Daytime Broadcasters Association) supported a change to 9 kHz spacing to increase the number of stations available to U.S. broadcasters. Regions 1 and 3 had adopted 9 kHz spacing in 1975, and it was also argued that Region 2 systems should be made compatible with the rest of the world.

In December 1979, the FCC voted in favor of 9 kHz spacing, and at the first session of the ITU MF broadcasting conference, the U.S. delegation proposed the change to 9 kHz spacing to the other countries in Region 2. The conference decided that further study was needed, and a final vote was postponed until the next year.

At hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International Operations on June 4, 1981, James Buckley, Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology stated that Cuba

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106/ The ITU divides the world into three regions: Region 1 is Europe, Africa, and the Soviet Union (including Mongolia); Region 2 is North and South America; Region 3 is Asia and the South Pacific.

considered 9 kHz spacing "essential to the resolution of Cuban-United States interferences." 107/ Nevertheless, on August 4, 1981, responding to concerns expressed by existing radio broadcasters about the costs involved in changing frequencies, the FCC reversed its decision and decided to retain 10 kHz spacing. In so deciding, the Commissioners reportedly felt that the Cuban interference problem would exist regardless of the channel spacing question. 108/

## 2. Bi-Lateral Technical Assistance

Another option considered by the United States for solving the Cuban interference problem was to assist them in building directional antennas. At the June 1981 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings, Undersecretary Buckley reported that the State Department and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had held several meetings with Cuban officials "to urge Cuba to adjust its present operations and modify its list of requirements for the regional plan." 109/ According to Buckley, the Cuban government informed the U.S. representatives that it had no plans to begin using directional antennas because of the expense and land area required (which they feared would reduce available farm and grazing land).

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107/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Operations. Region 2 Administrative Radio Conference on Medium Wave Frequency (MWF) Broadcasting. Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. June 4 and 10, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. p. 5.

108/ Radio Back to Status Quo at 10 kHz. Broadcasting, Aug. 10, 1981: 29.

109/ House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings, June 1981, op. cit., p. 5

U.S. experts hoped to convince Cuban officials that the land could be used simultaneously for antennas and farming/grazing, and that with directional antennas, fewer stations would be required to serve the island, balancing the costs of the directional antennas. 110/

Bi-lateral talks were held in April and August 1981. The second set, from August 24-28, took place shortly after the FCC decision to retain 10 kHz spacing. During these talks, the Cubans first indicated that they were considering operating their two planned 500 kw stations at 1040 MHz and 1160 MHz (although a formal notification was not made until the Rio conference), frequencies on which two U.S. clear channel stations broadcast. Also during this time, the first press reports of U.S. plans for Radio Marti were published.

Despite these potentially damaging factors, Kalmann Schaefer of the FCC reportedly expressed optimism that technical solutions could be found to the U.S./Cuban interference problems. 111/ U.S. experts participating in a related meeting in Geneva in June 1981 had also expressed the feeling that the Cubans were anxious to work out technical solutions to the interference problem. 112/

This optimism began to dissipate as the Rio conference neared, and some U.S. experts were reportedly dismayed about the timing of the Radio Marti

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110/ Frank, Harold A. Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, ibid., pp. 39-40.

111/ U.S.-Cuba Hold AM Interference Discussions. Broadcasting, Aug. 31, 1981: 27.

112/ Ray of Hope From 9 kHz Meeting. Broadcasting, July 13, 1981: 25. At this meeting, the Cubans reduced their number of planned stations from 188 to 182, apparently because of interference that the 6 stations would have caused with other Cuban stations.

announcement, although the FCC's Schaefer, who later chaired the U.S. delegation to the Rio conference, was quoted as saying that he was not certain that Radio Marti would be a problem. 113/

## E. THE RIO CONFERENCE AND THE IMPACT OF RADIO MARTI

The second session of the ITU conference on MF broadcasting was held from November 9 to December 19, 1981. During the initial weeks of the conference, it was reported that relations between the U.S. and Cuban delegations were "friendly" and Radio Marti had not arisen as an issue. 114/

Following the U.S. reversal of support for 9 kHz spacing, the conference decided to retain 10 kHz spacing for AM radio. The U.S. delegation was also successful in obtaining places in the Region 2 radio plan for the Voice of America's Radio Marathon station (which has been operating since 1962 on 1180 kHz) and for Radio Marti at 1040 kHz. Then the Cubans announced 48 unilateral changes that it wanted to make in its inventory (including the two 500 kw stations). Some of these would have adversely impacted U.S. stations, and the U.S. delegation successfully argued against the Cuban proposal and it was rejected.

In the last week of the conference, the Cuban delegation walked out, denouncing the United States because of the plans for Radio Marti, U.S operation of Radio Marathon (which the Cubans termed "illegal"), and the successful U.S. effort to prevent Cuba from making those 48 changes. In their final comments

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113/ AM Future on the Table in Rio. Broadcasting, Nov. 9, 1981: 44.

114/ Western Hemisphere Votes to Stick with 10 kHz in AM. Broacasting, Nov. 16, 1981: 27.

as they left the meeting, the Cubans quoted from an October statement by Castro stating that Radio Marti "would be bound to meet with a response." (See appendix V for the full text of the Cuban statement and the U.S. response.)

The U.S. delegation was reportedly surprised at the Cuban move, since neither Radio Marti nor Radio Marathon had arisen previously as issues. The Cubans claimed that they had three meetings with U.S. delegates at which the U.S. demonstrated no interest in eliminating or limiting Radio Marathon broadcasts; the U.S. delegates at the conference were quoted as saying that the issue was never raised. 115/ (Schaefer of the FCC has subsequently commented that the United States had made it clear from the beginning that Radio Marathon was non-negotiable.) 116/

## F. CURRENT STATUS

As a result of the walkout and its withdrawal from NARBA, Cuba is no longer bound by any AM broadcasting agreement, and can operate in whatever manner it chooses; at the same time, however, other countries are not required to protect Cuban radio stations from interference. Cuba has notified the ITU that it intends to make the 48 unilateral changes which were blocked by the United States at Rio. 117/

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115/ Cuban Walkout Finishes Off Hope of AM Conference Success in Rio. Broadcasting, Dec. 21, 1981: 30.

116/ Private communication, June 3, 1982.

117/ The Lingering Cuban Problem. Broadcasting, January 25, 1982: 84.

## 1. Interference

The Cubans apparently began implementing some of the changes included in the December 1979 plan during 1980 and 1981, but more changes have occurred since the Rio conference. The clear channel station operating at 1160 kHz (KSL, Salt Lake City) has begun experiencing measurable interference from a Cuban station. In hearings before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, a KSL representative reported that they became aware of a Cuban station operating on 1160 kHz in November 1981, and KSL found that its nighttime service signal "was being eliminated in virtually all of the KSL service area . . . . Its engineers found, for instance, that the Cuban station on 1160 kHz was being heard clearly and effectively in a southern California area at a signal strength approximately 50 percent of that furnished by KSL in the same area." The station's representative stated that KSL "believed" the Cuban station was "using power of at least 500 kw" and KSL could lose 1,400,000 square miles of its service area. 118/ According to FCC calculations, however, the power level of the Cuban station is only 75 kw. 119/

## 2. Bi-Lateral Negotiations

No bi-lateral negotiations have been held with Cuba since the Rio conference, and the future of such negotiations is in doubt. The one factor in favor of resuming negotiations is that Cuban stations apparently suffer

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118/ Wilkinson, Glen A. Testimony to House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finances. May 10,1982. Prepared statement (unpublished), pp. 3-4.

119/ Kalmann Schaefer, FCC, private communication, June 3, 1982.

interference from U.S. stations too, so that if Cuba wants to have better reception within its own borders, it will have to work out a compromise with the United States. The FCC's Schaefer has succinctly stated, "The ball is in Cuba's court." 120/

## G. ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF RADIO MATRI

Radio Marti may create difficulties for U.S. broadcasters in the sense that it might make the Cubans more likely to cause interference, particularly with the 1040 kHz frequency on which Radio Marti will operate, and on which radio station WHO, Des Moines, Iowa, already broadcasts. The State Department is convinced that it can avoid interference between Radio Marti and WHO by using directional antennas (aimed toward Cuba). The State Department also has testified to Congress that it is confident that if the Cubans jam Radio Marti, they will do it within Cuba by jamming the receivers, not by attempting to jam the transmitter, and therefore WHO will not be affected by jamming. 121/ The problem, then, will probably occur only if Cuba decides to counterbroadcast on that frequency. As noted earlier, the Cubans informally told the United States in August 1981, prior to the decision on what frequency Radio Marti would broadcast, that it would place one of its 500 kw stations on 1040 kHz.

Three issues concerning the technical aspects of the Radio Marti debate are: (a) when and why the 1040 kHz frequency was chosen; (b) what other

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120/ Politics the Stumbling Block in Rio. Broadcasting, Jan. 4, 1982: 34.

121/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and States, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983. Hearings. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Part 6. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print., Off., 1982. pp. 565-6.

options were considered for the task for broadcasting into Cuba; (c) the merits of technical modifications to U.S. radio stations versus a political solution.

### 1. The Choice of 1040 kHz for Radio Marti

According to the State Department, 1040 kHz was selected as the frequency for Radio Marti after consultation with the FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) because it would cause the least interference to other radio stations in the area. The question has arisen, though, as to whether there was any relationship between the State Department's choice of 1040 kHz for Radio Marti and the Cubans' decision to use that frequency for one of its superstations.

The U.S. choice of 1040 kHz for Radio Marti was made in September 1981. Several weeks earlier, during the August bi-lateral meeting with the Cubans, they had informally indicated to U.S. representatives that 1040 kHz was under consideration for one of their superstations, but a formal notification to that effect was not made until November (at the Rio conference). Thus, the United States knew unofficially that a Cuban superstation on 1040 kHz was a possibility, but an FCC representative has pointed out that at the time of the August meeting, the Cubans were also considering placing the superstations on clear channels operated by the Canadians, so the 1040 kHz reference was not considered final. 122/

The United States would not benefit by having a high-powered Cuban station counterbroadcasting on the Radio Marti frequency, so it seems unlikely that

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122/ Based on conversations with representatives of the State Department and the Federal Communications Commission, May 1982.

the State Department deliberately made such a decision. Whether the Radio Marti situation played a role in the final Cuban decision to place a superstation on 1040 kHz is unclear.

## 2. Alternatives to 1040 kHz

Opponents of broadcasting Radio Marti on 1040 kHz have listed several alternatives. The first would be to broadcast in the AM band, but on frequencies above or below 535 kHz and 1605 kHz. These frequencies are not used by commercial AM radio stations, so would not suffer from any counterbroadcasting that the Cubans might initiate. The argument against using these frequencies is that most radio sets are not designed to receive them, since there are no commercial AM stations in those bands.

Another option would be to lease broadcast time on a variety of different AM and/or FM frequencies to make it more difficult for Cuba to jam or counterbroadcast a single frequency. The disadvantage here is that the listener would not know where to tune in the program would have to turn the dial to find it.

A third option is to use the existing Radio Marathon facilities which are operated by the Voice of America. The problem in this instance is that VOA's charter does not permit the type of programming planned for Radio Marti. VOA broadcasts news about American society and American interests in general, rather than news about the internal affairs of a specific country, and either VOA's charter or the planned programming for Radio Marti would have to be changed to make the two compatible.

A fourth option is to broadcast in the shortwave (high frequency) band. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which are similar to Radio Marti in purpose, broadcast on shortwave frequencies. According to the Administration, this is not desirable because few Cubans own shortwave receivers. Shortwave signals are more difficult to jam, however.

### 3. Technical Versus Political Solutions

In reporting out its version of the bill authorizing Radio Marti on April 2, 1982, the House Foreign Affairs Committee included language providing for reimbursement by the Government of costs incurred by U.S. stations for technical modifications to circumvent existing and future Cuban interference. 123/ Technical remedies would include building higher transmitting towers and increasing the power of the radio station, but these actions must be taken carefully to prevent interference with other legally operating radio stations.

The NAB has responded that technical solutions are inadequate because the affected stations would not be able to fully recover their service area, the technical modifications would be time-consuming, and that even after the modifications were made, a minor change in Cuban operations could counteract them. 124/ NAB's President, Vincent Wasilewski, stated that: "the Cuban interference problem changes daily . . . the Cubans seldom operate the same station at the same power level on the same frequency for very long. It takes nothing more than a turn of a screw in Cuba to give U.S. broadcasters a whole new set of interference problems." 125/ While supporting the concept of

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123/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act; report to accompany H.R. 5427. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Apr. 2, 1982. H. Rept. 97-479, Part I. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.

124/ Cuban Interference: Treating Symptoms and Not the Disease. Broadcasting, Apr. 12, 1982: 45.

125/ Prepared statement, House Foreign Affairs hearings, Mar. 4, 1982. Unpublished, p. 6.

financial assistance to affected stations, the NAB stressed that it does not consider such steps a "substitute for a lasting diplomatic resolution of the Cuban interference problem." 126/

Robert Englehardt, representing radio station WHO, commented that "compensation . . . is at best an expensive stop gap measure which would obligate the government to expend tens of millions of dollars to offset a constantly changing Cuban interference pattern." 127/ Glen Wilkinson, representing KSL, added that "we think there should be a continuation, through our State Department . . . to find some means of reaching an agreement whereby both countries could operate a reasonable number of AM stations and do so without continuing the chaotic situation which now prevails and which may deteriorate more." 128/

## H. THE LINK BETWEEN CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE AND RADIO MARTI

Opinion is divided as to whether the Cubans will cause more interference specifically in retaliation for Radio Marti, or if they would create more interference in any case, but will use Radio Marti as a scape-goat for it. A third possibility is sometimes mentioned that Radio Marti may become a useful bargaining element in reducing Cuban interference. Those who adopt the latter stance note that there has been interference from Cuban stations for many years, and the announcement of Cuban intentions to increase the number and power of their AM radio stations pre-dated the Radio Marti affair by almost

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126/ Summers, John. Prepared statement, House Energy and Commerce Committee, May 10, 1982. Unpublished, p. 8.

127/ Prepared statement, House Energy and Commerce hearings, May 10, 1982. Unpublished, p. 16.

128/ Prepared statement, House Energy and Commerce hearings, May 10, 1982 Unpublished, p. 6.

two years. Those who support the former point of view contend that regardless of what has happened in the past, Radio Marti will give the Cubans a rationale for increasing radio interference.

The following excerpts from congressional hearings illustrate the range of views on the link between Radio Marti and Cuban interference.

### 1. Little or No Linkage

At hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International Operations in March 1982, Congressman Dante Fascell, chairman of the subcommittee, termed Radio Marti "an irrelevancy" in connection with interference problems. 129/ The South Florida Broadcasters Association, representing all radio broadcasters in Dade and Broward counties in Florida (many of which already suffer interference from Cuban stations), have adopted a resolution supporting Radio Marti. A representative of the association, Herbert Levin, stated that "While we recognize that Radio Marti and Cuban radio interference are interrelated to some aspects, we do not support this argument [that Radio Marti will worsen the problem]." 130/

At hearings before the House Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance on May 10, 1982, the FCC's Schaefer termed the relationship between Radio Marti and interference

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129/ Quoted in: Will Radio Marti Worsen the Cuban Interference Problem? Broadcasting, Mar. 15, 1982: 134-135.

130/ Prepared statement, House Foreign Affairs hearings, Mar. 3, 1982. Unpublished, p. 2.

"conjectural," while Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders called the two issues "separate and distinct." 131/

### 2. Moderate Linkage

David Hilliard, counsel for the Clear Channel Broadcasting Service, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Radio Marti "has the potential for making a bad situation worse." 132/ John Summers, Executive Vice President and General Manager of the NAB, called Radio Marti "another variable in the difficult situation that AM broadcasters face as a result of our relationship with the Cuban government." He cautioned against seeing Radio Marti "as a miracle bargaining chip that can be traded for the solution to our interference problem" or using it "as a smoke screen to mask the full history and complexity of the Cuban interference problem." 133/

### 3. Strong Linkage

At the House Energy and Commerce Committee hearings in May 1981, two witnesses argued that the relationship was very strong. John S. Nichols, Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at Pennsylvania State University's School of Journalism stated that "Radio Marti is likely to

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131/ Prepared statements, House Energy and Commerce hearings, May 10, 1982. Unpublished. Schaefer, p. 4; Enders, p. 1.

132/ Prepared statement, House Foreign Affairs hearings, Mar. 3, 1982, op.cit.

133/ Prepared statement, House Energy and Commerce hearings, May 10, 1982. Unpublished, p. 6.

initiate a radio war with Cuba that will disrupt U.S. domestic broadcasting." Robert G. Engelhardt, Vice President of Palmer Communications Inc, the licensee for WHO, claimed that "Radio Marti will poison any chance of resolving the interference problems resulting from Cuba's AM radio operations." 134/

Although he had previously termed the problems of interference and Radio Marti "separate and distinct," Assistant Secretary of State Enders later added that "the stage seems set for counterbroadcasting rather than jamming." 135/

### 4. April 4, 1982 Castro Statement on Radio Marti

On April 4, 1982, Fidel Castro made the following remarks about Radio Marti to the Fourth Congress of the Union of Young Communists in Havana.

> They [the United States] also spoke of subversion. There was talk of some radio station, which would even bear the name of Marti. Well, we are still waiting for that station. They have left us eager, and a little disappointed, like a boxer who arrives at the ring and finds that his opponent is not there.
>
> I don't know if they intended to scare us with their station. The fact is that it is still pending. We do not know if they are going to establish it or not. It would be best if they did not. But we are boxers, let's not forget that. In principle we want peace, but as a sport we prefer boxing. If we were to have a dispute with them, they with their subversive station and we with our replies -- well, logically it would be better if the match does not take place. It would be more peaceful. However, we are preparing outstanding replies to their subversive radio. 136/

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134/ Prepared statements, House Energy and Commerce Committee, May 10, 1982. Unpublished. Nichols, p. 1; Englehardt, p. 8.

135/ Op. cit., p. 11.

136/ Havana Domestic Service in Spanish, 2206 GMT, Apr. 4, 1982.

## I. Conclusion

The history of Cuban radio interference with U.S. radio stations substantially pre-dates the U.S. announcement to establish Radio Marti. The Cubans apparently have already begun broadcasting on one of the two frequencies (1160 kHz) on which they plan a superstation, although it is unclear as to whether they are using 500 kw of power. Substantial inteference has been noted by KSL, the U.S. clear channel station operating on that frequency.

Financial compensation for technical modifications to stations that suffer interference from Cuban stations appears at best to be a temporary solution, since the Cubans could easily change the frequencies and power levels on which they are operating, negating the effect of those technical changes.

The Cuban interference problem probably will not be resolved in a technical setting--rather, it is a political issue. Even if Radio Marti is not put on the air, interference problems seem likely to continue. To the extent that Radio Marti muddies the political climate between the United States and Cuba, however, it seems likely to aggrevate the interference problem, at least in the short term, especially in light of statements by Fidel Castro clearly implying that Radio Marti would elicit such a response.

## VI. LEGAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING RADIO REGULATION APPLICABLE TO THE PROPOSED RADIO MARTI AND TO THE CUBAN - UNITED STATES AM BROADCAST DISPUTE [137]

### A. INTRODUCTION

Radio broadcasting in the AM radio band is regulated on three tiers: worldwide, regional, and domestic. The ultimate goal of all radio regulation is the avoidance of harmful interference among stations. This section examines the international treaty and domestic statutory law applicable to Radio Marti and to the competing interests of Cuba and the United States in use of the AM radio frequencies.

From the first days of radio communications it has been apparent to all that effective use of the radio medium directly depends upon there existing only one receivable signal per bandwidth. Simultaneous reception of two or more signals results in interference that measurably reduces the range and value of the communication.

International and domestic regulation of the airwaves both originated for the purpose of avoiding interference. Regulation was, and is, compelled by basic scientific limitations upon the number, location, power, and wavelength of stations that are able to transmit on the airwaves without each harmfully interfering with the communications of the others.

International regulation preceded domestic regulation. The first international radio conference was held in Berlin in 1903, and directly lead to the 1906 conference at which the first international law was adopted -- the Berlin Wireless Telegraph Convention. (The United States did not ratify the treaty until April 3, 1912, on the

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137/ Prepared by David R. Siddall, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division.

eve of the next radio conference.)[138] Among the provisions to prevent interference between stations was the requirement that operating information be compiled and exchanged by means of the International Telegraph Bureau at Berne, Switzerland. This procedure is the predecessor to current international regulation, which depends upon the maintenance of master frequency lists which are determinative of internationally-recognized rights.

### B. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Worldwide regulation is governed by the International Telecommunication Convention and Annexed Radio Regulations (1959 Geneva Convention).[139] This treaty allocates the radio spectrum among the various services and provides basic registration mechanisms for the purpose of preventing or alleviating interference between stations.

The 1959 Geneva Convention provides that members may make separate agreements governing the assignment of frequencies to, *inter alia*, their broadcast stations which operate in the AM band, provided that 1) all affected ITU members are invited to the conference; 2) no part of any agreement conflicts with the provisions of the 1959 Geneva Convention; and 3) the ITU Secretary General is notified in advance of the conference and is informed of any resulting agreement.[140]

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[138] 37 Stat. 1565 (1912). Events surrounding this treaty and early international communications law are set out in Dill, *Radio Law* 9, 27 (1938) and Davis, *The Law of Radio Communication* 175 (1927).

[139] 12 UST 1761. A new convention was negotiated in 1979 and is pending before the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification. It would not substantially alter the broad regulatory scheme of the 1959 Geneva Convention that presently governs insofar as this basic discussion in concerned. *See*, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 97-21, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

[140] 1959 Geneva Convention, *supra* note , Radio Regulations Nos. 119, 121.

In accordance with these provisions the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA) was concluded to provide for coordinated frequency assignments in the AM broadcasting band among the North American countries. The multilateral treaty defines classes of AM band stations, establishes channels, and allots the frequency channels for use of the participating countries.[141] The United States and Cuba are original contracting parties to the NARBA agreement, but in November, 1980, Cuba exercised its right to denounce the agreement. Under the terms of the treaty, Cuba's withdrawal became effective in November, 1981, one year after the instrument of denunciation was received by the designated goverment.[142]

Domestic communications regulation is carried out under the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.[143] The Communications Act established a bifurcation of communications responsibilities that is unique to the United States. The Act established the Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) as an independent regulatory agency with responsibility for regulating all non-Federal Government telecommunications.[144] Regulation of all Federal Government use of the spectrum is vested in the President.[145]

Subject to certain exceptions, the President has delegated authority to administer Federal Government uses of the radio spectrum to the

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[141] 11 UST 413, Nov. 15, 1950 (entered into force April 19, 1960).

[142] *Id*. at 431, part III, § I.3. *See* p. , *supra*. [p. 3 Smith chapt.]

[143] 47 U.S.C. §§151 *et seq*.

[144] 47 U.S.C. §§301, 303.

[145] 47 U.S.C. §305(a).

Secretary of Commerce.[146] This responsibility is exercised within the Commerce Department by the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), who is also the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information and principal advisor to the President for telecommunications. NTIA in turn relies for advice upon the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), which consists of representatives of the major Federal Government users of the radio spectrum. The F.C.C. maintains liaison with the IRAC to coordinate overall use of the frequencies.[147]

Functions which relate to the disposition of appeals from assignments of radio frequencies to stations of the United States Government have been separately delegated by the President to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.[148]

## C. APPLICABLE LEGAL PROVISIONS

The operation of any radio station in the United States, including one operating in the AM radio broadcast band, is governed by both treaty agreements and statutory provisions. The United States is party to two particular treaties which apply to transmissions in the AM radio band:

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[146] Exec. Order No. 12046, 43 Fed. Reg. 13349 (1978) as amended by Exec. Order No. 12148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (1979).

[147] The Administrator of the NTIA is the Chairperson of the IRAC. Agencies represented are Commerce, State, Health & Human Services, Justice, Interior, Treasury, Agriculture, Energy, Coast Guard and Federal Aviation Administration from the Department of Transportation, International Communication Agency, Veterans Administration, General Services Administration, National Science Foundation, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Army, Air Force, and Navy. Liaison with the F.C.C. is provided by a representative of that agency. *See* 47 Telecomm. J. 315 (June, 1980).

[148] Exec. Order No. 12046, *supra* note at §3-2.

the International Telecommunication Convention and Annexed Radio Regulations (1959 Geneva Convention)[149] and the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA).[150] Applicable domestic regulatory provisions are contained within the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.[151]

## 1. International Telecommunication Convention and Annexed Radio Regulations

The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a specialized agency of the United Nations. The main purposes of the Union, set out in article 4 of the 1959 Geneva Convention, are

> a) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds;
>
> b) to promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunication services, increasing their usefulness and making them, so far as possible, generally available to the public;
>
> c) to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of those common ends.
>
> [152]

In order to achieve these purposes the ITU, *inter alia*,

> a) effect[s] allocation of the radio frequency spectrum and registration of radio frequency assignments in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations of different countries; [and]
>
> b) coordinate[s] efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations of different countries and to improve the use made of radio frequency spectrum. . . . [153]

The principal mechanisms for carrying out these purposes is the registration of each member nation's use of particular frequencies. This task is performed by one of the four organizational departments of the ITU, the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). This board, consisting of five elected members, advises and assists countries in the effective use and registration of radio frequencies in accordance with the ITU Table of Frequency Allocations and the Convention's Annexed Radio Regulations.

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[149] 12 UST 1761.

[150] 11 UST 413.

[151] 47 U.S.C. §§151 *et seq*.

[152] 1959 Geneva Convention, *supra* note , art. 4.1.

[153] *Id*., art. 4.2

The IFRB-maintained international list of frequency assignments is at the very heart of international radio regulation. The IFRB checks each frequency which member nations intend to use to insure that it conforms to ITU regulations and that it will not create interference with other registered stations.

If the IFRB determines that the proposed use of a frequency complies with the international regulations and will not interfere with other stations, the proposed use of the frequency by the applicant country is placed upon the register. If the IFRB determination is unfavorable, it returns the notice to the applicant country for appropriate change(s). However, a country may return it to the IFRB without conformance to the IFRB's findings, and it may be placed within a separate category on the registration list. If after a specified period of operation no complaints of interference result, the use acquires a recognized status. Each station's registered use of frequencies is recognized by the other nations in accordance with the terms under which it is placed upon the register, and all later applicants are obligated to protect the use of the frequency by prior registrants.[154/]

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[154/] Id., art. 13. See Annexed Radio Regulations, art. 9.

The Convention provides that all stations must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause interference to stations which operate in accordance with the Annexed Radio Regulations.[155] Settlement of disputes on questions relating to the Convention or to the Annexed Radio Regulations is encouraged "through diplomatic channels, or according to procedures established by bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between them for the settlement of international disputes, or by any other method agreed upon."[156]

The Annexed Radio Regulations Numbers 704 through 721 provide specific procedures to be utilized in attempts to solve interference problems, set out in appendix VI. In essence, the first step is for the receiving station to give to the transmitting station interfered with all possible information which may assist in determing the origin and characteristics of the interference. Once the source and characteristics of the interference have been determined, the nation of the station being interfered with may inform the nation of the interfering station of the problem in order that steps may be taken to eliminate the objectionable interference.

If the interference persists in spite of such actions, a report of infringement of the Convention or Annexed Radio Regulations may be addressed to the nation in which the station causing the interference is located, and that nation is responsible for taking any necessary action. If considered necessary, and these steps do not produce satisfactory results, the nation concerned may forward details of the case to the IFRB for its information.

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[155] Id. art. 46; see also Annexed Radio Regulations, art. 3.

[156] Id. art. 28; see also Annex 3 to the Convention concerning Arbitration.

In most instances the nation concerned may also request the IFRB to conduct a study of such interference and to make a report thereon containing its findings and recommendations for solution of the problem. However, the IFRB may not be required to deal with problems of harmful interference between Western Hemisphere stations operating in the AM radio band. "Such cases of interference shall be resolved by appropriate bilateral or multilateral arrangements".[157]

It is particularly noteworthy, in regard to both Radio Marti's proposed operation and to the operation of Cuban stations with high power, that Annexed Radio Regulation No. 423 explicitly sets forth the principle that the AM radio band is to be utilized for broadcasting only to one's own country.

> In principle, broadcasting stations [in the AM band] shall not employ power exceeding that necessary to maintain economically an effective national service of good quality within the frontiers of the country concerned.
> [158]

## 2. North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement

The North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, *supra*, provides for the coordination among its signatories of the frequency assignments in the AM broadcasting band. The United States also has bilateral treaties with certain countries on the same subject. As has been noted, however, Cuba exercised its option to withdraw from this treaty, effective in November, 1981. Therefore the relationship between Cuba and the United States in regards to broadcasting problems are presently governed by the 1959 Geneva Convention, *supra.*

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[157] *Id.*, Annexed Radio Regulation Nos. 704 - 721, set out in Appendix VI.

[158] Id., Annexed Radio Regulation No. 423.

3. Section 305(a) of the Communications Act

As noted supra, regulation of all Federal Government use of the spectrum is vested in the President by section 305(a) of the Communications Act.[159] The President has delegated his responsibilities under this provision as set out supra, page . In a case concerning interpretation of certain F.C.C. rules in regards to WHAM, Rochester, New York, and the Voice of America facility broadcasting to Cuba from Marathon, Florida, on the same frequency as WHAM, the authority of the Federal Government to provide for the Voice of America's operations on the AM radio broadcasting band under section 305(a) was unquestioned.[160]

One question which may be presented by the proposed operation of a "Radio Marti" is whether the station is or is not really a station that belongs to and is operated by the United States Government. Section 3 of H.R. 5427, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., as reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 97-479, Part I, delegates responsibility for operation of such a station to the Board for International Broadcasting.

S. 1853, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., however, appears to merely authorize support for an organization named "Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated." If this corporation is a private corporation, a question may be raised as to whether its broadcasting is in fact a Federal Government use of the frequency within the terms of section 305(a), and therefore governed by the President's authority rather than by the F.C.C. The principles to be applied, subject to final determination by the department or agency concerned after consultation with the F.C.C. and the NTIA, were developed by the IRAC and set forth by the F.C.C. in October, 1972, as follows:

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[159] 47 U.S.C. §305(a).

[160] Rust Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 379 F.2d 480 (D.C.Cir.1967).

> The following guidelines are to assist in the determination of whether or not a station belongs to and is operated by the United States as specified in Section 305(a) of the Communications Act of 1934:
>
> a. The department or agency concerned should be able to exercise effective control over the radio equipment and its operation; and
>
> b. The department or agency concerned assumes responsibility for contractor compliance with Executive Branch, departmental, or agency instructions and limitations regarding use of the equipment and ensures that such instructions and limitations are met when operating under the authority of an Executive Branch frequency authorization to the department or agency; and
>
> c. The station should be operated by an employee of the department or agency or by a person who operates under the control of the department or agency on a contractual or cooperative agreement basis, and who is under supervision of the department or agency sufficient to ensure that Executive Branch, departmental, or agency instructions and limitations are met.
>
> It is recognized that a Government agency may make a contract arrangement for maintenance or operation of a radio station under its control without diminishing the effective control of, or responsibility for, such station, provided the appropriate limitations or requirements are specified.
>
> Since the foregoing may not cover every case, or where there may be doubt, the determination will be made by the department or agency concerned after consultation with the OTP/FCC as appropriate.

161/

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161/ *In Re Request by Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy, Executive Office of the President*, 37 F.C.C.2d 872 (1972).

## D. CONCLUSION

This section set forth the international treaty and domestic statutory law applicable to both the proposed operations of Radio Marti and to the apparent conflict between Cuba and the United States regarding use of the AM radio broadcasting band.

By virtue of Cuba's having denounced the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, supra, relations between the two countries in regards to AM broadcast band operations are governed only by the 1959 Geneva Convention. (The 1979 treaty will apply upon its ratification by both countries, supra, but for purposes of this summary discussion provisions of the latter may be considered to be substantially similar to those of the former.) The focus of this Convention is the voluntary resolution of interference problems caused to and by stations of different nations. Its provisions for exchange of operating information prevent interference between stations which otherwise would lessen the utility of the radio spectrum to all nations. It is the basic scientific fact of radio propagation that radiowaves freely cross borders that has compelled an historically high level of international cooperation in radio spectrum regulatory matters.

Radio Regulation 423, attached to the Convention, explicitly sets forth the principle that the AM radio broadcasting band should be utilized exclusively for domestic purposes. Both a "Radio Marti" type operation and the use of transmitters in Cuba with ten times the power of that permitted anywhere in the United States on the AM band raise questions as to compliance with that principle. The preamble to the Convention explicitly recognizes the ultimate sovereignty of each nation to regulate its telecommunications. The dispute mechanisms of the Convention are ultimately dependent upon the cooperation of the nations involved.

This section has also examined the applicable provision of the Communications Act, which bifurcates radio spectrum responsibility between the F.C.C. for the non-Federal Government sector and the President for the Federal Government sector. Stations must be under the effective control of the United States government if they are to broadcase under the authority of the President instead of that of the F.C.C.

## APPENDIX I

## LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

### S. 1853

The bill authorizes appropriations for FY82 and FY83 for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated. It permits other funds to be granted if specified conditions are met as well as making the Secretary of State responsible for overseeing the funds authorized by this act until an appropriate oversight agency is designated. The bill also authorizes federal agencies to provide property for and to perform administrative and technical support and services for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, and for the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. It also authorizes the Secretary to accept donations on behalf of the Presidential Commission.

07/01/82. Hearings scheduled for S. 1853 in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

11/16/81. S. 1853 was read for a second time and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

11/16/81. Senator Percy, by request to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced S. 1853.

### H.R. 5427

The bill authorizes appropriations for FY82 and FY83 for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated. It permits other funds to be granted if specified conditions are met as well as making the Secretary of State responsible for overseeing the funds authorized by this act until an appropriate oversight agency is designated. The bill also authorizes federal agencies to provide property for and to perform administrative and technical support and services for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, and for the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. It also authorizes the Secretary to accept donations on behalf of the Presidential Commission.

06/14/82. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce granted an extension for further consideration ending not later than June 24, 1982.

05/20/82. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce granted an extension for further consideration ending not later than June 11, 1982.

05/20/82. H.R. 5427 considered by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance. Mark-up session held. H.R. 5427 then referred to full Committee on Energy and Commerce. Amendment: To prohibit Radio Marti from operating on non-governmental frequencies or from operating within 10 KH of such frequencies. This would effectively limit Radio Marti to short wave transmissions. Passed by vote of 12 to 2.

05/13/82. Executive comment on H.R. 5427 received from the State Department.

04/07/82. H.R. 5427 referred to Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance.

04/02/82. H.R. 5427 referred to House Committee on Energy and Commerce for a period ending not later than May 20, 1982.

04/02/82. H.R. 5427 reported to the House by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Report no. 97-479. (part 1)

03/24/82. H.R. 5427 ordered to be reported with amendment:

> Contained in Section 5- Amendment to the International Broadcasting Act of 1973. "Section 11. In order to assist the Board in carrying out the purposes set forth in section 2 of this act, any agency or instrumentality of the U.S. may sell, loan, lease, or grant property (including interests therein) and may perform administrative and technical support and services at the request of the Board...." Further Amended: "Section 12 (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State should seek prompt and full settlement of U.S. claims against the Government of Cuba arising from Cuban interference with broadcasting in the U.S. Pending the settlement of these claims, it is appropriate to provide some interim assistance for United States broadcasters adversly affected by Cuban interference.
>
> "(b) Accordingly, the Board is authorized to make payments to the United States radio and television broadcasting station licenses to compensate them for expenses which they incur in mitigating the effects of activities by the Government of Cuba which interfere with the transmission or reception of broadcasts of those licenses.
>
> "(c) The Board may issue such regulations and establish such procedures for carrying out this section as the Board finds appropriate."
>
> It is the sense of the Congress that the President should establish a task force to analyze the level of interference from the operation of Cuban radio stations experienced by broadcasters in the United States and to seek a practical political and technical solution to this problem.
>
> Amend the title so as to read; "A bill to provide for the broadcasting of accurate information to the people of Cuba, and for other purposes."

03/24/82. House Foreign Affairs Committee consideration and mark-up session held for H.R. 5427.

03/03/82 to 03/04/82. Committee hearings held.

02/02/82. Representative Zablocki, by request to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced H.R. 5427.

APPENDIX II

## CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

## COST ESTIMATE

April 1, 1982

1. BILL NUMBER: H.R. 5427

2. BILL TITLE:

Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act

3. BILL STATUS:

As ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on March 24, 1982.

4. BILL PURPOSE:

This legislation authorizes the appropriation of $10 million in fiscal year 1982 and $7.7 million in fiscal year 1983 for radio broadcasting to Cuba, and authorizes the payment to United States radio and television broadcasting station licenses to compensate them for expenses which they incur in mitigating the effects of activities by the Government of Cuba which interfere with the transmission or reception of the broadcasts of those licenses.

5. COST ESTIMATE:

(by fiscal years, in millions of dollars)

| Budget Function 150 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Authorization Level | 10.0 | 7.7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Estimated Outlays | 9.0 | 8.2 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 |

6. BASIS OF ESTIMATE:

This estimate assumes enactment of this legislation and subsequent appropriation of the authorized amounts for fiscal year 1982 by June 15, 1982. Estimated outlays were taken from the President's January budget.

Section 6 of the bill amends the Board for International Broadcasting Act with a new sense of the Congress section directing the Secretary of State to seek a settlement of claims against the Government of Cuba arising from Cuban interference with broadcasting in the United States and authorizing the Board to make payments to U.S. radio and television broadcasters to compensate them for expenses which they incur in mitigating interferences with the transmission or reception of these broadcasts. The language is permissive and open ended. In testimony given by the National Association of Broadcasters, over 200 AM radio stations in 32 states are threatened by Cuban radio interference. With an estimated cost of $100-200 thousand per station such payments could exceed $40 million for improvements in facilities alone. Any payments would require additional authorization and appropriations language.

7. ESTIMATE COMPARISON:

Authorization levels and estimated outlays are the same as the Administrations. The Administration has provided no estimate on the potential costs of section 6.

8. PREVIOUS CBO ESTIMATE: None

9. ESTIMATE PREPARED BY: Joe Whitehill (226-2840)

10. ESTIMATE APPROVED BY:

C.G. Nuckols
for James Blum
Assistant Director
for Budget Analysis

## APPENDIX III

### States Affected by Proposed Cuban Interference

Alabama
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
District of Columbia

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Source: Complied from: National Association of Broadcasters. Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcasting Stations. Washington, NAB, Mar. 1, 1982.

## APPENDIX IV

### Electric Power Requirements of Cuban Radio Stations*

| Number of Stations | Power Level (kilowatts) | Total Power Output (kilowatts) | Required Power Input (kilowatts) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 500.00 | 1,000.00 | 2,000.0 |
| 1 | 200.00 | 200.00 | 400.0 |
| 2 | 150.00 | 300.00 | 600.0 |
| 2 | 75.00 | 150.00 | 300.0 |
| 3 | 50.00 | 150.00 | 300.0 |
| 11 | 30.00 | 330.00 | 660.0 |
| 45 | 10.00 | 450.00 | 900.0 |
| 6 | 5.00 | 30.00 | 60.0 |
| 90 | 1.00 | 90.00 | 180.0 |
| 3 | 0.50 | 1.50 | 3.0 |
| 17 | 0.25 | 4.25 | 9.5 |
| 182 stations | | 2,705.75 | 5,411.5 |

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* Prepared by Marcia S. Smith, Congressional Research Service. Number of stations and power levels at which they are scheduled to operate were taken from: National Association of Broadcasters, Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcasting Stations. Washington, NAB, Mar. 1, 1982. Required power levels assume 50% transmission efficiency per information supplied by Michael Rau of the NAB.

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APPENDIX V
ANNEX 1

## STATEMENT OF CUBA

14 December 1981

Thank you Mr. Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen

We are making this statement in the Plenary Meeting because the decision involved deserves the attention of all those taking part in this Conference.

Our delegation has expressed two fundamental reservations in the course of this Conference, one of them (Document No. 46, Annex 1) at the First Plenary Meeting and the second at a recent meeting of Committee 4.

In our first reservation we called attention to the extraordinary fact that an administration represented here should have announced plans for setting up MF transmitters beamed at our country alone for purposes of subversion and destabilization, and we stated that we should keep a close watch on this station as it developed during the coming weeks and adopt the appropriate positions of legitimate self-defence.

We can now affirm that stations of this type are being entered in the Basic Inventory of the United States Administration under this Conference and that, according to the provisions of resolutions to be adopted, they will appear in List B of the Plan, thus implying not only the international recognition of their existence but also the legitimacy of their status under the Agreement. As a matter of fact, we do not fear the objective they pursue, since for the past twenty years transmissions have been beamed to Cuba from United States territory and Caribbean islands by powerful transmitters combined with efficient directional antenna systems; the main broadcasts were from Swan Island and Cayo Maratón, although they did not succeed in cracking our socialist consciousness or undermining the support of our people for its legitimate Revolutionary Government.

It is well to bear in mind, however, that in the past twenty years our Region had no international legal instrument covering or recognizing the existence of these media and it was assured that, out of an elementary sense of justice, an agreement for the Region's MF broadcasting services would not only rule out their consideration as part of a Plan but would also condemn their existence.

In its awareness of this background and assuming that all administrations would be prepared to collaborate in eliminating existing cases of conflict with a view to securing a regional Agreement acceptable to all parties, our Administration held three meetings with the United States Administration prior to the Conference without discerning any intention of discontinuing or restricting these transmissions; on the contrary, in the course of this Conference it has received evidence that they will be stepped up, as announced by the United States Government after our third meeting.

The imminent establishment of the so called "Radio José Marti" station was announced only two months before this Conference opened. Some weeks later, towards the end of October, Fidel Castro, our Head of State, stated publicly that the implementation of this project would be bound to meet with a response, emphasizing the great significance of Marti's name to our people and the fact that it could be besmirched by nobody, and adding that this new official station of the United States Government directed against the Cuban Revolution was a further instance of interference in the internal affairs of another country.

It is clear that matters of this nature might escape the attention of most of the administrations represented here, since they are concentrating on resolving their main sub-regional problems. For Cuba in particular, however, as the prime and sole target of these activities, it is quite intolerable that an international Agreement should recognize such acts aimed against the sovereignty of our State, with the manifest objective of subverting and destabilizing the internal order in our country. The foregoing arguments provide ample evidence of how inappropriate it is for Cuba to join the United States of America as a contracting party to a Regional Agreement which, even if efforts had been made in this direction, would not have resolved the long-standing and persisting differences between our two Administrations before its entry into force.

Let us now consider the scope and implications of our delegation's second reservation, entered in the Committee 4 meeting.

For all participating administrations, the main point to be considered before ratifying the Agreement and its associated Plan will certainly be the status their stations are granted in the Plan as a result of the negotiations.

In this respect, our delegation has been extremely active and has, since the planning stage began, showed that it was fully prepared to seek solutions to incompatibilities, both caused and received. After identifying the main problems existing with quite a number of administrations, it conducted a study of block frequency changes which settled most of the problems recognized as interference caused and at the same time guaranteed a rearrangement of our various internal services without any serious inconvenience to them.

Moreover, we have all witnessed in the past few days and in this very room the manner in which the United States delegation has prevented the rightful aspirations of Cuba and many other administrations concerned to the resolution of a large number of incompatibilities by studying the block frequency changes requested by Cuba for its stations.

After careful scrutiny within Group B of the Planning Committee and after receiving the approval of ten out of the twelve participating delegations, it was decided that this study should be immediately adopted and that the necessary bilateral negotiations should be undertaken.

Yet despite the fact that, during bilateral negotiations undertaken a few days earlier between our delegation and that of the United States, we had agreed to their proposal that the most serious problems of incompatibility should be examined after the Conference and told them that we intended to make frequency changes which would benefit them also, we were deeply indignant to learn that they were once more engaged in activities likely to cause us trouble and difficulties. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, they achieved their aims by an objection, which was improper not only from the standpoint of regular procedure - going back on a decision by a Working Group which had acted within its terms of reference - but also in the ethical and moral sense.

A careful study of the record of the discussion of this subject at the eighth meeting of Committee 4 will reveal that our delegation stated that the United States objection should have been ruled out of order and that its conditional withdrawal implied coercion and the breach of established principles.

However, its objection was accepted as a further proposal, with the sole support of one other administration - apparently committed for reasons unrelated to this Conference - and the only vote so far was taken, what is more, in secret.

In view of the foregoing arguments and the negative outcome of the vote, our delegation entered a further reservation concerning the procedure followed and the result of this decision.

After consultations with our Administration, Mr. Chairman, we now feel able to state our position on both reservations entered and to declare at this Plenary Meeting our final decision to take no further part in the work of this Conference.

Before closing, we wish to affirm that, irrespective of that decision, our Administration is still prepared to facilitate bilateral agreement with all those administrations which, before and during the Conference, have evidenced a sincere concern to solve problems of incompatibility within a framework of mutual respect and understanding.

We should also like to state our appreciation for the admirable assistance and facilities provided by the Brazilian Administration for the work of this Conference, as well as for the strenuous and unflagging efforts of all the members of the Union, the staff and participating delegates, and sincerely wish them every success in the performance of their task.

To you personally, Mr. Chairman, we would like to express our admiration for your efficient and impartial conduct of the proceedings of this Conference, as a token of which our delegation will welcome any comments you may wish to make before we leave this room, on the clear understanding that comments from any administration referred to can be made as part of the procedure for reservations to the Final Acts.

Many thanks.

## ANNEX 2

## STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF
## THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States considers it a cause for genuine regret that Cuba, which has participated actively in this important Conference, has decided not to take full advantage of the opportunities it provides for constructively examining differences of views and for resolving them in a way which will help to fashion a sound and fair basis for all countries of our region to share a crowded spectrum.

There have been and there remain ample opportunities for seeking a reasonable and fair basis on which the differences between the United States and Cuba could be effectively worked out. My delegation has made it expressly clear to the delegation of Cuba that we would not only accept but would genuinely welcome a continuation of negotiations between us which had started before this Conference and continued here at Rio.

Our efforts to resolve the mutual interference problems that exist between Cuba and the United States broadcasting requirements have included three bilateral discussions : I had felt that these meetings were constructive, and the United States entered this Conference to build in good faith upon the earlier progress achieved. Complexities we have faced at this Conference have not permitted us to resolve all our problems. However, this Conference has provided and continues to provide a valued path for progress.

My delegation is not aware that any single participant in this Conference finds all of its preferences fully satisfied in the framework we have been developing for a mutually acceptable scheme for the mutually beneficial management of MF spectrum allocations. But the willingness to persevere in the complicated and difficult effort to find solutions which reasonably balance our several needs has enabled the nations of this hemisphere to accomplish measurable, if incomplete, progress toward our important goal of creating a satisfactory plan for the conduct of MF broadcasting in Region 2.

Like all other participants here, the United States has sought to adapt ourselves cooperatively and reasonably to the differing needs which make it impossible for all of us - indeed for any of us - to achieve rigid and unyielding goals. We join other delegations in an expression of our sincere regret that the Conference appears to have lost one of our participants. This unfortunate event can only serve to reinforce the determination of our delegation - and I hope of us all - to continue to cooperate with each other so that we may achieve to the fullest possible measure the goals of this Conference, to which we have all contributed time, effort, substance and unflagging purpose.

## APPENDIX VI

International Radio Regulations Concerning Procedures in a Case of Harmful Interference, Numbers 704 - 721.

## ARTICLE 15 *

### Procedure in a Case of Harmful Interference

704 § 1. It is essential that Members and Associate Members exercise the utmost goodwill and mutual assistance in the application of the provisions of Article 47 of the Convention and of this Article to the settlement of problems of harmful interference.

705 § 2. In the settlement of these problems, due consideration shall be given to all factors involved, including the relevant technical and operating factors such as : adjustment of frequencies, characteristics of transmitting and receiving antennae, time sharing, change of channels within multichannel transmissions.

706 § 3. When a case of such interference is reported by a receiving station, it shall give to the transmitting station interfered with all possible information which will assist in determining the source and characteristics of the interference.

707 § 4. Where practicable, and subject to agreement by administrations concerned, such interference may be dealt with by direct co-ordination between their operating organizations.

708 § 5. If a case of interference so justifies, the administration having jurisdiction over the receiving station experiencing the interference shall notify the administration having jurisdiction over the transmitting station being interfered with, giving all possible information.

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* For the purposes of this Article, the term "administration" includes the centralizing office, where appropriate.

709 § 6. If further observations and measurements are necessary to determine the source and characteristics of and to establish the responsibility for the interference, the administration having jurisdiction over the transmitting station interfered with may seek the co-operation of other administrations, particularly of the administration having jurisdiction over the receiving station experiencing the interference, or of other organizations.

710 § 7. Having determined the source and characteristics of the interference, the administration having jurisdiction over the transmitting station interfered with shall inform the administration having jurisdiction over the interfering station, giving all useful information in order that this administration may take such steps as may be necessary to eliminate the interference.

711 § 8. When a safety service suffers interference, or in other cases with the prior approval of the administration having jurisdiction over the transmitting station interfered with, the administration having jurisdiction over the receiving station experiencing the interference may also approach directly the administration having jurisdiction over the interfering station.

712 § 9. • In cases of interference where rapid action is required, communications between administrations shall be transmitted by the quickest means available.

713 § 10. Full particulars relating to interference shall, whenever possible, be given in the form indicated in Appendix 8.

714 § 11. If the interference persists in spite of actions taken in accordance with the procedures outlined above, the administration having jurisdiction over the transmitting station interfered with may address to the administration having jurisdiction over the interfering station a report of irregularity or infraction in accordance with the provisions of Article 16.

715 § 12. If there is a specialized international organization for a particular service, reports of irregularities and of infractions relating to interference caused by the stations in this service may be addressed to such organization at the same time as to the administration concerned.

716 § 13. (1) If it is considered necessary, and particularly if the steps taken in accordance with the procedures described above have not produced satisfactory results, the administration concerned shall forward details of the case to the International Frequency Registration Board for its information.

717 (2) In such a case, the administration concerned may also request the Board to act in accordance with the provisions of Section VII of Article 9; but it shall then supply the Board with the full facts of the case, including all the technical and operational details and copies of the correspondence.

718 (3) However, the Board shall not be required to deal with problems of harmful interference between stations operating in the same band and in conformity with the Table of Frequency Allocations, when at least one of these stations is in a class the frequency of which is not required to be notified according to Nos. **486** or **487** of these Regulations; or between stations in the band 535-1 605 kc/s in Region 2. Such cases of interference shall be resolved by appropriate bilateral or multilateral arrangements in which administrations should particularly observe the provisions of No. **704**.

## ARTICLE 16

### Reports of Infringements

719 § 1. Infringements of the Convention or Radio Regulations shall be reported to their respective administrations by the control organization, stations or inspectors detecting them. For this purpose they shall use forms similar to the specimen given in Appendix 7.

720 § 2. Representations relating to any serious infringement committed by a station shall be made to the administration of the country having jurisdiction over the station, by the administrations which detect it.

721 § 3. If an administration has information of an infringement of the Convention or Radio Regulations, committed by a station which it has authorized, it shall ascertain the facts, fix the responsibility and take the necessary action.

## APPENDIX VII

## CONGRESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS

**Hearings:**

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983. Part 6. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Hearing, 97th Congress, 1st Session. March 24, 1982. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 539-582.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommitte on Government Information and Individual Rights. International Broadcasting: Direct Broadcast Satellites. Hearing, 97th Congress, 1st Session. October 23, 1981. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. 129 pp.

**Reports:**

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. International Shortwave Broadcasting and Direct Broadcast Satellites: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti. Report, 97th Congress, 1st Session. December 11, 1981. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981. 25 pp.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Report together with Dissenting and Additional Views (to accompany H.R. 5427), 97th Congress, 2nd Session. April 2, 1982. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. 16 pp.

The CHAIRMAN. At this time, we are pleased to hear our witnesses.

We will begin with the administration witnesses, the Honorable Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense, Mr. Kalmann Schaefer, Assistant to the Chairman for International Communications, Federal Communications Commission, Mr. F. Clifton White, Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, and the Honorable Richard Stone, Member, Executive Committee, Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba.

Secretary Enders, we are delighted to have you here this morning.

## STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS O. ENDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador ENDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to be back.

With your usual indulgence, if I could submit my statement, it seemed to me that your own introduction put the issues very well, and perhaps I could respond directly to the statements that you have made.

The CHAIRMAN. The full text of your statement will be incorporated into the record, and any summary comments you would like to make will also be included.

Ambassador ENDERS. Mr. Chairman, I think you put it very well talking about the nature of the Cuban society itself. It seems to us it is an economic and in some degree a social pygmy associated with a would-be foreign policy giant. It is a country that depends for a quarter of its GNP [Gross National Product] on a foreign power, the Soviet Union. It is a country that has basically stagnated since the revolution and yet it is a country that projects power in the world, in Africa and Central America. It is building up the second largest armed forces in the Western Hemisphere, and has threatened governments throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Now, there are very few countries in the world that can sustain a pattern of this kind, aggressiveness abroad at great cost to their own citizens and stagnation at home, because people force governments to address their own concerns, but in the case of Cuba they lack the means to hold their own government accountable.

The proposal is, as you say, a proposal to tell Cuba about what life is like in Cuba itself. It is not a proposal to tell Cubans about the United States. We have the Voice of America for that, and indeed, in the western part of Cuba some Cuban American stations broadcasting out of Florida do that, too. But these are not an adequate source of information about what happens in Cuba itself.

As you say, Mr. Chairman, we were struck by the fact that the Mariel refugees knew very little about, for example, the large Cuban military presence in Africa. Almost none of them knew about that. They knew very little about the fact that Cuba was deeply involved in Central America. They also thought that their own country was achieving some economic successes when in fact it was not.

It is not also, I should make clear, a proposal to incite Cubans to revolt against their own society. There is enough tension already in that society, the redistributed poverty, the tight controls on political activity and free expression, for example, and it would be irresponsible, indeed, immoral to add to those. It is not an attempt to set people against the Cuban Government. You compared it to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty before, and it is an attempt to earn gradually an audience through the special sensitivity this radio will have to the needs that the state itself ignores.

It took years in Eastern Europe for us to earn that audience. We earned it in the only way you really can ultimately, and that is by our probity, by the credibility of the programing we put on, by the fact that what we said stood up over time as truth.

We were impressed, when the Polish crisis broke, by the fact that we had about 70 percent of the radio broadcasting audience in Poland, and they were listening very intently, particularly during crisis. We wonder if there would be changes of the kind that had occurred in Poland had we not had that outside window on truth, but it could only be earned by probity and credibility and very careful programing.

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned that you are in favor of a dialog and exchange in the case of Cuba, as in other cases, in order to solve differences. As you know, we have had a substantial experience with that over the last 5 years. It has not been a successful experience, but it was undertaken on a very large scale. We did begin to talk with the Cubans at a very high level and with great discretion about improving our relationship in 1977, with the United States for its part saying, is there some way we can overcome the legacy of the past, unwind the embargo, possibly, or at least look forward to the time when we could do that, and with the United States asking Cuba, is there some way you could begin to temper your forceful or aggressive activities in the world, particularly, for example, your substantial position in Angola? We asked them whether they could begin to think of unwinding that, since the civil war was over.

While we were talking, the Cubans actually increased their presence in Africa and went into Ethiopia. Talks went on, and in Central America we had the beginnings of a big Cuban offensive. Then we had Mariel.

Mr. Chairman, although you cannot be absolutely certain, it seems almost as if this long series of dialogs undertaken by the United States had made Cuba bolder, with fewer constraints on it.

As you know, this administration has had high level contact with the Cuban Government, and we share the view that you have expressed, that it is important to be able to talk to adversaries, to see whether, in fact, there is a basis for some progress in relationships. Our initial contact has not been encouraging in that line, but I agree with you that the principle of contact, discussions, and dialog is important to maintain, and future contacts could conceivably yield a different result.

You mentioned the question of interference. This is the issue that has generated, I think, the most heat around this proposal, and perhaps the most misunderstanding as well. There is a very substantial pattern that has developed over the last 15 years of Cuban interference with U.S. broadcasting. Cuba broadcasts almost exclusively on the medium wave band. It does not use directional antennas such as are used in the United States in order to permit more than one station to operate on a given frequency within a given geographical area.

In addition to that, it has come, over the last years, particularly, to ignore the regulatory, the international regulatory body, the regional regulatory body, and its rulemaking abilities that are designed to prevent interference in frequencies between several users in the Western Hemisphere.

Indeed, in November of last year, Cuba put down a package of no less than 48 changes in frequencies as an inventory all together on a take it or leave it basis in the Western Hemisphere association and said, either you take all of these changes or we will just go ahead and impose them. The organization did not take them, and Cuba has gone ahead and said it would impose them. So, we have to face a lot of Cuban interference regardless of whether this proposal goes ahead.

The question that remains, Mr. Chairman, is, How would Cuba react to it. There are three possible ways. One way that it could react to it is by jamming the reception of the signal of the radio in Cuba itself. This is what the Soviets and Eastern Europeans attempt to do with a low-grade signal put in a series of locations onto local reception. As far as we can tell, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union this technique is not fully effective. Indeed, it may enhance the listenership, but it does not interfere with broadcasting from the source.

In other words, this technique would not interfere with broadcasting in the United States. We cannot rule that out.

Second, there is the possibility of counter-broadcasting. Castro and others have talked about setting up their own radio to tell the United States about what conditions are in this country. They have talked of a Radio Lincoln. Indeed, as far as we can tell from the most recent and authoritative Cuban statements, which were on April 4, it is this counter-broadcasting that is the direction in which Cuba is now going.

I think, Mr. Chairman, we have always believed in the freedom of exchange of ideas, and I think that Americans have nothing to fear from competition if that is the result.

There is the final possibility that has been raised. I think it appears to be the least likely. That is that Cuba, by way of retaliation, would step up its already substantial pattern of interference with broadcasting in this country. If it did that, clearly, a situation which is now difficult would be made somewhat worse, and the question would be raised that suggests what the appropriate reaction of the United States should be to that. However, I should point out to you that that itself would not stop Radio Marti, nor would it be possible, given Cuban means, in effect very substantially to increase what is already a very serious problem and must be dealt with as the very serious problem of Cuban interference.

We are talking with the National Association of Broadcasters independently of this on ways and means by which we can now again approach the Cuban interference problem with other countries of the region, because they are suffering also.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present the proposal to you.

[Ambassador Enders' prepared statement follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS O. ENDERS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Let me start with Cuban society itself. There is nothing quite like it. A would-be foreign policy giant is allied to an economic pygmy, whose peoples have had to sacrifice all hope for a rising standard of living to foreign adventures.

The Cuban economy, organized in the familiar Soviet command model, has registered a general failure. Despite growing Soviet assistance in sales of oil at low prices and purchases of sugar at high prices--the whole Soviet aid effort is now equivalent to one quarter of Cuba's GNP—per capita income in Cuba has been stagnant and steadily falling relative to much of Latin America.

Yet Cuba projects power in the world. The Soviet Union subsidizes Cuba with over $3 billion in economic aid per year. In addition, Cuba's Armed Forces—augmented by 66,000 tons of Soviet military deliveries in 1981 alone—are stronger than any in the Western Hemisphere other than the United States. It maintains 40,000 soldiers in Africa, dominating two countries, and serving the Soviet Union as a proxy. In Central America, Cuba is attempting to unite the left in search of the violent overthrow of established government, and maintains 2,000 military and security personnel in Nicaragua.

Most countries cannot overcommit to state interests in this manner, because the people force them to address their concerns. But Cubans lack the means to hold their government accountable.

The proposal we discuss today—Radio Broadcasting to Cuba—is intended to supply what the Cuban public is missing: Reliable news about Cuban life, features, sports, and entertainment alternatives to the distorted, censored news that is being offered by a government that rules not for the people but for itself.

No, this is not a project to tell the Cuban people about the United States. VOA—whose charter is international news and American features and culture—already does that. It can be heard in Spanish. So also can Florida radio stations broadcasting in Spanish to Cuban-Americans. These stations can tell Cubans much about us. But they are not an adequate source of information about what is going on in and about Cuba itself.

Nor is it a project to incite Cubans to revolt against their own society. There is provocation enough in the redistributed poverty, in the depressing austerity, in the unemployment and under-employment of educated Cubans, in the rigid regimentation and in Castro's speeches that only further sacrifice lies ahead. But it would be immoral, irresponsible to set a people against a government that monopolizes the means of coercion.

This radio is a proposal to give Cubans the means they now lack to know what kind of a society has been imposed on them, to furnish them with a source of news and entertainment that is not manipulated by the state, to let them find out what is really happening in their country, to inform them why so many have gone off to foreign military duty not always to return, and to learn what the state really does with the wealth of the Cuban people.

The radio—like Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty before it—is intended gradually to earn its audience through its special sensitivity to needs the state ignores. It will speak to young people of the sports and music they love. It will speak to adults of the great Cuban and Hispanic-American heritage they admire, which so often the state denigrates. And it will give news on the truth of which the listeners can rely.

We know that in Eastern Europe it took years for Radio Free Europe to earn an audience. Little by little that audience expanded. Radio Free Europe now has perhaps 70 percent of the Polish radio audience. Is there any doubt that the changes of the last decade could have occurred without that honest, trustworthy, humane outside contact?

Our proposal is thus to begin a sustained effort, over many years, to help the Cubans know more about their country, and thus to hold their government accountable in ways it is not now.

People say: Wouldn't it be better to negotiate with the Cubans; or it isn't like us to engage in propaganda; or Cuban conutermeasures will hurt us too much.

We have tried to talk with Cuba in the past and it would be wrong to rule out trying again. But the record is daunting.

In 1977 we started talking seriously to the Cubans, saying we wanted to create conditions in which the legacy of the past—the embargo and the political tension—could be overcome. We suggested a gradual withdrawal of the more than 20,000 Cuban troops from Angola. After all, the civil war was over. While we talked, Cuba went into Ethiopia.

Conversations continued. In mid-1978, Cuba launched upon a new aggressive strategy in Central America, uniting the left parties of first Nicaragua, then El Salvador, then Guatemala, committing them to the destruction of their established government.

Talks went on. In 1980, Castro turned the desire of many of his countrymen to flee Cuba into a hostile act against the United States—the Mariel boatlift.

It is not wrong to talk to adversaries. Often it is only prudent. This administration has had high-level contact with Cuban leaders to see whether there are areas of common interest.

But what counts is not the medium, but the message. Talks cannot be a complete Cuban policy, any more than diplomatic exchanges are a complete Soviet or Polish policy. Diplomacy enables us to talk to the government. We must also talk to the people.

Others ask: Should we be associated with "propaganda?"

No, we should not. We will not succeed in attracting an audience in Cuba if we offer them propaganda. If there are false reports, the listeners will soon realize the reports are false. If false reports continue, they will turn off. Only by respecting its audience can a project like this succeed.

So it must be the creature of no political tendency, of no action group, of no vested interest. We have acquired experience—in Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—of how to do that, even though the beginnings were difficult.

Some people say—the threat from Cuba is too great, Radio Marti will invite massive Cuban jamming, interference, retaliation. They say, change frequencies and hurt someone else, not me, or they say use another system—FM, SW, TV, out-of-band AM. Some even seem to imply we should abandon our plans out of fear.

Well, Cuban interference is a problem, a serious problem, because international radio broadcasting is based on cooperation, but Cuba has chosen to act as an outlaw. But Cuba's lawlessness vastly pre-dates Radio Marti and will continue to exist in the future—with or without this new station. The Cubans refuse to use directional antennae, as we do, to protect others broadcasting on the same frequency. And they do not respect the decisions of the regional body that allocates frequencies.

The truth is that we do not know for certain what Cuba will do about Radio Marti. In August 1981—a month before the White House announced plans for Radio Marti—Cuba made known its intention to put a high-powered station on 1040 kHz which would seriously interfere with WHO, Des Moines, and even more with any Radio Marti broadcasts on that frequency. However, this would also cause major problems for broadcasters in other countries in the region and would cause the Cuban station itself to lose effectiveness because of mutual interference with WHO and Radio Marti.

We would like to use 1040 kHz as the frequency for Radio Marti. This frequency appears in the region II frequency plan for use at Saddlebunch Key, Florida. According to the FCC and the NTIA, that listing in the plan permits us to use the frequency for Radio Marti. That means its use is legal and has been approved by the competent authorities in this country. The Cuban delegation to the region II medium frequency broadcasting conference acknowledged that inclusion of 1040 kHz for Radio Marti in list B granted it international recognition and legitimacy. WHO, Des Moines, also appears in the plan for 1040 kHz. I can assure you that the Radio Marti installation will be designed so as not to interfere with WHO signal as provided by the FCC rules and regulations. The operation of Radio Marti and WHO can be technically compatible. The antenna array being built by the Department of Defense at the U.S. Navy installation on Saddlebunch Key to meet military needs has been designed with these requirements in mind, should a decision be taken later to use this facility for Radio Marti. Meanwhile, despite recent stories to the contrary, no government funds are being, or will be, spent on Radio Marti itself until authorized by Congress.

The Castro regime may attempt to jam Radio Marti with low-powered stations situated in the main cities and towns of Cuba. This would badly interfere with reception of Radio Marti, but might have a minimal effect on WHO. It is also possible that Cuba may do nothing. The VOA has been directing broadcasts to Cuba for more than 21 years and Castro has rarely seriously tried to jam these broadcasts.

While some American observers may have doubts as to the possible effectiveness of Radio Marti, Cuban authorities have none. They fully recognize the potential impact of Radio Marti and take it very seriously indeed.

Cuba can mount a jamming effort. Many reports indicate preparation of stations, including a so-called Radio Lincoln, which could either jam or counterbroadcast.

But the most authoritative statement was by Fidel Castro himself to the Young Communists Union in Cuba on April 4. Speaking of Radio Marti, Castro said he hopes it won't go on the air but ". . . . if in the end there is to be a dialectic confrontation between them and us, they with their subversive station and we with our (arguments in) response . . . we are prepared to give a suitable response . . ." This suggests that Castro himself is threatening a stepped up campaign of broadcasting to the U.S. More recent indications support this.

Thus, while we cannot say for certain just what Cuba will in fact do, the stage is set for counter-broadcasting rather than jamming. I think Americans have nothing to fear from a competition of ideas.

Should fear of Cuban countermeasures cause us to abandon plans for Radio Marti, we would hand Fidel Castro a major propaganda victory. Rather than resolving the problem of Cuban interference with U.S. broadcasters, our stance would feed Cuban intransigence on radio interference.

Mr. Chairman, Radio Marti is designed to respond to a basic human need—the need to have access to information on events and policies that affect the lives of individuals. Freedom of information is what we are talking about here, a fundamental freedom recognized by every responsible individual and government in the world. This right, this freedom, has been consistently denied to the Cuban people since Castro came to power in 1959. Radio Marti will help restore it. This is one reason why the Radio Marti bill was given broad bipartisan support in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which approved the bill by a 20 to 5 vote.

Those of us who have lived in a Communist state will know just how much Radio Marti can affect the lives of Cubans. For those of us who have not, it is an opportunity to offer the Cuban people hope and the means to make informed judgments on the actions of their own government. For a people bottled up in a system of oppression which they did not seek and cannot remove, that can be precious.

Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to answer any questions the committee might have regarding this request.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Secretary Ikle, it would be the intention of the Chair to have you testify. Because there is such a narrow scope involving the Department of Defense which does not involve the broad policy issues, which will take time to develop, it would be my intention to begin questioning you, Secretary Ikle, and then turn it over to the other committee members for questioning. We could then excuse you so that we can go into the broader policy aspects of this issue. This is not to minimize your role, but I think it is a better use of time.

## STATEMENT OF HON. FRED C. IKLE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ambassador IKLE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your inviting me here, and I appreciate the arrangements you worked out.

The Defense Department has a national security interest and a military interest, and, of course, has a participation in the Caribbean. I shall focus on that, and shall somewhat summarize and abbreviate my testimony, and will submit my full statement for the record.

As we see it, the United States has two broad reasons for supporting Radio Marti: One, to enhance human rights, and my colleague, Tom Enders, has testified on that, and also to improve the prospects for peace and for our own military security in the Caribbean and in other parts of the world. I shall address the second reason.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, there has been one occasion when the world moved close to the brink of nuclear war. That crisis—with its threat of catastrophic dimensions—began and ended in Cuba. The cause of that dangerous crisis was the Soviet exploitation of

Cuba as a military base against the United States. Even though that crisis has been resolved, the Soviets' military exploitation of Cuba continues. Indeed, it has intensified of late.

The Soviets are fairly cramming Cuba with weapons and other military equipment. Last year—1981—saw larger quantities of military supplies flow to the Cuban regime than in any other 12 months since 1962. These trends command our attention.

Let us remember 1962. Soviet militarization of Cuba will culminate in another dangerous crisis unless the Cuba people can be encouraged to work for peace.

It is not only the Soviet military presence on Cuba that gives rise to the latent major threat of world crisis. Castro's Cuba exports military repression and conflict to many parts of the world, such as Nicaragua and Granada. In Angola, Castro's legions have returned that country practically to colonial status. They are helping a regime there to hang onto power in the capital city against genuine indigenous forces that have already liberated vast areas of the country.

I find it somewhat perplexing that so many Americans can view the Cuban military activities in Africa with equanimity. A mere moment's reflection should jolt us into recognizing what an unnatural state of affairs it is that Spanish-speaking forces from the Western Hemisphere should, in the service of the Russian military establishment, find themselves in Africa propping up the outer reaches of that empire which calls itself a peoples movement. I find the irony almost insulting.

How do the Cuban people feel about it? As my colleague, Tom Enders, just said, they may not even fully know about it. What do they know about their sons who die in distant places, fighting Africans in behalf of a European imperialist power?

I have heard it said that the $10 million proposed for Radio Marti may be too much in present times of budget stringency. We in the Defense Department believe it is one of the most efficient measures for national security available to us. At the cost of less than that of a fighter aircraft, or less than 10 percent of the cost of a new frigate, we can purchase a powerful instrument to forge a new relationship of peace with the Cuban people.

Radio Marti will help to build a constituency for peace among the Cuban people. The Cuban families whose sons fight in Angola against indigenous African independence movements are entitled to know what other Cubans think are Cuba's true national interests. The Cuban people are entitled to know more about the opportunities for genuine reconciliation with the United States. They deserve to hear more about the political situation in their own country.

Mr. Chairman, as I understand many of those who are still unsure whether we should go ahead with Radio Marti seem to have two chief concerns.

The first relates to Cuban interference with broadcasting within the United States, and the fear among U.S. radio stations that this interference might get worse. Secretary Enders has already addressed that, but please permit me to repeat some of these points.

There is a great deal of confusion in this area, and as the Russians say, repetition is the mother of learning. Interference is not the same as jamming. Cuba may well decide to jam Radio Marti, and such jamming might diminish, but would not destroy, the effectiveness of Radio Marti. By jamming, Cuba would do what the Soviet Union and East European countries have done against Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

By contrast, interference means broadcasting into a neighboring country with excessive power, infringing on wavelengths allocated to other stations. Jamming is a cowardly defense of a dictatorship that lacks popular support; it violates human rights at home. Interference, by contrast, is an aggressive act against a neighboring country. It violates international agreements to which Cuba is a signatory.

Those who argue that we should cancel Radio Marti because Cuba might increase its interference with our broadcasting stations may not be aware of the appalling implications of what they are suggesting.

This suggestion says that just because Castro seems to threaten an illegal aggressive act against the United States, the U.S. Government should abandon a peaceful activity which is protected, indeed encouraged, by international conventions. Increased Cuban radio interference would not be, I repeat, would not be in any way technically connected with what we do about Radio Marti. If Castro wants to stop Radio Marti from reaching his people, he will need jamming, not interference. The connection between Castro's threat and our own possible cancellation of Radio Marti would be purely psychological. It would be fear, fear of illegal Cuban retaliation.

Therefore, I am afraid that if Congress should decide against the legal international broadcasting program here proposed because of a threat of illegal action against the United States, this would leave us in a bad situation in the whole area of international and security relations. What precedents would we set? What kind of examples would we give to our allies?

Why should the Communist leaders in Czechoslovakia and Poland not conclude that they can start a massive interference program against broadcasting stations in West Germany to coerce the German Government—much as Castro in this case would have succeeded in coercing the U.S. Congress—to close down Radio Free Europe in Munich? And having played the threat of radio interference against Radio Marti, what would stop Castro from using that threat again, for extorting something else from the U.S. Congress?

A second concern voiced by Radio Marti's critics is that our broadcasting into Cuba would be seen as an "act of political confrontation" and that it would be "destabilizing." Secretary Enders has already addressed the political aspects of that. Let me add some security dimensions.

What is destabilizing is the current worldwide military role of Cuba, which continues largely because Castro is capable of concealing its nature and its costs from the Cuban people. What is destabilizing is the risk that Castro will foment more crises in the Caribbean, and more turmoil and warfare in Africa and Central America. Radio Marti, by building a constituency for peace in Cuba, will contribute to stability in the true sense of that world.

I do not think it is a proper mission for a great democracy, Mr. Chairman, such as ours to "stabilize" tyrannical dictatorships.

It has been suggested that Fidel Castro is merely reacting to hostility displayed by the United States, and that a more friendly U.S.

policy might give him an alternative to reliance upon Moscow. This assumption is disproven by recent history which my colleague, Tom Enders, explained or referred to. This history belies the contention that a more conciliatory approach by the United States toward United States-Cuban relations will render Castro our friend.

It seems to me as if a certain defeatism has shaped some of the initial negative reactions to the idea of Radio Marti. It is as if people had lost faith in democracy and believed that for the sake of stability we must defend people living under Communist dictatorships from participating with us in the discussion of political ideas.

Is not the highest calling of our democracy, not the simple avoidance of friction and disputes between ourselves and dictatorial regimes but the promotion of peace in a political and military sense based on respect for the rights of individuals?

The cause of peace, as we know, and as you, Mr. Chairman, in your own support for Radio Free Europe and all of your other actions have demonstrated, is served when governments are accountable to their people. Such accountability requires a resonably free flow of information. Thus, the connection between information, political freedom, and the military security and peace, I think, explains the strategic purpose, the larger strategic purpose of Radio Marti.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Ambassador Ikle's prepared statement follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED C. IKLE

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for inviting me to testify on the legislation to authorize support for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc. Designed to establish and operate "Radio Marti," this corporation will support the right of the Cuban people to receive information regardless of frontiers, consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has two broad reasons for supporting Radio Marti: To enhance human rights; and to improve the prospects for peace and for our security, in the Caribbean, and in other parts of the world. I shall address primarily the second reason—strengthening peace and security.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, there has been one occasion when the world moved close to the brink of nuclear war. That crisis—with its threat of catastrophic dimensions—began and ended in Cuba. The cause of that dangerous crisis was the Soviet exploitation of Cuba as a military base against the United States. Even though that crisis has been resolved, the Soviets' military exploitation of Cuba continues. Indeed, it has intensified of late.

The Soviets are fairly cramming Cuba with weapons and other military equipment. Last year—1981—saw larger quantities of military supplies flow to the Cuban regime than in any other 12 months since 1962, the year of the Cuban missile crisis. Soviet military shipments to Castro this year are matching last year's disturbingly high rate. And the Soviet combat brigade, which attained notoriety a few years back, remains in place in Cuba.

The strategic value Moscow derives from its use of the Cubans and their island is reflected in the formidable sums that the financially hard-pressed Soviet Union passes to Castro in the form of economic and military aid. In 1981, Moscow gave Castro $3 billion labeled economic assistance and at least $500 million of military assistance. The Soviets' strategic investment in Cuba is growing. So is the return. These trends command our attention.

Mr. Chairman, remember 1962. The Soviet militarization of Cuba will culminate in another dangerous crisis unless the Cuban people can be encouraged to work for peace.

It is not only the Soviet military presence on Cuba that gives rise to that latent threat of major world crisis. Castro's Cuba exports military repression and conflict to many parts of the world. The repressiveness of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua seems to intensify in proportion to the number of Cubans whom Castro has stationed there. On the Caribbean island of Grenada, Castro's forces maintain an unelected regime in power against the will of the people. Selwyn Strachan, who is Granada's Minister of National Mobilization, has publicly boasted that Cuba will eventually use his country's airport to supply Cuban forces in Angola. And Strachan pointed out that, because of its strategic location, that airport may also be used by the Soviet Union.

In Angola, Castro's legions have returned that country to colonial status. They are helping the regime there to hang on to power in the capital city against genuine, indigenous forces that have already liberated vast areas of the country.

Mr. Chairman, I find it perplexing that so many Americans can view the Cuban activities in Africa with equanimity. A mere moment's reflection should jolt one into recognizing what an unnatural state of affairs it is that Spanish-speaking forces from the Western Hemisphere should, in the service of Russian masters, find themselves in Africa propping up the outer reaches of an empire that calls itself a people's movement. The irony is almost insulting.

How do the Cuban people feel about this? What do they know about their sons that die in distant places, fighting Africans in behalf of a European imperialist power?

I have heard it said that the $10 million proposed for Radio Marti is too much in present times of budget stringency. I believe it is one of the most efficient measures for national security available to us. At the cost of less than that of a fighter aircraft, or less than 10 percent of the cost of a new frigate, we can purchase a powerful instrument to forge a new relationship of peace with the Cuban people.

Radio Marti will help to build a constituency for peace among the Cuban people. The Cuban families whose sons fight in Angola against indigenous African independence movements are entitled to know what other Cubans think are Cuba's true national interests. The Cuban people are entitled to know more about the opportunities for genuine reconciliation with the United States. They deserve to hear more about the political situation in their own country, such as the massive apparat for internal repression which Castro requires to keep himself in power.

Mr. Chairman, as I understand many of those who are still unsure whether we should go ahead with Radio Marti, they seem to have two chief concerns:

The first relates to Cuban interference with broadcasting within the United States, and the fear among U.S. radio stations that this interference might get worse. Interference is not the same as jamming. Cuba may well decide to jam Radio Marti; and such jamming would diminish, but would not destroy, the effectiveness of Radio Marti. By jamming, Cuba would do what the Soviet Union and East European countries have done against Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

By contrast, interference means broadcasting into a neighboring country with executive power infringing on wavelengths allocated to other stations. Jamming is a cowardly defense of a dictatorship that lacks popular support; it violates human rights at home. Interference, by contrast, is an aggressive act against a neighboring country. It violates international agreements (e.g., ITU Convention of 1973) to which Cuba is a signatory.

Those who argue that we should cancel Radio Marti because Cuba might increase its interference with our broadcasting stations may not be aware of the appalling implications of what they are suggesting.

This suggestion says that just because Castro seems to threaten an illegal aggressive act against the United States, the U.S. Government should abandon a peaceful activity, which is protected, indeed encouraged, by international conventions. Mind you, increased Cuban radio interference would not be technically connected, in any way, which that we do about Radio Marti. If Castro wants to stop Radio Marti from reaching his people, he will need jamming, not interference. The connection between Castro's threat and the cancellation of Radio Marti would be purely psychological—it would be, forgive me for putting it so bluntly, craven fear.

Should Congress decide gainst the perfectly legal international broadcasting program because of a threat of an illegal action against the United States, where would this leave us? What precedents would we set and what kind of examples would we give our allies? Why should the Communist leaders in Czechoslovakia and Poland not conclude that they can start a massive interference program against broadcasting stations in West Germany, to coerce the German Government—much as Castro would have succeeded in coercing the United States Congress—to close down Radio Free Europe in Munich? And, having played the threat of radio interference against Radio Marti, what would stop Castro from using that threat again, for extorting something else from the United States Congress?

A second concern voiced by Radio Marti's critics is that our broadcasting into Cuba would be seen as an "act of political confrontation" and that it would be "destabilizing." What is destabilizing is the current worldwide military role of Cuba, which continues largely because Castro is capable of concealing its nature and its costs from the Cuban people. What is destabilizing is the risk that Castro will foment more crises in the Caribbean, and more turmoil and warfare in Africa and Central America. Radio Marti, by building a constituency for peace in Cuba, will contribute to stability in the true sense of that word.

Mr. Chairman, it is not a proper mission for a great democracy such as ours to "stabilize" tyrannical dictatorships.

It has been suggested that Fidel Castro is merely reacting to hostility displayed by the United States, and that a more friendly U.S. policy might give him an alternative to reliance upon Moscow.

This assumption, unfortunately, is disproven by history—that is, by the experience of several U.S. Administrations in dealing with Castro. You will recall that about six years ago Cuban military forces were just beginning their combat role in Africa. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger strongly argued that the United States should not tolerate such conduct, and for a period in time in December 1975, the Soviet airlift of Cuban troops and equipment to Angola was halted. Then, however, Congress passed the so-called Tunney and Clark Amendments, prohibiting the President from assisting further the non-Communist elements in Angola. The Soviet-Cuban airlift resumed immediately, and within two weeks the number of Cuban troops in Angola had doubled. It increased gradually the following year, so that at the end of the Ford Administration there were an estimated 14,000 Cubans in Angola.

President Carter's Administration took a more conciliatory approach to Castro, and made a significant effort to improve relations with him. For example, the Carter Administration:

Opened an "interest section" in Havana, and permitted the Cuban Government to open one in Washington.

Relaxed travel restrictions on Cuban diplomats at the United Nations and in Washington.

Encouraged increased cultural exchanges between the countries.

Lifted restrictions on vessels that call at Cuban ports, allowing them to proceed to visit U.S. ports.

Lifted the ban on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba.

Permitted the resumption of charter flights between Cuba and the United States.

If we ever want to learn from history instead of just repeating it, we ought to recall the response of Fidel Castro to these friendly overtures. During the Carter Administration, Cuba increased the number of Cuban military personnel in Angola from about 14,000 to 20,000. Castro increased the Cuban presence in Ethiopia from 0 to a high of 17,000 in 1978 and in Nicaragua from 0 to 500. And to add insult to injury, Cuba provocatively denounced the United States at the summit meeting of the so-called Non-Aligned Movement in Havana in September 1979.

These actions belie the contention that a more conciliatory approach by the United States to United States-Cuban relations will render Castro our friend.

Defeatism seems to have shaped certain initial negative reactions to the Radio Marti project. It is as if people have lost faith in democracy, as if they believe that for the sake of stability we must prevent the people living under Communist dictatorships from participating with us in the discussion of political ideas. It is as if Radio Marti's opponents favor a pernicious ideology that declares the cause of democracy doomed once a country is under Communist control.

The Reagan Administration rejects that ideology as false and ignoble. The highest calling of American democracy is not the simple avoidance of friction and disputes between ourselves and dictatorial regimes, but the promotion of peace based on respect for the rights of individuals. The cause of peace and freedom is served when governments are accountable to their people. Such accountability requires a reasonably free flow of information. To grasp the connection among information, political freedom, and peace is to appreciate the grand morality and strategic necessity of such enterprises as Radio Marti.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much indeed.

I think first we should put on the record what the Defense Department is doing now with their construction program. Would you describe to the committee what the purpose is of the Navy's radio towers in the Florida Keys? Are these towers intended exclusively for the use of radio broadcasting to Cuba, or do they have other purposes? If so, can you explain those purposes?

[The committee has on file a classified response to this question.]

Ambassador **Ikle**. The purpose of the facility and the plans for their use, the detailed plans, are classified. I would be pleased to inform you separately about the details, and the purposes—the military purposes—for contingencies that may arise requiring broadcasting in the direction of Cuba in order to cope with emergencies the kind of which have developed in the past in the Caribbean.

The **Chairman**. What was the cost to the Navy of constructing these towers? Does the Navy expect to be reimbursed in whole or in part by Radio Marti for its use of the towers?

Ambassador **Ikle**. The estimated cost is about $1 million, including the Navy administrative overhead. The question of reimbursement is a possibility that we considered when we examined the design for this military requirement and examined whether we might not inadvertently preclude a dual use of this facility by some other governmental or Government-sponsored activity such as Radio Marti. In order not to inadvertently create waste and not have the left hand not know what the right hand is doing in our large government, we checked to see if there is anything we might be doing which would prevent the possibility of the same facility being made available if and when Congress should authorize Radio Marti.

The way in which that facility would then be available would obviously be governed by the legislation. It could be a lease or rental, whatever the legal requirements are, with the reimbursement flowing to the Treasury or the Department of Defense or whatever the act would state is required.

The **Chairman**. Secretary Ikle, do you anticipate that there would be any behavioral change by Cuba with respect to its military involvement in the Caribbean Basin region as a result of our moving ahead with Radio Marti?

Ambassador **Ikle**. I think so, Mr. Chairman, though it will take some time. Once the radio station is well conducted and following the kind of points you made, once it has a sound program that establishes credibility, I think over time the Cuban people will become more interested in living peacefully with us, and will put indirect, as this is possible even in a dictatorship, pressure on their government to abandon all of these military ventures. So, I think over time this broadcasting operation will indeed reduce the chances of military conflict and improve the chances for a peaceful relationship.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Senator Zorinsky? Let me say that any opening statements that Senators would like to make at this time I would ask for. There was no other member present at the time we began, so I would turn to the minority now for any opening statements or comments they would like to make.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have an opening statement which I would like to make. It is a brief statement. I would also introduce into the record hopefully with unanimous consent a letter from the Iowa Cattlemen's Association, and one from Radio Station WOW, a Meredith station which is located in Omaha, Nebr., which claims that they would lose 50 percent of their free nighttime signal as a result of Cuban interference, and they feel that some 100 odd U.S. stations would lose similar signal in varying amounts, some in excess of 90 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no objection, and it will be inserted in the record at this point.

[The material referred to follows:]

IOWA CATTLEMEN'S ASSOCIATION,
*Ames, Iowa, April 16, 1982.*

Senator EDWARD ZORINSKY,
*Russell Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR ZORINSKY: I am writing to express my concern over the Administration's intention to build an AM radio station at Saddlebunch, Florida to broadcast "the truth" to Cuba. Authorization for this project, commonly known as Radio Marti, is pending before the Foreign Relations Committee. In our view S. 1853 will have a serious, adverse impact on the American farmer as well as the AM and broadcast industries in the United States.

The Cuban government has proposed to build and operate 180 AM radio stations, some with very high power. The National Association of Broadcasters has estimated that operation of those stations will cause interference to more than 200 U.S. stations in 32 states and the District of Columbia. The Administration intends to use 1040 kHz for Radio Marti. The Cuban government has announced plans to operate a 500,000 watt station on the same frequency in order to counter Radio Marti programming. Station WHO, Des Moines, Iowa operates on this frequency and Cuba's response will have the effect of jamming WHO broadcast reducing its nighttime coverage from a radius of 800 miles to a radius of 45 miles, from more than 1,700,000 square miles to 5,900 square miles.

Approximately 40 million Americans now able to receive WHO's service at night will lose that service. At the same time, the Cuban station would totally override Radio Marti's broadcast.

Between the hours of 5:30–6:30 a.m., which are considered nightime hours for AM broadcasting during much of the year, WHO provides hundreds of thousands of midwest farmers with essential agricultural news together with grain, livestock and weather reports. Thousands of farmers each morning listen to these reports and make marketing decisions about livestock and produce based upon these reports.

Cuba's retaliation against Radio Marti will wipe this service off the air. This will be an irreparable loss to the farmers of the middle west.

As I indicated above, Cuba's AM station inventory will cause interference to more than 200 U.S. stations including WMAQ Chicago (98.3 percent nighttime service area loss); WKRC Cincinnati (45.3 percent nighttime service area loss); WOW Omaha (49.8 percent nighttime service area loss); WSJS, Winston Heights/Salem (66 percent nighttime service area loss).

In light of the number of radio stations that will be affected by Cuba's inventory it is clear that last summers bilateral negotiations between the United States and Cuba on his problem must be reactivated in as constructive an atmosphere as possible. It is equally clear that the passage of S. 1853 and the operation of Radio Marti will be regarded by the Cuban government as a provocative, destabilizing gesture, and will minimize the chance of a successful negotiation with Cuba.

In your deliberation of S. 1853 I urge you to weigh Radio Marti against the harm to the American farmer and to the broadcast industry and to millions of listeners in the country.

Thank you very much for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

JOHN HENNING, *President.*

WOW, KEZO,
*Omaha, Nebr., June 29, 1982.*

Hon. Edward Zorinsky,
*Russell Senate Office Bldg.,*
*Washington, D.C.*

Dear Senator Zorinsky: It was a pleasure speaking with you last week and sharing our views with regard to the Marti project.

From a commercial broadcaster's point of view, the Marti project can only further complicate our interference problems with Cuba. The construction and use of the Marti facility will be viewed as interference from the United States and would likely escalate our interference problems.

WOW Radio in Omaha stands to lose approximately 50 percent of its interference-free nighttime signal as a result of Cuban interference. Some 100 odd U.S. stations will lose similar signal in varying amounts, some in excess of 90 percent.

Changing frequency and power is not an option for many U.S. stations since our system of frequency and power assignments in North America is so interrelated. We should not allow political forces to disturb this system. (Ours or theirs.)

I believe we can negotiate an end to the interference problem, not spend millions of dollars on another government facility, and help the Cubans through our knowledge of AM Radio and directional antennas. This would be a significant show of strength on part of the United States.

There seems to be no capital gain in the Marti project, but much to lose.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Eddens.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Radio Marti presents some very real political problems, but at this point I want to voice concerns that have been brought to my attention by broadcasters in the midwest who are going to be the losers because of the administration's proposed propaganda weapon against Cuba. Cuba's proposed 500 kW superstation designed to retaliate against Radio Marti on the 1040 kHz frequency will create such interference that major stations in the midwest which provide vital information for our farmers will lose vast percentages of their nighttime ranges.

I will be anxious to hear from the affected parties, such as station WOW in Omaha and WHO in Des Moines, Iowa, at a hearing on Radio Marti when the committee receives the final report of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. Mr. Chairman, another hearing will be essential to our understanding of the full impact of Radio Marti, inasmuch as WOW will lose 50 percent of its nighttime signal and WHO will lose over 99 percent of its nighttime range.

Today, I will be asking witnesses from the Presidential Commission, the FCC representative, and the Department of Defense to explain how the 1040 kHz frequency was chosen for Radio Marti, as I understand there is some controversy over this decision. I will also be anxious to hear from Assistant Secretary Enders and Under Secretary Ikle as to how and why communication towers for Radio Marti are already being constructed in the Florida Keys without authorization from the Congress.

A final comment, Mr. Chairman. I am concerned with the expense to the American taxpayer for Radio Marti, which despite what its proponents say, is going to be a negative propaganda organ counterproductive to the best interests of this country. It is going to cause much more damage to us than its supposed benefits. The administration wants the Congress to authorize $10 million this year, and over $7 million the next and how many millions will be involved if the Congress approves the amendment coming out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee which will provide for compensation for those stations which incur expenses trying to combat Cuban interference. How can the administration justify this expenditure when the Federal Government is cutting back on essential services to our people.

The farmers of our country will have trouble understanding how the administration has millions for Radio Marti when that very radio will affect their receiving timely weather, crop, and commodity information. How will they understand this, especially when the Federal Government is discontinuing its agricultural weather service program.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that after we have the two hearings on Radio Marti, first with administration and Radio Marti witnesses, and then with the affected parties, and authorities on international broadcasting, we will be in a better position to consider the legislation before the committee.

Mr. Ikle, I would like to ask you if you can comment with regard to a statement made in a Florida newspaper, ". . . in Key West, officials told a different story. Lt. Comdr. Mark Neuhart, the public affairs officer for the United States Caribbean Forces, said that transmitting towers are indeed designed for Radio Marti." Can you make any comment on that?

Ambassador **Ikle**. Senator Zorinsky, I am pleased to clear this up. As I understand it, Lt. Comdr. Mark Neuhart was misquoted, but I do not have a tape of what he said, however.

Senator **Zorinsky**. You say he was misquoted?

Ambassador **Ikle**. That is what I understand, but I do not have the exact tape of what he said. Whatever he said, he may or may not have known the full context. The context is just as I explained it to the chairman, that as we have this requirement for the military capability for broadcasting in that area, we wanted to be sure to check out that we would make optimum use of taxpayers' money, and that if Congress should decide—if and when Congress should decide to authorize Radio Marti—that Radio Marti could rent or lease from other government agencies' facilities, that we would not inadvertently do something with that facility that would unnecessarily make it impossible and thus waste taxpayers' money by making it single purpose, when possibly the station could be dual purpose in the future.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Do you feel that that is a readily acceptable explanation? Leaving aside the fact that the Navy is claiming the facilities are being built for Radio Marti, the transmitting towers one built in accordance with the A. D. Ring engineering plan for Radio Marti. A four-tower directional antenna array designed for 1040 kHz is being constructed so as to minimize interference with WHO in Iowa and the facilities being erected at the Radio Marti coordinates.

Ambassador **Ikle**. Yes, though the coincidence is not coincidental. It is by design, just as I had explained. We wanted to design those facilities so that they would meet our military requirement, but we checked so that we would not do something inadvertently that would in no way enhance or serve the military requirement, but just by sheer inadvertence prevent the facility from being used in another way, should Congress so authorize, so as to get dual use for the taxpayers' money.

We recognize that that authorization may not occur. And we realize that the amount of money, which is relatively small, was fully justified for our urgent military requirements to have a broadcasting capability.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Mr. Secretary, in the event there is jamming, and we have very good assurance that there is going to be jamming and interference with the advent of Radio Marti, what indemnification do you feel should be given to the private sector broadcasting industry of this country? Sure, they can run around changing signals, but the chaos, disruption, confusion, and cost that would be incurred would be great. I have heard from many of these people, and I think we have to be concerned with the economic integrity of the private sector of the broadcasting industry here in this country, too.

Do you think the Federal Government should play a role in that?

Ambassador **Ikle**. I totally agree, Senator. I assume you refer not so much to jamming that Castro would institute to prevent the signal of Radio Marti from reaching his own people, that if it is done effectively will really not interfere with the United States. I assume what you refer to is really deliberate interference by high-powered Cuban broadcasting stations.

Senator **Zorinsky**. If the comments these broadcasters are making to us are valid ones and become a reality, where their station signals are impaired——

Ambassador **Ikle**. If there are broadcasting stations which infringe on international agreements and would infringe with the broadcasters that you referred to giving their farm news and all of that, I think this is not directly a Department of Defense concern, but I feel it would be a Government-wide concern and a concern for Congress that an illegal act by the Government of Cuba, which violates international conventions to which they agreed, as a political retaliation against a legal act by the United States, supported by the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, would not be tolerable.

We would want, as you say, the integrity and economic viability of our private radio stations. I would hate to speculate on what particular response we should give. I don't think it is prudent to speculate on that, because of similar Cuban actions—if one succeeds, they may step to another.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Do you feel that the Cubans have taken any illegal actions thus far throughout the world?

Ambassador **Ikle**. Well, I would not suggest——

Senator **Zorinsky**. Do not forget, we have a good precedent upon which to base the fear.

Ambassador **Ikle**. We also have a precedent where solid U.S. bargaining with Cuba backed up by determination has brought an improvement again. There has been constant bargaining, and sometimes we have been successful and sometimes we have not, but there could be other acts of a retaliatory nature that are illegal. They could capture our fishermen and interfere with them, much as they interfere with broadcasting, in order to extort some other action from the United States.

Senator **Zorinsky**. While we attempt a legal route to resolve these violations, what happens to the private sector broadcasting industry in this country?

Ambassador **Ikle**. I think this is really an area beyond my competence, whether the Federal Communications Commission or Congress can take some action to tide over our private broadcasters during these difficulties, so that their financial integrity is protected. I think these are possibilities that I have seen discussed before.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that in future hearings on this issue we do have some input as to financial liability of the Federal Government. If we are going to create a situation which precipitates the private sector in broadcasting having to spend confiscatory amounts of money to provide for their own survival due to an act of our Government, then we ought to hear some testimony on that facet of this proposal. I think it is very essential that we maintain our broadcasting industry as an integral part of our society.

Ambassador **Ikle**. Senator, if I might make one more point here, with the permission of the chairman, I think it is very important that whatever we do for our private broadcasters—and I am totally sympathetic to your points on that issue—not be misconstrued as condoning the Cuban illegal action of perpetrating deliberate interference. Otherwise, we would be giving in to blackmail. We would be like in a hostage situation. We would be letting our broadcasters be hostage. Next time it might be our fishermen; or anything Castro does not like, he will start interfering with, whether it be fishing or transit in the Caribbean, or television broadcasting, if he can. He will try to force our Government to do other things or to make up for it through internal compensation.

I think these things must be kept separate. If interference indeed is deliberately augmented. I think that would be a major issue, and it would have to be sorted out in hard bargaining.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Aren't there any other stations that are currently in place that can transmit to Cuba?

Ambassador **Ikle**. This gets back again to what I was trying to explain. There is no technical connection whatsoever between the illegal threat of creating deliberate radio broadcast interference in the Middle West or wherever and Radio Marti.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Aren't there any radio stations currently broadcasting in Florida, for example, that are not being used to the maximum amount of their ability? Could such stations be used for the very same thing that we are going to invest money in Radio Marti to do? Are we reinventing the wheel, in other words?

Ambassador **Ikle**. No; there might be additional uses that could be made of unused broadcasting facilities. I will let other witnesses testify on that. But that, of course, will not get you away from this blackmail threat.

Senator **Zorinsky**. It would get you away from spending tax dollars that may not be necessary.

Ambassador **Ikle**. Well, it is for other witnesses to explain how the proposed funding for Radio Marti or the Cuban broadcasting situation are to be allocated, and whether one could economize. Indeed, this very effort that we made in the Defense Department to potentially allow for the economic double use of technical facilities is moving in that direction.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Zorinsky.

Before some of our Senators arrived, I indicated that Secretary Ikle was brought here because of the involvement of the Defense Department in the construction of the facility in Florida, but we have a number of witnesses this morning who would deal essentially with the policy issues. I limited my questioning to 5 minutes, but I yield now to the chairman of our Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs for a full 10 minutes if he would like to have it.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, why don't I yield first to the distinguished minority member so that we will be back on track?

Senator PELL. I thank you, but shouldn't we go back and forth?

Senator HELMS. Well, I did want to defer to you first for your statement.

Senator PELL. You are very kind, but why don't you go ahead, please? Thank you very much for your courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say that any opening statements by Senators can be made at this time.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I do not have much in the way of an opening statement, and I mean to offend nobody who opposes or even questions the concept of Radio Marti, but it seems to me that sooner or later we must get down to the bottom line: are we in favor of truth, are we going to sit back and do nothing in the face of the arrogant activities of Fidel Castro who is himself broadcasting propaganda to Latin America? It seems to me, and maybe Dr. Ikle can comment if my apprehension is incorrect, that all we hear when it is suggested that we do something to counter the Soviet Union and its very clear activities in our hemisphere, is say well, we had better not do that, we might stir up something, or we cannot do this because it will offend someone over there, and we end up doing nothing.

We had a vote yesterday on the simple question of an airstrip in Honduras. I was amazed at the number of Senators who voted against that minimal help to a country which is devotedly our friend. I will say to Dr. Ikle and other witnesses, who include our distinguished former colleague, Dick Stone, and I am delighted to see you always, Dick—we miss your valuable input on this general question—I was in Honduras earlier this year. The President asked me to go down and represent him at the inauguration of the new president. Mr. Chairman, I think I shall never forget sitting in that soccer stadium with 60,000 or 65,000 people as its capacity. There were formalities which were quite impressive.

Their new president in his inaugural message began by saying I am a friend of the United States. Then he said, I am anti-Communist. Then he said, I am not capable of doing this job myself. I must have divine guidance and your help, and he pointed to the people, 65,000 of them.

And yet we sit up here in the United States and we say, well, we had better make a deal with Castro if we can. We had better get along. We have the spectacle of Senators going down there, and they are perfectly entitled to use their own judgment on where they go, what they do, and with whom they associate, and they smoke cigars with Castro and eat ice cream cones, and there is much backslapping. That is fine, I suppose, but it does not get to the heart of the question, what are we going to do about a Communist takeover of this hemisphere?

That is the fundamental question involved, and if I speak strongly on this subject, it is not simply because Radio Marti is kind of my idea. It is because I think that the hour is late.

Let me ask you this, Dr. Ikle. Have you had any suggestion from anybody who has expressed opposition to or who has questioned the concept of Radio Marti as to how we can do it? All I have heard is why we cannot do it or should not do it. Have you had any suggestion from the other side about that?

Ambassador Ikle. Senator, I am not sure I have heard all of the suggestions for alternatives, but they are focusing on the area that we would naturally more focus on—communications technology and so on. I can pick one or two suggestions that come to my attention. One suggestion I think that was discussed in a committee in the House, that is, in the other body, was that one should confine the broadcasting to the shortwave length. That, I think, is related to the misunderstanding on which I took quite a bit of your time and for which I apologize in this committee—the misunderstanding between jamming and interference and legal counters and illegal counters. It had the mistaken notion behind it that if you shift to shortwave, somehow the Cuban threat of interfering with our medium wave would go away.

We, of course, have the experience that if you give in to a blackmail threat you stimulate others, and if you give in to that threat—interfering with medium waves, back in the Middle West—then the next time Castro does not like something our Government is doing, he may, as I have suggested, just capture fishing boats and hold those for ransom until Congress complies. So, I think that technical suggestion occurred because of a misunderstanding.

That is about the only alternative on the technical side that I have heard.

Senator Helms. That is the only one I have heard, too.

Ambassador Ikle. Secretary Enders may have discussed the political alternatives.

Senator Helms. I have heard suggestions that we should delay this a little bit longer until some other report is received. Good Lord, Mr. Secretary. We have delayed it, we have delayed it, and we have delayed it. It is time to fish or cut bait. I think I know how the Senate of the United States will vote once this matter is reported out. I truly hope there will be no effort to delay it further. Let's go ahead and give it our best shot.

Mr. Chairman, the other day I met, quite by accident, with three Cuban families. Two of them have members of their families still in prison in Havana. The wife of one of the gentlemen said to me, "You know, we are beginning to wonder whether the United States cares anything about us or not." She put the question to me kind of directly. She said, "Do you think your country has any interest in seeing freedom restored in Cuba?" I said, well, I think the vast majority of Americans do, but it is the inertia of Congress and the unwillingness to face the obvious fact that we are losing in this hemisphere, that we are losing to the Soviets bit by bit, grab by grab. We are not losing because we are fighting, we are losing because we are doing nothing.

I say that one of these days, if we allow the area of Central America to go down the tubes, we are going to have a refugee problem that will make the existing one look like a tea party, because there are 100 million people living between our southern borders and Panama, and it is a reasonable expectation that 10 or 15 percent of them will walk north.

The question this Congress must face then or face now is, what will we do with 10 to 15 million people who do not speak English, who do not have jobs, who do not have homes? Gentlemen, if we delay this thing much further, we will be sending a signal that is well, we are just going to talk about it and delay. I hope we will move along and not delay it further.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Helms, I would like to comment on those Senators who have seen fit to "go down and see" Castro, smoke cigars with him, ride around in jeeps with him and eat ice cream cones.

Senator **Helms**. I did not mention the jeep riding. I appreciate your adding that. [General laughter.]

The **Chairman**. I have never met Mr. Castro. However, I did receive a perfectly beautiful box of cigars from him in an inlaid wooden box which I turned over to the State Department. [General laughter.]

The value of the box was above the $100. I think, much less than the cigars. I am sure they enjoyed the cigars at the Department. [General laughter.]

But I also have the feeling that Senators who have traveled to Cuba are in no different position than President Reagan when he invited Mr. Brezhnev to meet with him. Meeting with an adversary does not necessarily mean you are countenancing what they are doing. I think it is dangerous in the world today to not have communications.

There are conscientious people who have differing opinions on this legislation. We intend to examine all views fully. That is why staff has prepared and we have released a thoughtful study by the Library of Congress. It is objective, unbiased, and was written by experts, raising a number of questions that have to be answered. The track for this legislation will not be a very fast one, but we will proceed with deliberate speed. There will be no attempt to delay it or filibuster it within this committee. This chairman will not tolerate those tactics, and no committee member has ever tried. Senator Helms has been in the forefront of always letting things go right through the committee when we are ready for them.

But we will do a thorough job of analysis, and I hope an unbiased, totally objective job.

However, there are conflicting views on this subject.

Senator Grassley was scheduled as our first witness.

Senator Grassley, if you would yield to Senator Pell who would like to make an opening statement, and then if you would be good enough to testify and give your testimony, we would appreciate that.

Senator **Pell**. I also have a question or two.

The **Chairman**. We will come back to Secretary Ikle. Senator Grassley regretfully has a problem in scheduling, so I would like to accommodate him.

Senator **Pell**. I would be glad to defer to Senator Grassley.

The **Chairman**. All right, fine. Maybe that would be better. And then you can follow with the questioning of Mr. Ikle.

## STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA

Senator GRASSLEY. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify. I have written to the committee previously by personal letter.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a choice of testifying here or joining the panel.

Senator GRASSLEY. I would like to stay here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, fine.

Senator GRASSLEY. I have written to committee members a personal letter, submitted testimony at that time that I gave to the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, and I am going to submit that same testimony as part of this record.

I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear, and I will be perfectly candid and say that my interest, obviously, to some extent is very narrow in the sense that WHO Radio of Des Moines, Iowa, is at 1040 kHz where there is some consideration of having Radio Marti, but also in a broader sense the extent to which WHO Radio is part of the tradition of agriculture in the Midwest in the extent to which it has 24-hour broadcasting, there are other people beyond the boundaries of Iowa who rely to a considerable extent upon this radio and the problems that it might cause, not only WHO Broadcasting Co. but also people who live within the Midwest generally.

So even though I want to be perfectly candid and say the immediate concern is WHO Radio, it goes beyond that.

I also would like to say parenthetically that WHO Radio is the radio station where in the 1930's President Reagan was sports broadcaster.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you pointing out a conflict of interest? [General laughter.]

Senator GRASSLEY. To some extent we refer to this as President Reagan's radio station. [General laughter.]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to testify, and as I previously said, I want to submit the testimony that I had given to the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting because it goes into more detail than I want to in this 3-page statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The full statement will be incorporated in the record.

Senator GRASSLEY. I feel that the purposes and the goals of Radio Marti are worthy. The Cuban people have a right to know the truth or if the truth is used too broadly, at least to say that they need to know more than what they get from their own government now. And Radio Marti is an excellent vehicle from which this message can be directed.

The issues that need to be fully addressed, however, are at what cost the American citizens and the U.S. Government should be willing to pay for this effort and whether the expected benefits justify these costs. With this analysis, it is imperative that all viable alternatives are explored.

So I come to you, I say parenthetically, to ask you to explore alternatives that I am going to suggest.

As presently planned, Radio Marti will be broadcast from Florida on a frequency of 1040 kHz. Cuba has made clear its intentions to utilizing a 500,000-watt AM station to jam Radio Marti. If Cuba carries out this threat, WHO Broadcasting Co. in Des Moines, Iowa, will be damaged immensely. WHO's broadcast covers 1,714,000 square miles during the evening and predawn hours. Once Cuba jams Radio Marti, this WHO coverage will be reduced to fewer than 6,000 square miles, shrinking the station's broadcast radius from 800 miles to about 45 miles.

Cuban jamming will mean much more than the ruination of WHO's operations. It will spell the destruction of an essential marketing and production informational tool that is utilized by thousands of farm families throughout Iowa and the Midwest. Farmers have come to rely upon early morning broadcasts for farm news, weather forecasts, and farm market quotations. Farmers must have this valuable, timely information if they are to operate and manage their farms efficiently. And I would suggest that you ask Loraine if the people who farm her farms in northwest Iowa would not rely upon WHO for a considerable amount of news early in the morning on what the trends are in agriculture.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you trying to point out that I also have a conflict of interest? [General laughter.]

Senator GRASSLEY. No, not at all but I do know that you have an interest in agriculture, and your wife has a farming operation in Iowa.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. That sounds like a conflict of interest to me. [General laughter.]

Senator GRASSLEY. WHO is also the backbone of Iowa's emergency radio warning system. WHO relays emergency messages to nearly 60 other Iowa radio stations for automatic broadcast. To allow the disruption of this system will jeopardize the safety of citizens in my State and maybe in the Midwest generally. Replacement of this essential system would be costly, difficult, and time consuming.

It has also been revealed by a recent study conducted by the National Association of Broadcasters that more than 200 AM stations throughout the Nation will suffer as a result of Cuban radio interference. Indeed, the costs to the public will be immense.

Alternate operation plans do exist for Radio Marti. These viable alternatives can provide the same positive results at a lower cost while avoiding the tremendous damage and loss to Americans generally, particularly in the Midwest. Some of the alternatives I have detailed in the statement I submitted include the possibilities of utilizing the Voice of America facility at Marathon, Fla., the broadcast of a flexible FM signal, the utilization of 1200 kHz, and the broadcasting from air or sea. There has also been considerable support expressed for the use of 1610 kHz, and shortwave broadcasts. And I understand the concern about not having enough radios in Cuba that have shortwave receiving capacity.

Some of these alternatives would result in little or no additional costs to the Government. I am certain that the members of this committee share my sensitivity to unnecessary, avoidable expenses to the Government. It seems a waste of taxpayers' money to spend over $10 million to build and operate Radio Marti under its present plans when other, less costly alternatives, are available. But more important, it is unjustifiable to carry through with plans that are going to jeopardize the safety of our citizens, destroy essential news services, and cause a tremendous loss of money.

Clearly these costs have to be weighed very carefully to determine whether or not the benefits are worthwhile. This means a thorough investigation of all alternatives before authorizing Radio Marti. In this light, I am sure that the committee shares my deep concern about this proposal and appreciates the gravity of making certain that the public is afforded the full opportunity to air its views before further action is taken.

Thank you.

[Senator Grassley's statement before the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba follows:]

## STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLES GRASSLEY BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA, MARCH 30, 1982

I appreciate this opportunity to express my deep concerns about the potential effect of operating the proposed Radio Marti as presently planned. Specifically, I am referring to the disastrous consequences for the WHO Broadcasting Company that will result if Cuba carries out its threat to jam Radio Marti with a 500,000 watt AM station. WHO, which shares Radio Marti's proposed frequency of 1040 kHz, would be harmed immensely in the event that Cuba retaliates. This Cuban action not only would spell ruin in terms of WHO operations, but also would destroy a marketing and production informational tool that thousands of farm families have come to rely upon over the past several decades.

In addition to my service in Congress and the Iowa General Assembly, I have farmed most of my life. I recognize and appreciate the importance of being able to depend upon WHO at 5 or 6 a.m. to provide important farm news, weather forecasts, farm market quotations, etc. Farmers must start very early in the morning to begin their daily livestock chores and to get to the fields. Information provided by WHO in those early hours shapes the management decisions of the farmer not only for that immediate day, but also for the weeks ahead for the year. Farmers must have this valuable, timely information if they are to operate effectively and successfully.

It is not only the Iowa farmer who depends upon WHO's pre-dawn broadcast services. WHO's broadcast covers 1,714.337 square miles during the evening and pre-dawn hours. With this range, WHO can reach farmers from over 50 states and Canada. If Cuba retaliates as threatened, this coverage would be reduced to fewer than 6,000 square miles, reducing the station's broadcast radius from 800 miles to about 45 miles. Needless to say, this action would deprive most of Iowa farmers from the essential information offered by WHO, let alone the hundreds of thousands of farm families throughout the rest of the region.

While I fully support the purposes and goals of Radio Marti, in light of the severe damage that the present plans will create for WHO and farmers throughout the Nation, I strongly urge the selection of one of the many viable alternative operating plans that exist for Radio Marti. These alternatives can provide the same positive results at a lower cost, while avoiding the tremendous damage to WHO service.

The most feasible alternative would be to utilize the existing Voice of America facility at Marathon, Florida. Since this station is used only a few hours a day, there would be plenty of broadcasting time available to serve the purposes of Radio Marti. Another positive aspect of this alternative is the fact that Radio Marti could be operational immediately, at little or no additional cost to the government. As a member of the Senate Budget Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, I am acutely sensitive to the unnecessary, avoidable expenses of government. It seems to me a waste to spend over $10 million to build and operate Radio Marti when other less costly facilities are available. Furthermore, there exists even weaker logic for these enormous expenditures, for a radio station that could be rendered immediately ineffective by Cuban retaliatory jamming. For those who suggest that we cannot afford to jeopardize Radio Marathon's operation, I suggest that we likewise cannot justify the destruction of one of the finest farm radio operations in the country.

If the threat from Cuban retaliation is determined to be too real to jeopardize Radio Marathon, and since there is no justification for ruining the operations of WHO, other alternatives may require additional consideration. It is possible that we might be able to use a Mexican clear-channel frequency if permission can be obtained; we might be able to utilize a flexible FM signal that would be far more difficult to jam; the use of 1200 kHz presents another alternative that would also be more difficult to jam; and it would also be possible to broadcast from air to sea.

In summary, Radio Marti must be operated in a manner that minimizes the costs to our citizens and to our government. Utilizing 1040 kHz will destroy a very valuable service provided by WHO for the hundreds of thousands of farmers and other radio listeners around the country in the event that Cuba carries out its threat. If the State Department and other government officials determine that there is no real threat, then Radio Marathon should be utilized because of the cost savings as well as many other benefits that this alternative presents. If the Cuban retaliation threat is real and imminent, then we must not waste taxpayers money by building Radio Marti, as well as allow the destruction of a fine farm radio service. Instead, a workable alternative must be developed.

Thank you for this opportunity to present my views. I appreciate your consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley.

For the benefit of the Illinois press, I just want to make absolutely certain they understand that Loraine also has two farms in Illinois. The yield in corn and soybeans is even higher than——

Senator GRASSLEY. Only because you have more rain.

The CHAIRMAN. Both farm operators in Illinois listen to WHO and WGN in Chicago I believe also has a similar point of view and concern about this.

While you are still here, Mr. Ikle, I would like to ask one question, and it pertains to WHO's frequency.

Mr. Secretary, if the Navy intends to use the towers it is erecting to broadcast on 1040 kHz, what is to prevent Cuba from jamming that signal?

Ambassador IKLE. Mr. Chairman, jamming can be done and it can reduce the effectiveness of the broadcasts, as we experience in Eastern Europe, but it does not eliminate the effectiveness of these programs, particularly properly designed. It is a parallel situation to what we have in Eastern Europe.

Jamming, of course, is very different from the kind of interference Senator Grassley has referred to. As I mentioned before the Senator came in, there was a misunderstanding here that there was no technical connection between the threatened retaliatory interference in broadcasts and Radio Marti and possible Cuban attempts to stop Radio Marti. The Cubans, as much as they could use 1040, could use 1180 to interfere with another radio station here. So shifting to 1180 would not cure it. Putting your radio station on a ship would not get us out of possible threat of retaliation as the Cubans might threaten to capture some of our fishing vessels to do the same kind of blackmail—illegal interference with legal activities by the United States in order to pressure Congress to comply with Castro's wishes on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Grassley, we thank you very much for your testimony. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First I would like to comment on the references to the Honduran airstrip and then touch on the general question of policy vis-a-vis Cuba, and then go to the specifics regarding Radio Marti.

First, in connection with the vote on the Honduran airstrips yesterday, I was very glad that while the majority of my colleagues disagreed with me, 28 other Senators shared my view that it was a mistake to go ahead with the enlargement of those airfields which U.S. combat aircraft would be able to use. I offered to withdraw the amendment if the administration would agree to send me a letter saying they would consult with the Foreign Relations Committee prior to American military use of the airfields. They were not willing to do that, and that is why I pressed the amendment, and I would do the same thing again.

Now, vis-a-vis Cuba, I also have been to Cuba. I was there in 1960 when all the people who opposed Castro were either killed by him, put in jail, or fled. I again went to Cuba with Senator Javits, the Senator from New York, in 1974. We did not ride in a jeep with Mr. Castro but we did with his brother, and I was struck by the fact, incidentally, that security for the Castro brothers seemed negligible, and they drove their jeeps in a much freer way than some of us drive our cars coming down here to work.

In connection with our policy toward Cuba, I think we have practiced it now for 20 years and it has been a lamentable failure. We have embargoed that country economically. We have mounted one major invasion at the Bay of Pigs, and perhaps many mini-invasions as well. We have made several attempts to assassinate the chief of state, the chief of government, and then we wonder why it remains the greatest exporter of virulent communism in the world today.

I think we have ourselves to thank in part for having created and prolonged the existence of this Frankenstein. They themselves have given some signs of wanting to be out of the expensive embrace of the Soviet Union. Their Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez met with Secretary Haig a few months ago. He tried to meet with me and other Senators at the disarmament session in New York last week, but I was not able to see him. I do not know if any others did.

Castro met with General Walters a little while back. There are many signs that they would like to reduce the level of anger, the high tension that exists between our two nations at this time.

If you create Radio Marti, to my mind it goes in exactly the opposite direction. It would exacerbate the present relations even further, if they can be exacerbated further. We actually tried to do the same thing twice before. The CIA did it with Radio Swan. I remember that in my early years here as a Senator. And that was a dismal failure. Also, the USIA tried it with a program called Cita con Cuba, and that did not work out terribly well.

I appreciated receiving the interim report of the President's commission, but I do think that we should have the final report before us before we can usefully discuss this matter and mark up any legislation that is proposed. I think we should have the benefit of the final report at that time. I would add that the interim report states that the House and Senate leadership was consulted on Radio Marti. I would like to know what the nature of that conversation was since as ranking minority member of our committee I do not recall being consulted in any way on that. That I think might be considered to be a misstatement of fact.

Finally, I would like to know what role President Reagan's Latin American advisers during the campaign played in the development of the Radio Marti concept. Here I refer to the advisers now in policymaking positions in the National Security Council. I believe Lewis Tambs is one who wrote the report that recommended the establishment of "a Radio Free Cuba under open U.S. Government sponsorship which would beam objective information to the Cuban people, that among other things details the costs of Havana's unholy alliance with Moscow. If propaganda fails, the war of national liberation against Castro must be launched."

So I would very much appreciate the comments of the witnesses to these points specifically, what was meant by consultation with the leadership, and also, what role did Mr. Tambs play in the recommendations, the acceptance of the recommendations for Radio Marti?

Ambassador IKLE. If this is a question to me, Mr. Chairman, let me say that some of these questions should go to other witnesses.

Senator PELL. Well, much of what I said is a statement. I have only two specific questions.

Ambassador IKLE. Any question that you want to direct to me, Senator Pell, I would like to answer. The ones you want me to answer are the consultations, I think, that should be answered by other witnesses. That was not a Defense Department lead role.

On the question of where does the idea come from: Since I was involved in the transition process for the Reagan administration, I can provide an answer there. The idea is really not that new. Senator Helms referred to it; that he has articulated the idea. As an obvious analogy, there is the success of Radio Free Europe to which you yourself have contributed, Senator. There is an obvious parallel there. It is not surprising that people want to imitate success.

I think candidate Reagan had mentioned the idea quite early, way back. I also understand, though other witnesses may elaborate better on this, that it was considered, not rejected, I think, but considered and not decided upon in the Carter administration.

Senator PELL. I guess the difference between our viewpoints in that to my mind, the general policy we have had vis-a-vis Cuba has been incorrect and has been a failure and that this is escalation of that policy rather than a change which I saw signs of sometime back with the efforts of Rodriguez vis-a-vis Haig, and Castro vis-a-vis Walters and the various other actions, gestures that have been made to try to lower the temperature rather than heightening it.

Ambassador IKLE. Well, at the risk of stealing Tom Enders' thunder, who I believe will testify further, let me quote something he said—it is always better to be quoted by someone else, Tom—diplomacy enables us to talk to the government, but we must also talk to the people. And as I mentioned in my opening testimony, our talking to the Cuban people over a period of years in a reasonably constructed program can create forces for peace there which will be very conducive to our broad security interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Enders, I wonder if you would like to take a place at the table. We are getting into so many policy questions which really do not involve the Department of Defense—their role is a very limited one. The State Department has the policy responsibility—maybe you could comment on the questions that Senator Pell has raised.

Ambassador ENDERS. I would be glad to answer the questions with regard to the role of Mr. Tambs, I am not aware that Mr. Tambs had any role in this proposal, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Pardon, what was that?

Ambassador ENDERS. I am not aware that Mr. Tambs had any role in the formulation of this.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Ambassador, would you pull your microphone closer to you?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say that because of your height you are going to have to either lean down to the microphone or pull it up. You do have to be fairly close to these microphones for them to be useful.

Thank you.

Senator PELL. Secretary Enders has said, therefore, that Mr. Tambs had nothing to do with the formulation of this concept, for which I am very glad.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Thank you.

Senator Boschwitz?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a number of questions. I am in general sympathy with the objectives of Radio Marti, and——

The CHAIRMAN. Could we, Senator Boschwitz, finish with the Defense Department and release Secretary Ikle?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. My questions would be generally directed at Mr. Enders.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; fine. We will come right back to you and I will be happy to yield time to you, because you have not had a chance to question.

Senator Dodd, do you have any questions for Secretary Ikle?

Senator DODD. I can wait, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Mr. Secretary, we thank you very much for being here. We appreciate it very much indeed.

Now, Senator Boschwitz, if you could put your policy questions to Secretary Enders.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. This station, Mr. Enders, is going to be a 500-kW station, as I understand it?

Ambassador ENDERS. Fifty. The maximum that is permitted in the United States is 50.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Oh, no, I am referring to the Cuban one.

Ambassador ENDERS. Oh, I am sorry. The Cuban stations. The Cubans announced in 1979 that they would build two 500 kW stations with 10 times the maximum power permitted in the United States.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Do we plan a directional station?

Ambassador ENDERS. Our station would have a directional antenna. None of the Cuban stations use directional antennas.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Is our station directed not only at Cuba but at South America in general to counteract some of the broadcasting that is done by stations in Cuba?

Ambassador ENDERS. No. This would be directed at Cuba alone. Of course, we have the Voice of America—which discusses international news and the United States—which is beamed universally, including to South America.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Would you please expand on the statement you made in your testimony that in our interviews of Cubans who have come here we found that they were not very aware of what their government was doing in other parts of the world? It was my understanding that there was quite a free flow of information, telephones and so forth, between Cuba and Florida, and that surprises me.

Ambassador **Enders**. No, sir, there is not a very free flow. There was one brief period in which Cuban Americans were permitted to go in large numbers to Cuba to visit relatives and friends, and the result of that was a very substantial exchange of information. It is noteworthy that the Cuban Government acted almost immediately to close that down afterward.

Senator **Boschwitz**. You can no longer make telephone calls?

Ambassador **Enders**. Telephone circuits are relatively limited and the number of Cubans who have private telephones is not very high.

Senator **Boschwitz**. And would you then expand on what we discovered from interviewing some of the Cubans who came over here?

Ambassador **Enders**. We were surprised to find that very few people knew much about the Cuban soldiers in Africa, for example. The Cubans do go to considerable lengths to conceal how many people go to Africa, and they do not bring the wounded and dead back. So it is not widely known.

There are some signs that are appearing, such as certain diseases which are African in nature which are appearing in Cuba, but these are usually attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency as a result of a planned epidemic which is put into Cuba.

We found that at the same time the Cuban people did not have any clear idea of the very substantial amounts of aid they were receiving from the Soviet Union, because, of course, none of that aid seems ever to get to the people themselves.

Senator **Boschwitz**. How many Cubans are there in Africa, 20,000?

Ambassador **Enders**. Forty thousand.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Forty thousand. There are 9 million people in Cuba, as I remember the figure. That is one-half of 1 percent of the population.

Ambassador **Enders**. A very substantial number, yes.

Senator **Boschwitz**. It is very hard to believe that the Cuban people would not be aware of this.

How long can you keep those folks away from home without the people knowing? Do they not write home?

Ambassador **Enders**. One of the characteristics of societies of this kind is that people are very reluctant to talk with each other. That is one of the purposes of the radio, you see, that totalitarian societies do break down intercommunications between people, and the radio gives them an opportunity to hear things their neighbors would not tell them. The same is true of the telephone. If you get a telephone call from outside, nobody will say anything much on it for obvious reasons, because they are listened to.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Why was the 1040 frequency picked? 1040 currently is the clear channel station from Des Moines that Senator Grassley spoke of. There are about two dozen clear channel stations, as I recall. Is there not a frequency that is open that is not clear channel?

Ambassador **Enders**. Well, there is very extensive use of all frequencies in North America.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I understand.

Ambassador **Enders**. And in the hemisphere, as you know, and I would like to comment on this because both Senator Zorinsky and Senator Grassley, if I heard them correctly, said that Cuba was retaliating against Radio Marti by announcing these 500 kW, very powerful transmitters. If I could go over the chronolgy just a moment, Senator, because I think it may be helpful in this regard.

Those two 500-kW transmitters were announced in 1979. The Cuban Government in bilateral talks with us in August of last year told us that it was going to put one of them on 1040, which is the frequency of WHO, and another one on 1160, which is KSL in Salt Lake City. These are both clear channel frequencies in the United States.

We pointed out at the time that they would cause very substantial interference, and we proposed a package of exchanges between the United States, a package of adjustments on our frequencies on our side and on the Cuban side which would minimize what appeared to be a developing pattern of interference.

This was, however, long before the Radio Marti proposal was announced. It was a month before that, and it was no less than 3 months before our choice, through the FCC, of the 1040 frequency was notified to the regional conference, and that final decision was not made until January of this year.

My point is that rather than being retaliation against Radio Marti, Senator, it was the other way around. This was an announcement of a frequency in violation of international commitments against interference that was made in advance of our announcement of Radio Marti as a project, and many months in advance of the proposal from the FCC that 1040 be used for it.

Now, the Cubans are not broadcasting yet on 1040, but they are broadcasting on 1160 and interfering very substantially with KSL. So we have a problem which predates, is much larger than Radio Marti, Senator, and I think it is very important to keep the two separate.

That is one reason, I think, why the National Association of Broadcasters, and I do not know, Mr. Chairman, whether you are going to call them, why the National Association of Broadcasters has not taken a position on Radio Marti.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Well, let me say this. I have never lived in a closed society, but it seems to me if half of 1 percent of any society is shipped off to Africa, most of the rest of the folks would know about it. I will ask my staff person to look into that rather than discuss that here.

But why do you not pick 1030? It is a clear channel station. There are so many different numbers.

Ambassador **Enders**. Let me describe the process.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Mr. Chairman, I am told my time is up. I waited very patiently for an hour and a half and would appreciate some time.

The **Chairman**. Senator Boschwitz, we are on a 10-minute rule, and I took 5 minutes. Everyone has been waiting. We will just stay with the 10-minute rule. If you could finish your one question, we will go on to Senator Dodd.

Ambassador **Enders**. I would be glad to submit that process separately to the Senator.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Then I will ask a series of questions and will ask that they be answered.

Senator **Dodd**. Mr. Chairman, I believe in continuity of questioning, and I am patient.

The **Chairman**. I will be staying for the whole hearing, so it does not matter to me.

Senator **Dodd**. If you want to go ahead, Rudy, please do.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I will just ask a series of questions.

The **Chairman**. How much longer do you suppose they would take, Senator Boschwitz?

Senator **Boschwitz**. I will just ask them, and they can be answered for the record. And I would make one or two comments.

The **Chairman**. We do have a substantial number of additional witnesses to hear today.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I understand that.

I would like to know why that particular frequency was chosen? I do not subscribe very much to the idea that any radio station has a coverage of a 1,700,000 square miles. And I say that as an advertiser on WHO over a period of a number of years as a businessman.

Is is unclear to me how much the cost to the station is. And I see that the authorization is for $10 million or $7 million. And it is not clear to me how much other stations would require by way of some type of recompense for interference with their signal. I think I would oppose that, but I would like to have the opinions of the State Department about that.

I would like to know why we cannot buy time or why the State Department cannot buy time on a number of other Florida stations that are now operating within full range of Cuba rather than establishing a new station altogether.

I would like to also know about Mexican stations, because I think they are far in excess of the normal 50 kW and they interfere, and how that interrelates.

And how many Spanish-speaking stations are there now in Florida? And why can we not operate through them rather than establishing a new station?

I say again, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, that I have sympathy for what is intended here and also a sympathy for the desired results, which I think are reasonably achievable.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize. I did not realize that my time was up so quickly.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much. The only awkward problem we have this morning is, none of the other Senators has had a chance to question Secretary Enders. We limited our questioning to Secretary Ikle, we have not asked any policy questions yet. We are really starting in reverse order in the seniority system; a system which I respect more and more in the Senate as I advance in age. [General laughter.]

Senator Dodd.

Senator **Dodd**. I suppose, Mr. Chairman, one day I will, too. [General laughter.]

The **Chairman**. Yes; someday you will, too.

Senator **Dodd**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I thank Mr. Enders for appearing here this morning. If I can, I have some general comments about this proposal for Radio Marti.

First of all, Mr. Chairman—and I said this before in this committee, and I have said it in the presence, I think, of the members who are here—I do not and will not take a back seat to anyone in my opposition to Fidel Castro and the kind of politics and government which he imposes on the people of his own country of Cuba not to mention his acts of aggression around the globe. On that point, I will not accept a second spot to anyone.

Having said that, and while I truly and deeply respect the tremendous frustration and anger that are felt by Americans of Cuban descent who now live in this country, the families and individuals who have been killed, maimed, imprisoned, and have been violated in unmentionable ways, and certainly the plight of those Cubans who are presently living in Cuba and who cannot leave and are subjected to the cruelties imposed upon them by the Castro government, I would say with all due respect to those who are proposing this particular suggestion, that the desired result is not going to be achieved and, in fact, the exact opposite result will be effected if we proceed with this suggestion.

I have tried to think of the best possible words to describe this proposal. And the only thing I could come up with was what Al Smith had to say—and I say this with all due respect to the proponents of the idea—and that is, no matter how thin you slice it, it is still baloney.

That is what it is. It is a juvenile foreign policy idea. To think that somehow, by spending $17 million for a radio station that will broadcast into Cuba we will somehow change the complexion of the political realities in Latin America is ridiculous.

That is just where we are with regard to what we can do to challenge Castro. The best weapons against Castro and his brand of politics is economic development, political stability, some productivity, some hope for their future. That is the answer. A foreign policy with its end to destroy Marxism-Leninism is not going to achieve it with a radio station or arms alone. But if it is trying to build a better life for people in that part of the world, that is the best defense against Castroism.

Every place where there has been sound economic development, where there has been pluralism, where there has been self-determination and the ability for people to decide their own futures, Castro has failed. That is the lesson we failed to have learned over the past 20 years.

What are we doing this year? We are going to cut back on scholarship programs, for instance, for students from Latin America coming to this country.

When I was in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, hundreds of students were getting full scholarships to the Patrice Lumumba University in the Soviet Union, but a handful were coming to the United States. That is what is going to build an infrastructure. With $17 million, we could have a scholarship program and make a difference.

We are going to cut back on the Peace Corps all across the globe and in Latin America. That makes a difference in battling Castroism. In the Caribbean Basin Initiative, $17 million might make a difference in terms of trying to do something in that part of the world.

But to suggest somehow that we are really going to get Castro with this proposal is just foolish. And I am embarrassed to think that we are holding long hearings on an idea that just does not make any sense at all if we are truly going to battle the enemies that we face in our hemisphere and around the globe.

It is a bad idea. To think that you would even compare this to Radio Liberty or Radio Free Europe, where there were no alternatives for information in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. You can get Florida TV in Havana, and they get, I presume, a better reflection of what is going on in this country and the kind of information they should be receiving there than they will get out of this particular endeavor.

Mr. Chairman, I say this with all due respect to those who proposed it, and I say it to those who are solidly behind this idea. They are not doing themselves or the people they represent a service if they are truly interested in waging an effective battle against Castro and his supporters in this hemisphere.

Ambassador Enders, I have just a few questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd, may I interrupt you for just a moment. This is why this body has been called "the greatest deliberative body on Earth": because we really do feel that we are free to express ourselves, and we feel deeply about some issues. We are on divergent points of view, but we always respect each other for holding those views. I think you have expressed your point as eloquently as Senator Helms expressed his point of view.

Senator DODD. And my good friend Senator Helms and I have been through this. We do not disagree about our goals. It is how we are going to get there. How we are going to get there is where he and I have a very fundamental disagreement on how best to deal with that challenge. And that is what concerns me about this proposal.

I would suggest that Fidel Castro loves this hearing, that we are lionizing this guy. He does not deserve it. We are making him larger than life.

We are going to spend $17 million to build a radio station to deal with Fidel Castro, when we will not even bring students here and educate them. I think we are playing right into his hands. And we have done it over and over and over again. We actually do far more to enhance his reputation around the globe than he could ever do on his own.

We are spending $17 million to make Castro look bigger than he deserves. That is what we are doing. He would not spend that money on himself, for God's sake, and we are going to do it in this Congress, potentially. And that is what annoys me about this thing. It is not just this administration, it has been going on for the last 15 or 20 years as well.

And here we have the ability to broadcast without expending this money. I will not go into the questions raised by those from the farm States who are concerned with the obvious question of interfering with a domestic station here. But to pump in sports and entertainment at $17 million, I think is just foolish.

The CHAIRMAN. I see Secretary Enders doing all he can to restrain his 7-foot frame from speaking up. Did you ask him a question, or would you, just so he can have a chance to speak? [General laughter.]

Senator DODD. Well, I do have a question on your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Make up one question. [General laughter.]

Senator DODD. In your testimony, you talk about how these other stations in Florida cannot provide the kind of information about life in Cuba that Radio Marti would provide. Is there some source of information that Radio Marti is going to have that other stations with access to audiences in Cuba are not going to have?

Ambassador ENDERS. Yes. A couple of things about that, Senator. One is that their range, of course, is limited to the western part of Cuba. And second, and much more important, those are either American or Cuban American stations that have a rate base in the United States that talk and are programed, obviously, to their listenership. They can be heard. They say a lot about the United States. Some of them are, in effect, exile organizations which say a lot about the particular point of view of the exile group.

But what we are not promoting here is an exile radio, any more than we promoted that with Radio Liberty or with Radio Free Europe.

But I wonder when you say—and I would agree when you said earlier that if we are combating Castro and I would not admit, Senator, that is the only thing we are doing in our Latin American policy, by any means, is combating Castro—but if you are combating Castro in the hemisphere, you are going to do a lot of things with the countries concerned.

This is not a project which is directed toward Costa Rica or toward Venezuela or to the other countries. It is directed toward Cuba, a state which has this aggressive pattern of behavior, because, in fact, there is no way that the people can talk to their government effectively.

Now, you say Castro must be laughing. Then why is it that he seems so uptight about this? Why does he talk to so many people about this project? Why does he seem to fear it? Why does he make these noises about having to have counterbroadcasting? Or why do some Cuban officials' talk we pick up in intelligence reports about the need to jam, to prevent Cubans from hearing it? Why then is he disturbed?

Senator DODD. I will tell you why. There is not a politician in this hemisphere who loves center stage better than Fidel Castro. And we are giving it to him. And the more he protests, the more we go at it, and he gets more press and he loves it. That is why. He is no fool. He is a good politician. He understands how to get press. The more he complains about it, the more credibility we give him.

Ambassador ENDERS. Let us try to start talking to the Cuban people in the same way we have talked to the people in Eastern Europe, Senator.

Senator DODD. How many stations are there, Ambassador Enders, in Florida that are Hispanic stations that actually can reach into Havana? Do we know that?

Ambassador ENDERS. I assume that almost all of the stations in southern Florida can be heard on the western end of Cuba.

Senator DODD. How many are there now? How many reach into the major population centers into Havana, for instance?

Ambassador **Enders**. I think there are two that are generally heard. Television has a very short radius and really cannot be seen throughout the island, and FM wouldn't do. So you are dealing with some low-power stations that are basically dealing with the American audience. It is very fitful, and it is not targeted on Cuba in the way that we would have Radio Liberty, for example, targeted on the Soviet Union.

Senator **Dodd**. My time is up. I will have further questions.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Secretary Enders, I would like to ask you a three-part question. But as the Congressional Research Service report, a study that was made at our request, will show, there are very clear targeted audiences for Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.

First, what are the specific audiences in Cuba that you have in mind to target with Radio Marti broadcasts? Second, how long do you expect it is going to take before Radio Marti gains a following in Cuba? Do we have any experience in Eastern Europe to determine how long it is going to take to develop that audience?

And fourth, what specific domestic Cuban policies do you believe it is really possible to influence with Radio Marti in Cuba?

Ambassador **Enders**. With regard to the first, I think a prime, perhaps, for the time the most important one, would be the young people. They do not share the enthusiasm of the current Cuban leadership for war and revolution as the only occupation that people should have. And they have shown various signs of dissatisfaction and uncertainty.

We would like to be able to give them the kind of things that they do not get in their own system, the sort of features and the sort of music and the sort of sports, but along with some commentary about their own situation. This is the prime target, Senator, and it is the one, Senator Dodd, that Castro is most concerned about, and Communist countries in general are most concerned about for the future. We are not reaching them now.

Second, I think Cuba is obviously different from Poland or Czechoslovakia. I think it is impossible to make an estimate now of how long it will take to acquire the audience. But we know from our experience in Eastern Europe that it took a long time, not just to be heard but to acquire its confidence. And in order to do that, you cannot make any mistakes. They will turn off if you put misinformation on it. You have to be absolutely credible all the way through.

But it will take a number of years to do that. It is a long-term project. And it is not designed to show up Castro in the immediate future. It is designed over time to talk to the people.

As a third point, I think a very important consideration in Cuban society is obviously why so much of the resources can go to the military, to security, rather than to ordinary people. Cuba is a country in which the standard of living really has not changed in 20 years. There are not very many countries like that. Cubans ought to be able to raise questions about why that is so.

The **Chairman**. Many people who have expressed concern about Radio Marti feel that it is going to further strain our relationship.

Even some of the audience that you are aiming at, the academicians and journalists who are interested in seeing that Cuba does move toward closer relationships with the United States, have expressed concern that these programs might create more of a "Cold War" condition.

Do you believe that this program has introduced further strains in our relationships with Cuba, if that is possible?

Ambassador ENDERS. Well, one of the articles of faith, it seems to me, in our foreign policy, Mr. Chairman, under all kinds of different administrations has been that we believe in the free competition of ideas, and we have always felt that ultimately we would prevail or do well in that competition and that it is fundamental to our belief of the world that that is good for people.

The notion that a radio, if it is credible and serious and full of information, as our Eastern European radios are, is somehow an act of aggression is something that it seems to me we cannot accept. As long as, in fact, its frequency is allocated according to the responsible international bodies and the relevant international law, as is the case in Radio Marti.

If Cuba is irritated by this or reacts as we have seen some indications that Castro says maybe they should be counterbroadcasting at the United States, I do not think we should regard that as governing in the sense that we should accept the notion that we cannot do anything with which the Cubans might disagree but they can do a lot of things with which we disagree, then we will not be able to manage our relationship at all.

The CHAIRMAN. For 16 years I have been one of the strongest supporters of Radio Liberty and Radio Europe. I have really fought for it. I really believe in it. I believe the truth has to get through.

I believe when you have an adversary that has suppressed brutally the people of Eastern Europe, who is intimidating in every way it can, people all over the world and who has developed the capacity and capability to literally destroy the human race, that is an adversary you have to strongly confront.

We have to challenge them. But even in that situation, we have seen over recent years a change in attitude from the "Cold War" manner in which we were broadcasting Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. We have found that the dissemination of the truth, developing credibility, factually stating it unemotionally, is both useful and effective.

We are not trying to be a Radio Moscow. We are trying to be a different kind of voice that will really develop and build audiences of people who can influence the course of events. We have learned not to become "Cold War" advocates, trying to arouse and incite but to factually tell people very truthfully what is going on. The intent of this program is to change the perception of the Cubans' role in the world and where their resources are being put.

Ambassador ENDERS. That is our model, Mr. Chairman. I think Senator Dodd mentioned a moment ago that this is out of date, why are we doing it now, maybe it was all right 20 years ago. Well, I think we found out in the Polish crisis last year that we were awfully glad that there was a Radio Free Europe to talk to the Poles. It did not act in a propagandistic manner. It did not act in an inflammatory manner. It did not attempt to overthrow the Polish State, but it was essential in enabling people to find out what was going on in their country and how to act at that time.

This is the kind of radio we should have. And it earned that reputation because it was credible throughout. There may have been moments at its start when it was propagandistic, but it lost listenership by being propagandistic.

The **Chairman**. Cuba is in an entirely different issue than the Soviet Union. I agree with Senator Dodd in that respect. We sometimes make Castro bigger than life. If you take a survey of how big Cuba is, how big a military force it has, how powerful it is, the perception will be that it is 10 times taller and bigger than it actually is.

They are no threat to us, and they are not going to be any threat to us. But we have to be certain that we deal with this problem—in a reasonable way. If we can have a dialog with Brezhnev, and that dialog has been asked for by President Reagan, we are now sitting down in Geneva with the Soviets on INF as well as talks on strategic weapons, then we should be able to talk with the Cubans.

Has the State Department abandoned any concept of a dialog with Castro and with Cuba? Is there an intention to have some sort of dialog at some point to see whether or not some of these problems can be corrected and more freedom given to their people and so forth?

What effect do you think Radio Marti will have upon our desire to have a dialog at some point?

Ambassador **Enders**. We have had contact, as you have indicated, earlier, and we may have further contact with the leadership of Cuba. Mr. Chairman, usually what comes out of these meetings follows a pattern.

The Cubans tell us they would like very much to negotiate and to improve our relationship, and we say, that is interesting, and what would you like to do? They would like to negotiate on our bilateral relations on Guantanamo, diplomatic recognition, the embargo, et cetera, et cetera, all of our bilateral issues, many of which are very difficult.

We say, what are you prepared to suggest with regard to third-country issues, which are the ones that are the most important to us? What about Central America and your aggressive actions there? What about Africa? Can we find some way in which you can begin to pull out of Angola, for example, or Ethiopia?

Well, it turns out that these issues are nonnegotiable. All of these discussions tend to turn around that kind of difference, Mr. Chairman. But that does not mean that we should not have them. Whether you can call that a dialog with Cuba I think is questionable. But we should have contact with them periodically to see indeed whether there are opportunities in given areas or on a broader front. So far, they have not turned up.

As regards the effect of Radio Marti on that, I would say this. Cuba, if it is true to pattern, has always been quite eager to have these contacts with the United States. And should the radio go on the air, I would doubt very much that that would be a reason for Cuba to break that pattern.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Senator Helms, you have not had an opportunity to question Secretary Ikle.

Senator **Helms**. I am anxious to hear our next witnesses as well as Ambassador Enders. With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, let me address myself to your comment that Cuba is not a threat to us and never will be.

The **Chairman**. Not the kind of threat that the Soviet Union poses. In their own way, certainly, they are——

Senator **Helms**. Senator, how do you differentiate? Castro may be a dangling participle of the Soviet Union situation. But he is a part of the Soviet Union.

Now, if you want to use the old phrase, guns do not kill people, people kill people, all right. But the Soviet Union is using Cuba just like a gun. Now, if they are no harm to the United States and no threat to us, how do we address ourselves to what is happening in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, or elsewhere?

Furthermore, if Mr. Castro sees this only as a headline situation, why does he object so strenuously to it? This is not aimed at Mr. Castro as a bunch of flesh and bones. It is aimed at what is happening and what has happened and what will happen unless something is done down there to give the people an opportunity to get out from beneath the yoke of bondage.

Let me ask you this, Mr. Enders. How much money does Mr. Castro—and please translate that to me in Soviet Union currency, because that is where Castro gets his money—how much money is spent by Cuba to feed propaganda in Central America?

Ambassador **Enders**. I cannot give you a dollar figure, but it is probably very substantial. These 500-kW broadcasting stations are designed to broadcast throughout the hemisphere. That is why enormous power is being used.

In propaganda I think we have a very substantial amount of propaganda—something like 280 hours a week from Cuba to the area.

Senator **Helms**. So, obviously he believes in the power of ideas, does he not?

Ambassador **Enders**. Yes.

Senator **Helms**. You see, that is the whole point. I mean, we can engage in all the rhetoric, that this is childish stuff and so forth, but it is what the other side has used effectively, and the fact remains that despite the billions that have been poured into countries all over this world in so-called foreign aid, we are still today almost without friends on whom we can really count.

I know that you might not agree with that, but you look at the facts of what is going on. There has been a deterioration of trust in us because there has not been sufficient effort on our part to get the truth out.

Now, what Mr. Castro fears is not a 500-kW station or whatever it is going to be. It is what goes on that station. He is afraid of truth, and that is the reason he is going to jam it or interfere with it or whatever he is going to do.

Mr. Chairman, I suggest that unless there are further questions—oh, I see the chairman has evaporated.

Senator **Pell**. I have no further questions.

Senator **Dodd**. May I just get in a couple of questions, please?

Senator **Helms** [presiding]. Sure.

Senator **Dodd**. By the way, Senator, let me say that I thought I heard an implicit endorsement of gun control.

Senator **Helms**. Well, I always like to borrow your rhetoric. [General laughter.]

**Senator Dodd.** Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you might just tell us whether or not we have done any consulting with our allies in the region about this idea, with the Venezuelans or Canadians, Mexicans, others, the OAS? Have we talked about it there at all? What sort of reaction are we getting?

**Ambassador Enders.** We have had bilateral discussions with a number of countries. It has come up in the course of bilateral discussions.

You may be interested to know that Venezuela, for example, is investing in the Voice of Venezuela, which is, among other things, targeted on Cuba, and very extensively. That is, by the way, a very powerful station, a 1,000-kW station, and it is going to be a major enterprise.

We have found, Senator Dodd, that there are a large number of countries in this area, particularly around the Caribbean Basin, that are very concerned about the Cuban activities.

**Senator Dodd.** How do the Venezuelans feel about Radio Marti?

**Ambassador Enders.** Well, they told us simply that they were doing something of the same kind.

**Senator Dodd.** Do they consider Radio Venezuela to be the same sort of thing as Radio——

**Ambassador Enders.** They do not make the distinctions that we make in this country between the Voice of America and, say, Radio Free Europe. We have made that distinction. It fits our society better than theirs. I am very glad that we have made it. I think it is appropriate that we have quite different instruments for this purpose. This is why we are proposing this radio. The VOA itself is not enough.

That distinction, however, is less clear in other societies, and notably Venezuela.

**Senator Dodd.** Mexico, Canada?

**Ambassador Enders.** We have not discussed this with Mexico, but it has come up. The Mexicans themselves, of course, devote a lot of time to international broadcasting and have their own international broadcasting, but their attitudes toward Cuba are very different than ours.

**Senator Dodd.** Is any other country contributing to this effort, other than ourselves, in the hemisphere?

**Ambassador Enders.** No, it was not a suggestion that it be a collective effort.

**Senator Dodd.** Is Castro not a collective threat, as we have described him?

**Ambassador Enders.** They are countering in their own manner, very effectively, throughout the area. If you look for example at what Venezuela has been doing throughout the area, in terms of economic assistance, in terms of help in buying oil, and in terms now of its own information effort, you will find it is a very major effort.

**Senator Dodd.** I do not deny that, but if this is being heralded as an effort to deal with the threat to the hemisphere and the effective way of dealing with it, I am a little surprised that there are not more participants, particularly from the rich countries. Mexico, Venezuela have the financial resources to contribute.

**Ambassador Enders.** Oh, no, it is being heralded as a way of helping the Cubans deal with their own government. This is not targeted on the hemisphere.

Senator Dodd. Well, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I do not have objections to getting the truth into Cuba. That is not my position on this. I think we have the ability and the access and the availability to do that in the existing facilities. With this particular effort, if we were to check, we would find out that we would not be able to receive financial support from other countries who also perceive the threat but believe that this is not a sound way of approaching that threat at all.

But I thank Mr. Enders for appearing.

Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Pell.

Senator Pell. I would like unanimous consent to insert my opening statement in the record, with some enclosures.

The Chairman. Without objection, it will be entered into the record.

[Senator Pell's prepared statement follows:]

### Prepared Statement of Senator Claiborne Pell

Events of the past months seem to indicate that opportunities for a positive United States policy and hence a better United States-Cuba relationship are being presented. Despite these signs, the Administration, as evidenced by recent statements and actions, indicates that it has made the decision to re-emphasize the hard-line on Cuba. The Administration has decided to revitalize a policy that we have practiced now for 20 years—a policy which has been a lamentable failure.

This policy has been characterized by an economic embargo, by a major invasion—the Bay of Pigs—and perhaps many mini-invasions as well and by several assassination attempts on Fidel Castro. Is it any wonder why Cuba remains one of the greatest exporters of virulent communism in the world today? We have ourselves to thank in part for having created and prolonged the existence of this Frankenstein.

Now the Administration has just reimposed Treasury Department regulations which in effect place a partial ban on travel of United States citizens to Cuba, has expanded enforcement of the embargo, and has raised the level of rhetoric on Cuban involvement in Central America. The Administration's desire to create Radio Marti, in my mind, also goes in the wrong direction.

The Cubans have been giving clear signs that they want a better relationship with the United States and want to be out of the expensive embrace of the Soviet Union. At the very highest foreign policy levels, the Cubans have strongly indicated their willingness to cooperate in far-ranging negotiations with the United States. Earlier United States responses gave signals, albeit unclear, that discussions with Cuba were on the agenda. Secretary of State Haig met with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Mexico last November and General Vernon Walters met with Fidel Castro in Havana a few months ago. In the face of all these positive signs, the Administration is tightening its policy which only will serve to make Cuba totally dependent on the Soviet Union.

Radio Marti would exacerbate the present state of relations even further. The U.S. Government's previous attempts at directing radio broadcasting to Cuba such as the CIA's Radio Swan and the USIA's Cita con Cuba were dismal failures. Radio Marti, which is virtually certain to meet a similar fate, should not be permitted to be yet another obstacle to a policy toward Cuba which is in the best interests of the United States.

I would like to include recent articles on United States-Cuba relations by Clayton Fritchey, Leslie Gelb, Abraham Lowenthal, Jorge Dominguez, Flora Lewis, Saul Landau, William LeoGrande, Peter Winn, and a New York Times editorial of April 20.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 14, 1982]

### It's Time To Talk With Cuba

(By Clayton Fritchey)

In the crisis over the Falkland Islands, there is a lesson for the Reagan administration: don't let a dangerous situation deteriorate to the point of explosion.

There is also a lesson for Secretary of State Alexander Haig in the exemplary way that Lord Carrington admitted error when, as a point of honor, he resigned as Britain's foreign minister. "I was wrong in the assessment of what they were doing," he said, "and therefore I am responsible." How refreshing it would be if only Haig would admit as much about his dubious assessment that Cuba is to blame for all the unrest and turmoil in Central America and the Caribbean.

Tension with Cuba is nothing new, but we know from experience—the Bay of Pigs and the 1962 missile crisis—what it can lead to. Any new clash with Cuba would be even more dangerous, for Fidel Castro now has a far stronger military establishment, and he is backed by Soviet nuclear power which, unlike 1962, is now a match for the American arsenal. At this point, the Reagan administration could do worse than give some attention to a new study of the Cuban economy by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, which concludes that the 20-year-old U.S. trade embargo against Cuba is forcing Havana deeper into the Soviet camp. Before its 1959 revolution, Cuba relied on the United States for 75 percent of its imports and 65 percent of its exports, but now, according to the study, the U.S. embargo forces Havana to depend on the Soviet bloc for 75 percent of its foreign trade.

Rep. Henry Reuss (D-Wis.), chairman of the committee, says, "There can't be any solution to the problems of Central America without Cuba, so maybe a good place to start discussions with them would be on lifting our embargo against pharmaceuticals." Moreover, he added, the report confirmed his belief that both Cuba and the United States could benefit now from talks. Fortunately, the Cubans seem to have arrived at the same conclusion.

Only a few days ago a senior Cuban official said his government is now ready for wide-ranging negotiations and agreements on "mutual restraints" with Washington. At the same time he "distanced" Havana from Soviet actions in Poland and Afghanistan. He even went so far as to say that Latin America is not ripe for socialism, and therefore Castro is willing to promote "democratic change" and moderation in the region. Significantly, the Cuban spokesman acknowledged that Havana had in the past provided arms for Nicaragua, as well as "material aid" for El Salvador, but said the supplies had been stopped some months ago.

Since 1959, seven U.S. presidents have tried one way or another—including the attempted assassination of Castro—to bring Cuba to heel, but in spite of these efforts, the Cuban leader continues to flourish. What puzzles many nations that long ago formally recognized Cuba is why so many U.S. presidents, both Democratic and Republican, seem to have a fixation about Cuba, a small island with fewer than 10 million people. As one European diplomat recently put it, "You recognize and do business with all kinds of communist countries, including China, Russia and the Soviet bloc. Why can't you normalize relations with Cuba, which, after all, is hardly a serious threat to a superpower like the U.S.?"

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## Cuba Calls for Talks With the U.S. and Accepts Part Blame for Strains

(By Leslie H. Gelb)

Havana, April 4.—A senior Cuban official said this weekend that "until recently" Cuba as well as the United States bore responsibility for the present atmosphere of confrontation, but that his Government was now ready for wide-ranging negotiations and agreements on "mutual restraint" with Washington.

Apparently in an effort to achieve a major breakthrough in Cuban-American relations, the official acknowledged past arms aid to Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerrillas but also insisted that the supply had ended. He said this applied also to helping others to send arms.

Previously, Cuba had been unwilling to admit or had denied providing arms aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas and had claimed nothing about stopping transshipments of arms to El Salvador or stopping the arms flow to Nicaragua. The official said these activities had stopped within the last few months.

The senior official and others, speaking to a group of scholars and foreign policy experts gathered in Havana over the weekend, did not hide their concern about the possibility of United States use of force against Cuba. They spoke on the condition that they not be named, a practice adopted by many governments in order to provide some element of flexibility in later negotiations.

### TALKS APPARENTLY AT STANDSTILL

The senior official indicated that private talks with the Reagan Administration had reached a standstill and that the Cuban position was not adequately understood by the Administration or the American public. The most recent official Cuban-American meeting was last month when Ambassador at Large Vernon A. Walters met with President Fidel Castro in Havana.

The official said that Cuba would not abandon the right to supply arms and support revolutions, as he maintained the Reagan Administration insisted that it do, but claimed that as a practical matter Havana was now exercising self-restraint and was prepared to play "a positive role" in settling disputes and bringing about "democratic change."

He also distanced Havana from actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Poland. Diplomats here related that a number of points made by the Cuban official had been made privately in recent direct contacts with the Reagan Administration and through intermediaries.

The official stressed at the outset that "we believe we can have serious negotiations with the Reagan Administration" despite evident feelings of mistrust toward the Administration.

He said that Cuba would be willing to negotiate foreign policy questions with the United States "in a multilateral context" without prior normalization of relations. This, he said, included playing "a positive role" in working with other nations to bring about a political solution in El Salvador. Previously, in public at least, Havana has said that normalization of relations and a lifting of the American economic embargo were necessary before such negotiations could be held.

He asserted that normalization would lead to "restraints" on Cuban as well as American behavior.

### SOVIET BOND "UNBREAKABLE"

Perhaps to lay the groundwork for a better dialogue with Washington, the official indicated disapproval of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and said that the situation in Poland should be resolved by the Polish people themselves. However, he added that the bond between Moscow and Havana was unbreakable.

He also insisted that Moscow itself was not prepared to damage relations with Washington by trying to gain "an asset" in El Salvador.

Several themes ran through the official's presentation and answers to questions.

Cuba feels confident about its own future and beliefs, sees itself playing an important role in promoting world peace and economic development, and with this in mind, is ready for a "relative accommodation" with the United States.

Cuba will not under any circumstances compromise its principles, rights and support for revolution, but it is prepared to negotiate practical arrangements for mutual restraint to supplement and guarantee political solutions reached by the parties to conflicts themselves.

Latin America as a whole is not ripe for socialism, and President Fidel Castro is therefore willing to promote "democratic change" and moderation in the region.

While Havana will always maintain "socialist solidarity" with Moscow, it pursues an independent foreign policy and does not want to be the "victim" of East-West confrontation.

"Until recently," the official said, both the United States and Cuba "were acting in a way that was leading to an unavoidable confrontation." He said that was "the first thing to avoid, and it can be avoided."

### MISUNDERSTANDING IS NOTED

"We are convinced," he added, "that an important part of the differences results from misunderstanding, perhaps mutual misunderstanding."

He argued that it was wrong to think of everything in terms of global East-West competition and especially wrong to believe that "everything harmful to one side is produced by the other." "We Cubans are victims of that misconception," he said.

Most change, the official maintained, springs from situations of injustice and poverty within countries.

He acknowledged that Cuba had been providing what he called material aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas, but insisted that this had stopped 14 months ago. And he said that Cuba had also ceased transhipping arms from other countries to the guerrillas in recent months.

He said nothing about continued Cuban training of Nicaraguan forces and Salvadoran guerrillas or about what the Reagan Administration says is Cuba's involvement in the command and control of the Salvadoran guerrillas.

### OTHERS SAID TO SUPPLY ARMS

As for Cuban arms aid to Nicaragua, the official insisted that this had stopped several months ago since, he said, the Nicaraguans already had enough arms. He maintained that the Reagan Administration knew who was really supplying the arms, but would not say so. The official also declined to name the suppliers.

"The United States has told us they consider an end to our aid to Salvador as a prerequisite to future normalization of relations," he said. "We do not renounce the right to send arms to the guerrillas in El Salvador, but we have not exercised this right for over a year.

"Cuba cannot permit as a precondition for normalization what the United States understands as Cuban good behavior."

On El Salvador, he maintained that the United States "is not reading between the lines or the lines themselves." The guerrillas' message, he said was clear. "They are not fighting to establish a socialist regime, although some would like it, and some are Communists. They don't think they can reach Communism now, and they are trying to find a progressive democratic system."

He added that if the United States understood this, "there are wide possibilities to settle other Central American problems" as well.

Cuba, the official said, would not be a direct party to internal negotiations in Central America or Africa, but would participate in a "multilateral context" to help bring about political settlements and abide by the terms of the settlements as long as Washington did so.

"We do support the French and Mexican proposal to propitiate a negotiation between the Salvadoran junta and the guerrilla groups," he said. He seemed to indicate that this would not include the right-wing groups in El Salvador.

In his view, a solution to the Salvadoran situation would make it easier for the United States and Nicaragua and for Nicaragua and Honduras to settle their disputes.

In the meantime, he said, Cuba was also ready for "discussions" with Washington on issues affecting both countries, including American overflights of Cuba, the American base in Guantanamo and settlement of American financial claims against Cuba.

While insisting that the Cuban-Soviet bond was solid, the official responded to a question by saying that his Government was "worried" about the situation in Arghanistan. He said that Cuba had "never given support for what happened there" and had been "consistently working for a political solution."

Other Cuban officials explained that Cuba's vote in the United Nations against condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was as a matter of political realism. They said they were not about to line up formally against the country that provides Cuba with what State Department specialists estimate is some $3 billion annually in various forms of economic support and millions of dollars in free military equipment.

The senior official called the situation in Poland "a socialist tragedy," then added: We believe the Poles should have the opportunity to solve the problem themselves. The way the Poles are trying is the least tragic way possible without civil war or intervention."

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[From the New York Times, Feb. 26, 1981]

## On United States-Cuban Ties

(By Jorge I. Dominguez)

Cambridge, Mass.—The United States and Cuba are almost certain to be involved in bitter political disputes in coming months. The Reagan Administration, accusing the Cuban Government of interfering in El Salvador's internal affairs, has placed the El Salvador issue at the top of its foreign policy priorities in relations with friends and adversaries. Nonetheless, United States policy must recognize that despite any conflicts with Cuba over El Salvador, or Angola, or Ethiopia, there is an important aspect of the bilateral relationship that should be preserved.

To put it differently: Do Ronald Reagan and Fidel Castro have common interests? They do, and it is essential that both countries enhance their joint gains from their existing relationship, even though they may remain in conflict over their relations with other countries.

Mr. Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. have made it clear that they believe that combating international terrorism is an essential foreign policy goal. The main reason for the decline of one form of terrorism—the hijacking of commercial airliners to Cuba—has been the agreements between the two capitals that have deterred and punished hijackers. Our Government must retain the Cuban Government's trust and collaboration if a hijacking epidemic is not to resume.

Havana very much wants Washington to prevent the launching of terrorist attacks against Cuba from United States soil. If Washington wants to be credible and consistent in its antiterrorism campaign, the Administration should take all possible steps to do so.

The Administration has a major stake in regulating and controlling the flow of people into the United States. The Castro Government opened a harbor last year to allow the emigration of Cuban-Americans' relatives and friends to the States. Havana has signaled that it is ready to open the gates again, even in the absence of formal agreements with Washington. Such agreements must be negotiated, especially since the boats carried people including criminals, who would not ordinarily be admitted under the immigration law.

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Should the Miami area be asked to absorb another 250,000 Cubans?

The Administration has indicated that the guiding value of its policies toward Latin America is to make the Western Hemisphere a bastion of freedom. It would be contrary to that policy to cut off the possibility of receiving remaining Cuban political prisoners, to prevent Cuban-Americans from visiting their families in Cuba, to prevent United States citizens from traveling to Cuba for cultural, educational or artistic reasons or for touring, using charter flights departing from United States airports. It would be contrary to such a profession of freedom if visits by Cuban scholars or artists to the United States were prohibited, or if our libraries or scholars could no longer obtain Cuban documents and other publications, or if Cuban films could no longer be exhibited in this country.

Both governments share an aversion to the international drug traffic. Collaboration between their coast guards and the continued exchange of information on the problem would also serve common interests.

The maintenance of professional collaboration between both countries' weather services has served the safety of the peoples of Cuba and of Florida for decades. Hurricane-tracking in the Caribbean must remain insulated from disputes about El Salvador.

The diplomatic and consular "interest sections" established in 1977, whereby United States diplomats are posted in the Swiss Embassy in Havana and a comparable number of Cubans posted in the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington, have served to clarify disagreements and to cool down disputes in moments of crisis. Our section in Havana has proved invaluable in assisting our citizens in Cuban jails, individuals with both United States and Cuban citizenships, Cuban political prisoners going to the States, and United States tourists.

It might be argued that the two countries have compatible goals in areas of the world where suspicion and hostility prevail: They may share a common interest in a Namibian settlement, in the preservation of existing African borders, even in Gulf Oil's continued oil operations in Angola's Cabinda enclave. Admittedly, these are controversial propositions.

What should not be controversial is that Ronald Reagan and Fidel Castro do have common interests in ensuring that possibilities of cooperation remain, despite the foreseeable deterioration in relations.

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## Who's Scaring Whom?

(By Flora Lewis)

Washington, February 17.—Ominous but ambiguous rumbles about what the U.S. might do to Cuba have become a current staple of foreign policy noises from Washington. They are hard to read. Does the Administration have firm intentions? What are they?

The more you dig into this, the less you find. Grant the statements about a new flow of Soviet weapons to Cuba. But Washington's unwillingness to provide hard details is explained alternately as protecting sources and prudently avoiding over-dramatics like President Carter's useless flap about "discovering" a Soviet brigade on the island.

These are contradictory stands. Do they mean things are really getting worse, or that we want to signal Havana and Moscow we'll be very angry if they do? It depends which senior officials you ask.

There is no charge that the 1962 Soviet pledge not to send "offensive" arms to Cuba has been violated, though that is hard to define and is usually interpreted to mean nuclear-weapons in this context.

In any case, the Administration does not claim that the warnings have in fact achieved their advertised purpose of stopping "the export of Cuban subversion" to Central America and the Caribbean. But it has no answer to the question of whether the deliberate campaign of "not ruling out" the use of force may be provoking the arms buildup as a defensive reaction. Cuba's policy of aiding rebels isn't likely to change under pressure.

Meanwhile, Fidel Castro has been sending quiet signals that he wants to extend contacts and negotiate with the U.S. Nothing significant happened at the meeting late last year between Secretary of State Haig and Cuba's Vice President beyond the fact of the meeting itself, officials say. Both sides simply repeated their old positions.

But recently Mr. Castro told a Republican Congressman, Hamilton Fish, that he would take back criminals and sick people dumped on the U.S. during the Mariel exodus if a face-saving exchange were arranged. And he released four American prisoners.

The signs and gestures have been coldly received in Washington. There is a lot of talk about Cuba but little interest in talking to Cuba. It is taken for granted that Mr. Castro's overtures are a tactical attempt to defuse U.S. antagonism, not a genuine desire to improve relations and ease his country's total dependence on Moscow, as some foreign diplomats think.

Certainly, there is plenty of reason to worry about the future in the Caribbean basin. Ferment is developing through the area. To the extent the U.S. is seen as hostile to urgently needed social change, and to some people that's how it looks, hostility to the U.S. is growing.

A spread of Cuban influence, backed by the Kremlin, would indeed represent a strategic threat. President Reagan will spell out America's promised Caribbean Basin Initiative next week. Drafts are still being revised at the White House, but the latest word is that the speech will offer trade incentives and not much aid.

No doubt regional hopes are excessive. The U.S. and the industrial West can't simply cure impoverished, frustrated societies even if they had unlimited funds to offer. The main thing development experts have learned in their trials is how hard it is to speed peaceful change.

But it is the only reliable way to improve regional security in the long run. In the short run, encouragement and sustained hope make all the difference. Forcing people to choose sides in an East-West confrontation that seems irrelevant to their lives is a way to breed enemies.

A Canadian parliamentary commission that studied the area's urgent problems for nearly a year concluded that "potentially the most dangerous threat to security in these regions [is] the growing confrontation between the U.S. and Cuba."

Change in the area is necessary and inevitable, it said. "Any attempt therefore to characterize this process as derived essentially from an alien ideology should be resisted. Moreover, social change in these countries will evolve from a wide range of development models because of their rich and complex histories. It is unrealistic to expect them to blindly imitate the experience of others. Canada should recognize and support such pluralism in Latin America and the Caribbean."

All Canadian parties were represented on the commission. They were saying, in effect, that the U.S. is making a mistake in stressing a Cuban and Communist challenge rather than a human and social challenge.

Why is Washington on such a different tack and what does the Administration hope to achieve with its threats and warnings? The more one looks into the facts, the harder it is to avoid suspicion that the Administration isn't talking foreign affairs at all but domestic politics. The noises seem to be required to still right-wing charges of being "soft on Communists." Intentions are hard to read because they are so vague.

The trouble is that this bombastic domestic dialogue resounds around the world. It is frightening friends. It isn't facing let alone solving real problems.

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[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 5, 1981]

## REAGAN'S BEST WEAPON AGAINST CUBA MAY BE THE THREAT OF PEACE

(By Abraham F. Lowenthal)

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr.'s recent statements appear to have brought the United States another step closer toward punitive actions against Fidel Castro's Cuba.

The Reagan Administration, like six U.S. administrations before it, wants to pressure Cuba into changing its foreign policies, particularly its involvement in Central America's civil strife and its military support for the Soviet Union in other parts of the world.

Previous administrations in Washington have tried a gamut of options, ranging from measures just short of war—the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, acts of sabotage, and attempts to assassinate Castro himself—to Jimmy Carter's gestures toward rapprochement, which included opening quasi-diplomatic missions in Havana and Washington and permitting the limited resumption of travel and cultural exchange between the two countries.

No administration so far has succeeded, however, Castro still rules in Cuba, without serious challenge. The island's economic organization is still socialist. No compensation, not a cent, has been paid for expropriated U.S. properties. More important, Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union have not been broken. Rather, Cuba's troops have cooperated with Soviet policies in Africa and the Middle East. Worse yet, Cuba has been demonstrating in Central America and the Caribbean—in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Granada and even in Puerto Rico—that it does have some capacity to support the declared enemies of the United States.

The Reagan administration, anxious to show its skill and strength in the Western Hemisphere, favors renewed and intensified hostility toward Cuba. Tough talk is easy, and is already under way. Tougher actions can be expected to follow; resuming air surveillance over Cuba; expelling Cuba's diplomats from Washington; curbing or ending travel between the two nations, revoking the bilateral fishing agreement and other accords between the two nations; stepped-up propaganda against Cuba, perhaps intensified economic sanctions, and maybe even renewed covert military or para-military operations against Cuba.

The path Washington seems to have started down has been tried before. Experience suggests it will not work. Fidel Castro has not been budged by American bluster, nor by more tangible measures. On the contrary, Washington's previous bursts of hostility may have helped Castro consolidate his hold on Havana and given him a plausible pretext for harsh repression; it may also have strengthened the anti-accommodationist advisers in his circle and reinforced Cuba's links with the Soviet Union.

Faced with this recipe for almost certain frustration, one hopes that President Reagan and his advisers will at least consider alternative ways of accomplishing the desired aim—forcing Cuba to break or at least loosen its close alliance with the Soviet Union. What President Reagan could try, perhaps more effectively than any of his predecessors, would be to create for Fidel Castro some real incentive to distance himself from Moscow. Reagan could do so, not by menacing Cuba with war, but by threatening Cuba with peace.

President Reagan could make it clear to Castro that the United States accepts the consolidation of his government and is willing to extend it conventional diplomatic recognition. He could indicate that we expect to deal with a series of outstanding bilateral issues—including the status of expropriated property and the fate of the U.S. naval station at Guantanamo Bay—in the context of resumed diplomatic exchange and with the prospect of renewed commerce. He could go on to say that his Administration regards the economic and social development of the entire Caribbean basin to be a high priority, fundamentally because long history and present migration trends show the United States that it has an important stake in the health of its closest neighbors.

The President could emphasize that Cuba still obviously suffers from the problems shared by all other Caribbean nations: inadequate access to markets, technology and capital; excessive dependence on primary exports; extreme vulnerability to the vagaries of disease, the weather and international economic fluctuations. Reagan could emphasize the obvious—that the United States has the resources needed to deal with these problems. And he could let Castro know that only two obstacles now bar inviting Cuba to join in an all-out regional effort to confront these basic issues: Cuba's overt foreign military adventures in alliance with the Soviet Union and evidence that Cuba is covertly involving itself militarily in the internal affairs of various Central American nations. The President could affirm that the United States recognizes Cuba's right to have a mutual security relationship with the Soviet Union. He could also reaffirm that the United States wants to remain uninvolved militarily in Central America's civil strife as long as all other external powers stay out. The President could invite Castro, finally, to clarify Cuba's policy on its precise limits on Cuba's interventionism in the Americas and elsewhere.

This dramatic ploy might not succeed in forcing Castro to back away from his alliance with the Soviet Union. Castro's ideological and personal commitments to world revolution should not be underestimated, nor should his confidence that historical trends ultimately favor Cuba's stance.

But neither should one overlook Castro's demonstrated skill at pursuing Cuba's interests, even when they conflict with Moscow's. Nor should we minimize what U.S. recognition and free access to the world economy might mean now for Cuba, particularly if these incentives were offered by a conservative Administration.

At the very least, a U.S. promise of peace would allow Washington to take the initiative, not simply to react to events. And it would let Cuba's people know exactly what its leaders' choices are, thus making Fidel Castro fully responsible for how he responds.

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[From the New York Times, Mar. 4, 1982]

## WARM UP TO CUBA

(By Saul Landau)

WASHINGTON.—It is time for a new policy toward Cuba.

Washington's hostility toward Fidel Castro's Government has proved not only futile, but dangerous.

One consequence of this policy is that the Cuban Revolution has emerged far stronger than it was at the beginning, in 1959, and Mr. Castro, once a young guerrilla in the mountains, is now a powerful leader, firmly entrenched. Another result in that Soviet support has become essential for Cuba's survival, and Moscow has gained a friend in the Western Hemisphere.

After 1973, some of the most aggressive features of United States policy toward Cuba were abandoned in favor of a limited thaw. The Nixon and Ford Administrations took small steps, and the Carter Administration lifted travel restrictions in this country for Cuban diplomats, allowed cultural exchanges, and worked out arrangements for American tourism in Cuba and return visits by Cubans. But while both countries set up so-called interest sections—diplomatic offices in other countries' embassies—in each other's capitals, no diplomatic recognition, direct trade, or commerce was permitted.

Ironically, President Carter's "soft" policy allowed the United States, for the first time since the Cuban Revolution, to regain some informal influence in Cuba—other than the destructive influence produced by Washington's aggression. The increased contact during the Carter years encouraged many Cubans to yearn for freedoms denied them and for more consumer goods. The Carter Administration temporarily dropped cold war rhetoric and began to treat Cuba as a small country that could be influenced by constructive overtures.

But today the United States seems again determined to emphasize the East-West side of a problem that objectively has more to do with North-South relations. And like any true obsession, the United States' preoccupation with Cuban troops in Africa and Cuban aid to revolutionary forces in Central America is both exaggerated and unworthy of a great power.

Much of the developed world recognized that underdevelopment, and not the Soviet Union, is the cause of third-world misery and instability. That is why many Western European countries, Mexico, Venezuela, and even Brazil have supported Nicaraguan, and why some of these countries even send aid to Cuba. The Swedish, Dutch, Norwegian and Mexican Governments do not view Cuba as a threat, but as a poor developing country.

Yet Washington insists that the Cuban Revolution and liberation struggles in other third-world countries are part of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is this obsession with the East-West conflict that lies at the heart of the United States' bad relations with Cuba and some other third-world countries.

Our policy, then, has failed. Cuba is not ready to fall apart and Moscow's hold there will probably remain strong—unless the United States takes the initiative in helping Cuba diversify its dependent economic relations. Then Cuba could begin to move closer to currently hostile neighboring countries. There is, of course, no guarantee that this will happen, but after 22 years of failure and frustration it only makes sense for Washington to try a more constructive approach.

In July 1974, Henry A. Kissinger showed how this might work. He sent a secret note—until now virtually unmentioned in any public account—to Fidel Castro, requesting secret talks. Those talks, on a lower level, took place between the fall of 1974 and the fall of 1975, and some steps toward improving relations were made. Then President Castro sent troops to Angola and Mr. Kissinger broke off the talks.

Today, it is time to pick up where Mr. Kissinger left off. We should lift the economic embargo on Cuba, and begin selling food and medical supplies. Since Mr. Castro claims that the embargo is an act of war, we would thus remove the only serious obstacle to re-establishing relations. Then we could begin to discuss Cuban expropriation of United States property, the future of the Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, and even each other's foreign policies—much as such differences are discussed with most other countries. Cubans in the United States want to maintain contact with their families on the island. Businessmen throughout the United States are eager to resume trade. In fact, real barriers to renewed relations are much less heavy than the hostile rhetoric of the past 20 years makes them seem.

The United States' vituperative and vindictive Cuban policy has failed to achieve any positive results. Both commonsense and geography argue against the existing alignment in which the Soviet Union, not the United States, is Cuba's most important partner and ally.

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[From Foreign Policy magazine, No. 46, spring 1982]

## CUBA POLICY RECYCLED

(By William M. LeoGrande)

For over two decades, Cuba has thwarted U.S. hemispheric policy. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy tried to overthrow Cuban Pemier Fidel Castro, Presidents Johnson and Nixon tried to break him through economic embargo and covert action, and Presidents Ford and Carter tried to entice him into better behavior with the lure of normalization. All failed. Having resisted the pressures of six presidents, Castro will not be tamed by the seventh.

As unveiled thus far the Reagan administration's policy options hold nothing new or innovative. The rising war of words, the renewed effort to isolate Cuba diplomatically, and the tightening of the economic embargo are sanctions refurbished from the 1960s. Having failed them, they are no more likely to succeed today.

It seems incredible that the United States, with its vast economic and military resources, has never found an effective response to the Cuban challenge. U.S. policy makers have spent the better part of 20 years searching for ways to translate their overwhelming resources into real leverage.

But the unpleasant truth is that Castro's decision to align Cuba with the U.S.S.R., which agreed to subsidize Cuba's survival, deprived the United States of its traditional ability to dictate the terms of U.S.-Cuban relations. Until America accepts this reality and adjusts its policies accordingly, successive administrations will continue, as did their predecessors, to search in vain for the magic formula that will make Castro behave.

Relations between the United States and Cuba were strained even before the Soviet Union's patronage made Cuba a focal point of the Cold War. Washington's long and friendly relationship with Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, the intense nationalism of Castro's revolutionary movement, and Washington's assessment of the new regime as dangerously radical burdened bilateral relations from the outset with deep mutual distrust and suspicion.

These latent tensions became manifest when the United States excoriated the policies of the new Cuban regime: its 1959 agrarian reform, which nationalized substantial holdings of U.S. citizens; its determination to open trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc; and its willingness to provide sanctuary and assistance to other Latin American revolutionaries. To Washington's objections Cuba offered defiance. The rising spiral of hostile rhetoric took on a dynamic of its own.

Cuba's leaders must also assume a major share of responsibility for the deterioration of relations. But once Washington undertook to strangle the Cuban revolution economically and subvert it militarily. Havana was forced to find a patron willing and able to defend it. The Soviet Union took on this task reluctantly at first, later with relish. Without Soviet assistance, the Cuban economy could not have survived the severing of U.S. ties; without Soviet arms, Cuba's revolution could not have survived U.S. efforts to overthrow it.

During the 1960s Washington held fast to its policy of hostility, organizing paramilitary attacks and recruiting its allies to join the diplomatic and economic embargo on Cuba. Outside the hemisphere, the embargo met with little success, but among Latin American states only Mexico refused to abide by the sanctions imposed in 1964 by the Organization of American States (OAS). Cuba responded to its pariah status by stepping up the export of revolution to its neighbors, even though this policy strained relations with the U.S.S.R. To the Soviets, Cuba's strategy was unrealistic as well as detrimental to their objective of fostering peaceful coexistence.

## U.S. POLICY COMES FULL CIRCLE

In the early 1970s U.S. policy makers began to reassess relations with Cuba. The policy of hostility had failed to destabilize the Cuban regime and had not noticeably deterred Cuba's export of revolution. At the same time, the advent of détente made Cuban communism seem less malevolent and Cuba's ostracism less rational. One by one, Latin American states began to abandon the sanctions, and Cuba responded by moderating its revolutionary zeal in favor of normal state-to-state relations. The carrot, it appeared, was a better policy lever than the stick. Within the OAS and even within the United States itself, pressures began building to normalize relations with Cuba.

The Ford administration took several initiatives in this direction. It eased the economic embargo for subsidiaries of U.S. firms operating abroad, voted in 1975 to relax the OAS sanctions, and dropped its demand that Cuba sever its relations with the Soviet Union as a precondition for normalization. Shortly thereafter the United States and Cuba began private discussions on the full range of bilateral relations.

The movement toward normalization ended, however, when Cuba deployed—according to Castro—36,000 combat troops in Angola to support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Washington reacted by denouncing Cuba as a Soviet puppet, threatening a military response to any further Cuban adventures abroad, and making the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola a precondition for resuming the normalization process.

By 1977 Cuban troops had begun withdrawing from Angola, and so the incoming Carter administration did not regard them as an insurmountable obstacle to improved relations. The new administration negotiated a fishing agreement with Cuba and resumed discussions on a broad range of bilateral issues. Both Cuba and the United States sought to propel the process forward by making a series of minor but symbolically important concessions. The United States halted reconnaissance overflights and lifted the ban on travel to Cuba. The Cubans in turn released 4,000 political prisoners, including a number of U.S. citizens. Havana also began a dialogue with leaders of the Cuban exile community, concluding agreements to allow exile visits to Cuba and to permit the reunification of families. These efforts led to the establishment of diplomatic interests sections in both capitals—a move one step short of diplomatic recognition.

Carter's efforts to normalize relations with Cuba, like Ford's, collapsed as a result of Cuba's Africa policy. In 1978 Cuba sent 20,000 combat troops to Ethiopia, coordinating the move much more closely with the U.S.S.R. than had been the case in Angola. Over the next few years, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated dramatically as a result of successive minicrises: the 1978 invasion of Zaire—which the United States accused Cuba of instigating—by Katangan rebels; the deployment to Cuba of Soviet MIG–23 fighter aircraft, which in some configurations are capable of carrying nuclear weapons; the 1979 controversy over the alleged Soviet combat brigade in Cuba; and the 1980 flotilla of Cuban refugees from Mariel.

The Reagan administration has, from the outset, taken a hard line on Cuba, in part because of Cuban assistance to revolutionaries in Central America. The administration has imposed new sanctions, including tightening the economic embargo, and is attempting to re-isolate Cuba within the hemisphere. Administration officials have even warned that the United States is prepared to exercise military options against Cuba unless it halts its arms shipments to the guerrillas in El Salvador. In short, U.S. policy has come full circle. Yet a hard-line policy is no more likely to succeed now than it did 20 years ago.

### REALITIES OR WISHFUL THINKING?

Cuba remains, after all, a socialist country in which the economy and polity are organized according to values profoundly different from those prevailing in the United States. These differences translate into sharply conflicting policies across a broad spectrum of international issues. Areas of mutual interest between the United States and Cuba do exist—the anti-hijacking and fishing agreements negotiated in the 1970s were based upon such mutual interests. But in light of the deep differences between the two countries, it would be naive to expect that even under the best of circumstances the opportunities for accord and mutual benefit will ever overshadow the occasions for conflict and competition.

The United States must learn to live with this reality unless it is willing to confront the Soviet Union directly. Neither the sanctions applied during the 1960s nor the enticements offered during the 1970s were sufficient to divert the Cuban government from its program of socialist construction at home and revolutionary solidarity abroad. These bedrock policies can be altered only by changing the basic character of the regime itself or by overthrowing it—both unlikely occurrences.

Despite recent economic hardships in Cuba and their attendant political discord, Castro continues to enjoy broad popular support. Unlike some of its East European counterparts, the Cuban regime has responded to discontent with pragmatic reforms. In the past two years, as in the early 1970s, the regime has modified prevailing economic orthodoxy to stimulate consumer production and has rearranged political institutions to improve elite sensibility to mass opinion. Moreover, whereas Polish nationalism is anti-Russian and tends to erode the legitimacy of a Soviet-linked regime, Cuban nationalism is anti-Yankee and tends to bolster a regime in confrontation with the United States. Thus, with or without the propaganda broadcasts of Radio Marir the U.S. sponsored station scheduled to begin broadcasting to Cuba in 1982—Castro is not likely to face an eruption of mass opposition.

If the Cuban regime is relatively secure from internal upheaval, then only direct, massive military force can change its basic domestic and international orientation. Even in strictly military terms, this option is untenable. Cuba is defended by a well-trained, well-equipped professional army of 100,000 people, an equal number of reservists, and a militia of 500,000. To occupy the island would require the United States to strip every other theater of operations, including Western Europe and the Persian Gulf, of conventional forces.

Moreover, an invasion would provoke an immediate confrontation with the Soviet Union. Not only would an invasion place U.S. troops in combat against the several thousand Soviet military personnel stationed in Cuba, but it would also violate the agreement that ended the 1962 missile crisis, whereby the United States pledged not to attack Cuba in return for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles. The Soviet Union, therefore, could not ignore an invasion or any other direct military action, such as a blockade or air strikes.

Nor is there any political exchange that America could feasibly offer the Soviets to induce them to abandon their support of Cuba. As U.S.-Cuban rhetorical exchanges have escalated, the Soviets have repeatedly warned that Cuba is, in Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's words, "an inseparable part of the socialist community." A U.S. invasion of Cuba would imperil world peace as much as would a Soviet invasion of West Berlin.

For Washington, then, the challenge is to abandon the hopeless quest for ways to eliminate U.S.-Cuban conflicts and instead to devise a strategy for managing them. The measure of success will be whether U.S. policy modifies Cuban behavior in ways that advance the interests of the United States. Great expectations in this regard would be illusions, but if the United States bases its policy toward Cuba on realities rather than on wishful thinking, some successes are possible.

## OUTSTANDING ISSUES

To design a strategy for managing conflicts with Cuba, the United States must begin to specify the issues in contention and the sorts of Cuban behavior that damage U.S. interests. These issues fall into two categories: strictly bilateral questions between the United States and Cuba, and multilateral issues involving a third country.

Most of the bilateral questions are relatively insignificant. Left over from the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations in the 1960s, they could probably be settled if both parties had the will to proceed with negotiations. Compromise would not require either side to relinquish vital interests. The outstanding issues include the ongoing U.S. economic embargo of Cuba, the presence of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba, immigration, U.S. demands for compensation for property nationalized in 1959–1960, and Cuban counterclaims for damage caused by the embargo and by the Central Intelligence Agency's secret war in the 1960s.

With the exceptions of immigration and compensation, none of these issues involves Cuban actions or potential actions that are or have been damaging to the United States. On the contrary, most involve Cuban demands for a cessation of U.S. activities—the embargo, the occupation of Guantanamo, and the overflights. This imbalance may explain why Cuba has generally been more willing than the United States to enter negotiations over the bilateral issues: Cuba has a good deal more to gain from their successful resolution.

Since the uncontrolled exodus of refugees in 1980, immigration has been the main bilateral issue in which the United States has a significant stake. The flow of tens of thousands of exiles could be resumed at any time, once again making a mockery of U.S. immigration laws and worsening intense social pressures in Florida. For humanitarian reasons and because of the intense emotions of the Cuban-American community, the United States could do little to halt such an inundation.

The Reagan administration claims it has contingency plans to prevent another exodus, but any plans beyond deploying the Coast Guard to halt the boat lift, as the Carter administration tried to do, are difficult to imagine. In fact, it was candidate Reagan who blasted Carter's efforts to bar the refugees; as president, Reagan could expect similar treatment from his political adversaries.

The key conflicts between the United States and Cuba have never been strictly bilateral. Ever since Cuba adopted socialism and sought safety with the Soviet Union, Cuba's partisan position in the Cold War has dictated the terms of U.S.-Cuban relations. Washington has viewed Soviet military assistance to Cuba and Cuban assistance to foreign revolutionaries as threats to the security of both the United States and its allies abroad. As Cuban foreign policy has become increasingly global and more successful, Washington's fear that Cuba acts as the vanguard of Soviet influence in the Third World has become more acute.

Cuba's partnership with the Soviet Union and the potential danger it holds for U.S. interests are real, although the relationship has not always been portrayed realistically. If the Cuban-Soviet partnership lies at the heart of U.S. concerns about Cuba's international behavior, then the U.S. response must be premised on an understanding of that complex partnership and on a realistic assessment of the dangers it poses for U.S. interests.

The Cuban-Soviet military relationship has not constituted a serious direct threat to U.S. security since 1962 when the Soviets attempted to place intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. The agreement that ended the missile crisis prohibits the Soviet Union from deploying offensive weapons on the island. This agreement was extended in 1970 to encompass Soviet nuclear submarine bases and again in 1979 to cover Soviet ground forces. As long as the agreement remains in force, Cuba can pose little danger to the United States.

At some future time of crisis, of course, the Soviets might abrogate this agreement and use Cuba as a forward naval or air station for Soviet action in the Western Hemisphere. The United States can do little about this possibility now other than plan for that contingency. But the chances of such a scenario materializing are remote; a Soviet military initiative in the Western Hemisphere makes little strategic or geopolitical sense. Even if the U.S.S.R. intended simply to divert U.S. forces from other theaters of operation, a credible threat would divert Soviet forces as well and would bring U.S. retaliation against Cuba, by far the most militarily exposed member of the Soviet bloc.

The Soviet Union is not likely to initiate a superpower confrontation under such unfavorable circumstances for such small stakes. Nevertheless, a confrontation could develop if the United States abrogated the missile crisis agreement, as

Ford threatened to do because of Cuban policy in Africa and as Reagan threatens to do over Cuban policy in Central America. A naval blockade or air strike against Cuba would force a Soviet response—if not in Cuba, then elsewhere in the world. Another obvious Soviet option would be to upgrade the Soviet military posture in Cuba in ways currently prohibited. Cuba could then pose a direct security threat once more to the United States.

### OTHER CUBAS?

In the absence of such a threat, the United States has been preoccupied with Cuba's Third World initiatives, in Angola, Ethiopia, Central America, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Washington has interpreted Cuba's actions—whether diplomatic, economic, or military—as gambits in the Cold War, aimed as much at advancing Soviet interests as Cuban ones. The extreme version of this interpretation reduces the Cubans to mindless proxies of the U.S.S.R. with no autonomy or interests of their own.

Such a view is not supported by the historical record. Despite the support Cuba has received from the Soviet Union, relations between the two have been complex and volatile. During the late 1960s Cuban leaders openly criticized the Soviet Union for sacrificing proletarian internationalism on the altar of peaceful coexistence. Cuba cited the willingness of the Soviets to do business with rightist regimes in Latin America, their capitalist trade relations with the Third World, and their inadequate defense of North Vietnam. The Cubans, in contrast, sought to create a new revolutionary international at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana and to forge a militant third force with Vietnam and North Korea within the socialist camp.

Such differences, however, have diminished since 1970. Cuban and Soviet world views now correspond closely, making possible a variety of cooperative ventures abroad—in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. If this partnership remains intact, most Cuban foreign policy successes will have the effect, intended or not, of advancing Soviet interests. But the sharp disagreements of the past should demonstrate that the current Cuban-Soviet partnership is neither inevitable nor interminable.

Even in the 1970s there have been significant discrepancies between Cuban and Soviet policies. In Angola Cuban troops helped the late President Agostinno Neto's moderate faction of the MPLA defeat the 1977 coup attempt by Nito Alves's pro-Soviet fashion. In Ethiopia Cuba has refused to send its troops into combat against Eritrean rebels. Instead, it called for a negotiated settlement despite the Soviet Union's initial preference for a military solution to the insurgency.

The most important difference between current Cuban and Soviet foreign policies concerns the quest for a new international economic order. As the 1979–1982 leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and a self-described member of the Third World, Cuba has long been in the forefront of demands for change in the international economic system—including advocating that all developed countries, capitalist and socialist alike, expand development assistance to the Third World. Castro's speech before the 1979 U.N. General Assembly on behalf of the non-aligned countries explicitly called on the socialist states to contribute their share of the burden. The Soviet position on the new international economic order has been unenthusiastic at best.

Other Cuban foreign policy initiatives seem to be of little concern to the Soviet Union, among them Cuban policy in the Carribean region. Although the Soviets have now, as far as is known, tried to restrain Cuban behavior, they have shown remarkably little enthusiam for creating other Cubas in the region. The Soviet Union has refused to underwrite the expenses of socialist construction in such countries as Jamaica under former Prime Minister Michael Manley, or Nicaragua. Even the Salvadoran Communist party's modest request for arms was met with reluctance in Moscow. The Soviet economy can ill afford to finance any more Cubas in the Caribbean, especially because they would provide only a marginal strategic gain over the existing partnership with Cuba itself. Indeed, the next major disagreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union could come over Soviet unwillingness to shore up a faltering Nicaraguan economy.

### HOSTILITY OF ENGAGEMENT?

As U.S. policy makers seek to formulate responses to Cuba's international activism, they must look beyond the Manichaean rhetoric about Cuban puppets and mercenaries. Cuban-Soviet agreement and cooperation varies from region to region. For the United States to assume that Cuban behavior comes at Soviet behest is foolish and dangerous.

It is equally dangerous to determine U.S. policy toward regional conflicts by looking at Cuba's posture rather than the realities of the conflicts themselves. Current U.S. policy in Central America, for example, is hostage to Washington's animosity toward Cuba. Washington cites Cuban assistance to revolutionary movements in the region as evidence that Cuba created these movements and that therefore their leaders are implacable enemies of the United States. The idea that these insurgencies may be authentically indigenous and that there may be no solution to the region's crises without the insurgents' participation is lost in the cacophony of anti-Cuban rhetoric. Washington ignores the real source of insurgency in Central America—decades of economic inequality and political oppression.

Indeed, Central America offers a perfect example of what has been wrong with U.S. responses to Cuban initiatives abroad. By treating Cuba as the source of Central America's problems, the United States loses sight of regional dynamics, focusing only on the East-West dimension of local conflicts. The United States would respond more effectively to Cuban initiatives by focusing on the regional conflicts themselves, seeking solutions that deprive Cuba of political advantage. As Angola and Ethiopia demonstrate, Cuba's opportunities for major gains are greatest when regional conflicts erupt in violence and become internationalized. When negotiations resolve conflicts, as they did in Zimbabwe, Cuba—and the Soviet Union—are prevented from extending their influence through military aid.

As they contemplate how best to manage the conflicts between the United States and Cuba, U.S. policy makers face a choice between two broad sets of policy options. A policy of graduated hostility, on the one hand, is a coercive strategy aimed at forcing Cuba to cease activities objectionable to the United States by punishing Cuba for undertaking them. At the heart of this strategy lies the premise that no significant improvement in America's relations with Cuba should be undertaken until it fundamentally alters its foreign policy.

A strategy of gradual engagement, on the other hand, seeks to induce changes in Cuban behavior by positive reinforcement. This strategy is based on the premise that an improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations could serve U.S. interests even if Cuba did not change its basic foreign policy positions. This strategy does not, however, rule out such change as a long-term objective of U.S. policy. To embark on this strategy, the United States would have to make a decision to offer inducements to Cuba and, if they are met with a positive response to follow them with additional inducements. The United States can, of course, introduce some punitive measures into an overall strategy of engagement. What is critical is the decision to test the possibility of improving relations.

The specific components of the strategy of hostility range from a relatively passive stance of malign neglect to active policies of diplomatic isolation, economic embargo, paramilitary attack, or even direct military assault. During the 1960s U.S.-Cuba policy sought to overthrow Castro or, failing that, to raise the cost to Cuba of pursuing a socialist path of development in partnership with the U.S.S.R. By making the survival of the Cuban revolution as difficult as possible, the United States hoped to deter other Latin American countries from following the Cuban model.

Washington achieved some success. The sanctions did damage the Cuban economy and force Havana to divert vast resources from economic development to national defense. Cuba's subsequent economic difficulties and its dependence on the U.S.S.R. are by no means enviable. And in at least two instances—Angola and Nicaragua—revolutionary governments, despite an ideological affinity with socialism, have tried to maintain mixed economies and good relations with the West in the hope of avoiding Cuba's difficulties. Ironically, the Cubans themselves have apparently encouraged these governments in this course.

But if the United States succeeded in making Cuba a negative example, it failed to overthrow the Cuban revolution. Moreover, the overall effect of the sanctions on bilateral relations was not salutary. The full range of sanctions, excluding only direct military attack, failed to modify Cuban behavior in ways favorable to the United States and actually seemed to make Havana more belligerent. And although the policy of isolating Cuba from Latin American countries and the other Western states damaged the Cuban economy, it also forced the Cubans to rely more heavily on the U.S.S.R. for economic and military aid.

Thus, the central problem as perceived by Washington—Cuba's relationship with U.S.S.R.—was exacerbated.

If the Reagan administration is indeed intent upon returning to the strategy of hostility, it will encounter the same problems with this strategy that existed in the 1960s, without the attendant benefits. No one can now expect diplomatic and economic isolation to endanger the Castro regime's survival. Cuba today is much less economically dependent on the West than it was 20 years ago.

In fact, the effect of graduated hostility might be precisely the opposite of its intended purpose. Cuba's most assertive international posture came in the late 1960s—the period of exporting revolution—when U.S.-Cuban relations were at their worst. Moreover, Cuba can now strike back in ways that it could not before; Castro could unleash Cuban troops in Africa—in Zaire, Somalia, or Namibia—or Cuban refugees from Mariel.

On balance, a strategy of graduated hostility offers so little leverage that this strategy is unlikely to alter Cuba's foreign policy except perhaps for the worse. It promises no more than a continuation of the status quo in both U.S.-Cuban relations and, more important, in Cuban-Soviet relations.

In contrast, a strategy of gradual engagement advocates the progressive establishment of links between the United States and Cuba to enhance the ability of U.S. policy makers to exert leverage on Cuban behavior in the future. There is some historical precedent for such a strategy in the Ford and Carter administrations, efforts to begin normalizing relations. Cuban involvement in Angola and Ethiopia, however, clearly demonstrated that Cuba was unwilling to make major foreign policy concessions in exchange for normal relations with the United States. This fact has become the principal argument against a policy of engagement.

But this argument has force only if the main justification for a U.S. policy of engagement is the prospect that Cuba will give up its entire foreign policy—its relationship with the Soviet Union and its support for friendly governments and revolutionary movements abroad—in exchange for relatively minor concessions by the United States. Such unrealistic expectations are precisely why U.S.-Cuban relations have been stalmated for so long.

A strategy of gradual engagement would entail seeking out the most pliant issues for both Cuba and the United States and negotiating agreements with balanced concessions from each side. Negotiations no doubt cannot resolve some issues in isolation, and the two countries will have to examine those issues as part of a broader package. But more important for success would be the U.S. acknowledgement that compromise must be mutual.

In the short term such a policy has a number of advantages. The United States and Cuba could resolve most of their bilateral issues, leading to economic and diplomatic relations that would give Washington at least some leverage on other issues. The United States could probably persuade Cuba to mitigate its denunciations of Washington in such international forums as the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations. More significant, a less confrontational relationship would diminish the credibility of Cuba's efforts to build its prestige in the Third World on the image of an embattled David confronting the Goliath of U.S. imperialism. In addition, an improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations would eliminate Cuba as a potential flashpoint of superpower confrontation. Improved relations might also begin to free U.S. policy makers from the tendency to react reflexively against every Cuban initiative abroad, regardless of the circumstances.

In the long term of policy of gradual engagement would allow Cuba to reduce its military and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. As long as U.S. hostility persists, Cuba's ties with the Soviets remain essential to Cuban national security. The Cuban-Soviet relationship will not, however, wither away in short order. Cuban soldiers have been trained with Soviet arms, and Cuban factories are filled with Soviet equipment. Soviet economic and military assistance to Cuba is indispensable, and no Western nation would be prepared to assume these burdens, even if the Cubans were looking for a new patron.

Nevertheless, Castro has always been one of the most nationalistic leaders in the socialist bloc. Whenever circumstances have allowed, he has tried to reduce Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union, especially by attempting to create a Cuban constituency in the Third World. This strategy is not so different from that pursued by Yugoslavia, although Cuba's non-alignment is less neutral. If Cuba is to have any prospect of striking out on a more independent course, it must have the economic and military breathing space to modify its relationship with the Soviet Union. Only the United States can create that opportunity by moving away from the policy of hostility, which leaves Cuba no option but to hold fast to its Soviet patron. For years the United States has sought to encourage East European states to distance themselves, however slightly, from the Soviet Union, and several—Romania, Hungary, and Poland—have done so. Surely the prospects for such a development are greater in the case of Cuba, despite its reliance on Soviet aid, than they are in Eastern Europe.

A realistic assessment of the advantages to the United States of pursuing a strategy of gradual engagement with Cuba shows that limited gains, particularly on bilateral issues, are fairly certain, whereas major gains, such as changing Cuban foreign policy significantly or reputing Cuba's partnership with the Soviet Union, are at best long-term possibilities. Such gains may not be impressive, but they are nevertheless superior to the results achieved over the past two decades by a policy of hostility.

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[From the New York Times, Apr. 20, 1982]

## The Puffs From Havana's Cigar

First, the hard-nosed interpretation of Cuba's unexpected pitch for better relations with the United States: It's a trick and a trap. Fidel Castro doesn't really mean it when his agents express a desire to "talk" with Washington, admit to having smuggled arms to Central America and disapprove of the Soviet interventions in Poland and Afghanistan.

All this is being said insistently to selected but not only "friendly" Americans. Still, Mr. Castro isn't saying it himself, and these overtures may be just a concession to a hard-pressed Soviet Union that is tired of lavishing $3 billion a year to maintain the Cubans. Or it could be a trap, so the United States can again be shown up as a hostile oppressor of a little country. Twice before, in 1974 and 1977, Mr. Castro encouraged hopes of a limited accommodation—hopes that floundered when he sent new armies to serve Soviet policy interests in Africa.

Yet a different reading is also possible. Cuba may at last have wearied of its dependence on the Kremlin and developed a genuine taste for its professed nonalignment. Logically. it should be willing to talk to Washington about its export and encouragement of Latin insurgencies, its still-growing collection of Soviet arms, its refusal to take back criminals and deranged refugees that it cynically dumped into American-bound boats two years ago.

And if it wants to talk, then what? Then by all means keep talking—as the Reagan Administration has been doing since Secretary of State Haig met in Mexico last December with Cuba's Vice President. In March it sent to Havana the crustiest of negotiators, Gen. Vernon Walters, a former deputy director of the C.I.A. and when Mr. Haig gets off the Falklands shuttle, he ought himself to spell out what he expects of the Cubans if these approaches are to bear fruit.

Cuba is not a China or Yugoslavia breaking openly from the Soviet camp. The Cubans say their ties with Moscow are not negotiable. There probably are clear limits to how far Cuba could now go in any deal with Washington. But that is no reason for the United States not to hold out an opportunity for some realignment.

It has long been American policy to give every Communist nation a chance to improve relations with the West, to make the world safer for pluralism and to soften the rigidities of bloc diplomacy. Indeed. Americans have worked hard to break through iron and bamboo curtains to promote their values in other estranged societies. It never made sense to seal off Cuba.

The inconsistency is rooted in American domestic politics. Six Presidents have failed to fashion an effective Cuban policy based on isolation, direct assault or economic sanctions. Cuba has been hostile, provocative and repressive, a military adventurer in Africa and an abettor of revolution in the Caribbean. But sooner or later it will discover that it has not thereby served its own highest interests.

President Reagan has the conservative credentials to test the chances for reopening serious dealings with Cuba. Indeed, Havana's receptivity may be partly due to the Reagan Administration's threats of dealing with revoluntary challengers "at the source." If changing circumstances have opened a narrow path for negotiations, by all means it should be explored.

[From the New York Times, July 8, 1982]

## DON'T SAY NO TO HAVANA

(By Peter Winn)[1]

The troubled history of American relations with Castro's Cuba has been paved with mutual misperceptions and missed opportunities. The Reagan Administration seems intent upon perpetuating this pattern, responding to the most promising Cuban overture in recent years with an intensified economic embargo and diplomatic hostility that are both ill conceived and counterproductive.

Three months ago in Havana, a senior Cuban official told a group of visiting Americans that Cuba was prepared to offer the United States a new relationship based upon mutual restraint, ranging from a "relative accommodation" in the Caribbean and Africa to normalized relations in the Florida Strait. Although Fidel Castro is not about to surrender his revolutionary vocation or sunder his Soviet ties, he seems willing to compromise his goals in the interests of regional peace and Cuban autonomy.

Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration has refused to seize this opportunity to obtain the Cuban self-restraint that the Ford and Carter Administrations sought in vain. Instead, it has responded to Havana's overtures with what one high State Department official termed a policy of "tightening the screws."

American tourist and business travel to Cuba has been banned and steps have been taken to reimpose a strict economic embargo on the island. Our allies are being pressed to close the credit lines that finance their commerce with Havana. Currently, some 31 percent of the island's overseas commerce is with non-Communist countries, mostly sugar for manufactures and machinery, with the Soviet Union accounting for almost all the rest. Mr. Reagan's "invisible blockade" is now calling into question even these limited links with the West. "What are they trying to do—force us to have 100 percent of our trade with the Russians?" one senior Cuban official asked incredulously.

The answer is yes. The Reagan policy, a State Department spokesman suggested, is to make Cuba totally dependent upon the Soviet Union to punish Havana for its overseas adventures and to raise for Moscow the cost of its empire. Reversing Republican and Democratic policies of the last decade, which were designed to increase the distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration is forcing Fidel Castro deeper into the Soviet embrace.

This may be good domestic politics, but it is bad foreign policy. Adding $2 billion in Cuban trade to Moscow's bill will not beggar the Soviet Union, but it is quite likely to provoke Havana. During the 1960's, similar economic pressures only made Mr. Castro more defiant, as Cuba's active support for other guerrilla movements demonstrated. Such measures are even less likely to force a far stronger Cuba to its knees today. Nor are they likely to persuade the Cubans not to act as "Soviet proxies" and to return to the Western camp, the declared goals of the Administration's Cuba policy. If anything, deepening Cuban dependence on Moscow is likely to have the opposite effect.

Tightening the screws in response to Cuban conciliation, moreover, may teach Mr. Castro a lesson, but it is the wrong lesson. Punishing Cuba immediately after military adventure in Africa or Central America makes didactic sense. It does not make sense when Havana has declared that it is ready to "play a positive role" in a Salvadoran peace settlement and has indicated that it is prepared to curtail its military interventions in Africa. If Washington's response to Cuban moderation is increased hostility, there is no incentive for Havana to exercise self-restraint in the future.

Worse still, this wrong-headed policy comes when a less intransigent stance might advance long-standing American purposes, including the Reagan Administration's own stated objectives. It might even start a process of change that would carry Havana further from Moscow in the future than can be foreseen today. But the Reagan policy makers show little understanding of historical process and less still of Mr. Castro and the Cuban revolution. As Mr. Castro is reconsidering his foreign policy, Washington is strengthening the hand of those in Havana who argue that no accommodation is possible with the United States. When Cuba has signaled its readiness to compromise, the Administration is insisting upon capitulation as the price of accommodation and is responding to political openings with economic warfare.

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[1] Peter Winn is professor of Latin American history at Tufts University and a senior fellow at Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change.

Secretary of State-designate George P. Shultz should recognize that he has inherited a shortsighted Cuba policy. Tightening the screws on Mr. Castro will force Havana to move even closer to Moscow, and the opportunity to alter a pattern of relations that has proved costly for both the United States and Cuba will be lost. The predictable result will be a more troublesome neighbor, a more restless Caribbean and a less stable third world.

Senator PELL. I would add that while I vigorously oppose Radio Marti, my affection and regard for those who support it, including my colleague from North Carolina, and including my old friend Ambassador Enders from the State Department and others, is unabated.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Enders, will the creation of a Radio Marti operation be a violation of the principle that AM radio broadcasting bands should be utilized exclusively for domestic purposes? Will the operation of such a radio violate the 1959 Geneva Convention?

Ambassador ENDERS. The governing body on this is a Western Hemisphere regional body which assigns frequencies, and this proposal was put to that body at the Rio Conference in November, and it occupies a frequency which is assigned to the U.S. Government, and there is no question about that.

Most of the international broadcasters as well as domestic broadcasters in the Western Hemisphere are on AM, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I might ask also were the previous U.S. broadcast efforts directed at Cuba, Radio Swan, Radio Americas of the CIA and VOA's Cita con Cuba program ever considered violations of the principles of the 1959 convention?

Ambassador ENDERS. I do not believe so. The real problems with Cita con Cuba, for example, was that it was concluded that it was not compatible with the VOA charter which, in effect, separates the foreign broadcasting function targeted on individual countries from the general information effort, and it was wound up on that basis.

Radio Swan was an example of what we think we ought not to do in this new round. That is to say that the effort ought to be an entirely overt one; it ought to be authorized by the U.S. Congress and governed by legislation, and in this regard we think it would be very important if this new radio were put under the Board of International Broadcasting and subject to its regulation in the same way.

The CHAIRMAN. We have talked about $7 million or $8 million cost, but the question has arisen and will arise in subsequent testimony that the U.S. Government is creating an entity which could result in extensive damage to U.S. commercial broadcasts.

Do you have any idea of what the costs would be, and what is the potential disruption of U.S. commercial broadcasting, and if there is damage, what is the U.S. Government position on whether it assumes any proportionate cost or part of that damage?

Ambassador ENDERS. We think that question ought to be studied very intensively to see whether a principle of compensation can be defined and applied in this.

There are four possible reactions from the Cubans. One is to do nothing. If, in fact, as Senator Dodd says, it is not significant to the Cubans, then that would be the obvious response. Another is to put up their own broadcasting, choosing a frequency which is compatible with the international rules. A third is to jam, which will not affect our broadcasting. And the fourth—this is where the question of compensation has been raised—the fourth would be targeted, aggressive, hostile interference, not only what is being done already, but an attempt to link this with given interference with a radio station in the United States. That would be a hostile act, and it would have to be dealt with by the United States as a hostile act, and whether compensation is the only way to do it or whether there should be some other way, whether the Cubans who themselves are very substantial broadcasters and have a very vulnerable radio system, whether they should be made aware of the risks that would be involved for them in this, those are questions which we think should be looked at very carefully.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I know the answer to this question but I am going to put it to you anyway because your range would be much broader than mine and the Cuban Americans that I have dealt with essentially in the State of Illinois. Having met so many people who have fled from Cuba under Castro, many of them living in my own State, my concern goes back quite a ways now with the plight of those people and their friends and relatives and former associates in Cuba. I have long recognized the constructive role that they have played in building America. The Cuban Americans have become fine citizens. My former company, Bell and Howell, happens to have its international headquarters and its largest manufacturing facility located just outside the Hispanic community in uptown Chicago where large numbers of Cuban Americans have lived. Bell and Howell employed thousands of them in Chicago and we know how much they have contributed to American society.

I share their abhorrence of dictatorships. They have seen what it has done to their country and what it has done to their people. They share our sympathy for the people of Cuba whose basic human rights have been abridged for over two decades now.

As we consider this issue, I think we should keep in mind, and must keep in mind, what Cuban Americans have contributed to our own society and what their attitudes are and what their feelings are.

Other questions that we have will be submitted for the record. I would like to have a cost estimate of what we think the damages we might incur as a result of this proposal.

Do you have any estimates now that you could give us?

Ambassador ENDERS. No; because it is not at all clear that there will be damages that can be identified to the consequences of the radio, Senator, and that, for example, now, we have a question. The KSL in Salt Lake City is being interfered with by one of those 500 kW transmitters announced in 1979. Radio Marti is not responsible for that. WHO might be interfered with, but they announced it well before Radio Marti. So, is Radio Marti involved in that?

There are some very difficult questions on this, and I do not think that we should want to attribute all of Cuban interference to this. And maybe we would not be able to attribute any of it to this.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have a very qualified panel also coming forward that I think can help us.

I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Ambassador ENDERS. Thank you.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, I would hope the record would be kept open so that any questions we might wish to submit in writing could be done before the close of business today.

The Chairman. We will keep it open even longer than that for Senators who are not here today.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

The Chairman. We plan on printing these hearings and will leave the record open for 10 days. Any absent Senators or present Senators can submit questions to the Secretary for his direct response. I have a number of them myself. We will not take additional time for them this morning.

Ambassador Enders. In particular response to the questions asked by Senator Boschwitz, which are important. I will supply those in writing to you, Mr. Chairman, as well as to him, if I may.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Senator Helms. I hope Mr. Enders will furnish the figures to the extent that he is able to do so concerning how much Castro spends on propaganda to Central America.

Ambassador Enders. We will give the best estimates that we can from that closed society.

[The information referred to follows:]

## CUBAN PROPAGANDA

[SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE]

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to provide accurate figures on how much Cuba spends on propaganda to Central America since Cuba publishes no statistics on the subject, and there is little hard data. Also, it is difficult to estimate dollar costs. We do, however, know a good deal about the extent of the Cuban propaganda effort in the Caribbean region, which, I feel, you will find useful.

The Castro regime, recognizing that insurgent movements are uncharacteristic of the Caribbean political environment, relies primarily on cultural and informational exchanges and a variety of propaganda techniques to introduce and expand its influence in this region. These activities are part of a multifaceted yet carefully coordinated mechanism designed to promote Cuban policies and undercut U.S. influence worldwide. The mechanism is extremely complex and involves elements of the party, the government, mass organizations, commercial and cultural entities, front groups, and the regime's subversion apparatus, yet it is still flexible enough to make allowances for national and regional differences as well as for class distinctions in each country.

The regime's simplistic approach of the 1960's—when a Cuban sponsored guerrilla team in the field was considered all that was needed to bring a pro-Cuban revolutionary movement to power and set a country on the path toward a definitive solution of all its political, economic, and social problems—has been scrapped for a much more sophisticated formula. The new approach, profiting in particular from an analysis of Che Guevara's disaster in Bolivia in 1967, places much greater emphasis on enlisting the support of the masses for the revolutionary struggle and concentrates on:

Raising the political consciousness of the masses through propaganda,

Creating political structures through which the masses can be motivated and mobilized to support wittingly or unwittingly,

Setting Cuban policy goals,

Training revolutionary cadres to provide leadership.

Moreover, cultural exchanges and contacts provide the Cubans with a channel through which they can identify cooperative intellectuals who can be useful in propaganda operations, activities in labor unons, youth groups, and women's and farmers' organizations who might profit from training and indoctrination in special schools in Cuba, and potential agents for intelligence collection and operations.

The development of links to the masses in "nonrevolutionary" countries is intended to supplement the formation of a coalition of leftist—and even centrist—forces into one unified opposition that can create and maintain pressure on the government while being prepared to confront it at the appropriate time. The elitist concept of the Guevara era, when leftist forces (including the local

Communist Party) were expected to subordinate themselves to the Cuban-sponsored guerrilla leadership (foco) in the rural area, has given way to a politically more ecumenical attitude in which virtually all opposition groups are initially welcome under one umbrella. This does not mean that Havana is willing to have its revolutionary proteges share power; rather it reflects the Cubans' confidence in their ability to control and later isolate and politically sterilize any elements of the anti-government opposition when they are no longer useful.

On the other hand, in countries considered to be truly revolutionary, such as Nicaragua or Grenada, the links to the masses are intended to consolidate the revolutionaries' hold on power and to help intimidate any opposition to the creation of a one-party, Marxist-Leninist state. The Cubans, no doubt, believe that if Chile's Salvador Allende had well developed mass organizations at his disposal, he would have been able to deter and neutralize the military establishment that eventually overthrew him.

Cuban external cultural activities, therefore, are not blind ventures or efforts aimed at the genuine cultural enrichment of the target countries. They are unique cogs in a large and surprisingly efficient machine designed to achieve specific foreign policy goals. The activities include radio broadcasts, press activities, the formation of front groups, sports competition, cultural festivals and contests, and the training of specialists.

## ACTIVITIES IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

### *Radio broadcasts*

Cuba broadcasts by radio 406 hours per week in many languages. The largest share of this is to North and South America (282 hours). Radio Havana, Cuba's shortwave broadcasting service, transmits over 355 program hours per week in eight languages to all points of the world. This service uses eight transmitters located near Bauta, outside Havana; since May 1979 it has also been relayed on several shortwave frequencies from transmitter sites in the U.S.S.R. Radio Havana broadcasts that can be heard in the Caribbean Basin include:

14 hours weekly in Creole to Haiti
60 hours weekly in English to the Americas
3 hours weekly in French to the Americas
125 hours weekly in Spanish to the Americas

Cuba also has medium wave Spanish-language broadcasts to the Caribbean nightly over "La Voz de Cuba," a network of high-powered transmitters located in different parts of Cuba. These broadcasts are made from midnight until five in the morning, and because of the darkness, the transmissions can be heard in many areas of the Caribbean basin. Programs usually consist of special commentaries, topical talks, entertainment features, and periodic newcasts. Cuba also uses its 150-kilowatt medium wave transmitted to relay 84 hours weekly of Radio Moscow programs in English to North America.

### *Prensa Latina*

As the press agency of the Cuban Government, Prensa Latina combines news gathering and intelligence operations. Prensa Latina has flourished. It has its headquarters in Havana and a field office in the following countries:

Jamaica, Guyana, Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, Cost Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Portugal, United Nations (New York), Canada, Spain, France, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, East Germany, Argentina, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Lebanon, India, Japan, Vietnam, China, Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R., Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Romania, Peru.

Cuba also maintains stringers in 12 other countries:

Nicaragua, Cyprus, Brazil, Syria, Suriname, Bolivia, Australia, Grenada Afghanistan, Honduras, Philippines, Dominican Republic.

In addition to its press transmissions to subscribers in all parts of the world, Prensa Latina disseminates a number of publications such as Cuba Internacional, a current events journal with emphasis on illustrations, and Prisma Latinoamericana, a news magazine clearly intended to compete with Time, Vision, and similar publications. Both are monthlies published in the Spanish language only.

### *Front groups*

Havana sees its role in the Third World largely as that of an organizer and then a catalyst of revolution, with the successful completion of the former being a prerequisite for the success of the latter. The Cubans either join existing groups to try to influence them from within or, where formal structures are lacking, establish news organizations. To counter the influence of the Inter-american Press Association, for example, they formed the Federation of Latin American Journalists, with non-Cubans in the leadership to mask Cuban involvement. In December 1977 Cuban labor officials were instrumental in organizing the First Caribbean Trade Union Conference, which was attended by some 40 regional labor delegations. The conference created a Caribbean Workers Committee of Unity and Solidarity, which has its headquarters in Georgetown, Guyana. In November 1979 the executive secretariat of this committee met in Havana to discuss the Caribbean workers' "struggle for full sovereignty against penetration by multinational companies, economic dependence, and unemployment."

In addition, the Cubans maintain some of the old front organizations set up in the 1960's. The Continental Organization of Latin American Students, with its Permanent Secretariat in Havana, holds irregular "congresses" of student leaders from Latin America and the Caribbean—the last was in March 1979—and publishes a monthly journal in Spanish to focus attention on student political activities and to serve as a forum for pro-Cuban revolutionaries. Similarly, the Africa, Asian, and Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization, founded with great fanfare in Havana in 1966, now seems to do little more than publish a monthly propaganda magazine in Spanish, French, and English editions to denigrate the United States and plead the case of revolutionaries everywhere. It also publishes a monthly bulletin in Spanish with similar content. Its executive secretariat is in Havana. Although both organizations are theoretically independent, the distribution of their publications is handled by an agency of the Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry.

Where efforts to coopt a regional organization might prove counterproductive, the Cubans send delegations to meetings of these organizations where they function as advocates of the Castro regime. Pro-Castro Cuban clergymen, for example, are sent to attend regional conferences of clerics of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Cuban mass organizations regularly send representatives to meetings of women's groups, labor unions, and youth and farmers' organizations. Havana also provides assistance, usually in the fields of public health and education to various countries of the region. Cuban construction has built schools in Jamaica. Several hundred others are now in Grenada working on an airport project which could eventually be used to extend the range of Cuban MiG-23 jetfighters or as a refueling stop for Cuban transport aircraft that are carrying troops to Africa. Cuban medical teams are currently working in Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada, and Nicaragua. Similar assistance has been offered to other governments in the eastern Caribbean.

The Cubans frequently urge local groups to set up Cuban Friendship Associations, which then maintain contact with Havana through the Cuban Institute of Friendship with People—an entity of Cuban intelligence. These associations, ostensibly serving cultural functions, are particularly useful where Havana does not have formal diplomatic ties and help generate sympathy for the Cuban cause.

### *Sports competition*

Cuba places considerable importance in fielding large and usually formidable sports teams for virtually all regional games where they can arrange an invitation. They believe that excellence in sports is an effective means of selling the Cuban political system. Despite Cuba's economic problems, the Castro regime has consistently shown that it is willing to go to great expense to use sports as a propaganda weapon.

### *Cultural festivals and contests*

The Castro regime not only sends impressive delegations to cultural events elsewhere in the region, it also plays host where appropriate. Havana was the site of the 11th World Festival of Youth and Students in the summer of 1978 and entertained delegations from some 140 countries for political entities including Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Dominica, Antigua, St. Vincent, and St. Lucia from the English-speaking Caribbean. In July 1979, the Castro regime brought together 2,100 artists and intellectuals from almost all countries in or bordering on the Caribbean in an annual regional celebration called Carifesta 79. To insure success, a Cuban passenger ship was sent to the eastern Caribbean to provide passage for over 200 artists and performers, and many of the visiting groups were flown from Havana to eastern Cuba to perform in the country's second largest city, Santiago de Cuba.

The Casa de las Americas in Havana holds annual literary competitions for writers, poets, and playwrights. Several years ago the Casa de las Americas established a special category for writers of the English-speaking Caribbean. Other Cuban organizations such as the National Union of Writers and Artists and the Cuban Union of Journalists maintain ties with counterparts in the area and make periodic awards to those whose work, in Havana's opinion, merits recognition.

*Training*

All Cuban mass organizations operate schools for the training of cadres in organizational work and indoctrination, and all have courses for the training of specially selected non-Cubans. Each year Cuba offers 100–200 scholarships to Caribbean students for these courses. The Central Organization of Cuban Workers, for example, runs the Lazaro Pena Trade Union Cadre School in Arroyo Arenas, Havana, to train young labor officials from Latin America and the Caribbean in organizational, political, and propaganda techniques. The Young Communist League, the party's youth arm, has a school for those who have the potential to lead youth movements: the Cuban Women's Federation helps to train organizers of women's groups; the National Association of Small Farm Owners provides instructions on how to organize activists in rural areas; and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution trains organizers for urban areas. The party is also believed to have its own courses for non-Cubans. The enrollment statistics for these courses are not publicized nor are the names of those trained released for obvious reasons.

Senator HELMS. Fine.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, while we are waiting for the next witnesses to come to the table, with regard to the legislation before the committee, I will offer an amendment that the Federal Government will assume all costs of damages to radio broadcasting. That was done on the House side, and I think it is a very sound addition to the proposal, so that there will be no financial burden that will have to be borne by private enterprise in this country as a result of this activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will hear our next witnesses as a panel. They are our distinguished former colleague, and it is always a pleasure to see Senator Richard Stone. In this capacity he comes as a member of the Executive Committee, of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting; the Chairman of that Commission, Mr. Clifton White, just posed; and Mr. Kalmann Schaefer, Assistant to the Chairman for International Communications, Federal Communications Commission.

Gentlemen, we are pleased to have you here today.

Mr. White, if you would like to start off with testimony, the full text of your testimony will be printed in the Record.

So whatever you wish to do, summarize your testimony or put the full text in the record, would be fine.

Mr. White.

## STATEMENT OF F. CLIFTON WHITE, CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

Mr. WHITE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is good to welcome another not old friend, but a young friend of longstanding.

Mr. WHITE. I am particularly pleased to be here, and I was delighted that Senator Dodd, who may not be aware that I am one of his constituents, was able to provide us with such a marvelous political speech.

Having been only a citizen appearing before this body, I have no previous, former bureaucratic title, so I am just a plain, poor old citizen and am not used to participating in this rather grand display of political atmosphere that we have in these——

Senator DODD. You are doing pretty well already. You learn quickly.

Mr. WHITE. I am just delighted to be here.

I was also going to congratulate you on the fact, but then I realized you were not running this year, upon your abhorrence of baloney. I thought that was a marvelous statement that you made in that direction, and I wanted to congratulate you on it.

I will not read my statement. You have my statement, and therefore, in the interest of time and in the interest of being able to answer the questions that I hope you have to ask, I would make only two points.

I think one of the great traditions of America has been that we have tried to present a posture of truth to the people of the world, and I think that while we have also tried to present democracy, that an absolutely essential corollary to that is the presentation of truth, and that therefore Radio Marti falls in that responsibility and in that tradition, and it should be recognized as such.

Second, in regard to interference, I knew nothing about radio broadcasting before I became chairman of this committee except that if I turned a button I got a noise out of a machine somewhere. I have become appalled at the interference that the Cuban Castro regime has been engaging in for the last 15 years in this field. I think it is one of the critical and fundamental problems facing this world because radio is the essential communication vehicle that' exists, partcularly for the underdeveloped and Third World countries. And to allow to exist outlaw behavior that can jeopardize this one instrument that allows all of the peoples of the world to have a communications network available to them I think is one of the great crimes that is existing in the international field, and certainly it should be addressed and should be dealt with. But it is not directly related to Radio Marti, and I would hope that we could discuss the merits of Radio Marti without getting involved in the total question of the problem of outlaw behavior by Castro which has been going on for the last 15 years.

With that, I will desist and allow my colleagues to make their comments and then hopefully answer whatever questions the committee has to ask, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. White's prepared statement follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF F. CLIFTON WHITE

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba was established by Executive Order No. 12323 of September 22, 1981. Ten members were subsequently appointed to the Commission in January, and an eleventh member was named in June. A list of their names is attached. The Commission is responsible for developing a recommended plan for radio broadcasting intended for transmission to Cuba. According to the executive order, it should examine such issues as possible program content, information gathering, writing and editing needs, staffing requirements, legal structure for a broadcasting organization, proposed legislation, budgets, and the location, structure and function of possible broadcasting facilities.

The Commission's interim report prepared for this hearing provides the Commission's preliminary conclusions and recommendations with regard to most of these questions based on the deliberations of its meetings during the winter and spring. Let me call attention to the most important of these findings, as follows:

The Commission strongly endorses the administration's proposal to initiate radio broadcasting to Cuba as the most effective means available to make the Cuban people aware of the costs to them of Castro's mismanagement at home and adventurism abroad, so that they will have the information needed to try to hold their Government more accountable. "Radio Marti" should be established to broadcast to Cuba information and programs similar to those beamed by Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) behind the Iron Curtain. Program policy guidelines have been adapted from the RFE/RL experience to serve Radio Marti. By providing comprehensive and reliable news, analysis and commentary, Radio Marti can give both international and domestic Cuban developments a perspective, balance and fullness now denied the Cuban people by its Government. In furnishing such information together with entertainment and sports, Radio Marti can serve as a surrogate "home service" and break the Cuban Government's virtual monopoly on news and information. This program of broadcasting to Cuba is being proposed in keeping with our unwaivering commitment to the principle of freedom of information, that is the right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers," in accordance with article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Neither VOA nor private stations are designed to perform this role. While Spanish language broadcasts by VOA and commercial stations in Florida can be heard in Cuba, the information provided differs from that planned for Radio Marti. The charter granted to the VOA by the Congress in 1976 does not contemplate a surrogate home service, like Radio Marti. Rather, the VOA is mandated to serve as a window on America, presenting U.S. Government policy and projecting American society and institutions.

Private U.S. commercial stations, on the other hand, are geared primarily to the listening tastes of their local audience which forms the rate base for their advertising revenues. The program content of these stations does not address the needs of listeners in Cuba and may be too partisan to serve the interests of the United States Government. In testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 3, the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association stated clearly that because of limited reception in Cuba "commercial operations are a poor substitute for the proposed Radio Marti."

In reaching the Cuban people, neither FM nor TV broadcasts would have adequate reception, even in the area of Havana and its surroundings, from available transmission sites in the United States. Neither could possibly reach the majority of the Cuban people, who live in eastern Cuba. Nor would shortwave be an effective way to reach the Cuban populace since SW receivers are scarce in Cuba. AM transmission, with quality reception throughout Cuba, however, is quite feasible. AM is the medium the Cuban Government uses to reach its own people. AM receivers are common and widely distributed throughout Cuba. AM broadcasting is the only effective way for Radio Marti to accomplish its mission.

With regard to frequencies, technical studies conducted by the FCC show that the most appropriate standard AM frequency available for Radio Marti is 1040 kHz. It would provide good coverage of Cuba and would avoid interference with U.S. stations. Radio Marti itself would not interfere significantly with the primary U.S. station already assigned the use of this channel in the United States, WHO of Des Moines. The FCC and NTIA have approved this frequency for Radio Marti, and NTIA has assigned it to the United States Government. The frequency assignment has been accepted by the ITU.

Cuban radio interference with U.S. broadcasting in violation of international broadcast agreements and norms often discussed in connection with this project is a separate problem that has existed for 15 years, well before Radio Marti was proposed. This has been made clear in testimony before the Commission by the National Association of Broadcasters and by the Broadcasting Associations in Florida.

Tying Cuban interference to Radio Marti is inaccurate and misleading. The illegal radio interference by Cuba over the last 15 years represents a serious threat to regional broadcasting totally unrelated to Radio Marti. The problem of Cuban interference with American medium wave broadcasting should be a high priority on the agenda of this administration and the Congress but it should not be allowed to stand in the way of moving forward with Radio Marti, an important initiative in communicating with the Cuban people.

In closing, I would like to stress as Chairman and as a Commission the importance of proceeding expeditiously with favorable action on this bill so that Radio Marti may be on the air before the year is out.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

CHAIRMAN

Mr. F. Clifton White, President of Public Relations firm, F. Clifton White and Associates, Inc.

MEMBERS

William B. Bayer, Political Editor, WINZ; Joseph Coors, President, Adolph Coors Company; Tirso del Junco, M.D., Chairman, California Republican Party; George Jacobs, Consulting Radio Engineer; Jorge L. Mas, President, Church and Tower of Florida, Inc.

Richard M. Scaife, Publisher, The Tribune Review, Pittsburgh; Herbert Schmertz, Vice President for Public Relations, Mobil Oil Corporation; Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith, former Ambassador to Cuba, retired; Senator Richard B. Stone, Proskauer, Rose, Gertz and Mendelsohn; Charles Z. Wick, Director, International Communication Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Stone, how many times have you been on that side of the table?

Senator STONE. This is it.

The CHAIRMAN. This is it. I have served so many delightful years with you on this side——

Senator STONE. It is a strange feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. And being a Senator from my native State of Florida, I was born in Pensacola, I particularly welcome you back. Senator Helms, you did not know I was a southerner, did you?

Senator HELMS. No, but I guess it is just something in your accent. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. On behalf of all of us, we warmly welcome you back here. You provided a valuable contribution to this committee. It was a great personal joy for us to work with you for so many years. We miss you and are very pleased to have you here today.

## STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD B. STONE, A FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA, AND MEMBER, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

Senator STONE. Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate that welcome, and it is a pleasure to be back even on this side of the table.

The CHAIRMAN. It is sometimes better to be on that side.

Senator STONE. Sometimes.

I say to you and the distinguished Senators from North Carolina and Connecticut, I am going to ask that my complete statement be included in the record, and I will abstract one or two points from it because I think that they answer some of the questions that the distinguished Senators have raised.

In the first place, there seems to be some question in some of your minds as to whether the Cuban people do have an ability to know information. May I just quote what the Miami Herald said last year on October 6 in a lead editorial:

> There is no freedom of expression in Cuba. The flow of information is tightly controlled by the Communist dictatorship. As long as that remains true, the U.S. Government has a right, even a duty, to fill the void by broadcasting to Mr. Castro's captives.

Second, the Christian Science Monitor last year on July 2 commented:

> It is astonishing that after 22 years of Castro, the United States still has not set up for Cuba the kind of hard-hitting, objective, round-the-clock broadcasting operation that Radio Free Europe has provided for Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe since 1950. * * * The United States looks inept when it does nothing to counteract the Soviet broadcasts which are now relaying out of Havana to Latin America as well as to the United States and Canada.

Third, as to whether the press community of Latin America, as well as this press have a position on this, they are organized in the Inter-American Press Association, and at its General Assembly at Rio de Janeiro last October, they resolved to encourage free journalists—stating:

> Whereas, since the rise to power of the Communist government of Fidel Castro, all media have been confiscated and consolidated into a few official organizations, giving the government absolute control of public information under conditions leading to massive indoctrination. * * *
>
> The General Assembly resolves to encourage free journalists of the continent, especially members of the Inter-American Press Association, to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective.

May I say that Radio Marti was deeply discussed by that press association, and this is the way they reflected their desire to increase the flow of information.

As to whether we now receive broadcasts from Cuba, I will not read this item but I included in my statement an item just a few months ago from the New York Times reporting that late night radio listeners along the Atlantic Coast can now tune in Radio Havana in English on 1160, and reporting that for some time Cuba has been using 550 and 600, crowded with local and regional U.S. stations, making reception difficult.

Fourth, is to whether this is simply an administration proposal, it is a bipartisan proposal. I served as a Democrat, I am registered as a Democrat, and a few days ago at the Mid-Term Conference of the Democratic National Party in Philadelphia, the Hispanic Democratic Caucus resolved supporting Radio Free Cuba and Radio Marti, and I will not read their reasons. It was about the same as both the Miami Herald editorial and the Press Association, the monopoly and stifling within Cuba of the ability to know, and that they have a right to know.

But Radio Marti is bipartisan, and the administration does support it, and lest anyone think that that support has faded, I have included in my remarks a letter sent just a few days ago by Judge Clark to Congressman Broyhill again urging support of the President's proposal to establish Radio Marti, and saying, just one sentence in here, "It represents one of the few peaceful options available to the United States in this very sensitive and vital area."

Responding to this question of a possible threat of aggressive, unlawful radio broadcasting interference with our domestic broadcasts, Judge Clark said "Basing U.S. policy on presumed threats from a foreign power is, in any event, an unacceptable precedent."

So may I just close, and I will spare you my Spanish, but I will read you the first phrase: "El que vive en un credo autocratic es lo mismo que una ostra en su concha," and I have included the whole Jose Marti quote which I have liberally translated as follows, and this is why, among other reasons, we want to call this Radio Marti. He said one who lives under autocratic domination is as an oyster imprisoned in darkness in its shell, but he who can hear from within that shell receives the wings of liberty and knows the energetic pulse of the world.

And so we say let the people of Cuba hear.

[Senator Stone's prepared statement follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD B. STONE

The Cuban people have the right to know and, currently as in previous years, that right has been stifled by a virtual monopoly of internal propaganda. As the Miami Herald stated in a lead editorial on October 6, 1981:

"There is no freedom of expression in Cuba. The flow of information is tightly controlled by the Communist dictatorship. As long as that remains true, the U.S. Government has a right—even a duty—to fill the void by broadcasting to Mr. Castro's captives."

The great value of accurate information and balanced opinion by an American broadcasting facility has been proven in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by the excellent work of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The Christian Science Monitor on July 2, 1981 put it this way:

"It is astonishing that after 22 years of Castro, the United States still has not set up for Cuba the kind of hard-hitting, objective, round-the-clock broadcasting operation that Radio Free Europe has provided for Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe since 1950. It is still not too late to do so. Broadcasts to Cuba could be supplemented by English and Spanish services for the entire Caribbean and Central American region. The United States looks inept when it does nothing to counter the Soviet broadcasts which are now relaying out of Havana to Latin America as well as to the United States and Canada."

The press of our hemisphere organized and speaking through the Inter American Press Association in its general assembly at Rio de Janeiro last October resolved as follows:

"Whereas (1) since the rise to power of the Communist government of Fidel Castro, all media have been confiscated and consolidated into a few official organizations, giving the government absolute control of public information under conditions leading to massive indoctrination. * * *"

"The General Assembly Resolves (2) to encourage free journalists of the continent, especially members of the Inter American Press Association, to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective.

The Castro regime does not stop at attempts to indoctrinate its own people, but for years has broadcasted extensively and intensively to the Western Hemisphere and specifically to the United States. The New York Times carried an item last December 28th as follows:

"RADIO HAVANA MOVES; NOW CLEAR IN THE EAST

"Late-night radio listeners along the Atlantic Coast can tune in Radio Havana at 1160 on the AM dial.

"For the first time, English-language programming from the station is on a frequency audible throughout the East. Cuba has been broadcasting in English to the United States for two years, but has been using frequencies 550 and 600, which are crowded with local and regional United States stations, making reception difficult."

This project has bipartisan support. At the Democratic National Party in Conference in Philadelphia last week, the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party resolved support of the establishment of a Radio Free Cuba/Radio Marti for broadcasting to the people of Cuba. And their reasons for adopting these resolutions were that:

"The people of Cuba deserve to have an accurate, timely, and unbiased source of news and information about significant events in relation to the activities of their neighboring peoples and governments, in the Americas and the world; and, radio broadcasting, in a peaceful manner consistent with international law, has proven effective in furthering communications between peoples divided by political boundaries as demonstrated by the experience of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty."

On June 18, 1982, the Presidential National Security Advisor, William Clark, wrote Congressman Broyhill:

"I am writing to urge you to support the President's proposal to establish a new radio station for broadcasting to Cuba. Informing the Cuban people is a keystone of the Administration's efforts to address the growing Soviet/Cuban presence in the Caribbean. It represents one of the few peaceful options available to the United States in this very sensitive and vital area."

Furthermore, regarding the frequently stated concern that the Cuban Government would go beyond jamming the Radio Marti signal in Cuba and would aggressively interfere with other radio station signals in the United States, Judge Clark wrote:

"Radio Marti is consistent with international law, in contrast to the Cuban Government's practice of generating interference with U.S. stations. This illegal Cuban broadcasting, which has continued for more than ten years, is indeed a serious problem, but it is not one that will be resolved by actions we take with regard to Radio Marti. Basing U.S. policy on presumed threats from a foreign power is, in any event, an unacceptable precedent."

They can be expected to continue and expand these broadcasts and interference efforts with our own domestic broadcasts whether or not Radio Marti itself broadcasts. But broadcasts by Radio Marti will disclose to the Cuban people the costs of violent Castro adventures in this hemisphere, Africa and the Middle East. This will raise the political cost domestically within Cuba of engaging in these disruptive world exercises. The broadcasts will be balanced, accurate and fair, and I urge the committee to approve this legislation, and thereby address the right to know of our neighbors, the people of Cuba.

As Jose Marti wrote: "El que vive en un credo autocratico es lo mismo que una ostra en su concha, que solo ve la prision que la encierra y cree, en la oscuridad, que aquello es el mundo; la libertad pone alas a la ostra. Y lo que oido en lo interior de la concha, parecia portentosa contienda, resulta a la luz del aire ser el natural movimiento de la savia en el pulso energico del mundo." Which means in summary that he who lives under autocratic domination is like an oyster imprisoned in darkness in its shell, but he who can hear from within that shell receives the wings of liberty and knows the energetic pulse of the world.

Let the people of Cuba hear.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Could I ask a clarifying question, Senator Stone?

You indicated that the Democratic Convention in Philadelphia had taken a position. Was that a position by a subcommittee or the Hispanic Committee or was it actually taken by the entire convention?

Senator STONE. No; this was the Hispanic Caucus, the people who most——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see. It was not adopted by the convention.

Senator STONE. No; it was a resolution of the caucus, and may I say, those are not Cubans. They are Mexican-Americans for the most part. They are not from Florida for the most part. Some were. Most of them are from the Southwest and the Far West. Most of them—it has been implied that this is a Florida, Cuban exile type of felt issue, and it certainly is that, but it is far more than that. And I just would add, since you raised this question of wide support, it is only fair that the people of Eastern Europe have some facts, and it is only fair that the people within Cuba who darned well know that almost 1 percent of their population has been sent abroad as soldiers, should know some casualty figures which I guarantee you they do not know, and what the cost in disease as well as wounds are to these people operating in Ethiopia and the Eritrean front, not just Angola, and in South Yemen, not just in Africa, and other places in the Middle East and Far East where we do not want them. Yes, Cuba is a small country, but they have projected a large amount of armed power around the world as Soviet proxies. And those people there have a right to know what are the consequences of their Government's policy. They do not have the ability to know.

Impartial news organizations such as the Miami Herald, completely impartial in this issue, and frequently criticized by the Cuban exile community for not being vigorous enough in an anti-Castro posture, have come out crystal clear on this. And you could not exactly accuse the Christian Science Monitor of being a radical.

So this is a project whose time has come. The Cubans broadcast propaganda to us. We wish to broadcast facts to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

## STATEMENT OF KALMANN SCHAEFER, ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Mr. SCHAEFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here.

As you know, I recently served as the chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Regional Broadcasting Conference which was held in Rio de Janeiro from November 6 to December 19, 1981.

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a detailed statement for the record, and I would like to make a few very brief remarks regarding Radio Marti and interference from Cuba so that we may leave the remaining time for questions and answers.

Prior to the Rio Conference, the FCC, at the request of the executive branch, identified an appropriate frequency based upon the criteria provided us, namely, optimal coverage of Cuba, and second, minimal or no interference to United States broadcasters as well as other countries in our hemisphere. Based on our studies at the FCC, the executive branch selected 1040 kHz as the most appropriate frequency.

As chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Rio Conference, part of my instructions were to secure an approved and protected frequency assignment within the parameters of our regional broadcasting agreement. Also as chairman of the U.S. delegation, I can report to this committee that we accomplished this objective in Rio.

As you know, the United States has been experiencing radio interference from Cuba for the past 15 years ago or so, and indeed, the Commission has had to deal with complaints in this regard, this interference from Cuba, in spite of the existence of international treaties and agreements.

We set with representatives from Cuba on three occasions in an attempt to find resolutions to the interference problems. In these discussions we were encouraged that technical solutions could be found. However, it was at the Rio Conference where Cuba attempted a shift of 48 frequencies as a package deal, or en bloc. Such a shift would have created havoc to U.S. broadcasters and would have destroyed our ability to effectively use the proposed Radio Marti frequency.

Following initial success by Cuba at a conference working level, the U.S. delegation was able to blunt the adoption of this proposal by the conference as a whole by means of a secret ballot. Shortly thereafter, the Cuban delegation received instructions from Havana to return to Cuba. They did.

The conference proceeded with its deliberations, and we concluded the regional agreement which provides for an orderly planning of the broadcasting service in this hemisphere. From the U.S. point of view, we accomplished our objective, our primary objective, namely, preserving the integrity of the U.S. broadcasting system.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Schaefer's prepared statement follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF KALMANN SCHAEFER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Kalmann Schaefer; I am the advisor to Chairman Fowler of the Federal Communications Commission for international communications. I also served as Chairman of the United States Delegation to the recently concluded ITU Administrative Conference on Medium Frequency Broadcasting in Region 2, which is to say, AM broadcasting in the Western Hemisphere. That Conference concluded with the signing, by the United States and most of the other countries of North, Central and South America, and the Caribbean area, of Final Acts by which the signatories agreed upon stated principles, standards and procedures for protecting each others' AM broadcast services from mutual, destructive interference. As you are aware Mr. Chairman, Cuba is not a signatory to the Rio Final Acts.

Interference from Cuba has been a cause for mounting concern to AM broadcasters in the United States for several years. Until last November, Cuba (along with Canada, the Dominican Republic, the Bahama Islands and the United States), was a party to the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, called NARBA, which prescribed interference protection criteria for each others' AM services. Cuban departures from NARBA's restrictions had become evident long before November 1980, when Cuba gave the prescribed 1-year notice of its withdrawal from NARBA. In 1981, prior to the Conference at Rio, representatives of the FCC and the State Department conducted bilateral discussions with Cuban representatives on two separate occasions in an effort to develop an updated agreement with Cuba for mutual protection of AM services in Cuba and the United States.

Similar efforts were pursued at the Rio Conference, during which I and other senior members of the U.S. Delegation met with the Cuban Delegation in an effort to continue the discussion of mutually agreeable solutions to conflicts between the United States and Cuban proposals for AM assignments which each had submitted to the International Telecommunication Union. Our first bilateral discussion with the Cubans during the Rio Conference was destined to be our last.

Late in November, long after the deadline for frequency changes of November 10, 1981, which had been established by the Conference and which was adhered to by all other participating countries, the Cuban Delegation sought to introduce changes to the frequencies assigned in its previously submitted station inventory. These changes were not accepted by the United States. Cuba's maneuver almost succeeded however. First, it had the backing of all the other participants in the Planning Group where it was introduced. These were Canada, the Caribbean and Central American countries toward whom interference from Cuba would be reduced or eliminated. Cuba's frequency revisions would accomplish that at the expense of the United States, which would be subjected to heightened interference, while interference to other neighbors of Cuba would be reduced.

These changes were proposed on an all-or-nothing basis and therefore it did not help matters that some of the 48 changes proposed by Cuba would reduce interference to some U.S. stations, so great would be the damage inflicted by other changes, such as the shift of two proposed very high power—500 kW Cuban stations from Canadian clear channels to channels occupied by two U.S. clear channel stations. KSL operating on 1160 kHz at Salt Lake City and WHO on 104 kHz at Des Moines, each with the 50 kW maximum power permitted in the United States, provide a wide area service protected by the FCC from interference within a radius of 750 miles from their transmitters. Cuban interference would destroy this service. Other U.S. stations, as well, stand to lose service to significant areas and populations, some so severe as to bring into question the ability of some U.S. stations to continue to survive economically.

Cuba, although not a signatory to the Rio Final Acts, is a member of the International Telecommunication Union. As an ITU member, Cuba has undertaken the obligation to observe certain restrictions on radio emissions causing harmful interference to other ITU members. These are laid down in the charter of that body—the ITU Convention—and, in more detail, in the Radio Regulations which by the terms of the Convention bind all ITU members. Both the Convention and the Radio Regulations provide that members shall not cause "harmful interference" to each others' radio services. The Rio Final Acts made certain procedures for establishing protection rights applicable, for the first time, to AM broadcast stations in the Western Hemisphere. In view of the unwillingness of Cuba to resolve its interference problems with the United States, it is just as well that Cuba is not a signatory to the Rio Agreement, because if Cuba had signed, its stations, operating and planned, which cause such havoc to the U.S. broadcasting industry, would have received the color of legality which would have made resolution of the interference problems impossible and which would therefore, in our opinion, have raised serious questions as to the propriety of ratification of the Agreement by the United States. We should not be a party to any agreement which would result in the mutilation of our own broadcast service.

Under the ITU procedures, which are elaborated principally in Chapter 12 of the International Radio Regulations, members notify the ITU International Frequency Registration Board—usually referred to as the IFRB—of the bringing into use of new or changed station assignments. The IFRB maintains a Master Register of all notified frequency assignments, with indications as to whether they conform with the requirements for the protection of previously notified assignments. Assignments found not to comply with protection requirements are entered with an encoded indication of such non-conformance. Such non-conforming assignments are included in the Master Register for information only. Unlike conforming assignments, the non-conforming assignments are not generally entitled to protection by stations subsequently brought into use.

The ITU is not endowed with the power to enforce conformance by ITU members with the stated requirements for protection against harmful interference. But the publication of information that an assignment is non-conforming and therefore not entitled to protection exposes such assignment to interference by other stations. Failure to conform with generally agreed standards of mutual protection thus exposes all to mutually destructive interference. This is what furnishes the basic incentive for sovereign nations to establish and adhere to systematic schemes for their mutual protection against destructive interference.

The choice is stark: Mutual accommodation or chaos. Radio signals, obedient only to the laws of nature, generally travel where they will, unheedful of national boundaries or the posture of political relations among neighboring countries. The dense traffic of the airwaves, when not channeled under an orderly scheme, results in mutual destructice of radio signals to the point where few nations could plan their respective communication systems in an orderly fashion.

In short, the imperative to find a mutually acceptable basis for avoiding mutual destruction of radio services is universal; and it applies equally to neighbors with fundamental political differences as to friendly neighbors. It is this, Mr. Chairman, which I believe accounts for the degree of success attained by the International Telecommunication Union, which provides the mechanisms and defines agreed standards for mutual protection of countries all over the world from the destructive of each others' radio services. The compelling need for an internationally ordered system of radio spectrum usage, and the fact that ITU's response to that need is dictated by universally recognized characteristics of signal propagation, explain the achievement of general conformance with internationally agreed plans of spectrum use.

It is this, Mr. Chairman, which raises the possibility that—in its own self interest—Cuba may yet initiate another attempt to develop a scheme of AM broadcast allocations under which both Cuba and the United States would—in the main, at least—shelter their AM services from mutual interference. It would not be the first example of mutual adjustment in radio allocations by countries with fundamental unresolved differences.

This is not to say that we should overlook any opportunities to help U.S. broadcasters to regain service areas lost to currently increasing interference from Cuban stations. The FCC has issued special, temporary authorizations for the use of higher power by some U.S. broadcasters to counter Cuban interference. The Commission will continue to provide similar relief where possible. We must, at the same time, recognize the severe limitations on the possibilities of increasing the power of some U.S. stations without shrinking the interference-free service areas of others. The greatest potential relief thus would come from the development of mutually agreeable provisions for mutual protection of United States and Cuban broadcast services.

In these brief remarks I have not addressed Radio Marti, as the principal considerations affecting it are beyond the scope and competence of the FCC. They relate not so much to the implementation of the system of AM allocations developed at Rio, as they do the issues raised by Assistant Secretary of State Enders in his testimony before you and by Cuba's operation, of stations disseminating, for reception beyond Cuba, the programs of Radio Moscow and some similarly oriented programming of Radio Havana. I have, rather, attempted to describe the context in which the FCC faces the problem of Cuban interference to domestic AM radio service within the United States, in the hope that this would provide useful background for any questions you may wish to ask.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Schaefer.

Mr. White, you and Secretary Enders have said that Radio Marti will not be a propaganda activity.

What safeguards do you have to prevent Radio Marti from becoming the instrument of anti-Castro Cuba activity?

Mr. White. Well, the safeguards, as you will note in the preliminary report, are that we have looked at Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe and have established the guidelines that have governed that, predicated upon the experience in that particular area. And second, as I am sure you recognized clearly, Senator, after you move from the point of putting everything on paper to guarantee that particular objective, then you try to secure the personnel that are equally dedicated and devoted to that objective. And that is the way I think you accomplish that objective.

The Chairman. Senator Stone, from your perspective in Florida, how can Radio Marti improve on the broadcasting that Cuba already receives from the United States, and what does Cuba receive from the United States now?

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are two Miami radio stations that are heard in Havana and in the western part of Cuba part of the day, WGBS and WQBA. WQBA broadcasts in Spanish, WGBS broadcasts in English. WQBA reaches western Cuba only a short time during daylight hours, nothing substantially in the evening or late at night. WGBS is broadcast in English, not in Spanish, and also is not heard around the clock. It has commercial broadcasting. It is not Cuban broadcasting.

Second, none of the major population of Cuba gets Florida broadcasting on a consistent basis. I am referring particularly now to Santiago de Cuba, Cienfuegos, where all those areas of eastern Cuba do not hear the Miami stations, or the Palm Beach stations, or any of the others. If that were not sufficient, by and large, the kind of programing they would pick up would not be the kind of programing you could find in Eastern Europe from Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty. And to do a job of imparting the information which the people within Cuba have a right to hear and a right to know, you would have to set up something along these lines of Radio Marti.

Now, is to whether additional commercial outlets could be used in addition to this Government broadcast facility, I think they could. As to whether you could supplement with FM and supplement with shortwave, I think you could. But in order to reach a good, solid audience of people within Cuba who have regular radio receivers but do not have the other frequencies, you do need to broadcast reliably on a set medium wave frequency, and the FCC helped the Government in figuring out what is the least possible obtrusive frequency to use. They have recommended 1040. But that is not a final decision, and there are many things that we can still do to minimize any possible interference that we might cause or that might be caused in countering our broadcasts.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. White, in what parts of Cuba are these broadcasts received, and do not these stations provide sufficient material for the average Cuban to compare the performance of his government and the quality of his life against what other countries have?

Senator STONE. May I briefly answer, then turn over to the chairman?

The answer to that is no, and the programing on those stations does not give the casualties that the Cubans have suffered this week in Angola, or last week in the Eritrean battle and so forth, all of which has got to be programed and done properly. Those supplemental facilities could be used in addition to our own, but none of those reach Santiago de Cuba or the Oriente, the eastern part of Cuba from the middle on. That is the bulk of the Cuban population.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. White.

Mr. WHITE. What Dick has said certainly I would concur in and, in fact, just emphasize that point, that what we are talking about is creating a surrogate station for Cuba, and this is not—this particular procedures is not going to be established by any commercial stations. They have different objectives, and they have to have rates for advertisers. and their programing is not going to meet that overall requirement of providing a good, sound surrogate station for the Cuban people.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that you have made arrangements to have rebroadcasts of American baseball games, the Dodgers and the Yankees, for instance?

Mr. WHITE. We as a Commission have not made any final arrangements for anything because——

The CHAIRMAN. No; but we were told about this in the briefing that we had.

Mr. WHITE. We have had members of our Commission and other people who have been talking to the owners and managers of these groups.

The CHAIRMAN. So, you have a serious negotiation under way on this.

Mr. WHITE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the owners have granted permission for you to rebroadcast those games, then.

Would you tell us how you would justify to the American taxpayer the broadcasting of American baseball games to people in Cuba, and do you think that they really care who wins? Are they following those teams?

Senator STONE. Well, in the first place, there are a number of exile Cuban players that play baseball, major league baseball, and many,

many Latin baseball players that are followed and are popularized even within Cuba to the extent they can learn about it. The Cubans are very strong baseball fans. Even Castro himself is a baseball player and a baseball fan, and we used to exchange teams with Cuba all the time, and reestablishing that baseball connection is no different than the Ping-Pong diplomacy that started off the normalization process with Mainland China.

The CHAIRMAN. In the Congressional Research Study, it is stated that Mr. Newman said that the managers of the New York Yankees and the Los Angeles Dodgers have agreed to allow Radio Marti to use their Spanish language network broadcasts, and it is free of charge also.

Senator STONE. The object of this station is not just to broadcast hard news or even opinion on hard news. It will be a full service station that will give nonpropaganda relief some of the time to the incessant Castro propaganda, and I for one would hope that we will allow some of the Cuban comedy and Cuban rhythms in music that the people within Cuba used to constantly innovate month by month and year by year, but no longer do, and that they will begin to hear a little of that on this radio station, too, not just hard news.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, Mr. White or Mr. Schaefer, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that reimbursing U.S. stations that will suffer interference from Cuban broadcasts on the 1040-kHz cycle would cost upward of $40 million.

Is this figure correct, and if so, where would the funds come from and what position do you take on that?

Mr. WHITE. I will let someone else answer as to whether the figures are accurate or not. I will repeat what I said earlier in my testimony, and that is Radio Marti is not responsible for Cuban interference.

Mr. SCHAEFER. Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether the figure is accurate. It certainly could be.

Let me just point out the difficulty in assessing or putting a dollar value.

First of all, if one were to estimate, if a station were to receive or experience the interference, depending on the particular service area that that station covers, how much of that service area would be obliterated by interference, what dollar value in that particular market would be, these are very difficult estimates to make. So as a guess, $40 million may be a reasonable estimate. However, I cannot verify that one way or the other.

Senator STONE. Mr. Chairman, may I just add a word about the other side of that particular proposal, because I have not testified against it in the House. I did testify in the House on the Radio Marti hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, but I did not mention this. But you know, when I was serving here we heard a number of presentations by American citizens and companies whose property was confiscated by Fidel Castro. Castro boasts about having nickel to export from Nicaro, Cuba. That was an American investment. And there were even some broadcast facilities that were American investments that were confiscated. I do not think that there is a current thought that we should now have the American taxpayer, other than the tax writeoffs that have already been done, to compensate all of the American citizens for the loss of their property that Castro has confiscated.

If that becomes viable with this radio approach, possibly you will see some of them coming here and saying, now, if you are going to speculate on how much profit some of these stations may lose if Castro interferes with us, how about taking care of the actual dollars that were seized out of our bank accounts down there, and properties, such things as the nickel mine and many other productive enterprises.

So, it is not just a simple prospect of saying, well, if Castro seizes our fishing boats we will pay for the fishing boats, or if he seizes our domestic air, we will pay the domestic broadcasters. I think we do have to consider telling Castro you cannot unlawfully confiscate our property which they are doing now.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have read both the report and the appendix that were submitted by the Commission, the interim report and appendix, and I would like to ask Mr. White, you say on page 2 of your report, after consulting the House and Senate Foreign Affairs leadership, the Commission recommended, et cetera. Who on the minority side did you consult with in the Senate Foreign Affairs leadership?

Mr. WHITE. I must say that I personally did not. We talked, the Commission did talk to Dante Fascell in the House, but the Senator specifically asked me about the Senate, I met with Senator Percy here myself, and that is all.

Senator PELL. Right. Well, that is an inaccurate statement because I was never consulted.

Mr. WHITE. No: that is right. You made that point.

Senator PELL. Then further on in your report you mention on page 8 that if Cuba persists in interfering with U.S. radio stations, the United States may have to consider appropriate action, and on page 9 you say, should Cuba violate international laws by launching a radio war of deliberate, aggressive, and extensive interference with American broadcasting, the Commission believes the United States should consider denouncing this as an unfriendly act meriting appropriate U.S. countermeasures.

What measures are you talking about in both these cases?

Mr. WHITE. I do not think it would be desirable to specifically say what those measures would be.

Senator PELL. What would be the broad range? You talk about appropriate action.

Mr. WHITE. I think the broad range—first, my strong feeling, which I have indicated here in this Commission and in the House both, my very strong feeling is that we ought to take very serious action about this interference right now, and I would recommend to the—this is not my area either of expertise or immediate responsibility except that I have mentioned it there, but in terms of creating something of this nature, I think we need—and I mean this most seriously, Senator, and I think it is one of the most serious subjects you people have—of taking some action to make sure that the outlaw radio interference that Castro engages in is in some way ameliorated through all of the peaceful means that can be utilized, and I would do that through all of the international organizations that are available, I would do it through international public pressure, I would do it through our friends and allies. I think there are many steps that we could take in that direction to make sure that he adheres to the rules and regulations in this field.

Senator PELL. In the broad range of appropriate action, would that include military measures or not in your view?

Mr. WHITE. I would doubt if we would have to come to that. I do not think you should ever state what your total options are in a judgment of this nature.

But again, no, the answer is no to your question, OK?

Senator PELL. Because when you use the words "appropriate actions," you are bound to be asked what do you mean by appropriate actions?

Mr. WHITE. Right, yes, sir, and I have tried to suggest it, yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Now, your programing, how many hours per day do you think you would devote to the news as opposed to sports, as opposed to music, et cetera? How would you break that down?

Mr. WHITE. Well, again, we have not yet arrived at a specific allocation or decision on that because we felt we ought to examine more data before we made the judgment, but my judgment would be that those particular categories that you have described—and I will not be running this station, but the categories that you described I would work into approximate thirds probably, timewise.

Senator PELL. And how many hours a day do you visualize the program being on the air, if it is approved?

Mr. WHITE. If this station were approved, I think we have to be on the air, to be effective, a minimum of 10 to 14 hours.

Senator PELL. VOA I believe is only on about 5 hours a day, is that correct?

Mr. WHITE. Right. It is a different function that we are trying to perform here, sir.

Senator PELL. Right.

How many hours did your Commission meet as a group?

Mr. WHITE. I cannot tell you the hours specifically, although I suspect I could add them up. We have had—the Commission was appointed in January. We had meetings in February, March, April, as I recall. We had a February 5 meeting, a March 2, March 30. We had one April 16, but it was canceled because of a meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee; and we had one on May 3, and those meetings have run roughly from 10 o'clock in the morning until 3 or 4 in the afternoon, and we have had excellent attendance. We all owe a debt of gratitude to those distinguished members of this Commission who have given us their time.

Senator PELL. Did you meet in open session or closed session?

Mr. WHITE. We met in both.

Senator PELL. I have no further questions. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of questions, and I would direct them to Mr. Schaefer.

Speaking of interference, and only that, at what geographical point does it interfere with the station in Iowa?

Mr. SCHAEFER. Senator, are you referring, if Radio Marti were to operate on 1040, would it interfere with Iowa?

Senator HELMS. Yes.

Mr. SCHAEFER. Our estimation was that if properly designed, Radio Marti would not interfere with WHO or at least not to any significant extent.

Senator HELMS. You see the point I am getting at.

Now, I have had a little bit of a relationship with the broadcasting industry, and I am amazed at the figure of, what $40 million, what was it—some absurd figure—and I would be interested to see who made that estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. The Congressional Office of the Budget.

Senator HELMS. And second, on what basis they made it, because unless the broadcasting industry has changed in the 10 years since I left it, this would not affect the stations' income at all, because what they pay off in terms of advertising rates, Dick, is not how many miles you may cover but to how many homes you deliver.

So, I think somebody has been smoking opium on that $40 million figure, unless broadcasting has changed immeasurably since I left it.

Mr. SCHAEFER. No, sir, it has not changed in that sense.

I believe that the estimate—let me say first of all, that as I indicated in my brief remarks, when the Commission did its frequency check, the intent was to identify the best frequency which would cause no or minimal interference to U.S. broadcasters. That we have identified.

Perhaps the estimate that Senator Percy was referring to by OMB was in case of retaliation or interference from Cuba, what kind of economic effect it would have on some of the U.S. broadcasters, if I understood it correctly.

Senator HELMS. I understand.

Mr. SCHAEFER. But even in that case——

Senator HELMS. But you suggest that the interference would have no effect. Is that what you just said?

Mr. SCHAEFER. The Radio Marti, if it were to operate on 1040, it will not interfere with U.S. broadcasting, certainly not with WHO, if properly designed, as I am sure it will be.

Senator HELMS. So they would be able to get out their hog market reports for 700 miles unimpeded, is that correct?

Mr. SCHAEFER. That is correct provided the Cubans do not put their 500 kW station on 1040 and create jamming possibilities.

Senator HELMS. But then you get into the international law on it.

Mr. SCHAEFER. That is correct.

Senator HELMS. And that goes back to what Dick Stone said.

Senator STONE. Senator, if I could just jump in for one brief point.

Senator HELMS. Please do.

Senator STONE. I would say that jamming and interference by Castro goes much farther and would go much farther than U.S. domestic reception. It would go to Central America, it would go to the Caribbean Islands, it would go to Mexico, it would go to Venezuela, and Colombia, and all of those countries offended by that interference with their own domestic broadcasting would be potential allies in the appropriate methods of coming back on and responding to that kind of unlawful interference.

Senator HELMS. Exactly the point. Exactly.

I think there is a good deal of fiction introduced into the objections to this proposal.

Mr. WHITE. Senator, that is precisely the point. All of this speculation on the problem of interference is based upon what Castro might do, illegally. That is what he might do illegally, and they are assuming that if he says he might do it that he would. He said he was going to hold free elections in Cuba, and I have been waiting for that for 20 years.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. I want to thank all of the witnesses. This has been a most informative hearing, and I appreciate your calling it.

The CHAIRMAN. Because of your past relationships with the broadcast industry, the figure $40 million came from a letter signed by James Blum, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis of OMB, and he indicated in his letter that in testimony given by the National Association of Broadcasters, over 200 AM radio stations in 32 States are threatened by Cuban radio interference. With an estimated cost of $100,000 to $200,000 per station, such payments could exceed $40 million for improvements in facilities alone. Any payments would require additional authorization and appropriations language.

Once again we come right back to the point made by Mr. White, that this is not just because of Radio Marti, this is all types of interference.

I would like to not only join you, Senator Helms, in commending our guests this morning who appeared as witnesses, but also on behalf of the committee to thank the outstanding experts in the area, Nina M. Serafino, analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division; Marcia Smith, specialist in aerospace and energy systems, Science Policy Research Division; David R. Siddall, legislative attorney, American Law Division.

This report which we have released today is available to the public. We will try to make copies available for interested persons. The study covers the background of this proposal for Radio Marti, our experience with other broadcasting to people behind the Iron Curtain, with the Voice of America, and in previous broadcasting to Cuba. It also reviews the political concern raised by this proposal, the technical issues related to the selection of the 1040 frequency, and possible interference on that channel.

Finally, the report covers the legal provision regulating radio broadcasting in this hemisphere and in the world, and I do commend it to anyone interested in this subject.

Senator HELMS. Just one minute. I do not want the record to stand with complete and replete praise for this report from the Library of Congress. I wish no ill to Nina M. Serafino, or Marcia S. Smith, or David R. Siddall. I am sure that their spouses, if they have them, love them. I am sure that their dogs run out and wag their tails when they come home, but this is not exactly an objective report, Mr. Chairman.

I can understand that we all have biases. We all know that everything that comes out of the Library of Congress is not handed down from Sinai. So let us not say that this is an objective last word on this question. It is informative, and it will be received by me and read in its entirety. I have read only 4 or 5 pages of it, but it is something less than totally objective.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, let me modify my statement. The report is thoroughly researched. It comes from people who are hired because of their objectivity. My 16 years experience with the Library of Congress, taking everything into account, it is the most objective and finest research facility any Member of the Senate has available to them, but it still ends up that human beings do the research. They are like Senators who always try to be objective, fair, and never have any prejudices whatsoever.

The hearing is adjourned.

Senator HELMS. One more minute. It is sort of like the book that I read one time, an objective assessment of the War Between the States from the Southern point of view. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing really is adjourned.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

### STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOSCHWITZ

*Question 1.* Given the large Cuban presence in Africa (40,000 troops), how can it be that the Cuban people are largely unaware (as you claim) of this activity?

Answer. The controlled nature of society and Cuba's lack of a free press account for this. Although some word of Cuba's involvement in Africa has been spread by word of mouth from returning reservists, there has been very little media coverage within Cuba on Ethiopia and Angola. What articles have appeared have been repetitive, very vague on details of Cuban involvement, and carefully orchestrated, presenting only an upbeat picture. There is never mention of casualties or the size of Cuba's commitment. This would be surprising in an open society, considering the fact that Cuba has been engaged in Angola for 7 years. It is not surprising in Cuba, where there is no free flow of information. The neighbor's boy may not return from Angola, but there is no way of knowing how many other boys are not coming back. This type of information is closely controlled by the government, casualties have been spread over a long period of time, the killed are buried in Angola and the wounded are treated in Eastern Europe rather than returned to Cuba for care. There are no government reports or statistics published.

*Question 2.* Why was the frequency 1040 kHz chosen for Radio Marti since Cuba has a 500 kW station that will broadcast on 1040?

Answer. While Cuba indicated its intention to broadcast on 1040 kHz with one of its 500 kW transmitters last year, this plan was not accepted at the Western Hemisphere regional AM broadcasting conference. The U.S. plan to use this frequency was accepted instead by the conference. Since then Cuba has not made clear whether it still intends to use 1040 kHz. If it does broadcast on this frequency using high-power transmission, it will be doing so illegally, contrary to accepted international telecommunications practices.

The U.S. selection of 1040 kHz as the most appropriate frequency for Radio Marti proceeded independently of Cuban plans. The Federal Communications Commission was requested in a letter dated September 18, 1981 to recommend a frequency for use by Radio Marti. In making this choice, the FCC considered three criteria: (1) minimization of interference from Radio Marti to U.S. domestic stations; (2) maximization of service from Radio Marti over Cuba; and (3) minimization of interference from Radio Marti to other stations in the Western Hemisphere.

All 107 channels in the AM band were reviewed to assess usability. It was determined that approximately three U.S. Class 1A clear channel frequencies, one of which was 1040 kHz, showed greatest promise. Through computer analysis it was determined that 1040 kHz met the criteria noted above to the greatest extent. These studies did not take into account Cuba's plans to use 1040 kHz since Cuban notification of this intent had not been made to the International Frequency Registration Board at the time the FCC made its recommendation. The FCC formally identified 1040 as the recommended frequency for Radio Marti in a letter dated October 29, 1981.

While the United States was aware of Cuban interest in 1040 kHz, accepting Cuba's plan would have meant accepting destruction of WHO Des Moines by a 500 kW super-station. Our own plans were carefully crafted to cause no such damage to United States or Cuban stations. We therefore took our case to the relevant international forum, the Regional Conference, where we were vindicated.

A chronology of the events related to the selection of 1040 kHz is attached.

### RADIO MARTI AND THE 1040 KHZ FREQUENCY—A CHRONOLOGY

1979: Cuba announces construction of two 500 kW transmitters.

1981: August 24–28: United States-Cuban bilateral talks in Washington on frequency problems. Cuba makes known its intention to utilize its 500 kW transmitters on 1040 kHz (WHO) and 1160 (KSL), both clear channel frequencies in the United States.

August 27: New York Times article on Administration plan to launch radio broadcasting to Cuba.

September 18: Interagency Group asks FCC to identify an appropriate frequency for Radio Marti.

September 23: Announcement by NSC concerning program of radio broadcasting to Cuba.

October 29: FCC formally identifies 1040 kHz as recommended frequency for Radio Marti.

November 2: 1040 kHz first mentioned publicly as frequency for Radio Marti in "Broadcasting" Magazine.

November 8: Western Hemisphere AM Broadcasting Conference in Rio; U.S. delegation files broadcast plan including 1040 kHz as frequency for USG use. (First official U.S. notification of intent to use 1040 kHz). Conference rejects Cuban application for use of 1040 and accepts U.S. plan to use this frequency.

December 14: Cuba announced decision no longer to participate in Rio Conference.

December 28: Cuba notifies ITU it would ignore frequency assignment plan adopted by Rio Conference and indicated it would implement the 48 frequency changes it had proposed at Rio.

1982: January 12: NTIA formally assigns 1040 kHz for use by U.S. Government.

*Question 3.* What is the projected cost of Radio Marti, both for fiscal year 1982–1983 and in relation to possible compensation that must be paid to U.S. domestic radio stations?

Answer. In order to establish Radio Marti, the Administration is requesting $10 million for fiscal year 1982. Of this amount, $4.2 million will be devoted to the construction of transmission and studio facilities, and $5.8 million will be used for operating expenses to cover programming, engineering and administrative costs. For fiscal year 1983, $7.7 million is requested, a reduction of $2.3 million from the 1982 level. This decrease is a result of non-recurring construction and administrative costs.

The budget requests for fiscal year 1982–1983 do not include funds for compensation to U.S. commercial radio stations. There is no legal requirement for such compensation now. The House version of the Radio Marti bill (H.R. 5427) in Section 6(a) authorizes the Board for International Broadcasting to compensate U.S. broadcasters for "expenses which they incur in mitigating the effects" of Cuban radio interference. How the "effects" of Cuban interference or the "expenses incurred in mitigating" these effects can be precisely defined has yet to be determined. Section 6(a) does not indicate whether the "effects" and the "expenses" should be tied only to interference allegedly related to Radio Marti or to Cuban radio interference in general.

The estimate that compensation payments could exceed $40 million, submitted by the Congressional Budget Office, is exaggerated and highly speculative. This estimate is based on compensation costs of $100–$200 thousand projected for each of the 200 AM radio stations identified by the recent study of the National Association of Broadcasters as affected by Cuban radio interference if Cuba should implement fully its ambitious plan to build a variety of new, high-powered radio stations. Since many of these stations may not operate at the power indicated, or may not even be built, the $40 million figure is clearly high. As pointed out in the Congressional Research Staff study on Radio Marti (p. 51), one factor weighing against Cuba's fully implementing its plans is the amount of electricity which would be required for these stations. Nor does the $40 million figure distinguish between compensation for existing interference and that which may be attributable to Radio Marti. Some of the 200 U.S. stations listed are already experiencing Cuban interference.

While the Administration is acutely aware of the problem of Cuban interference and the need to deal effectively with it, we believe that any plan to compensate U.S. broadcasters should be the result of careful analysis of the problem and its impact in view of the technical complexity and question of precedent involved. Accordingly, we welcome the establishment of a task force to deal with the interference problem, as provided for in Section 6(b) of H.R. 5427, and see it as a logical body to address the question of compensation as well.

*Question 4.* Why not buy time on Florida radio stations as a less expensive substitute for Radio Marti? In particular, why not use Spanish-speaking Florida stations in this regard?

Answer. Because of their distance from Cuba, insufficient power, and antennas which are not designed for broadcasting to Cuba, these stations can be heard in only limited areas of Cuba and cannot provide blanket coverage, as envisaged for Radio Marti. Radio Marti's transmitter will be located in the Florida Keys and will have a directional antenna. Even then Radio Marti will need a separate transmitter to reach Eastern Cuba.

Private stations might be reluctant to give up prime time for Radio Marti, since this might affect their own commercial viability. The cost to Radio Marti, therefore, for leasing this prime time might be quite high.

In any case, using commercial stations would not mean substantial savings. Separate office space, studios and regional bureaus would still be needed for Radio Marti. The costs of programming, operations and administration (personnel), which would amount to about 90 percent of the overall budget in fiscal year 1983, would be the same regardless of transmission facilities used. If Radio Marti could use other U.S. Government transmission facilities which may be available in the Florida Keys, the cost of the initial transmitter will be significantly reduced. The construction of a second transmitter site will be necessary, however, in order to reach eastern Cuba.

Private stations are often identified with positions that are too partisan to serve U.S. interests, whereas Radio Marti would be non-partisan. Commercial station programming is geared primarily to the listening tastes of local audience which form the rate base for advertising revenues. The program content of these stations does not address the real needs of listeners in Cuba.

Thus private stations do not offer a real alternative. The South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association, in testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 3, stated that "commercial operations are a poor substitute for the proposed Radio Marti."

*Question 5.* For the record, to what extent do Mexican stations interfere with U.S. broadcasting and what have we sought to do about it?

Answer. The United States and Mexico have had AM broadcasting agreements for many years. Under these agreements all stations have been coordinated and agreed to prior to coming on the air. As a consequence, radio interference has not been a problem between the United States and Mexico. Later this year we will begin renegotiating the current agreement to take into account the results of the Rio Conference last fall and to resolve potential incompatibilities between our planned stations which were submitted at that conference.

## STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

*Question.* WEAN–AM, Rhode Island's only all news talk station is concerned about the Cuban Government-announced plans to broadcast on its frequency. Mr. Garrison, the General Manager of WEAN–AM, urges the State Department and White House to begin negotiations now to resolve this potentially threatening situation. What is the status of negotiations with Cuba on radio frequencies and interference problems? How will Radio Marti affect the prospects for reaching a settlement?

Answer. The Department of State is very concerned about existing and potential Cuban radio interference with AM broadcasting in the United States. We will continue to explore all possible means to address the problem. But the record of past attempts to negotiate this issue with Cuba and continued Cuban intransigence does not suggest that Cuba is ready for meaningful negotiations. The Cubans showed no flexibility or real interest in accommodation during bilateral talks on frequencies on several occasions last year. Efforts to negotiate a resolution of the interference issue at the Western Hemisphere AM broadcasting conference last fall were unsuccessful. Cuba's withdrawal from the conference after its frequency proposals were rejected clearly ratified Cuba's outlaw status in the field of international telecommunications. Cuba appears unwilling to negotiate seriously on this issue now.

Nonetheless, we are working with the National Association of Broadcasters to develop a position acceptable to U.S. broadcasters should the opportunity for talking to Cuba about the interference problem present itself. Bearing in mind that Cuba's radio broadcasting plan, which has been in development since the mid-1960's, and that Cuban radio interference both pre-date Radio Marti, and are therefore separate from it, we would not expect Radio Marti to adversely affect any possible talks on this issue.

[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

# RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA

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TUESDAY, JULY 27, 1982

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building (Hon. Jesse Helms) presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Pressler, Pell, and Zorinsky.

Also present: Senators Hawkins and Jepsen.

Senator **Helms**. The commitee will come to order. This afternoon the Committee on Foreign Relations convenes to continue the testimony on broadcasting to Cuba, commonly known as Radio Marti.

This afternoon we will hear testimony from two panels of public witnesses. Before the testimony is heard, let me say a word about the importance of Radio Marti. For the past 20 years, perhaps more than that, the Cuban people have been subjected to a tyranny which is unparalleled in this hemisphere. The conditions under which they live are so widely known that they certainly need no repetition from me at this time.

Nonetheless, there are some who would overlook these fundamental facts in order to promote reconciliation of the United States with Fidel Castro; a reconciliation that would be based on the premise that Castro is actually an advocate of freedom and desires nothing more than peace, tranquility, and democracy for the Cuban people and the peoples of the rest of the hemisphere. Anybody who believes that will believe anything.

Now, it is clear that those assumptions can be judged on their own merits. The people of Cuba do not have, as matters now stand, the information on which to base judgments about their own Government and about their own society as well as the rest of the world. And they are thus kept in the dark by a government whose campaign against the right of the people to know the truth is as fierce at home as is its drive to spread revolution abroad.

It is the hope of many of us that Radio Marti will be an important element in the continuing efforts of the United States to bring peace and freedom to the rest of the hemisphere.

In that regard, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn has so eloquently stated, falsehood is always followed inexorably by violence, while truth brings tranquility in its wake. So it is clear that the American people stand on the side of truth, and for that reason, Radio Marti has been proposed by the administration with the encouragement and full support of this Senator from North Carolina.

Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony, and we have an able U.S. Senator from Iowa, my good friend, Roger Jepsen, who will present one of the witnesses.

## STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER W. JEPSEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA

Senator Jepsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This afternoon, I have the pleasure of introducing Bob Engelhardt, vice president and technical director of Palmer Communications, Inc., the parent company of WHO in Des Moines. Mr. Engelhardt has been involved in broadcasting all of his life and has been associated with Iowa broadcasting since 1955.

Mr. Engelhardt has served on the technical advisory committee of the Iowa Public Broadcasting Network for 15 years. He has also served in different capacities on the Iowa Emergency Broadcasting System.

For almost 58 years, Iowa farm families and families of surrounding States have relied on WHO in Des Moines for news brought to them on WHO's early evening, nighttime and presunrise farm broadcast service. The inevitable jamming that will result from Radio Marti will put an end to this reliance and will have a direct negative impact on Iowans as well as on many other Americans across the country who rely on radio for their information and entertainment.

Also, 99 percent of all American households do more than listen to the radio every day; they rely on it. Nowhere is this reliance more crucial than in the farming community where the weather and the market reports are vital in day-to-day living.

In the specific instance of WHO in Iowa, WHO is the activating station for the emergency broadcasting system in Iowa. If this station is subjected to high-power jamming, the radius of emergency broadcasting for Iowans will be reduced to about a 45-mile radius. So in the event of a tornado or other disaster, I can assure you that my home in Davenport, Iowa, which is 175 miles away, would not receive a timely warning, Mr. Chairman.

I believe, along with the officers and the people involved in WHO—and I am sure along with all of the other radio stations involved in this, as well—that the concept behind Radio Marti is in the national interest. But the national interest is not served when Government seeks to use a commercial frequency for its program, while other viable options go ignored.

Alternatives, such as using the facility already owned by Voice of America [VOA] at Marathon, Fla., should be given careful consideration. This option will eliminate any necessity of creating an entirely new facility and could be put into operation almost immediately.

Another option is the use of a flexible FM signal. The more sophisticated system would have greater chances of reaching the intended audience without risking interference with domestic signals in the United States.

Finally, Cubans do need to hear the truth. As the chairman knows, my credentials of supporting the national interest in this country are acceptable. Cubans need to hear the truth, but I do not believe the radio war, which will certainly result, should be fought at the expense of commercial broadcasting in this country; not when there are other alternatives available.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman for permitting me to introduce Mr. Engelhardt and make these remarks.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator Jepsen. I recognized Senator Jepsen out of order because he has to go to another meeting at which he is to preside.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I have no questions at this time, thank you.

Senator HELMS. Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Well, the chairman would join Senator Jepsen in welcoming Mr. Engelhardt and Jim Eddens of WOW-KEZO radio station in Omaha. And a very familiar name to us North Carolinians, even though he has a Waterloo, Iowa, address now. His dad lives in Charlotte, NC. I welcome Sy Behekal, Jr. of KXEL; also, Mr. John B. Summers of the National Association of Broadcasters in Washington; and Mr. Matthew Leibowitz of the Florida Association of Broadcasters in Miami.

Suppose we go from my left to right. You may proceed. The general procedure of the committee is to summarize a prepared statement with the understanding that the entire statement will be put in the record. But that is entirely up to you, and we welcome you. Mr. Engelhardt.

## STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. ENGELHARDT, VICE PRESIDENT, PALMER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., DES MOINES, IOWA

Mr. ENGELHARDT. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Robert Engelhardt and I am vice president of Palmer Communications, Inc., a licensee of radio station WHO in Des Moines, Iowa. With me is Robert H. Harter, Palmer's president, and I welcome this opportunity to testify on Radio Marti.

Palmer believes that Radio Marti will have a disastrous impact on radio broadcasting in the United States and it will have a disastrous impact on WHO, the residents of Iowa and the American farmer, and that there are far better and less expensive alternatives for broadcasting the truth to Cuba without jeopardizing the broadcast industry.

Radio Marti will operate on WHO's frequency of 1040. WHO's presunrise and nighttime service area is more than 1,700,000 square miles; approximately 40 million people in 32 States can receive WHO.

One of our most vital services during these hours is our 5:50 to 6:30 a.m. agricultural program covering all major Midwest farm markets. Hundreds of thousands of Midwest farmers frequently make marketing decisions based upon WHO's early morning market quotation broadcast. No other station in the Nation carries such extensive agricultural information.

Cuban retaliation against Radio Marti with a 500,000-watt radio station on 1040 not only will override Radio Marti, but will reduce WHO's presunrise and nighttime coverage by over 99 percent. This poses a threat to the people of Iowa. WHO is the key input station for the Iowa statewide emergency broadcast plan.

The Federal Emergency Management Administration concludes that Cuban jamming of Radio Marti will destroy WHO's ability to activate the EBS system. Cuba has said that it will jam the station, and the FCC, the NTIA, ICA, and several congressional committees all agree it can or will jam and interfere with Radio Marti. Jamming a single AM station is, frankly, quite simple, and international broadcasts have been jammed since their inception. Thus, Cuba will make Radio Marti nothing more than an ineffectual but expensive symbol which will worsen the interference problem.

But will Radio Marti increase the flow of information to Cuba? Not according to ICA. Separate broadcasts for Cubans only would in no way increase the supply or availability of appropriate broadcast material, but could rather be interpreted as a special propaganda campaign. Less creditable and even dismissable. At best, Radio Marti might increase the flow of information to Cuba, but only at the cost of diminished service in the United States.

Any frequency selected for Radio Marti must protect the integrity of the U.S. broadcast industry. It is clear to us that the impact of Cuban countermeasures and the use of the technologies and broadcast services were insufficiently studied before it was decided to build an AM station on 1040 for Radio Marti. No thought was given to AM frequencies at the high end or the low end of the AM band not used by AM broadcasters to avoid jamming or destroying commercial stations.

Before authorizing Radio Marti, Congress must decide whether Cubans actually lack access to the truth. We submit they do not. VOA Spanish language AM broadcasts currently received in Cuba carry interviews with Cuban political prisoners and refugees, as well as stories concerning Cuban involvement in Angola and Ethiopia. VOA and Southeast commercial radio stations are received in Cuba and give Cubans the American view and a window on the world.

Spanish language commercials on Miami Spanish language radio stations reflecting the abundance of American life are the most effective message we can deliver. And commercial broadcasts carry an internal credibility that a government station cannot match.

Therefore, should we spend $17.7 million to broadcast baseball games, pop music, news, and two soap operas to Cuba, when this programing is already carried by commercial and VOA stations?

We agree with the Chicago Tribune that if Cubans have been deprived of the truth, it would be hard to quibble over spending $10 million to give it to them. But they are not. As the Tribune said, a far more effective manifestation of the American good life is already being beamed across the gulfstream of Florida's existing Spanish language stations in the form of commercials.

There are better, cheaper ways to broadcast to Cuba without putting U.S. radio stations and their audiences in jeopardy. And make no mistake, Radio Marti places them in jeopardy.

On June 14, Assistant Secretary Enders recognized this reality. On June 14, he told Chairman Percy that the VOA's Radio Marathon should not be used for Radio Marti because use of VOA frequency would only increase the risk of Cuban interference to the VOA station. We agree. There is a risk of interference for the VOA station on Radio Marti's frequency; there is an equal risk to WHO if Radio Marti operates on 1040.

The risk of Cuban retaliation should first be borne by Radio Marathon, not commercial stations. Radio Marathon is a 50-kilowatt AM station that covers Cuba that operates only 5½ hours per day. It should be fully utilized before a new U.S. base station is built. Nothing in the VOA charter prohibits its use for Radio Marti.

The scope of the interference problem is dramatic. The NAB concludes that Cuba's proposed 187 AM stations will cause interference to more than 200 U.S. AM stations in 32 States and the District of Columbia. Worsening interference and Radio Marti are inextricably intertwined. Should the Government place U.S. radio stations and listeners in jeopardy for Radio Marti?

Congress should fully consider FCC and NTIA judgments that the station not only will preclude a political settlement, but will exacerbate the interference problem.

Radio Marti should operate on the internationally sanctioned medium for international broadcast—shortwave. Shortwave would protect U.S. broadcasters from the direct impact of Cuban retaliation and it is much harder to jam. Shortwave combined with Radio Marathon and leased time on commercial AM/FM and TV stations that are received in Cuba could maximize the chance of Radio Marti's signal reaching Cuba.

We agree with the NAB that the longstanding interference problem must be resolved politically. Technical modifications to the U.S. stations are inadequate. The best corrective power and antenna combination may cost several hundred thousand dollars. And a minor change in Cuban operation would require a complete redesign. Negotiation, not technical modification, is the solution, and experience has shown that Radio Marti will dim prospects for a negotiated settlement.

Cuba and the United States did conduct negotiations in August 1981 and Cuba was surprisingly cooperative. But the August press report of Radio Marti ended hopes of a settlement. How, then, will Radio Marti contribute to a solution?

During the current recession with rising inflation, triple digit deficits and nearly double digit unemployment, Radio Marti is a $17.7 million project that must be questioned in light of the ease with which Cuba can destroy the broadcast, the fact that programing is already available from commercial stations and the VOA, and the impact that Radio Marti will have on the public.

Thank you. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[Mr. Engelhardt's prepared statement follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. ENGELHARDT

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Robert G. Engelhardt. I am Vice President of Palmer Communications Incorporated. Palmer is the licensee of Radio Station WHO located in Des Moines, Iowa. With me are Robert H. Harter, Palmer's President and Kenneth D. Salomon of the law firm of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson. I welcome this opportunity to testify on S. 1853, the Administration's proposal to authorize support for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., popularly known as Radio Marti. Mr. Chairman, in addition to my prepared statement, I have a brochure detailing Palmer's interest in Radio Marti, press stories on the project, correspondence, and a history of WHO. I ask that the brochure be printed with my statement.

For several reasons, Palmer believes that Radio Marti will seriously aggravate the problem of Cuban radio interference in the United States, that Radio Marti will have a disastrous impact on WHO, the people of Iowa and the American farmer, and that the $17.7 million requested for this project for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 will be wasted.

WHO is a Class 1-A channel AM radio station broadcasting on 1040 kHz with 50 kw of power. Radio Marti is slated to operate from Saddlebunch Key, Florida on 1040 kHz with 50 kW. WHO's pre-sunrise and nighttime service area encompasses 1,714,337 square miles. Approximately 40 million people in 32 states are able to receive WHO at night. One of our most vital services is our 5:30–6:30 a.m. farm and agribusiness news, agricultural weather forecasts and market reports for all major Midwestern grain markets and livestock terminals. During much of the year, these are pre-sunrise and nighttime hours. Hundreds of thousands of farmers across the Midwest make decisions essential to their economic well being and their ability to serve American consumers based on these reports. They frequently decide whether to buy or sell livestock, grain or other agricultural commodities on a given day based upon the expected receipt and price quotations they are able to receive via WHO in the early morning hours. No other station in the region carries such extensive farm and agribusiness information.

We are deeply concerned that Cuba's announced plans to retaliate against Radio Marti will destroy WHO's pre-sunrise and nighttime service, including its vital farm market and weather reports. Such jamming with a 500 kW transmitter will shrink WHO's from 1,700,000 square miles to 5,900 square miles—a 99.65 percent decrease. Radio Marti poses a direct threat to the people of Iowa. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has concluded that Cuban jamming of Radio Marti's signal will destroy Iowa's Statewide Emergency Broadcast Plan, which alerts Iowans to national and natural disasters and emergencies. WHO is the key input station for the system and jamming will prevent it from activating the network. Thus, Radio Marti will have at least the indirect effect of depriving Iowans of emergency messages under the present EBS plan. Letter from Patrick J. Breheny, Regional Director, FEMA, to Gen. Louis O. Giuffrida, Director, FEMA (April 16, 1982).

Our concern over the impact of Cuban jamming is heightened by the Administration's efforts to eliminate the National Weather Service's Agricultural Weather Service Program in FY 1983. With the elimination of this Service, farmers will have to rely to an even greater extent on WHO and other nongovernmental sources for the specialized weather information that is absolutely essential to farming.

The impact of Radio Marti on farmers is illustrated by the concerns of the National Corn Growers Association. Accurate reports of "weather conditions are very critical to farmers . . . [who] depend on the pre-dawn radio weather reports to determine work activities for that day and the near future." The loss of WHO's "sophisticated weather reporting services . . . to farmers would cause considerable financial losses to these grain producers. . . ." According to the NCGA, disruption of WHO's pre-sunrise service will preclude farmers from receiving "critical market information plus coverage of agricultural issues such as soil conservation, increased agricultural exports [and] additional basic research related to agricultural production and marketing. . . ." Letter from William R. Mullins, President, National Corn Growers Association, to Senator Rudy Boschwitz (April 16, 1982) discussing the impact of Radio Marti on the American farmer).

Without taking a position on the need or wisdom of our government broadcasting the "truth" about the Cuban government to the people of Cuba, WHO questions whether Radio Martin, operating on WHO's frequency of 1040 kHz, or any AM frequency, is the most economical and efficient way to deliver the message without a disastrous worsening of the Cuban radio interference problem. We are deeply concerned about the impact Cuba's proposal to operate more than 180 AM stations will have on U.S. broadcasters and their audiences. In short, Radio Marti may increase the flow of information to Cuba but only at the expense of diminished service to the people of the United States.

However, rather than increase the amount of unbiased news, Radio Marti may actually reduce the amount of international broadcasts available to Cubans. One expert on Cuban communications, Professor John Nichols of Pennsylvania State University, has found that with the announcement of Radio Marti, Cuba has increased jamming of international broadcasts. This means that Radio Marti has already reduced the diversity of information sources available to Cubans. Professor Nichols has also concluded that few Cubans can or will tune to Radio Marti, in part because radio listenership on the island is dwindling and because there is only one radio for every five Cubans. He asks how Radio Marti can have a communication effect if nobody is listening. Statement of Professor John S. Nichols before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies (April 21, 1982).

Even the U.S. International Communication Agency (ICA) has concluded that "*a separate broadcast 'for Cubans only' would in no way increase the supply or availability of appropriate broadcast materials, but could rather be interpreted as a special propaganda campaign, less credible and even dismissible.*" ICA report, "VOA Broadcasting to Cuba" (June 1980) (Emphasis added).

Before proceeding with this project Congress must ask whether Cubans actually lack the information that the Administration wants to provide them. Assistant Secretary of State Enders told this Committee on July 1 that Radio Marti will give Cubans the means they now lack "to inform them why so many have gone off the foreign military duty. . . ." Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at 4 (July 1, 1982). However, the Congressional Research Service reported to this Committee last month that news and entertainment programs of U.S. broadcast stations are received in Cuba. Congressional Research Service, "Radio Marti" at 28 (June 28, 1982) (CRS Report). The VOA's Spanish-language AM Radio Marathon in Florida is beamed to Cuba. According to the VOA, it broadcasts interviews with Cuban political prisoners and refugees and "Developments involving Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia are reported to Cuba." While the VOA cannot be a surrogate national radio service, it "can . . . and does . . . deal with [Cuba's] internal developments when and as they become issues of international significance." "VOA Broadcasting to Cuba"; CRS Report at 19–20.

Over the past several months, we have had numerous discussions about Radio Marti, Cuban retaliation by way of jamming and its impact on broadcasters, Midwestern farmers, and WHO with Members of Congress, the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, and officials of the Federal Communications Commission, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the State Department and the Defense Department. In this regard, let me say at the outset that we are astonished that until we began to make inquiries no government official or representative involved in the planning and development of Radio Marti contacted WHO about the impact of Radio Marti's use of 1040 kHz or WHO. We only learned of the decision to use that frequency through press reports and our efforts in coming to Washington to talk to as many people involved in this project as possible.

In the course of our discussions, it became clear that the impact of jamming or other Cuban countermeasures and the use of other technologies and broadcast services were at best insufficiently studied before it was decided to build an AM station on 1040 kHz. For example, until we raised it at the Defense Department, no thought was given to using AM frequencies below 540 and above 1600 kHz (spectrum not used by U.S. broadcasters) to avoid direct, off-island Cuban jamming of Radio Marti from destroying U.S. radio stations. The ease of jamming a single AM station and the effect of that jamming on U.S. broadcasters was not considered at all by the FCC and other agencies in this process. "[T]he FCC failed to take into account interference which could result from Cuban countermeasures when it selected the frequency [for Radio Marti]. [T]he effects of all possible countermeasures should have been thoroughly examined prior to the selection of a frequency . . . ." Report of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982). We agree and share that Committee's concern that the frequency selection process must fully protect the American broadcast industry and American radio listeners. H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2 at 7.

In fact, documents released to us under the Freedom of Information Act show that the planners of Radio Marti made a conscious decision to ignore the adverse impact of Radio Marti on domestic broadcasting. For example, the "potential *future* interference" to "three additional applications for radio facilities in the State of Florida on frequency 1040 kHz . . ." purposefully was not considered by the planners. "Interagency Group on Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Memorandum for the Record re: Radio Broadcasting to Cuba (RCB)," prepared by Col. R. W. Gingras (USA) (October 20, 1981). (Emphasis in original). This decision is an apparent violation of the NTIA Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management which, in part, prevents a government station from using a non-government frequency (such as 1040 kHz) if "harmful interference" will be caused to the service rendered by non-government stations, present or *future*. Section 4.1.2 of the Manual. (Emphasis added). Thus, the government would permit unsuspecting businesses to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars in stations that will be destroyed by Radio Marti's broadcasts or Cuban countermeasures. I point out that the design for

Radio Marti does not provide protection for these proposed domestic stations. Consideration of the connection between Radio Marti, Cuba's AM radio inventory and Cuban interference to domestic broadcasts was also totally ignored.

Government documents also make clear that the government decided to use 1040 kHz for Radio Marti before the appointment of the Presidential Commission and before normal FCC-NTIA frequency assignment procedures were followed. Under NTIA regulations, not only must the use of non-government frequencies for a government station result in no interference to non-government users, but the use can only be authorized by NTIA after FCC concurrence. Section 4.1.2 of the NTIA Manual. FCC Chairman Fowler told NTIA that Assistant Secretary Enders had "inform[ed] us [on October 16, 1981] that the Interagency Group [on Radio Broadcasting to Cuba] would proceed to use 1040 kHz." "Thus, since the Executive Branch has selected 1040 kHz, events have mooted your request for the concurrence of the FCC." Letter from Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC to Bernard J. Wunder, Jr., Administrator, National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information (October 29, 1982) reprinted in H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2 at 7-9.

Leaving these issues aside, there is a certain futility to this project that must be considered by Congress before authorizing the expenditure of nearly $18 million for these broadcasts. Cuba has announced that it will jam Radio Marti; government reports confirm that fact. A June 10, 1982 report of the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee states that "The opinion of [government officials] was that Cuba will definitely jam Radio Marti if and when it goes on the air." The report continues: "Cuba has the capacity to carry out its threat to jam U.S. radio broadcasts into Cuba, and [the interviewed government official] believes that Cuba will in fact, jam Radio Marti." The ICA's July 15, 1981 Radio Free Cuba Feasibility Study (Feasibility Study) states at page 21 that "The NTIA and the FCC both see increased U.S. Broadcasts to Cuba leading to jamming of the frequencies involved, *with even greater interference to U.S. broadcasters.*" (Emphasis added). At page 22, ICA said that "Cuban jamming of [Radio Marti] would clearly result in serious interference to American service areas." These direct and drastic consequences were disregarded by the Administration with one exception: protection of the government's VOA station in Florida from Cuban countermeasures. Assistant Secretary Enders has rejected using the VOA's station, Radio Marathon, for broadcasts to Cuba in part because use of VOA's frequency "would only increase the risk of Cuban interference" to Radio Marathon. Letter from Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Senator Charles H. Percy, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at 5 (June 14, 1982).

Mr. Enders also has downplayed these consequences to this Committee saying that fear of Cuban retaliation should not cause us to abandon Radio Marti because that would "feed Cuban intransigence on radio interference." Mr. Enders July 1, 1982 statement at 11. But the question really is whether, in light of the expert assessments on the impact of increased broadcasts to Cuba, Radio Marti should have progressed beyond the planning stage. We also ask why the Administration proceeded with Radio Marti in light of FCC, NTIA and ICA judgments that the station not only will preclude a political settlement of the interference problem but, also, will exacerbate the already serious problem. We think Mr. Enders should answer these questions.

From its point of view, Cuba can only consider Radio Marti's broadcasts to be provocative. Cuba, for example, told the International Telecommunications Union in January of this year that Radio Marti is a "flagrant act of aggression against Cuba. . . ." Telegram from U.S. Mission in Geneva to the Secretary of State. Radio Marti will be a further irritant in U.S.-Cuban relations, CRS Report at 43-44; H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2 at 6-7. With this background, it is naive to think that Radio Marti will not be jammed or that there is no connection between the station and increased Cuban radio interference. In December 1981 Cuba said it would jam Radio Marti when it walked out of the Regional Administrative Conference on Medium Frequency (AM) Broadcasting in Region 2 (Western Hemisphere) at Rio. Indeed, one member of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba has said that "you have to be an awful optimist to think that" Cuba will not jam Radio Marti. International Broadcasting: Direct Broadcast Satellites: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights of the House Committee on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1981). In a December 1981 report entitled "International Shortwave Broadcasting and Direct Broadcast Satellites: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti," H.R. Rept. No. 398, 97th Cong. 1st Sess., the House Committee on Government Operations noted that international radio broadcasts have been jammed since their inception. For example, the Soviet Union began jamming of Radio Liberty within 10 minutes of its going on the air. H.R. Rept. No. 398 at 9. There is no reason to think Cuba will do less.

The broader and more serious consequence of Radio Marti was noted by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. It said that Radio Marti "might well incite Cuba into moving ahead with the frequency shifts and new station inventory it [has] proposed . . ." which will exacerbate the existing interference problem in this country. In fact, as detailed later, the National Association of Broadcasters concludes that Cuba's proposed AM station inventory will cause interference to more than 200 AM radio stations from Connecticut to California, from Florida to Minnesota. H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2 at 6–7.

There is kind of "Catch-22" illogic to this situation. If Radio Marti were not judged to be effectively serving its purpose of broadcasting the "truth" to Cuba it would be an expensive folly. Yet to the extent it does serve that purpose, it encourages and perhaps compels the Cuban government to resort to jamming techniques, and it is clearly within their capability in this instance to render it an expensive folly.

One must question why 1040 kHz was selected for Radio Marti after Cuba "suggested" to the U.S. Government in August 1981 that it intended to place one of its two 500 kW stations on that frequency. These stations are ten times more powerful than any U.S. radio station.[1] Cuba's action came before the September 1981 announcement of Radio Marti and before the February 1982 NTIA assignment of 1040 kHz to the Department of Defense for the station.

The Cubans have not yet activated a facility on 1040 kHz. Surely, whatever their decision in the absence of an American facility at Saddlebunch Key, the activation of Radio Marti will be viewed by them as a provocative act, calling for retaliation, and will substantially increase the likelihood they will inaugurate jamming efforts, to the detriment of WHO and its listeners. The Cubans have said that Radio Marti would not pass without a response since the station would be an example of U.S. interference in Cuba's internal affairs. The text of Cuba's December 14, 1981 statement on leaving the Region 2 conference was published recently by the Federal Communications Commission. Fourth Report in the Administrative Conference for AM Broadcasting in Region 2, BC Docket No. 79–166, FCC 82-93 (released March 30, 1982), Attachment 1 at 34–40.

The frequency selection chronology causes one to question the true purpose of Radio Marti and to ask why the Administration adheres to the selection of 1040 kHz. In May, Assistant Secretary of State Enders testified before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance that Radio Marti will give

"Cubans the means they now lack to know what kind of a society has been imposed on them, to furnish them a source of news and entertainment that is not manipulated by the state, to let them find out what is really happening in their country, to inform them why so many have gone off to foreign military duty not always to return, and to learn what the state really does with the wealth of the Cuban people."

But surely the Cuban people already know the oppressive, totalitarian nature of the government they live under. And as previously noted, the VOA and U.S. domestic stations already provide this information to Cuba.

Therefore, should $17.7 million be spent to broadcast baseball games, pop music and two "soap operas" to Cuba, especially when most of this programming, including news about Cuba, is aired by U.S. commercial broadcast stations which are received in Cuba? "Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Fiscal Years 1982 and

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[1] It should be noted that expert government agencies believe that Cuba's two 500 kW transmitters are being built because of broadcasts to the area about Cuba. The ICA noted in its Feasibility Study, that those stations "are in retaliation to VOA's Marathon station. The NTIA and the FCC both see increased U.S. broadcasts to Cuba leading to jamming of the frequencies involved, with even greater interference to U.S. broadcasters." Feasibility Study at 21. "In addition to jamming [Radio Marti], it is highly probable that [Cuba] will respond by installing their own high power (500 kW or more) transmitting stations for broadcast to the United States. For example, in retaliation for the VOA station at Marathon, the Cubans plan to install two new 500 kW stations." Voice of America Memorandum from Anna L. Case to Mr. Haratunian, reprinted in the Feasibility Study.

1983 Estimates" at 4., International Broadcasting hearings at 71; H.R. Rept. No. 398 at 24.

In earlier testimony, Mr. Enders asked: "Wouldn't it be better to negotiate with the Cubans, or it isn't like us to engage in propaganda, or Cuban countermeasures will hurt us too much." Significantly, Mr. Enders did not answer the final question because the answer can only be that U.S. broadcasters and their listeners will be seriously affected. And, as noted earlier, Mr. Enders recognizes the harm of Cuban countermeasures when he rejected using VOA's Radio Marathon for Radio Marti because use of Radio Marathon's frequency will "increase the risk of Cuban interference" to Radio Marathon. Letter from Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Senator Charles H. Percy, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at 5 (June 14, 1982). Mr. Enders' disavowal of the interconnection between Radio Marti and increased interference and his down playing of the likelihood of Cuban jamming is belied by his June 14 letter, and seems disingenuous, at best.

Mr. Enders belief that there is no connection between Radio Marti and interference is not shared by all. For example, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce specifically found that "the operation of Radio Marti and the issue of Cuban interference . . . are inextricably intertwined." Radio Marti "could greatly exacerbate what is already a severe problem of interference. . . ." H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2 at 5–6; CRS Report at 62–64.

U.S. broadcasters in the Southeast, particularly in Florida, have over the past decade or more received intolerable interference from Cuba. It is a serious problem. And Cuba's Region 2 AM radio station inventory will, according to the National Association of Broadcasters, result in interference to more than 200 U.S. Stations in 32 States and the District of Columbia. "Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcast Stations" (March 1, 1982). Fifty-two of these stations are in states represented by members of this Committee. They are:

| *Station and city* | *Percentage of presunrise and nighttime coverage loss* |
|---|---|
| Illinois: | |
| WLS, Chicago | 98.7. |
| WMAQ, Chicago | 98.3. |
| WJJD, Chicago | 53.6. |
| WCFL, Chicago | 50 plus. |
| WGN, Chicago | 50 plus. |
| WBBM, Chicago | Partial. |
| WIBV, Belleville | 14.8. |
| WRTH, Wood River | 29.8. |
| Tennessee: | |
| WMC, Memphis | 72.9. |
| WRJZ, Knoxville | 42.1. |
| WNOX, Knoxville | 16. |
| WDOD, Chattanooga | 46.3. |
| WDXI, Jackson | 12.7. |
| WSIX, Nashville | 11.6. |
| WSM, Nashville | Partial. |
| WLAC, Nashville | Partial. |
| North Carolina: | |
| WWNC, Asheville | 64. |
| WISE, Asheville | 11.5. |
| WRAQ, Asheville | 14.6. |
| WTOB, Winston-Salem | 20.3. |
| WSJS, Winston-Salem | 66. |
| WGTM, Wilson | 57.9. |
| WDNC, Raleigh-Durham | 18.2. |
| WMFD, Wilmington | 22.7. |
| WLAS, Jacksonville | 20.5. |
| WBIG, Greensboro | 9.4. |
| WBT, Charlotte | 50 plus. |
| California: | |
| KFI, Los Angeles | Partial. |
| KNX, Los Angeles | Partial. |

| *Station and city* | *Percentage of presunrise and nighttime coverage loss* |
|---|---|
| Indiana: | |
| WNDE, Indianapolis | 13.4. |
| WOWD, Fort Wayne | Partial. |
| Maryland: | |
| WCAO, Baltimore | 47. |
| WBAL, Baltimore | 50 plus. |
| WGMS, Bethesda | 20.7. |
| Kansas: | |
| KGGF, Coffeesville | 19.9. |
| Minnesota: | |
| WCCO, Minneapolis | Partial. |
| Rhode Island: | |
| WEAN, Providence | 19.7. |
| WPRO, Providence | 9.2. |
| Ohio: | |
| WWWE, Cleveland | 98.9. |
| WLW, Cincinnati | 50 plus. |
| WKRC, Cincinnati | 45.3. |
| WSAI, Cincinnati | 8.6. |
| WCKY, Cincinnati | Partial. |
| WPFB, Middletown | 23.7. |
| WNXT, Portsmouth | 17.6. |
| WKBN, Youngstown | 6. |
| Nebraska: | |
| WOW, Omaha | 49.8. |
| KFAB, Omaha | Partial. |
| Massachusetts: | |
| WEEI, Boston | 45.3. |
| Connecticut: | |
| WTIC, Hartford | 50 plus. |
| WDRC, Hartford | 3.6. |
| WICC, Bridgeport | 14. |

It is impossible to see how Radio Marti will facilitate a political settlement of this serious national issue. Press reports and statements from U.S. participants confirm Cuba was surprisingly forthcoming at last summer's bilateral negotiations to resolve mutual radio interference problems. A Department of State telegram from the Cuban Interest Section in Havana to the Secretary of State last September noted that the U.S. and Cuban delegates to the August radio negotiations had "express[ed]" their pleasure over [the] fruitful results of discussions to resolve mutual radio broadcasting interference . . ." but it implies that the August press reports of Radio Marti precluded a settlement. And Cuba walked out of the Region 2 Conference, in part, because of Radio Marti. December 1981 Telegram from the American Counsel, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to the Secretary of State; FCC Fourth Report in the Administrative Conference for AM Broadcasting in Region 2; CRS Report at 55. All hopes of negotiations evaporated with the walk out. The United States should be working to resolve the interference problem through renewed negotiations. We believe that Radio Marti will worsen the existing interference problem while, at the same time, dimming all prospects for a negotiated settlement. As the Congressional Research Service concluded: "To the extent that Radio Marti muddies the political climate between the United States and Cuba . . . it seems likely to aggrevate the interference problem, at least in the short term. . . ." CRS Report at 66. And the FCC believes that Radio Marti "could result in a 'chill' in efforts to resolve the interference problem." FCC Memorandum to the Department of State, July 1981, reprinted in H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2 at 7.

If the goal of Radio Marti is to actually deliver the truth to the Cuban people rather than to serve as a domestic political symbol or to provoke a radio war as part of a larger anti-Castro strategy, there is a better, cheaper way, and one that will not irreparably damage broadcasters, including WHO, and their millions of listeners. Every proposed government expenditure must be examined to insure that it is productive and will benefit the public. During the current recession with rising inflation, triple digit deficits and nearly double digit unemployment, Radio Marti is a $17.7 million project that simply cannot be justified in light of the documented ease with which Cuba can destroy the broadcasts, the fact that the programming is already available from commercial stations and the VOA and the impact that Radio Marti will have on the public.

I might add at this point that Section 6(a) of the House version of S. 1853, H.R. 5427, would add a new provision to the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, 22 U.S.C. § 2877. This provision expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should attempt to settle radio interference damage claims against Cuba. Because it views such interference as a foreign policy matter, the legislation permits, but does not require, compensation for radio and television licensees "for expenses which they incur in mitigating the effects of activities by the Government of Cuba which interfere with the transmission or reception of the broadcasts of those licensees." H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2 at 10–11, 14–15; Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part I. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982).

The financial obligation of the government under Section 6(a) would be large, indeed. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs estimated that it would cost between $150,000–$200,000 to increase a radio station's power from only 5 to 10 kilowatts and to modify its directional antenna. The NAB concluded that more than 200 AM stations will be affected by Cuba's Region 2 AM inventory. Using that figure, the Congressional Budget Office concluded that "[w]ith an estimated cost of $100,000–$200,000 per station such payments could exceed $40 million for improvements in facilities alone." (The CBO study is reprinted in the CRS Report 81–82.)

Larger power increases and construction of new, as opposed to retuned, directional antenna arrays to overcome interference while protecting domestic broadcasters will multiply this total. WQBA in Miami, for example, will spend more than $1 million to increase power from 10 to 50 kW. International Broadcasting hearings at 117. Moreover, the House Committees have not indicated whether additional energy and personnel costs for operating higher powered transmitters and advertising revenue loses due to interference would also be covered by the compensation provision. Covering these elements will cause the financial obligation to skyrocket. Unfortunately, the compensation provision is permissive, not mandatory, and does not authorize a specific pool of money for such payments. Moreover, power increases are not a panacea available to all affected stations. WHO, for example, already operates with the maximum power allowed U.S. stations.

The National Association of Broadcasters believes that technical modifications, such as power increases granted to eight Florida radio stations, are an inadequate solution to the interference problem. A station cannot recover the entire service area and audience that it lost to Cuban interference. Design and construction of directional antennas to recover lost service area are extremely complex and time consuming and the best combination of transmitter power and directionalized antenna may cost several hundred thousand dollars. Most significantly, a minor change in the Cuban operation would require a complete redesign of the radio station. While it may take 6 to 12 months to design and build a directional antenna facility to ameliorate interference, it would only take Cuba a few minutes to change the operating parameters of a radio transmitter—and cause an entirely new set of interference problems for the station. FCC relaxation of technical standards to permit interference to be shared by all nighttime AM broadcasters is unworkable due to the uniqueness of each AM station's protection requirements. "Cuban Interference to United States Broadcasting" by Michael C. Rau, NAB Staff Engineer (April, 1982). See also "Cuban Interference: Treating Symptoms and Not the Disease, Broadcasting," at 44, col. 2 (April 12, 1982). In June, the NAB told the FCC that "Consideration of various technical proposals to combat Cuban interference leads to one inevitable conclusion: interference must be corrected at its *source* not at the point of reception. Thus, from any perspective, a lasting and comprehensive solution to Cuban interference must be arrived at diplomatically." Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters in FCC BC Docket No. 82–187, Implementation of the Plan for AM Broadcasting in Region 2, at 3 (June 4, 1982). (Emphasis added).

The Congressional Research Service concurs with the NAB's conclusion. "The Cuban interference problem probably will not be resolved in a technical setting—rather, it is a political issue." "To the extent that Radio Marti muddies the political climate between the United States and Cuba, however, it seems likely to aggravate the interference problem . . ." CRS Report at 66.

Compensation and power increases, therefore, are at best expensive stop gap measures which will obligate the government to expend tens of millions of dollars to offset a constantly changing Cuban interference pattern. It is clear that negotiation is the way to resolve Cuban-U.S. radio problems. Experience has shown that Radio Marti will dim the prospects for a negotiated settlement.

There are a number of more workable and practical options for broadcasting to Cuba in the event it is decided to proceed with the project. The House Government Operations Committee said that the proven method of maximizing the chance of international broadcasts overcoming jamming and reaching their intended audience is to broadcast on multiple frequencies. The Committee said that "[M]ultiple frequency broadcasting gives the jammer more to deal with and increases the possibility that listeners will be able to tune in an audible signal. Since the international broadcasts are monitored by the receiving nation, one channel must be left unjammed and it is possible for the listener to find that one channel." H.R. Rept. No. 398 at 10–11.

On the question of jamming, the Defense Department admitted to the House Committee on Appropriations that "if Cuba in fact did [build a more powerful transmitter on Radio Marti's frequency], it would block the DOD/Radio Marti transmission and severely interfere with radio station WHO." House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff report (June 7, 1982).

Clearly, the better way to get a message to Cuba is by simultaneously utilizing a combination of AM, FM, TV and shortwave signals. This can easily be done without investing millions of dollars in capital costs for a new station. As the Chicago Tribune said in its July 5, 1982 editorial "There is little need for this 'Radio Free Cuba' when a far more effective manifestation of the American good life is already being beamed across the Gulf Stream by Florida's existing Spanish language stations in the form of commercials." In a January 25, 1982 editorial, the Chicago Tribune noted:

"If Cubans were really being deprived of truth it would be hard to quibble over spending a mere $10 million to give it to them. But they are not. Privately-owned stations in Florida are inundating Cuba with Spanish-language programming. . . . What they get on these private enterprise stations is pretty much what they want to hear: baseball scores and game broadcasts, the latest Latin music, news of the world and of Cuba, and commercials. The [President] can use the $10 million more profitably someplace else."

In short, Southeast radio stations, combined with VOA broadcasts, can and do supply Cubans with exactly the type of "truth" to be supplied by Radio Marti. The project is redundant.

The VOA's Radio Marathon, only 30 miles from Radio Marti's site, is an existing, underutilized 50 kW facility on 1180 kHz, which is received in Cuba. It can be used in conjunction with shortwave broadcasts and leased time on commercial AM, FM and TV stations in Gulf Coast states. Both the House Committee on Government Operations and the Congressional Research Service have noted that shortwave has been and continues to be the primary means of transmitting news and information across international borders. H.R. Rept. No. 398 at 1, CRS Report at 74 quoting International Telecommunication Convention and Annexed Radio Regulations, Annexed Radio Regulation No. 423, 12 UST 1761. The Committee on Government Operations found that Radio Marathon and U.S. commercial television and radio broadcasts are received on Cuba. H.R. Rept. No. 398 at 23. While there may be fewer FM and shortwave receivers than AM receivers on the island, FM and shortwave are more difficult to jam. Therefore, given that difficulty, more Cubans would be able to hear unjammed shortwave and FM broadcasts than the jammed AM broadcasts that the Defense Department expects. This view is echoed by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2 at 14.

There are reliable reports, recounted in the Chicago Tribune, the Miami Herald and elsewhere, that Spanish-language commercials carried on Miami Spanish-language commercial radio stations, reflecting the fullness and abundance of American life, are among the most devastating rebuttals of the Cuban government's message to its own people. Indeed, one member of the Presidential Commission, Mr. Jorge L. Mas, has noted that "[t]he population in Cuba is fascinated upon listening to advertisements for foods and latest-fashion jeans [on U.S. stations]." Radio Free Cuba Project, Jorge L. Mas at 6 (November 10, 1980), News reports of Cuba on these stations already give the Cuban people ready access to the "truth" about their government as well as pop music, baseball and soap operas considered so vital by our government. These commercial news broadcasts carry an internal credibility that a government owned, operated and programmed station could never match.

If it is decided to forego the proven and more efficient multiple frequency technique in favor of a single government-owned, U.S.-based AM station, no compelling reason exists in the current budget situation for building a new facility at a cost of several million dollars rather than taking over or leasing time on Radio Marathon. As you probably know, the Navy admits that it is building, prior to Congressional authorization, a specialized four tower directional antenna system at Saddlebunch Key for Radio Marti. It is being built according to the engineering specifications for Radio Marti, at the Radio Marti coordinates and tuned for 1040 kHz, Broadcasting, June 7 and June 14, 1982 at page 7; Miami Herald, June 16, 1982; Des Moines Register, June 16, 1982 at 7A.

Radio Marathon operates only 5½ hours per day: 1½ hours in the morning and 4 hours in the evening between 6 and 10 p.m. The physical broadcast plant is in place and ready to go, literally on a moment's notice. And contrary to Mr. Ender's position, there is nothing in the VOA Charter to prohibit Radio Marti-type broadcasts. "There does not . . . appear to be anything in the VOA charter that prohibits" broadcasts of Radio Marti programming on VOA stations. CRS Report at 20. As corroboration, note that the ICA already airs on its Spanish-language broadcasts the type of hard news programs proposed for Radio Marti:

"Among the program materials used in the regular Spanish-language programming in the first half of 1980, for example, were interviews with Cuban political prisoners . . . and with a broad cross-section of Cuban refugees. . . . Developments involving Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia are reported to Cuba. . . . News analyses, commentaries, editorial opinion packages, and special reports and documentaries appear regularly and on special occasions." VOA Broadcasting to Cuba, June 1980, attached to the Feasibility Study.

Moreover, Charles Z. Wick, Director of the U.S. International Communication Agency, testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies on March 24, 1982 that ICA plans to build several AM stations in the Caribbean to reach Central America and the Caribbean basin. Radio Marti could operate on one or more of these new facilities thereby protecting U.S. stations on the Radio Marti frequency from jamming.

One final comment about the use of Radio Marathon. Both the Congress and the Executive Branch must weigh the benefits to be gained in broadcasting to Cuba against the risk that Cuba will jam the broadcasts resulting in a loss of service to the audience and $17.7 million. Cuba has made its retaliatory intentions clear and it has the capability to carry out those intentions. For example, Cuba advised the United States in August, 1981 that it planned to build a second 500 kW station on 1160 kHz, the frequency assigned to Radio Station KSL, Salt Lake City. Cuba recently began operating a very high power AM station on 1160 kHz, resulting in a significant loss in KSL's pre-sunrise and nighttime coverage. Private enterprise has been asked to do much by this Administration, but it seems to us that if there is a risk that a station will be destroyed by Cuban retaliation, it should be the government's station, Radio Marathon, that should initially be placed in jeopardy on the front lines rather than commercial stations. It is grossly unfair to place the burden on WHO when the government has a facility that is ready and available for Radio Marti.

But, this is a risk that the government does not want to bear. On the one hand, Mr. Enders and the Presidential Commission have testified that they do not believe that Cuba will jam Radio Marti. Mr. Enders told both this Committee and the House Telecommunications Subcommittee that Cuba's most likely response to Radio Marti will be increased counter broadcasts into the United States rather than jamming. Of course, increased Cuban counter broadcasts means more Cuban stations beamed into the United States, perhaps with more power, causing more interference to U.S. broadcasters and listeners than would have occurred without Radio Marti. As indicated earlier, however Mr. Enders appears not to fully believe what he says about the risk of jamming. His June 14 letter to Chairman Percy rejected using Radio Marathon for Cuban broadcasts in part because use of the VOA's frequency "would only increase the risk of Cuban interference" to the VOA station. Letter from Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders, to Senator Charles H. Percy, June 14, 1982 at 5. It is inconsistent for Mr. Enders to down play WHO's concern over the likelihood of Cuban jamming destroying its station while, at the same time, using the Cuban threat as a reason for not exposing the Voice of America station. Apparently, Mr. Enders believes that the U.S. audiences and radio stations should be placed in jeopardy before the government.

The State Department has testified that one principle codified in the International Telecommunications Union rules is that the AM band is for domestic use and that shortwave frequencies are the proper medium for international broadcasts. International Broadcasting hearings at 52 (testimony of Richard Shrum, Office of International Communications Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State); CRS Report at 74; H.R. Rept. No. 479, Part 2 at 14. Will Radio Marti, therefore, be legal under international law? Operation of Radio Marti on 1040 kHz may well interfere with stations on that frequency in other Western Hemisphere countries. Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia and the Dominican Republic, for example, have or propose to have stations on that frequency. The United States listed 1040 kHz at Saddlebunch Key, Florida in our Region 2 inventory. But it is on List B, a tentative allocation, because one or more countries claimed that the proposed operation will cause objectionable interference to their stations. The allocation, therefore, is subject to bilateral negotiations with our neighbors. As a related matter, the ICA has assessed that the spill over impact of Cuban jamming of Radio Marti into other countries will have an adverse diplomatic impact on the United States, not on Cuba. "The diplomatic situation being what it is in this area, the United States will be held more responsible for originating the [jammed] signal than will Cuba for jamming it." Feasibility Study, July 18, 1981 memorandum from R. Utrick.

All of these factors led the Minneapolis Star and Tribune to conclude in its June 29, 1982 editorial that: "fundamental questions must be answered before proceeding with Radio Marti. Why spend $10 million on a separate station to do what Voice of America could [do] as well or better? Why concentrate on polemics rather than negotiations? Why encourage Cuba to broadcast on frequencies that would interfere with U.S. stations? Why build antenna towers before Congress has appropriated construction money? The self evident answers mean that instead of building Radio Marti, the administration should bury it. And if the administration won't, Congress should."

In summary, WHO is deeply concerned that Cuban jamming of Radio Marti, operating on 1040 kHz, will effectively end its pre-sunrise and nighttime service and, in particular, its EBS function and its farm and agribusiness news and weather reports so vital to the operational and marketing decisions and the economic well being of hundreds of thousands of farmers throughout the entire Midwest. We think it is grossly unfair for the government to put WHO and its listeners in jeopardy when Radio Marathon can and does provide the desired service. In short, it is the government's place to bear the risk in the first instance, not U.S. radio stations and listeners. We are also concerned that the combination of Cuba's inventory and the operation of Radio Marti will make the existing problem of Cuban interference far more serious than it is now. The experience of last summer and fall shows that Radio Marti will make negotiations impossible. If the project to broadcast to Cuba must go forward, far more desirable, workable and economical means exist to deliver the message so as to maximize the chance of the Cuban people to hear it while minimizing the impact on our people.

Thank you for the time you have given us today. Mr. Harter, Mr. Salomon and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

## EFFECT OF THE RADIO MARTI AND CUBAN COUNTERPROPOSAL ON WHO'S SERVICE AREA

The United States Government proposes to operate a 50,000 watt AM radio station, designated as Radio Marti, on the WHO assigned Class 1-A Clear Channel frequency of 1040 kHz and directionalized towards Cuba, for the purpose of "telling the truth to the Cuban people about their government's domestic mismanagement and its promotion of subversion and international terrorism in this Hemisphere. . . ." Cuba has said that it will retaliate against such broadcasts and in December of 1981, it formally proposed to operate a 500,000 watt AM radio station, preliminarily designated as "CMBX WAJAY" from Havana, Cuba on the WHO frequency of 1040 kHz. Such an operation would jam and completely override Radio Marti's broadcasts. Should the Cuban station become operational, it would also interfere with and override the WHO signal in Iowa, as well as all of the contiguous states it now serves with its present Class 1-A Clear Channel signal, during pre-sunrise and nighttime hours. Even though Cuba "suggested" to the United States in August 1981 that it might operate a 500,000 watt AM radio station on 1040 kHz, the United States subsequently selected that frequency for Radio Marti. This raises the question why 1040 kHz was selected for Radio Marti in the face of Cuba's stated intention to build a 500,000 watt station that would preclude Radio Marti's signal from ever reaching the Cuban people.

The large circular arc reflected on the attached coverage map, prepared by Jules Cohen & Associates, reflects the area in which WHO's 0.5 millivolt 50 percent nighttime skywave signal can presently be heard by residents living in that area. The smaller and irregular circle depicts the perimeter of WHO's present 0.5 millivolt groundwave signal which can be received at all times by listeners residing in that area. The shaded area of the map reflects that in which Cuba's proposed 500,000 watt operation on 1040 kHz would override WHO's signal, and thus preclude satisfactory reception of its signal and award-winning service by all listeners residing in either area. The area in which listeners could receive pre-sunrise and nighttime radio service from WHO would be reduced from a radius of 800 to 45 miles.


FEBRUARY 1982
DOMINION OF CANADA
PROSPECTIVE INTERFERENCE-FREE PRIMARY SERVICE (13.7 MV/M GROUNDWAVE)
EXISTING 0.5 MV/M GROUNDWAVE PRIMARY SERVICE
EXISTING 0.5 MV/M, 50% SKYWAVE SECONDARY SERVICE
CMBX WAJAY, CUBA 1040 KHZ 500 KW U
NOTE: ALL WHO SKYWAVE SERVICE WOULD BE DESTROYED.
GULF OF
NIGHTTIME INTERFERENCE STUDY
PALMER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
RADIO STATION WHO DES MOINES, IOWA
1040 KHZ 50 KW U
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electronics Engineers

## TESTIMONY OF ROBERT G. ENGELHARDT, VICE PRESIDENT, PALMER COMMUNICATIONS INC.

My name is Robert G. Engelhardt. I am Vice President of Palmer Communications Incorporated. Palmer is the licensee of Radio Station WHO located in Des Moines, Iowa. With me are Charles McKerns and Kenneth Salomon of the law firm of Dow, Lohnes and Albertson. I welcome this opportunity to testify on the relationship between Radio Marti and WHO.

WHO is a Class 1-A clear channel AM radio station broadcasting on 1040 kHz with 50 kW of power. Radio Marti is slated to operate from Saddlebunch, Florida on 1040 kHz with 50 kW. WHO's nighttime service area encompasses 1,714,337 square miles. Approximately 40 million people in 31 states are able to receive WHO at night. One of our most vital services is our 5:30-6:30 a.m. farm and agribusiness news, weather and market reports for all major Midwestern market terminals. During much of the year, these are nighttime hours. Hundreds of thousands of farmers across the Midwest make their marketing decisions based on these reports. That is, they frequently decide whether to buy or sell livestock or agricultural commodities on a given day based upon the price quotes they are able to receive via WHO in the early morning hours. No other station in the region carries such extensive farm and agribusiness information.

We are deeply concerned that Cuba's announced plans to jam Radio Marti with up to 500 kW of power will destroy WHO's nighttime service, including its vital farm market reports. Such jamming will shrink WHO's coverage from a radius of 800 miles to approximately a radius of 45 miles, from 1,700,000 square miles to 5,900 square miles—a 99.65 percent decrease. We have distributed a brochure about WHO, its nearly 58 year history of service and the devastating impact that Cuban retaliation against Radio Marti will have on the station and its audience.

WHO takes no position on the need of our government to broadcast the "truth" about the Cuban government to the people of Cuba. We do question, however, whether Radio Marti, operating on WHO's frequency of 1040 kHz, is the most efficient and economical way to deliver the message. We are also concerned about the impact Cuba's proposal to operate more than 180 AM stations will have on U.S. broadcasters and their audiences.

Over the past month, we have had numerous discussions about Radio Marti, the Cuban retaliation by way of jamming and its impact on Midwestern farmers and WHO, with members of this Commission, and representatives of the Federal Communications Commission, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the State Department and the Defense Department. In this regard, let me say at the outset that we are astonished that no one involved with Radio Marti has yet contacted WHO about the use of 1040 kHz. We only learned of the decision to use 1040 kHz through press reports and our own efforts in coming to Washington to talk to as many people involved in this project as possible. Many said that we were to be consulted, but no one made the effort. We have also met with the entire Iowa Congressional delegation as well as with members of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance concerning the effect of current and projected Cuban radio interference on U.S. broadcasters.

In the course of our discussions, it became clear that the use of other technologies and broadcast services were at best insufficiently studied before it was decided to build an AM station on 1040 kHz. The ease of jamming a single AM station and the effect of that jamming on U.S. broadcasters was not considered at all by the FCC and other agencies in this process. Until we raised it at the Defense Department no thought was given to using AM frequencies below 540 and above 1600 kHz to avoid Cuban jamming of Radio Marti from destroying U.S. commercial stations.

Cuba has announced that it will jam Radio Marti. From its point of view, Radio Marti's broadcasts can only be considered provocative. It is naive to think that the station will not be jammed. Cuba said it would do so when it walked out of the Region 2 Conference on AM Broadcasting in mid-December of last year. Indeed, one member of this Commission has said that "you have to be an awful optimist to think that" Cuba will not jam Radio Marti. In a December 1981 report entitled "International Shortwave Broadcasting and Direct Broadcast Satellites: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti" (H.R. Report Number 398, 97th Congress, 1st Session), the House

Committee on Government Operations noted that international radio broadcasts have been jammed since their inception. For example, the Soviet Union began jamming of Radio Liberty within ten minutes of its going on the air. There is no reason to think Cuba will do less.

There is a kind of "Catch-22" illogic to this situation. If Radio Marti were not judged to be effectively serving its purpose of broadcasting the "truth" to Cuba it would be an expensive folly. Yet to the extent it does serve that purpose, it encourages and perhaps compels the Cuban government to resort to jamming techniques, and it is clearly within their capability in this instance to render it an expensive folly.

After reports in Broadcasting magazine at least as early as November 2, 1981 that 1040 kHz would be used for Radio Marti, Cuba amended its AM inventory during the week of December 7, 1981 moving its two 500 kW stations from 550 and 1010 kHz to 1040 and 1160 kHz. This timing sequence has been acknowledged by FCC Chairman Fowler. Cuba's action, therefore, came after press reports in August of U.S. plans to build Radio Marti, after the President signed Executive Order 12323 on September 22, 1981 creating this Commission and after then National Security Advisor Richard Allen formally announced Radio Marti on September 23, 1981.

If the goal of Radio Marti is to actually deliver the truth to the Cuban people rather than to serve as a domestic political symbol or to provoke a radio war, we suggest that the project as currently planned will fail and that the government's $10 million investment will be totally wasted—not to mention that WHO and its millions of listeners will be irreparably damaged.

There are a number of options to the current plan. The Government Operations Committee said that one proven method of maximizing the chance of international broadcasts overcoming jamming and reaching their intended audience is to broadcast on multiple frequencies. The Committee said that "[m]ultiple frequency broadcasting gives the jammer more to deal with and increases the possibility that listeners will be able to tune in an audible signal. Since the international broadcasts are monitored by the receiving nation, one channel must be left unjammed and it is possible for the listener to find that one channel."

With this background, it is clear that the better way to get a message to Cuba is by simultaneously utilizing a combination of AM, FM, TV and shortwave signals. This can easily be done without investing $2½–$4 million in a new station. The Voice of America's Radio Marathon in Florida, is an existing, underutilized 50 kW facility on 1180 kHz, which is received in Cuba, and can be used in conjunction with shortwave broadcasts as well as leasing time on commercial AM, FM and TV stations in Gulf Coast states. The Government Operations Committee noted that shortwave has been, and continues to be, the primary means of transmitting news and information across international borders and, that with regard to Cuba, U.S. commercial television and radio broadcasts are received on that island. While there may be fewer FM and shortwave receivers than AM receivers in Cuba, FM and shortwave are more difficult to jam. Therefore, given that difficulty, more Cubans would be able to hear unjammed shortwave and FM broadcasts than jammed AM broadcasts.

Parenthetically, I should note that these are reliable reports, recounted in the Chicago Tribune, the Miami Herald and elsewhere, that Spanish language commercials carried on Miami Spanish-language commercial radio stations reflecting the relative abundance of American life, are among the most devastating rebuttals of the Cuban government's message to its own people. These also carry an internal credibility that may be difficult to match with a government owned, operated and programmed facility.

If it is decided to employ only a single government-owned AM station, no compelling reason exists in the current budget situation for building a new facility at a cost of many million dollars rather than taking over or leasing time on Radio Marathon, which is now operating only 5½ hours per day. Radio Marathon broadcasts for 1½ hours in the morning and between 6 and 10 p.m. We understand that studies of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty indicate that late night hours are "prime time" for international broadcasts. The physical broadcast plant is in place and ready to go, literally on a moment's notice. Any possible legal action to the use of the VOA station would be solved by passage of H.R. 5427 as amended on March 24. Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa proposed, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee adopted, a provision permitting Radio Marti to use Radio Marathon's frequency. We also note that Charles Z. Wick, Director of the U.S. International Communication Agency, testified on March 24 before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations that ICA plans to build several AM stations in the Caribbean to reach Central America and the Caribbean basin. That being the case, it is only natural to ask why Radio Marti cannot operate on one of these new facilities thereby protecting U.S. stations on the Radio Marti frequency from jamming?

One final comment about the use of Radio Marathon. It is fundamental that the government must weigh the benefits to be gained in broadcasting to Cuba against the risk that Cuba will jam the broadcasts resulting in a loss of $10 million. Cuba has made its intentions clear and the capability exists to carry out these intentions. Private enterprise has been asked to do much by this Administration, but it seems to us that if there is a risk that a station's service will be destroyed by Cuban jamming, it should be the government's station, Radio Marathon, that should initially be placed in jeopardy on the front lines rather than private broadcasters' stations. It is grossly unfair to place the burden on WHO when the government has a facility that is ready and available for Radio Marti.

The State Department has testified that one principle codified in the International Telecommunications Union rules is that the AM band is for domestic use and that shortwave frequencies are the proper medium for international broadcasts. See the testimony of Richard Shrum, Office of International Communications Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, before the Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, October 23, 1981.

Therefore, we must ask if Radio Marti will be legal under international law? Operation of Radio Marti on 1040 kHz may well interfere with stations on that frequency in other Western Hemisphere countries. Honduras, Guatamala, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Columbia and the Dominican Republic, for example, have or propose to have stations on that frequency. The U.S. listed 1040 kHz at Saddlebunch, Florida in our Region 2 inventory. But it is on List B, which is a tentative allocation subject to bilateral negotiations with our neighbors.

As you know, U.S. broadcasters in the Southeast, particularly in Florida, already receive interference from Cuba. It is a serious problem. And Cuba's Region 2 AM inventory will, according to the National Association of Broadcasters, result in interference to more than 200 U.S. stations in 32 States and the District of Columbia. Until the announcement of Radio Marti, last summer's bilateral Cuban-U.S. negotiations to resolve mutual interference problems were surprisingly encouraging. All hopes of a negotiated settlement evaporated with the announcement of Radio Marti. But, who will be perceived as the "aggressor" in this radio war? Some, perhaps including many of our Latin American neighbors, would say that the U.S. Government's establishment of Radio Marathon in 1962, which was outside of the North American Regional Broadcast Agreement, set the stage.

In summary, WHO is deeply concerned that Cuban jamming of Radio Marti, operating on 1040 kHz, will effectively end its nighttime service and, in particular, its farm and agribusiness reports so vital to the marketing decisions and the economic well being of hundreds of thousands of farmers throughout the entire Midwest. We think it is grossly unfair for the government to put WHO and its listeners in jeopardy when Radio Marathon can provide the desired service—in short, it is the government's place to bear the risk in the first instance, not WHO and its listeners. We are also concerned that the combination of Cuba's inventory and the operation of Radio Marti will make the existing problem of Cuban interference far more serious than it is now. And Radio Marti, as experience of last summer suggests, will make negotiations impossible. If the project to broadcast to Cuba must go forward, far more desirable, workable and efficient means exist to deliver the message so as to maximize the chance of the Cuban people to hear it.

Thank you for the time you have given us today. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

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### STATEMENT BY SENATOR CHARLES GRASSLEY

I appreciate this opportunity to express my deep concerns about the potential effect of operating the proposed Radio Marti as presently planned. Specifically, I am referring to the disastrous consequences for the WHO Broadcasting Company that will result if Cuba carries out its threat to jam Radio Marti with a 500,000 watt AM station. WHO, which shares Radio Marti's proposed frequency of 1040 kHz, would be harmed immensely in the event that Cuba retaliates. This Cuban action not only would spell ruin in terms of WHO operations, but also would destroy a marketing and production informational tool that thousands of farm families have come to rely upon over the past several decades.

In addition to my service in Congress and the Iowa General Assembly, I have farmed most of my life. I recognize and appreciate the importance of being able to depend upon WHO at 5 or 6 a.m. to provide important farm news, weather forecasts, farm market quotations, etc. Farmers must start very early in the morning to begin their daily livestock chores and to get to the fields. Information provided by WHO in those early hours shapes the management decisions of the farmer not only for that immediate day, but also for the weeks ahead for the year. Farmers must have this valuable, timely information if they are to operate effectively and successfully.

It is not only the Iowa farmer who depends upon WHO's pre-dawn broadcast services. WHO's broadcast covers 1,714,337 square miles during the evening and pre-dawn hours. With this range, WHO can reach farmers from over 30 states and Canada. If Cuba retaliates as threatened, this coverage would be reduced to fewer than 6000 square miles, reducing the station's broadcast radius from 800 miles to about 45 miles. Needless to say, this action would deprive most of Iowa's farmers from the essential information offered by WHO, let alone the hundreds of thousands of farm families throughout the rest of the region.

While I fully support the purposes and goals of Radio Marti, in light of the severe damage that the present plans will create for WHO and farmers throughout the Nation, I strongly urge the selection of one of the many viable alternative operating plans that exist for Radio Marti. These alternatives can provide the same positive results at a lower cost, while avoiding the tremendous damage to WHO service.

The most feasible alternative would be to utilize the existing Voice of America facility at Marathon, Florida. Since this station is used only a few hours a day, there would be plenty of broadcasting time available to serve the purposes of Radio Marti. Another positive aspect of this alternative is the fact that Radio Marti could be operational immediately, at little or no additional cost to the government. As a member of the Senate Budget Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, I am acutely sensitive to the unnecessary, avoidable expenses of government. It seems to me a waste to spend over $10 million to build and operate Radio Marti when other less costly facilities are available. Furthermore, there exists even weaker logic for these enormous expenditures. For a radio station that could be rendered immediately ineffective by Cuban retaliatory jamming. For those who suggest that we cannot afford to jeopardize Radio Marathon's operation, I suggest that we likewise cannot justify the destruction of one of the finest farm radio operations in the country.

If the threat from Cuban retaliation is determined to be too real to jeopardize Radio Marathon, and since there is no justification for ruining the operation of WHO, other alternatives may require additional consideration. It is possible that we might be able to use a Mexican clear-channel frequency if permission can be obtained; we might be able to utilize a flexible FM signal that would be far more difficult to jam; the use of 1200 kHz presents another alternative that would also be more difficult to jam; and it would also be possible to broadcast from air or sea.

In summary, Radio Marti must be operated in a manner that minimizes the costs to our citizens and to our government. Utilizing 1040 kHz will destroy a very valuable service provided by WHO for the hundreds of thousands of farmers and other radio listeners around the country in the event that Cuba carries out its threat. If the State Department and other government officials determine that there is no real threat, then Radio Marathon should be utilized because of the cost savings as well as many other benefits that this alternative presents. If the Cuban retaliation threat is real and imminent, then we must not waste taxpayers money by building Radio Mirti, as well as allow the destruction of a fine farm radio service. Instead, a workable alternative must be developed.

Thank you for this opportunity to present my views. I appreciate your consideration.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
*Washington, D.C., March 19, 1982.*

Hon. JIM LEACH,
*House of Representatives,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN LEACH: I have been personally following developments concerning the establishment of Radio Marti. The decision to establish Radio Marti was made by the Office of the President, and the Federal Communications Commission was not directly involved in the decision. However, I wish to lend my support for this important project.

I have been apprised of Cuba's stated intent to operate one of its planned 500 kW transmitters on the same frequency as Radio Marti, 1040 kHz. If such operation actually occurs, destructive interference to the nighttime service area of WHO, Des Moines will result. I am advised that when 1040 kHz was selected for Radio Marti, Cuba had not announced plans to operate a 500 kW transmitter on this frequency, although, they had announced plans for 500 kW transmitters on two different frequencies.

There do not appear to be any simple alternatives to resolve this potential problem. However, I want to assure you that the Commission stands ready, as it has in the past, to render assistance if called upon.

Thank you for your interest in this matter.

Sincerely,

MARK S. FOWLER, *Chairman.*

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OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
*Des Moines, Iowa, March 31, 1982.*

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
*The White House,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing to express my concern about the intention of the Presidential Commission for Broadcasting to Cuba to use the radio frequency of 1040 kHz for its programming on "Radio Marti". As you may recall, this frequency is the same one used by WHO radio in Des Moines for its clear channel broadcasts.

It is my understanding that the Cuban government has announced plans to operate a 500,000 watt AM station on this same frequency in order to counter "Radio Marti's" programming. This Cuban response will have the effect of jamming WHO's broadcasts and reducing its evening and nighttime coverage from 800 to 45 miles. In addition to this tremendous loss of audience for WHO, I believe the Cuban operation on this frequency would seriously hamper Iowa's ability to react to natural disasters such as tornadoes and to implement civil defense procedures during a military attack since WHO radio is the state's primary vehicle for informing the public and other radio stations during a crisis.

In view of the irreparable loss of farm news, grain and livestock markets, and weather reporting service hundreds of thousands of midwestern farm families would suffer if WHO's broadcasts are jammed, as well as the potential harm to our disaster assistance efforts, I urge you to instruct your staff to review this matter and to identify another radio frequency which might be used to carry this programming to Cuba.

Thank you very much for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

ROBERT D. RAY, *Governor.*

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IOWA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
*Des Moines, Iowa, April 6, 1982.*

Hon. RONALD REAGAN,
*President of the United States,*
*The White House, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This communication from me is a letter of concern to you and I want to express the same concern to the two Iowa Senators and six Iowa Congressmen, as well as U.S. Secretary of Agriculture John Block and Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng, concerning some of the proposals that have been forthcoming from the "Radio Marti" governing body. "Radio Marti" is your Presidential Commission on broadcasting to Cuba and the 10 members were appointed by you on January 19, 1982. Soon after the appointment of your commission, the commission began to attempt to free themselves of any State Department control and have recently been discussing a 50,000 watt AM station designated as "Radio Marti" which would operate on WHO's frequency of 1040 kHz.

We understand the purpose of "Radio Marti" is to tell ". . . the truth to the Cuban people about their government's domestic mismanagement and its promotion of subversion and international terrorism in this Hemisphere and elsewhere. . . ." Although this effort may somehow serve our national interest, it will also surely antagonize the present Cuban administration. Thus, it appears certain the Cuban government will carry out their proposed 500,000 watt AM station jam "Radio Marti." Unfortunately, in doing so, they will also jam the early evening, nighttime and pre-sunrise broadcasts of WHO, depriving 114,000 Iowa farm families, and thousands of others in surrounding states, of the excellent farm service programs the station broadcasts during those hours.

We are also advised the "Voice of America", a State Department agency, presently owns another 50,000 watt AM station, now operating on the former I–A Clear Channel of 1180 kHz, identical to that proposed for "Radio Marti", which now operates on the former I–A Clear Channel of 1180 kHz, from a site no more than 30 miles from that under consideration for the latter. That station is already beamed toward Cuba. We also understand it operates no more than 6 hours per day, and could be readily used for the proposed "Radio Marti" effort.

In view of the irreparable loss of farm news, grain and livestock markets, and weather reporting service, hundreds of thousands of midwestern farm families would suffer if WHO's early evening, nighttime and pre-sunrise broadcasts are jammed, we urge you and your colleagues to aggressively propose reassignment of the "Radio Marti" effort to the frequency of 1180 kHz. To precipitate the jamming of WHO's highly regarded farm and agricultural broadcasts *would be a disservice to hundreds of thousands of midwestern farm families* vitally in need of this reporting service on a regular and daily basis.

We shall appreciate your support of our position on this matter.

With my kindest personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT H. LOUNSBERRY,
*Secretary of Agriculture.*

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IOWA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
*Des Moines, Iowa, April 7, 1982.*

Hon. ROGER JEPSEN,
*Dirksen Senate Office Building,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR ROGER: I am enclosing a copy of the letter I sent to President Reagan regarding the issue of "Radio Marti." I feel that WHO has provided a tremendous service to the citizens of Iowa, particularly the rural population through their farm broadcasting service.

The proposal by the Presidential Commission to use "Radio Marti" on a separate channel 1040 kHz will definitely shrink the ability of farm broadcasts during those critical hours to reach out in the radius it now covers. In fact, in eastern, northeast and northwest Iowa our Iowa stations will not have the benefit of the farm broadcast service, whereas now that service reaches out into a wide radius to the Canadian border, as far east as western New York and Pennsylvania, as far south as Louisiana, and as far west as Wyoming and Colorado.

I hope that you will try and urge the Presidential Commission to use the principal option available in the best interests of the economy and service to Iowa and to other areas which WHO currently serves.

Thank you for your support on this issue.

Sincerely,

R. H. LOUNSBERRY,
*Secretary of Agriculture.*

This same letter sent to our 2 Senators, 6 Congressmen, Secretary Block and Deputy Secretary Lynn.

IOWA FARM BUREAU FEDERATION,
*West Des Moines, Iowa, March 31, 1982.*

Hon. RONALD REAGAN,
*President of the United States,*
*The White House,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are concerned about the effect of the government's proposal to establish Radio Marti on the same frequency as Radio Station WHO in Des Moines.

Many farmers throughout IOWA and the Midwest depend upon WHO for farm news, grain and livestock and weather reporting at all hours of the day.

It is our understanding that the Cuban government has announced plans to jam the proposed Radio Marti station with a 500,000 watt AM station on the same frequency. If this occurs, the effective signal for Station WHO on frequency 1040 will be reduced to 45 miles during early evening, nighttime and pre-sunrise broadcasting.

We've been told that the State Department already has a 50,000 watt AM station that operates no more than 6 hours per day on the 1180 frequency. It seems logical to use this facility which is located near the proposed site of the new station in Florida and which is already beamed toward Cuba.

In this period of overwhelming need for restraints on federal spending, the decision to use an existing facility and already-assigned frequency makes economic sense. To spend additional money and risk the jamming of WHO's highly regarded farm and news broadcasts would be costly to Iowa farmers, Iowans and taxpayers.

We respectfully ask that you favorably consider our request to protect a valuable domestic broadcast station's service to Americans while finding a way to communicate the truth to the Cuban people.

Sincerely,

DEAN KLECKNER, *President.*

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NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL,
*Des Moines, Iowa, March 31, 1982.*

Hon. RONALD REAGAN,
*The President of the United States,*
*The White House,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I speak for a half million people who produce $9 billion worth of pork annually. Our industry is concentrated mainly in the 14 central and midwestern states. People are dependent on several radio stations for their marketing information and make their marketing decisions on a daily basis. Owner manager station WHO in Des Moines that you are originaly familiar with has a frequency 1040 kHz.

Representatives of Palmer Communications, Inc., licensee of Radio Station WHO, Des Moines, have advised the Cuban government to announce plans to operate a 500,000 watt AM station on WHO's frequency of 1040 kHz, jamming its broadcasts and reducing its early evening, nighttime and pre-sunrise coverage from 800 to 45 miles. The apparent purpose of the Cuban plan is to jam the 50,000 watt AM station, designated as "Radio Marti", the Department of State also proposes to operate on WHO's frequency of 1040 kHz, and directionalize toward Cuba.

We understand the purpose of "Radio Marti" is to tell ". . . the truth to the Cuban people about their government's domestic mismanagement and its promotion of subversion and international terrorism in this Hemisphere and elsewhere . . ." Although this effort may somehow serve our national interest, it will also surely antagonize the present Cuban administration. Thus, it appears certain they intend their proposed 500,000 watt AM station to jam "Radio Marti". Unfortunately, in doing so, they will also jam early evening, nighttime and pre-sunrise broadcasts of WHO, depriving 114,000 Iowa farm families, and thousands of others in surrounding states, of the excellent farm service programs the station broadcasts during those hours.

We are also advised the "Voice of America", a State Department agency, presently owns another 50,000 watt AM station, now operating on the former I-A Clear Channel of 1180 kHz, identical to that proposed for "Radio Marti", which now operates on the former I–A Clear Channel of 1180 kHz, from a site no more than 30 miles from that under consideration for the latter, that is already beamed toward Cuba. We also understand that station operates no more than 6 hours per day, and could be readily used for the proposed "Radio Marti" effort.

In view of the irreparable loss of farm news, grain and livestock markets, and weather reporting service hundreds of thousands of midwestern farm families would suffer if WHO's early evening, nighttime and pre-sunrise broadcasts are jammed. We urge you and your colleagues to aggressively propose reassignment of the "Radio Marti" effort to the frequency of 1180 kHz, and the "Voice of America" outlet to another. To precipitate the jamming of WHO's highly regarded farm and agricultural broadcasts would be a disservice to hundreds of thousands of midwestern farm families vitally in need of this reporting service on a regular, and daily basis.

We shall appreciate your support of our position on this matter.

Sincerely,

ORVILLE K. SWEET,
*Executive Vice President.*

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IOWA CORN GROWERS ASSOCIATION,
*West Des Moines, Iowa, March 26, 1982.*

The PRESIDENT,
*The White House,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Iowa Corn Growers Association would like to bring to your attention a situation that we feel has severe implications to the majority of the 110,000 Iowa corn producers.

We understand the Department of State plans to operate a 50,000 watt AM radio station designated as "Radio Marti" on a frequency of 1040 kHz. Proposed programming is directed toward the people of Cuba. Additional information we have obtained indicates that if such a station would operate, the Cuban government would jam that frequency with a signal being broadcast from a 500,000 watt station. Such a station would seriously affect a major farm radio station in Iowa, WHO, operating on their assigned frequency of 1040 kHz.

We can appreciate the need to provide the Cuban people with accurate and reliable information about their government, however, the adverse effect this will have on Iowa agriculture we feel merits selecting another alternative.

Jamming of the 1040 kHz frequency would prevent farmers in a 200 mile radius of Des Moines from receiving the WHO farm programming from dusk to dawn. Of major concern to us is the weather reporting services during late evening and early morning hours in the planting and harvesting seasons. Obviously, during these seasons of the year the weather conditions are very critical to farmers and they depend on the pre-dawn radio weather reports to determine work activities for the day. WHO has devoted substantial resources to provide sophisticated weather reporting services that are needed by farmers. The loss of this information to Iowa farmers could cause considerable financial losses to these grain producers as well as affect the U.S. and world food supplies in a drastic manner.

Additionally, farmers depend upon the timeliness of radio for much of their market information and farm news. Most of the farm news is provided in the time slots of 5:30 a.m. to 6:30 a.m. and during the noon hour. Thus, interference on the 1040 frequency during early morning hours would prevent most farmers in Iowa from receiving the critical market information plus coverage of issues that you and your Administration have selected as high priorities such as soil conservation, increased agriculture exports, additional basic research related to agricultural production and marketing and a short-term priority of farmer awareness and participation in the 1982 farm program.

We are advised that an alternative to the present plan is available. The "Voice of America" presently operates a 50,000 watt station on the frequency of 1180 kHz within a short distance from the proposed "Radio Marti" site. Additionally this station operates no more than six hours per day and could be used for the project "Marti" effort.

Mr. President, based on the serious consequences that the loss of WHO weather, market and farm information would have on Iowa's farmers and the economy, we strongly urge you to encourage the Department of State to choose an alternative to the present 1040 kHz "Radio Marti" proposal.

Sincerely,

DAN STADTMUELLER, *President*.

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IOWA CORN GROWERS ASSOCIATION,
*West Des Moines, Iowa, March 26, 1982.*

Hon. ROGER W. JEPSEN,
*U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR: The enclosed letter describes the concern with which the Iowa Corn Growers Association views the proposed Department of State 50,000 watt "Radio Marti" plan.

If the plan goes into effect and Cuba jams the transmission as anticipated, consequences for Iowa agriculture will be severe, as dusk-to-dawn programing on WHO will be affected.

Farmers in Iowa truly do depend on WHO for weather and market information. I find WHO "Farm Radio" a reliable source of the information so crucial to my operation.

In light of the fact that the Department of State has a reasonable alternative to broadcasting on the same frequency as WHO, I feel that proceeding with this plan would be a real disservice to Iowa farmers. I trust you will take whatever action you deem appropriate to direct the State Department to avoid interference with the 1040 kHz frequency.

Sincerely,

JACK PARSONS, *Director*.

[NOTE.—This same letter sent to our two Senators, six Congressmen, Secretary Block, and Under Secretary Lodwick.]

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IOWA SOYBEAN ASSOCIATION,
*West Des Moines, Iowa, March 25, 1982.*

The PRESIDENT,
*The White House,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: WHO Radio of Des Moines, the station on which I used to hear your broadcasts of the Drake Relays, is in serious trouble if the Department of State goes ahead with plans for "Radio Marti" on a frequency of 1040 kHz.

Proposed jamming of "Radio Marti" by the Cubans would effectively eliminate early morning and late evening broadcasts of farm markets, weather, and news so vital to midwest agriculture.

Iowa's Clear Channel WHO Radio has an outstanding farm department that provides needed, up to the minute agricultural information. Interruption of this service would mean the loss of a valuable news source on which farmers make costly decisions.

There must be a better way!

Thank you for your serious consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,

RAYMOND HECK,
*President, Iowa Soybean Association.*

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IOWA DAIRY INDUSTRY COMMISSION,
*Ankeny, Iowa, April 1, 1982.*

The PRESIDENT,
*The White House,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Recently I became aware of the State Department's plan to operate a 50,000 watt AM station, designated as "Radio Marti." Also, according to information I have received, "Radio Marti" would operate on a frequency of 1040 kHz, the same as radio station WHO of Des Moines, Iowa.

I understand the purpose of "Radio Marti" is to tell ". . . the truth to the Cuban people about their government's domestic mismanagement and its promotion of subversion and international terrorism in this hemisphere and elsewhere . . ." While I believe the Cuban people have a right to hear this information, and while it may serve our national interest, Mr. Castro most assuredly would not stand idly by. In fact, he has announced plans to jam "Radio Marti" broadcasts with a 500,000 watt AM station, also using the 1040 kHz frequency.

Who, then wins this political battle of the airwaves? No one. But there are losers—those being radio station WHO and the hundreds of thousands of midwestern farmers who depend on their early evening, night-time and pre-sunrise broadcasts. Farmers, as you know, Mr. President, depend on accurate weather and market information, and here in the midwest they have counted on WHO for over 50 years to bring this information to them.

I also believe, Mr. President, that to ask taxpayers to foot the bill for this multi-million dollar project that will not achieve its goal due to Castro's plan to jam the station is wrong.

Thank you for your time and consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,

KEITH R. MAXEY, *Executive Secretary.*

**Enclosure.**

Carbon Copies to the following: Robert Harter, President, Palmer Communications Inc.; Keith Kirkpatrick, Farm Director, WHO Radio; The Honorable Roger W. Jepsen, United States Senate; The Honorable Charles E. Grassley, United States Senate; The Honorable Jim Leach, United States House of Representatives; The Honorable Tom Tauke, United States House of Representatives; The Honorable Cooper Evans, United States House of Representatives; The Honorable Neal Smith, United States House of Representatives; The Honorable Tom Harkin, United States House of Representatives; The Honorable Berkley Bedell, United States House of Representatives; The Honorable John R. Block, The United States Secretary of Agriculture; and the Honorable Richard A. Lynn, Deputy United States Secretary of Agriculture.

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY,
*Kansas City, Mo., April 16, 1982.*

Gen. LOUIS O. GIUFFRIDA,
*Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR GENERAL GIUFFRIDA: A matter of utmost importance has been brought to my attention which potentially threatens the Iowa State EBS system, but more importantly, reveals a lack of coordination amongst Federal Agencies at the National level.

I was informed that the United States Department of State proposes to operate a 50,000 watt, AM radio station designated as "RADIO MARTI" on a tentatively assigned frequency of 1040 kHz, directionalized towards Cuba for the purpose of broadcasting news of Cuba into the island Nation. In apparent retaliation, the Cuban government now proposes to operate a 500,000 watt AM radio station initially designated as "CMBX WAJAY" from Havana, Cuba on the Radio Marti frequency of 1040 kHz for the purpose of jamming and overriding the Radio Marti broadcasts. Should Cuba do so, they will interfere with, and override, a large percentage of the WHO-Des Moines, Iowa broadcast signal which also operates on 1040 kHz. The WHO nighttime and pre-sunrise radio broadcast pattern would be reduced from a radius of 800 miles to 45 miles.

The Iowa State-wide EBS plan which was finalized and approved January of this year identifies radio station WHO-AM as the key input station for the State EBS system as well as the Common Program Control Station (CPCS-1) for the Des Moines Operational Area. The preparation of this plan took a number of years and required operational and monetary commitments from a number of broadcasters before the plan was finally approved. The potential Cuban interference would negate the viability of the present plan and any subsequent modification to the plan could provide a more costly and less satisfactory solution.

I am aware that the national interest may well be served by our government having the ability to disseminate broadcast information in this area of the

Western Hemisphere. However, I am concerned that no coordination effort was made with FEMA by either the State Department or the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), particularly since there is a potential threat to the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), and FEMA has the responsibility for EBS Oversight.

There are a number of alternatives available to the State Department to accomplish their objective. In light of the potential degradation to the EBS, I strongly recommend that FEMA take exception to the utilization of 1040 kHz as the operational frequency of RADIO MARTI.

For your information, I am attaching copies of a FEMA VII staff report of an emergency meeting of the Iowa State EBS Committee called by Governor Ray on this matter. A letter was also received from Major General Roger W. Gilbert, the Adjutant General of the Iowa National Guard on this subject. They believe an alternative frequency and site is now available to accomplish the original goals at a considerable savings of government monies.

Sincerely,

PATRICK J. BRESHENY, *Regional Director.*

Attachments—press stories from various publications.

[From Broadcasting, Sept. 28, 1981]

### RADIO FREE CUBA

(U.S. government plans AM station to broadcast "truth" into Castro's home territory; effect on western hemisphere spectrum negotiations feared.)

The Reagan administration has decided to combat what it calls the Cuban government's "lies" to its people by establishing an AM station to broadcast news and commentary on Cuba into the island nation. "Radio Marti"—named after a hero of the Cuban war for independence from Spain in 1900—is to begin broadcasting in January. But many of the details of its operation remain to be settled by a presidential commission still to be established.

However, senior officials who briefed reporters on the project last week said the station will operate under a structure similar to that of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which broadcast news of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, respectively, into those areas. They said Congress will be asked to enact the necessary legislation as well as to approve the use of $10 million of State Department funds to finance the first year's operation of Radio Marti.

The officials said the station, which will broadcast in Spanish, would operate under a normal FCC license, but they could not identify the frequency to be used, or the power, or the location, or even whether there would be one or two transmitters. Indications are, however, that Radio Marti would start small—a virtual necessity since the commission that will plan and organize its operation is not scheduled to submit its recommendations and final report until Oct. 1, 1982. One of the senior officials said Radio Marti might initially buy time on existing stations.

Richard V. Allen, President Reagan's national security adviser, said in a statement that the purpose of Radio Marti's to break the monopoly on news in Cuba the government has had since Fidel Castro assumed power more than 20 years ago: "This radio service will tell the truth to the Cuban people about their government's domestic mismanagement and its promotion of subversion and international terrorism in this hemisphere and elsewhere."

Announcement of the administration's plans for Radio Marti caused some uneasiness among U.S. officials preparing for the six-week conference of western hemisphere nations on AM broadcasting, to begin in Rio de Janeiro, on Nov. 9. A major cause of concern has been Cuban plans for 180 new stations, many of very high power. U.S. officials have been hopeful they could persuade the Cubans to modify their plans in a manner that would assure the island of service without causing serious interference to U.S. stations. "Radio Marti won't help us in our problems with Cuba," said one official.

The administration was aware of those problems, but appears to have concluded there would be no point in letting consideration of them alter its plans for Radio Marti. One of the officials who briefed reporters noted that the Cubans in 1977 announced plans for two 500 kW transmitters, whose operation would violate an agreement with the U.S.

"We are not at all certain what will influence the Cuban government's attitude," the official said. It could use Radio Marti "as a scapegoat" to explain its position. "We note only that a time when we were trying very much to improve relations with Cuba, in 1977, it announced plans for the two large stations."

An FCC official, who said the commission was not aware of those plans until last year, said neither station is yet on the air.

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[From Broadcasting, Nov. 7, 1981]

## MOVE AHEAD DESPITE CONCERNS OF SOME U.S. DIPLOMATS

(Government AM service aimed at Cuba continues to evolve; station may be on 1040 kHz)

The Reagan administration decision to establish a radio station in Florida to broadcast news of Cuba into the island nation is said to have provoked expressions of concern from U.S. diplomats in Havana. However, State Department officials say the objections being raised were considered when plans for the AM radio service were being formulated but were not found to be persuasive. In that connection, one official indicated the U.S. questions whether Cuba can deliver on its at least implied threat to put very-high-powered AM stations on the air.

The New York Times last week reported that the United States Interests Section in the Swiss embassy in Havana had told the State Department that Radio Marti—named after a Cuban patriot, Jose Marti—might prove counterproductive. They said it could generate a new wave of Cuban immigration to the U.S., when the U.S. is trying to stem illegal immigration, and lead to reprisals by Cuba.

Those were among the factors considered when the decision was made to proceed with Radio Marti, a State Department official said last week.

As for sparking a new exodus from Cuba, he said the programing would not be designed to promote one. Officials have said the Spanish-language station would break the monopoly on news they say Fidel Castro has held for more than 20 years. However, Richard V. Allen, President Reagan's national security adviser, in announcing plans for Radio Marti, also said it will "tell the truth to the Cuban people about their government's domestic mismanagement and its promotion of subversion" abroad (Broadcasting, Sept. 28).

And as for reprisals—Cuba is said to be preparing to establish a number of high-powered AM stations, including two of 500 kW—the official said it is not clear that Cuba has the necessary resources. "From a practical point of view," he said, "the amount of power that would be required doesn't leave much for electric light and heat. It's a significant taxing of the system."

Radio Marti is scheduled to begin operating in January. And a private, nonprofit corporation has been formed (see page 48) to operate it along the lines of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which broadcast news of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, respectively, into those areas. The new corporation is not scheduled to submit a final report and recommendations until Oct. 1, 1982, Start-up and first year operating costs will be $10 million.

Most of the technical details of Radio Marti remain to be disclosed, if indeed they have been developed. However, one report circulating in Washington last week was that Radio Marti would operate on 1040 kHz, the clear channel on which WHO(AM) Des Moines, Iowa, is the dominant station. The State Department official said a final decision on a frequency has not yet been made. But he said 1040 kHz "looks the best" of those under consideration.

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## CUBAN PROJECT

Private corporation has been formed in Washington under auspices of State Department to oversee proposed "Radio Marti" broadcasting to Cuba (Broadcasting, Sept. 28). New "Committee for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba" was announced at a hearing before House Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights chaired by Representative Glenn English (D-Okla.) Committee trustees include William Steadman, retired ambassador; Robert Zimmerman, former Foreign Service officer, and Midge Decter, writer.

[From the Chicago Tribune, Jan. 25, 1982]

## PROPAGANDA AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

The Reagan administration professes to believe in private enterprise—in the inherent genius of the profit motive and individual initiative as opposed to the deadening pressure of government bureaucracy. That is the Reagan approach to economic recovery; to foreign aid; to conservation.

But it is not, apparently, the Reagan approach to truth, the administration is hell-bent on spending a sizable amount of taxpayers' cash on a government-run radio station that is to beam "the truth" to the communist-benighted island of Cuba. The administration has named a commission of certified right-wingers to run the station, which is to cost around $10 million a year. It is to be similar to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which beam their broadcasts to the Soviet Union and the East European satellites.

(The Cuban station was to be called "Radio Marti" in honor of Cuban patriot Jose Marti until it was discovered that he was virulently anti-Yanqui and once wrote of a stay in New York: "I have been in the entrails of the monster." Now the station has no name.)

If Cubans were really being deprived of truth it would be hard to quibble over spending a mere $10 million to give it to them. But they are not. Privately-owned stations in Florida are inundating Cuba with Spanish-language programming that is, by all accounts, heard with enthusiasm all over the island. Such stations as Miami's big WQBA are easily picked up on the island, especially at night and along the northern beaches. Cubans tune in openly and without noticeable interference from the authorities—who also listen to them.

What they get on these private-enterprise stations is pretty much what they want to hear: baseball scores and game broadcasts, the latest Latin music, news of the world and of Cuba, and commercials.

Yes, commercials. The commercials on these commercial stations are probably the most effective propaganda that could possibly be broadcast into Cuba. Through them, the Cubans can find out how much Americans pay for an automobile, how much for clothing, how much for food. They can find out about things that are not available in Cuba at any price, but can easily be had—often at bargain rates—in America. By many accounts, the huge rush of refugees in the Mariel boatlift was not attributable to any yearning for free speech and habeas corpus; it was more like a run on Macy's on sale day.

The Cubans also get plenty of news about Cuba. What is happening inside Cuba is hometown news in Miami and it is broadcast in detail on the Spanish-language stations. Cuban groups in Miami probably know a great deal more about what goes on in their native land than any government-run station could discover, and they are at pains to see that the information is beamed back home.

The Miami stations also handle the news with a convincing impartiality that cannot be expected of a government station that is run by the commission named last week. The intensely right-wing slant of the commission is sure to appeal to Cuban anti-Communists. But most of them are probably already in Miami. The purpose of propaganda is to appeal to Castro supporters and those on the fence, and they are not likely to be influenced by a badly propagandistic outlet whose bias will be obvious to its listeners. Being suspicious of American motives anyway, its not likely that Cubans will switch away from the tried-and-true Miami commercial stations.

So the administration should scrap the Cuban propaganda scheme and leave the job to those in Miami who are already doing it well and doing it with private initiative, the way the President says things should be done. The way matters stand these days he can use the $10 million more profitably someplace else.

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## U.S.-CUBA "AIRWAVES WAR" MAY JAM WHO BROADCASTS

(By Tom O'Donnell)

University of Iowa sports fans—especially those in the southeastern part of the United States—someday may tune in WHO radio in Des Moines to hear sportscaster Jim Zabel describing the Hawkeyes and find themselves listening to Fidel Castro.

If so, they can blame a former WHO sportscaster—Ronald Reagan.

A pet project of the Reagan administration—a radio station to beam news and propaganda to Cuba—has triggered threats of a war of the airwaves between the two countries, with WHO a potential early casualty.

The State Department plans to build its radio station in Florida, and to broadcast on AM frequency 1040—the same one used by WHO. Castro has already said he would jam that frequency, and WHO officials are concerned that their nighttime sports broadcasts and call-in programs may be crowded off the air.

Cuban officials have said they will build a 500 kW station—10 times as powerful as WHO's signal—to jam the State Department broadcasts. That would wipe out WHO's nighttime transmissions to the southeastern part of the nation.

Robert Engelhardt, vice president and technical director for Palmer Communications Inc., the company that owns WHO, said southern followers of WHO's sports and call-in programs would be lost.

"There's an audience out there, it's loyal, and this has the potential to destroy it," Engelhardt said.

Although the stretch of the Cuban station's signal would depend on a number of factors, there would be "a substantial amount of interference, that's safe to say." Engelhardt said.

If conditions are right, the Cuban signal could reach even farther than the southeastern states, but Engelhardt said any guess now about how far it could go would be speculative.

Engelhardt said listeners are particularly loyal to WHO's sports broadcasts, following the University of Iowa basketball team in the winter and the Hawkeye football team in the fall. The football games, which are played in the afternoon, are rebroadcast late at night to take advantage of the station's wider nighttime range, he said.

"People who have moved out of the state—graduates and sports buffs—have learned that they can receive that service on WHO," Engelhardt said.

The administration first announced plans for the radio station last September. Richard Allen, then Reagan's national security adviser, said the station would get the truth to the Cuban people because the news broadcasts in that nation "have lied throughout the two decades of the revolution, they lie today and will continue to lie."

Vice President George Bush, speaking to a press association meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in October, said, "Castro is terrified at the prospect [of the station]. Actually, I have to confess, the idea gives me enormous pleasure."

The station, called Radio Marti, after Jose Marti, a 19th century fighter in Cuba's war for independence from Spain, would be patterned after Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Those stations brodacast news and propaganda to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

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[From the Sunday Miami-Herald, Mar. 7, 1982]

## MIAMI MAY PLAY HOST TO RADIO MARTI

(By Jay Ducassi)

The presidential commission appointed to organize Radio Marti is considering Miami and two other major American cities as possible sites for the station's headquarters, a commission official has disclosed.

New York and Washington, D.C., are the two other cities that the panel has considered as possible sites, commission assistant director Yale Newman said in an interview after last week's hearings on the project in the House of Representatives.

The discussion of possible sites occurred at the two meetings the commission has held since being appointed last January, Newman said.

The selection of a headquarters, as well as a transmitter site, will be made in the next two months, Newman said. The commission wants to select a transmitter site "as close to Cuba as possible," he said. He named the Florida Keys as one possible location.

At the House hearings a witness and a congresswoman suggested that Radio Marti use a Voice of America facility already in operation in Marathon.

"The commission hopes to have most of the nuts and bolts (of the project) pretty much under wraps around the end of April," Newman said.

The station could be on the air July 1 if Congress approves the project, Newman said. But there is no guarantee that Congress will act by then.

After all, Radio Marti—the Reagan Administration project to broadcast news and entertainment to Cuba—is already months behind schedule. It was initially supposed to have been operating in January.

But when January rolled around, a Congress burdened with more pressing budget questions had not even begun to consider the bills that would authorize the establishment of the station nor its $10 million start-up costs.

Although the House Foreign Affairs Committee heard testimony Wednesday and Thursday, it set no date for presenting the Radio Marti bill to the rest of the House. A congressional aide said it would be a couple of weeks before this happens.

The bill has yet to come up in the Senate, although Florida Senator Paula Hawkins, who supports Radio Marti, has sent a letter to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee requesting that a date be set to consider the bill.

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### STATIC ON RADIO MARTI

Radio waves travel at the speed of light, but the Government's effort to establish Radio Marti to broadcast "truth" to Cuba would hardly overtake a tortoise. Considering the direction that the infant project is headed, that's a relief. No use rushing a mistake.

As first envisioned, Radio Marti was to have been on the air by now, beaming news and information to Cuba from a transmitter perhaps located in the Florida Keys. Its controversial nature combined with legislative inertia, however, to stall Radio Marti's enabling legislation in Congress.

On January 19 President Reagan named 10 members—including three rabidly anti-Castro Miamians—to the Radio Marti governing body, the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. The ink was hardly dry on their appointment notices before some commission members began agitating to free Radio Marti of any State Department control.

That's Worry No. 1. The conservatives think the State Department is downright pinko, so they want Radio Marti under White House control. There, they figure, they'll find more support for their hardline broadcasting aims than they'll ever find at State.

Worry No. 2 arose on Wednesday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which opened hearings on establishing Radio Marti. Thomas Enders, assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs, hinted that the United States would give tit for tat if Cuba tried to jam Radio Marti's signal to make it unintelligible in Cuba.

Congress can and should head off Worry No. 1 by making clear that Radio Marti is to broadcast straightforward, objective news, not propaganda. Radio Marti should pattern its news broadcasts after those of the Voice of America, which have solid international credence precisely because they are untainted by propaganda.

If the hard-line conservatives on the Radio Marti commission cannot live with this simple credo, let them resign. If Radio Marti starts off as a propaganda service, its value will be lost at the outset. If it beams facts to the Cuban people that their government denies them, however, it can be of immense value. The simple truth always is.

The possibility of the United States and Cuba engaging in an escalating battle of radio-station jamming is just as worrisome. Jamming not only plays hob with the international pacts governing the assignment and use of radio frequencies. It also could disrupt AM radio stations' night-time signals well into the U.S. heartland.

Congress ought to weigh very carefully both the propaganda and the jamming prospects involved with Radio Marti. Legislation cannot deter Cuban jamming, of course, but it can deter those who would subvert Radio Marti's potential by coloring its news with propaganda. It can, and it must.

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[From Broadcasting, Mar. 15, 1982]

### WILL RADIO MARTI WORSEN THE CUBAN INTERFERENCE PROBLEM?

**(That's a question raised in hearings on new government service; Florida broadcasters, others want negotiations to avoid harm to their signals, also lessening of U.S. rules to allow fighting back.)**

The fate of American AM broadcasting and U.S. foreign policy as it affects Cuba were closely linked as the House Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on the Reagan administration's proposal to create Radio Marti. The 50 kW station on 1040 kHz would be the U.S.'s chosen instrument for breaking what the administration says is the Castro government's monopoly on information reaching the Cuban people. But some industry representatives who testified expressed concern that establishment of the station would simply aggravate the problem—already serious—of Cuban-caused interference to U.S. stations. They called for negotiations with Cuba. But others talked of a kind of electronic warfare.

With some reservations—including those of Chairman Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.), who wondered whether the government couldn't do the same programing by way of the Voice of America's AM outlet on Marathon Key, Florida, or by private stations—the committee seems sure to approve the administration bill (H.R. 5427) authorizing the station and providing $10 million in State Department funds for first-year costs. Indeed, Representative Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the subcommittee on International Operations, said in effect that approval was a foregone conclusion. "The policy decision [by the administration] has already been made," he said. "Asking Congress to put a brake on this is unrealistic."

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders said the purpose of Radio Marti—named after a 19th century Cuban patriot—is "to give Cubans the means they now lack to know what kind of society has been imposed on them, to have a source of news and entertainment that is not manipulated by the state, to find out what is really happening in their country, why so many have to go off to foreign military duty not always to return, and what the state does with the wealth of the Cuban people."

But what would be the cost to American broadcasting? The administration is well aware of Cuban-caused interference. The National Association of Broadcasters two weeks ago released a study documenting the problem (BROADCASTING, March 8). It shows that, if Cuba implemented plans for the 187 stations—existing and proposed—in its inventory, the results for American broadcasting could be devastating. And Enders, in response to a question, said "there is no question" that the Cubans will use Radio Marti as an excuse for raising the level of interference.

But Enders made it clear he does not think Radio Marti would be the real cause. He noted that Cuban stations have been the source of interference to U.S. outlets since the 1960's and that, in 1979, "when the U.S. was trying hard to improve relations with Cuba," Havana announced plans for building a number of new transmitters, including two 500 kW stations. State Department officials say there is no indication, based on past dealings the interference problem would cease if Radio Marti did not go on the air.

The only remedial action Enders discussed in his statement involved defensive measures—"fast-track" regulatory procedures to enable affected stations to increase power or change frequencies when targeted (a tactic already being applied by the FCC, with the commission responding within 24 to 48 hours) or possible congressional action to compensate stations affected by "additional, aggressive interference should all else fail."

But in response to questions from Representative Andy Ireland (D-Fla.), who left no doubt he felt the U.S. should strike back at Cuban radio service, Enders said the U.S. might find it necessary to "retaliate" in response to Cuban radio "aggression." "We have the capability to interfere with Cuban radio on a broad scale," he said. "The Cuban government should know that if they attempt to cause interference or to target individual stations, two can plan at that game."

Among the broadcasting industry representatives who testified, the toughest talk came from those closest to the firing line. Harold Frank, vice president and general manager of WINZ(AM) Miami and vice president of radio for the Florida Association of Broadcasters, and Herbert Levin, general manager of WQBA-AM-FM Miami and president of the South Florida Association of Broadcasters, both said representatives of affected agencies of government, including the FCC, State Department and Congress, should participate in a coordinate effort to find solutions to the interference problem. (A task force of FCC and State Department officials is already searching for solutions.) But Frank said FAB believes Castro needs "incentives" to come to the bargaining table and that, as a result, it has adopted a resolution calling on the government to build facilities to interfere with "and/or" jam Cuban radio signals. Levin noted that the south Florida radio broadcasters adopted a resolution supporting the concept of Radio Marti.

Representatives of national organizations, however, took a less heated view. The National Association of Broadcasters, the Clear Channel Broadcasting Service and the Association of Broadcast Engineering Standards called for negotiations with Cuba as a means of resolving the interference problem. And while Vincent Wasilewski, president of NAB, avoided mention of Radio Marti—he said the association had not taken a position on it—David E. Hilliard, speaking for CCBS, and Walter Johnson, the executive director ABES, expressed concern that Radio Marti would aggravate the problem.

Wasilewski said, "The solution lies with the federal government. Broadcasters implore Capitol Hill and the administration to work together with the Cuban government on this serious issue. While we fully recognize the political sensitivity of the Cuban interference problem, we urge you to carefully consider all negotiable options and their consequences which may affect each and every American."

Wasilewski said Cuba, which walked out of the western hemisphere conference on AM broadcasting in Rio de Janeiro last December and did not sign the Final Acts, "operates its facilities as an outlaw nation, ignoring international restrictions." And he said the implications for American radio stations throughout the country, not only in the Southeast, are "alarming." He cited the results of the NAB study on Cuban interference which shows that, if Cuba proceeds with its inventory of stations, over 200 AM stations in 32 states and the District of Columbia would suffer interference and reduced listening areas.

Hilliard, who is a partner in the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis and counsel for the CCBS, and Johnson, who served on the U.S. delegation to the Rio conference, did not stop with urging the committee to consider negotiations as a way out of the interference problem. They said the presumed value of Radio Marti should be weighed against the possible loss in domestic service that could result. Radio Marti, Hilliard said, "has the potential for making a bad situation worse."

Such arguments did not seem to make much of an impression on the committee. Fascell described Radio Marti as an "irrelevancy" in connection with the interference problem. And Ireland, in response to a plan from Johnson to be sensitive to the danger to the U.S. system of broadcasting, called him "a Neville Chamberlain."

However, some support for the possibility that Cuba herself might initiate bilateral talks came from Kalmann Schaefer, assistant to the FCC chairman on international communications and head of the delegation to Rio. He noted that the success of the International Telecommunication Union is based on the self-interest of the members. Such self-interest, he said, raises the possibility that "Cuba may yet initiate another attempt to develop a scheme of AM broadcast allocations under which both Cuba and the United States would—in the main, at least—shelter their AM services from mutual interference."

Short of such talks—or their failure if held—Hilliard had another suggestion. He said the U.S. should go beyond its present policy of permitting stations to increase power to recoup service lost to Cuban interference. He said it should permit such increases above the 50 kW limit now imposed on American broadcasting. He noted that the present policy discriminates against Class I clear channel stations which now operate with 50 kW and in some cases are suffering from Cuban interference.

Harriet A. (Sis) Kaplan, president of the National Radio Broadcasters Association, went a step further—to the delight of Fascell. She said it is "unfair that the Florida broadcasters should have to bear the brunt of the interference which has resulted from a political problem affecting the entire nation." She recommended that Congress suggest to the commission that it relax rules governing interference, "much of which interference is highly theoretical." She said the relaxation could be in the form of allowing affected stations to increase power—even above 50 kW—to overcome interference. She would grant such cases unless the interference to U.S. stations was "substantial." Such a plan, she said, would "result in a sharing of the burden of the Cuban problem" now experienced in Florida with stations outside of the state.

Fascell throughout the hearing had called for such an approach. And he chided the broadcasting industry for ignoring the problem while only Florida stations were affected. But he said the time has come for the industry "to stick together in this thing and do whatever is required to force a long-term agreement and help the industry people who are in difficulty."

But Wasilewski, in his testimony, cast doubt on the wisdom of an effort at sharing the burden, or even of attemping to counter Cuban interference by authorizing higher power for affected stations. Cuban interference patterns, he noted, change daily. "It takes nothing more than the turn of a screw in Cuba to give U.S. broadcasters a whole new set of problems."

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[From Broadcasting, Mar. 16, 1982]

## RADIO MARTI OPTIONS

(Presidential commission is examining ways to fight any Cuban jamming of new AM service.)

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba is concerned not only with problems of establishing Radio Marti, which is to be the administration's voice for telling Cuba news of that country (see page 134). The commission is also considering options available for dealing with Cuban jamming of the station.

According to minutes of a closed meeting on March 2, released last week, the commission discussed four options: 1. purchasing time on private stations in Florida, Louisiana and perhaps Texas to transmit evening programing from a variety of geographical sites and frequencies; 2. using high-powered stations in the Caribbean to broadcast several hours a day; 3. using shortwave transmissions, employing Voice of America transmitters at different sites in the U.S., and 4, using VOA's AM transmitter on Marathon Key, which signs off at 10 p.m.

There were several other developments last week related to what has become the U.S.'s broadcasting war with Cuba. Representative Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Subcommittee on International Operations, held a hearing on the outcome of the western hemisphere conference on AM broadcasting, in Rio de Janeiro, last fall, and took the occasion to restate his view that Florida broadcasters should not be expected to bear the brunt of Cuban-caused interference, particularly if it increases after Radio Marti goes on the air. He feels they should be compensated by the government for costs involved in recouping service area lost to the interference. But in spite of his concern about the Florida broadcasters, Fascell complimented delegation members who testified on their work in Rio and the commission for its effort to help the Florida broadcasters. Delegation members showered praise on their chairman, Kalmann Schaefer, assistant to the FCC on international communications matters, for his leadership at the conference.

Meanwhile, it was evident that the U.S. has not resolved technical problems involved with Radio Marti. Wilson LaFollette, chief of the FCC's technical and international branch and a vice chairman of the delegation, said Radio Marti would cause interference to stations in Cuba and several other countries. That indicated the U.S. still plans to operate the station on 1040 kHz. But observers noted that would be foolhardy in the face of Cuban plans to establish a 500 kW station on the frequency. They also noted that the U.S. officials have said repeatedly that Radio Marti would be engineered to avoid interference to anyone; the aim, he noted, is to put a listenable signal over Cuba.

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[From the Daily Gate City, Mar. 21, 1982]

## AVOID CASTRO'S JAMMING OF WHO BEST

(By Jim Leach)

Last week the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved legislation to establish Radio Marti—a no-nonsense news program to be beamed in Spanish to Cuba.

Similar in format to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which for years have broadcast Western news to nations behind the Iron Curtain, Radio Marti is intended to provide the Cuban people a democratic perspective to Castro's Marxist policies.

Castro is so apprehensive about the prospect of his people receiving unbiased information that he has threatened to jam Radio Marti broadcasts with a 500 kilowatt transmitter. A jamming undertaking of this magnitude—unprecedented in this hemisphere—carries potentially extraordinary implications for Iowans.

If current plans are implemented, Radio Marti will broadcast on 1040 kHz—precisely the same frequency as WHO of Des Moines. The 1040 kHz frequency was chosen because the signals emitted by Radio Marti from Florida to Cuba would cause relatively little interference for WHO and other private broadcasters in the United States. However, the government survey that led to this frequency selection did not take into account the effects of potential Cuban jamming to prevent Radio Marti from reaching its intended audience.

We now know that Castro has both the capacity and the stated desire to jam Radio Marti with a 500 kW transmitter. If this occurs, Cuban jamming would restrict WHO's range to a 30-mile radius of Des Moines and jeopardize the functional viability of America's best known agricultural and talk show station. Instead of sending a clear signal from Minnesota to Louisiana and from Wyoming to Pennsylvania, WHO would barely reach Ames. Towns as close as Grinnell and Iowa City and Ottumwa would be deprived of a familiar and valuable source of news and entertainment.

"The Voice of the Middle West", WHO has been broadcasting into the homes of millions of Americans for almost 58 years. Operating as one of an exclusive grouping of "Clear Channel" 50,000-watt stations, WHO has developed a national reputation for the quality of its news and farm reports, weather information, Iowa athletics and public service for countless loyal and interested radio listeners. Its call-in programs provide a medium by which diverse Americans can interact and exchange view-points despite the many miles which separate them. Over the years it has received numerous journalistic awards and counts among its alumni Ronald "Dutch" Reagan as well as former Iowa Congressman H. R. Gross.

Given the probability that Castro will seek to jam Radio Marti. I have written the president suggesting alternative frequency approaches and amended the authorizing legislation to allow the administration to use a frequency currently reserved for Voice of America.

The potential for presidential embarrassment is extraordinary if current administration plans are not modified. President Reagan has always identified with and expressed great fondness for WHO. If WHO's frequency is used for Radio Marti, Castro will be given enormous incentive to jam its initial broadcasts and thus thwart an administration initiative to which the president has lent his personal prestige the minute it is undertaken.

Jamming is not a difficult art. It is just expensive. The fact that Castro is so insecure as to feel compelled to block "truth" from invading Cuba's shores is a reflection of a leader in trouble. The concern I have is that a commendable idea—the establishment of Radio Marti—does not cause the president such embarrassment as to increase the prospect of militant retaliations on our part against Cuba.

For months Secretary Haig has obliquely warned of the possibility that the Administration may "go to the source" and commence significant moves against Cuba. There are a few in inner circles in Washington that appear bent on confrontation with Cuba. One strategically placed Pentagon appointee went so far as to tell WHO representatives that jamming Radio Marti might be considered an "act of war."

Somewhere a more responsible perspective must be found. The jamming of Radio Marti is not equivalent to the sinking of the Maine. Should Radio Marti not have the effect our government might hope, care must be taken not to overreact. Interventionism has not served us well in the immediate past. It's not likely to in the immediate future. The Bay of Pigs mentality reflected in the leaked news that our CIA is considering staging guerrilla attacks on Nicaragua must not be compounded by unrealistic threats against Cuba. Now is the time to de-escalate rhetoric and seek responsible arms control discussions on a world-wide basis. Another confrontation with Russia over Cuba has all the "deja vu" earmarkings of man's pride jeopardizing man's fate.

Castro, intelligence sources tell us, has never been lower in Cuban public esteem. Cuba's economy is in disarray and Cuban mothers, not unlike their American counterparts, have grave reservations about sending their sons to fight civil wars on foreign soil. Dictatorships have a habit of collapsing from the weight of incompetence and ideological rigidity. Great power intervention in the affairs of small states all too frequently makes martyrs out of villains. Generally it ensconces rather than curtails the authority of petty potentates. The greatest threat to Castro is to ignore him. Restraint is the order of day.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 1, 1982]

## CUBA MAY JAM REAGAN'S OLD STATION

(By Caroline E. Mayer)

President Reagan's plan to launch a new Spanish-speaking radio station in Florida to broadcast "the truth" about Castro to all Cubans may hurt the very radio station on which Reagan launched his public career.

According to officials of WHO radio in Iowa, the administration's plans to set up Radio Marti—named after Jose Marti, the father of Cuban independence—could trigger reprisals by Cuba that might wipe out almost all nighttime service of the Des Moines, Iowa, AM radio station on which "Dutch Reagan" was a popular sportscaster during the 1930s.

If the United States goes ahead and sets up Radio Marti on channel 1040, the same radio frequency on which WHO operates, many U.S. officials predict Castro will retaliate by setting up a far more powerful station on the same channel to wipe out Radio Marti's signal.

"We are deeply concerned that Cuba's announced plans to jam Radio Marti with up to 500 kW of power, 10 times the U.S. government's limit for American stations, will destroy WHO's nighttime service, including its vital farm market reports," says Robert Engelhardt, vice president of Palmer Communications, Inc., the company that owns WHO.

Radio signals travel much farther during dark than they do during daylight hours. As a result, a powerful Cuban jamming of Radio Marti could affect WHO's broadcasting signal even though the transmitters for the two stations would be thousands of miles away.

Thus, says Engelhardt, if Cuba were to try to block out Radio Marti "such jamming will shrink WHO's coverage from a radius of 800 miles to a radius of 45 miles, from 1,700,000 square miles to 5,900 square miles—a 99.65 percent decrease."

Radio engineers say that WHO would be the only station affected by the jamming.

As a result, Engelhardt and other company officials have been busy trying to persuade the administration and Congress to use another channel for Radio Marti. Just two days ago, they met with the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba to try to persuade them to select another AM channel or another method of broadcasting—such as FM or short-wave radio—to send "the truth" to Cuba. The commission was appointed by President Reagan to recommend a plan for establishing Radio Marti.

Additionally, notes one of WHO's Washington lawyers, Kenneth D. Salmon, "we've tried to see that the fact that WHO will be affected by Radio Marti was brought to the president's attention. So far, we have no way of knowing if it has."

Reagan announced his intention to set up Radio Marti last September at the height of rhetorical hostility between the two countries. Accusing Castro of lying to its people for 20 years, Reagan said Radio Marti would broadcast "accurate information about Cuba" to the Cuban people.

With a $10 million authorization from Congress—which has yet to be approved—Radio Marti would operate much like Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which have broadcast information to Russia and its Eastern European satellites for more than 30 years.

Initially, several U.S. diplomats to Havana opposed the idea of Radio Marti, saying it not only would generate more Cuban immigration to the U.S. but also could lead to a series of unwanted reprisals. However, commission members say that initial opposition has died down and the support for Radio Marti is "gung-ho" from administration officials.

"It is a lot easier for the U.S. to take out our feelings against Cuba with a so-called war of words rather than a war of bullets," says George Jacobs, an engineer on the presidential commission, in explaining why the program is drawing such strong support from the State Department and Department of Defense.

Commission officials say channel 1040 is the best frequency with which to carry out this verbal battle. It is the one radio frequency that won't interfere significantly with other stations in the area, commission officials say. Additionally, they claim that short-wave radio broadcasts would not be effective because short-wave receivers are scarce in Cuba. FM-radio would not broadcast a signal in as wide an area as AM, commission officials add.

Officials are not convinced that Cuba will send out powerful signals to block Radio Marti. For one thing, they note, despite all expectations, Castro has not jammed Radio Marathon, the Voice of America station that goes to Central American countries.

Additionally, they contend, Castro could block Radio Marti's signals from reaching Cuba using a low-powered transmitter that would cost far less than a 500 kW unit. The lower-powered signal would not interfere with WHO's broadcasting.

And even if Cuba did employ a 500 kW transmitter, a Defense Department official said that the U.S. might then try other frequencies for Radio Marti. "It's a little bit like a game of chicken," says the official.

Even so, WHO officials are disturbed by the "game of chicken" metaphor and now express concern that their station will end up being just a pawn in a war of words.

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[From Quad-City Times, Apr. 1, 1982]

## CUBA RADIO FRAY HAS LEACH TUNED IN

(By Terry Hughes)

WASHINGTON.—Calling for moderation is nothing new to Iowa Rep. James Leach, and this time he's in the middle of a tussle involving Fidel Castro, the U.S. State Department and Des Moines radio station WHO.

The State Department has proposed—and the House Foreign Affairs Committee has approved—creating Radio Marti, a Radio Free Europe-type effort aimed at Cuba.

The frequency for the station—1040 kHz—is the same as that assigned to WHO. Normally that would not create a problem because the broadcast is aimed at Cuba, but Castro has said he will jam the frequency with a 500-kW transmitter sending signals back to the United States.

And if that happens, WHO will reach only a 30-mile radius, instead of its present range from Minnesota to Louisiana and from Wyoming to Pennsylvania.

The simple answer, Leach says, would be to pick another frequency. But that apparently is not about to happen.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig has warned that the United States might move against Cuba if Radio Marti is jammed.

"There are a few in inner circles in Washington that appear bent on confrontation with Cuba," Leach said. "One strategically placed Pentagon appointee went so far as to tell WHO representatives that jamming Radio Marti might be considered an 'act of war.' "

"The principle of Radio Marti is important," Leach said Wednesday. "Frankly, I share some of that perspective.

"I just am convinced that they chose WHO's frequency without giving any consideration to the effects of jamming."

Leach has written to President Reagan—who in his early years was a sportscaster for WHO—asking that alternate frequencies be considered.

But he says he sees only modest hope the administration will change its mind. So he is trying to get Congressional support for changing the signal to either another United States frequency one in Mexico, or using several different frequencies.

The brewing confrontation is taking on tones of past clashes with the Soviet Union over Cuba, Leach said, another case of "man's pride jeopardizing man's fate.

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[From Broadcasting, Apr. 5, 1982]

## MORE WORRIES OVER MARTI

(Presidential commission hears interference concerns from WHO, KSL; alternative to 1040 kHz station is urged.)

The private concerns of American broadcasters are bumping up against national policy concerns. So far, the national policy concerns are not budging.

The point of discussion is Radio Marti the 50 kW station the Reagan administration plans to operate from Saddlebunch, Fla. in the Florida Keys. The frequency that has been selected is 1040 kHz, and that prompted attendance at a Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba meeting, at the State Department last week, by an officer of WHO(AM) Des Moines, Iowa, which operates on that frequency.

Robert G. Engelhardt, vice president of Palmer Communications Inc., urged the commission to consider an approach other than a station on 1040 kHz, perhaps a combination of AM, FM, TV and shortwave outlets. He is afraid the jamming or interference he says Cuba has threatened to disrupt Radio Marti would seriously affect WHO.

But it wasn't only prospective concerns the commission heard. A representative of KSL (AM) Salt Lake City, Glen L. Wilkinson its Washington counsel, said the station, which operates on 1160 kHz, is already suffering badly from Cuban interference. Indeed, Bonneville International Inc., the licensee, contends the interference is from a 500 kW station.

The complaint contains the first suggestion that Cuba has begun to make good on its stated intention to operate two 500 kW stations—one on 1040 kHz and one on 1160 kHz. However, there was no confirmation from any other source regarding the Bonneville claim.

Neither Engelhardt nor Wilkinson—both spoke at a public meeting—appeared to have jarred the commission from its present thinking.

Engelhardt said Cuba's plans to install a 500 kW station on 1040—in what he said would be retaliation for plans for Radio Marti—would "destroy WHO's nighttime service," including the farm market reports he says are a vital part of the station's service in the Midwest. The "jamming," he said, "will shrink WHO's coverage from a radius of 800 miles to a radius of 45 miles, from 1,700,000 square miles to 5,900 square miles—a 99.65% decrease."

Apart from the danger to WHO, Engelhardt said using a single AM station to broadcast to Cuba is not a rational method. It could be easily jammed. As currently planned, he said, the project will fail and the government's $10 million investment—the first year costs—"will be totally wasted."

He offered other options. He noted that the House Government Operations Committee had suggested broadcasting on multiple frequencies as a means of overcoming jamming. Thus, he said, "the better way to get a message to Cuba is by simultaneously utilizing a combination of AM, FM, TV and shortwave signals."

He said in that combination the AM station could be the Voice of America's 50 kW Radio Marathon, in the Florida Keys, which is now heard in Cuba. Indeed, if the government decides to use only one AM station, he said, it should be Radio Marathon. He said the station—which he called "underutilized"—could be "taken over" or the government could lease time on it.

"If there is a risk that a station's service will be destroyed by Cuban jamming," Engelhardt said, "it should be the governments station, Radio Marathon, that should initially be placed in jeopardy on the front lines, rather than private broadcasters' stations. It is grossly unfair to place the burden on WHO when the government has a facility that is ready and available for Radio Marti."

However, Radio Marathon is not alone on the 1180 kHz frequency on which it operates. It shares it with WHAM(AM) Rochester, N.Y., whose licensee, Rust Communications Group, has been trying to get Radio Marathon moved for the past 20 years. Engelhardt said WHAM would not suffer as much damage as WHO if Cuba attempted to interfere with a station on 1180 kHz, since WHAM offers "an urban service" rather than one for an audience spread over considerable distances.

Commission members did not express much sympathy. William B. Bayer, political editor and news commentator for WINZ(AM) Miami, told Engelhardt his presentation amounted to "guesswork, presumption." He said, "You're jumping to conclusions, before you know you're going to be hurt. My station in south Florida was one of the first to be interfered with. I don't think you can count on anything."

The commission chairman, F. Clifton White, said later that the commission has not fixed on 1040 kHz—although a proposal for a station on the frequency at Saddlebunch, Fla., is in the U.S. inventory of stations that was submitted to the western hemisphere conference on AM broadcasting. "A number of other options," including those suggested by Engelhardt, are under consideration, he said.

Wilkinson, in his presentation, said the interference KSL was suffering was being caused by a Cuban station of "unknown power." He said the interference had reduced a 750-mile radius to about "50 or 60 miles."

But later, he said a study by Bonneville's vice president for engineering, William Lovelace, indicated the Cuban station was operating with 500 kW. Lovelace, in an interview, said the measurements he made indicated that was the power involved.

However, Lovelace acknowledged that no one agrees with his findings. "But that's what we're measuring," he said. Among those who disagree is Cohen. He acknowledged that KSL is suffering interference—but from a station whose power he calculates at between 120 kW and 150 kW. FCC engineers said their studies did not indicate a Cuban station with more than 100 kw on 1160 kHz.

Regardless of the precise power of the interfering station, it was hurting, Wilkinson said. "We're not complaining," Wilkinson added. "We know this is a problem with wide ramifications." But he hoped negotiations could be restored with Cuba leading to a solution. "Is there any way the government can get back into communications with Cuba?" he asked. He noted the station is receiving letters from listeners complaining about the interference.

The reaction he received was not particularly warm, either. Richard B. Stone, the former senator from Florida now practicing law in Washington, said the problem of Cuban interference is an old one; he said stations have complained about it for 19 years. Jorge L. Mas, a Miami building contractor, said of the Cuban prime minister, "It's impossible to sit down and reach an agreement with Castro." And White said the issues raised by Wilkinson "don't come within the jurisdiction of the commission." However, he said, "We're aware of the problems. It's a corollary benefit of the commission being created. We have raised the level of concern."

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### EVERYBODY ON 1040

Administration officials dispute charge they have put WHO(AM) Des Moines, Iowa, in jeopardy with their plans to use its frequency—1040 kHz—for Radio Marti (see page 147). Cubans late in November—several weeks after those plans were reported (BROADCASTING, Nov. 2, 1981)—announced intention to shift 500 kW station to 1040 kHz. And WHO officials say interference from that monster station would wipe out WHO's nighttime service.

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### MORE TRANSMITTERS FOR CARIBBEAN

Radio Marti is not only new radio voice administration wants to add in Caribbean. Charles Z. Wick, director of International Communication Agency, has told Congress that ICA's Voice of America wants to add three 50 kW AM transmitters in region now attracting much U.S. attention. Transmitters—two on Grand Cayman and one on Grand Turk, according to plans—would rebroadcast Spanish- and English-language programs originating in Washington. Total cost of adding three more Caribbean transmitters would be $11.2 million.

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[From Broadcasting, May 17, 1982]

### MARTI ROADBLOCKS: FREQUENCY PROBLEMS AND START-UP COSTS

(House Telcomsubcom takes first look at proposed government radio station to broadcast to Cuba.)

A proposal to create a U.S.-owned AM station that would broadcast news and entertainment to Cuba may have encountered its first major stumbling block last Monday (May 10) as the House Telecommunications Subcommittee began reviewing how the station, to be named Radio Marti, might affect the growing problem of Cuban interference to U.S. stations. Subcommittee members, who heard from government as well as industry spokesmen, appeared most concerned about the administration's apparent failure to consider alternatives to the frequency it chose for the service and about its proposed cost.

"We are not questioning the potential benefit of being able to counter the misinformation and propaganda which flows in and out of Cuba," said Representative Al Swift (D-Wash.) who chaired the hearing. "Our primary concern is the impact Radio Marti could have on American broadcasting practices and institutions."

Representative Thomas Tauke (R-Iowa), called the proposal for Radio Marti "strange" in that its planned 14 hours of daily programing would include drama, play-by-play baseball, and the top 50 hits of American pop music charts as well as news. Florida broadcasters already provide that kind of entertainment, said Tauke, and the Voice of America's station at Marathon, Fla., reaches most of Cuba every day with news and information.

Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders said the U.S. wants "programing rich and interesting enough to attract listeners to Radio Marti." It also wants to broadcast information about Cuba itself and its problems, he said, and this would violate the VOA's charter to provide general news that doesn't concentrate on a single country. "We want to keep VOA a news service," he said. As for Florida AM stations, "they cannot be heard in all of Cuba," said Enders, and they "cannot be expected to speak for the U.S."

Tauke noted that the U.S. attempted to carry out the same purpose it now has for Radio Marti on VOA's Marathon station from 1962 to 1974, but had stopped that service for lack of available news and information about Cuban affairs. Enders said the previous service was stopped because it was "inconsistent with VOA's mandate," and that he "could not substantiate" reports that not enough news was available. "There are plenty of sources of plenty of information and lots we'd like to say," he said.

Radio Marti is not likely to aggravate the problem of Cuban interference to U.S. AM stations, Enders contended. The interference, which has been "steadily increasing" since the mid 1960's, "is the result of a Cuban program to alter its broadcasting system so it will reach the U.S. and other neighboring countries," he said. "Cuba's lawlessness pre-dates Radio Marti and will continue to exist in the future, with or without this new station.

In apparent disagreement with Enders, however, was John Summers, executive vice president, general manager, National Association of Broadcasters, who said Radio Marti is "but another variable in the difficult situation that AM broadcasters face as a result of our relationship with the Cuban government." There are technical alternatives to broadcasting on 1040 kHz, the frequency recommended by the FCC for Radio Marti, said Summers, including using empty frequencies at either end of the AM band, which can be received by AM radios in Cuba, or leasing time from U.S. commercial broadcasters.

Neither of these alternatives, according to Summers, carries the likelihood of interference to American commercial broadcasters, as would the present proposal which would leave WHO(AM) Des Moines, Iowa, open to serious interference if Cuba chooses to retaliate against Radio Marti by jamming or counterbroadcasting. The "slop-over" areas at either end of the AM band are now used only by the U.S. Park Service to broadcast information to park users, said Summers, and the leasing of time on multiple frequencies would frustrate Cuban attempts at jamming or counterbroadcasting. Congress "must be aware of the possible relationship between Radio Marti and Cuban interference," said Summers, and it must realize that the solution to the ongoing problem of Cuban interference "must be arrived at diplomatically," not technically.

Robert G. Engelhardt, vice president of Palmer Communications Inc., the licensee of WHO, agreed with Summers, and argued further that a proposal in the Radio Marti legislation to compensate broadcasters who have to increase power to compete with Cuban interference is "at best a stop-gap measure which would obligate the government to spend tens of millions of dollars to offset a constantly changing Cuban interference pattern."

Engelhardt proposed that the U.S. lease time on a variety of frequencies, shortwave, AM, FM and TV and including the VOA's Marathon station, to send its message to Cuba. Multiple signals he said, will frustrate Cuban attempts to jam.

Harriet (Sis) Kaplan, president, National Radio Broadcasters Association, proposed that the VOA's Marathon station be given a new split license, to be shared by VOA and Radio Marti. Shared licenses are not unusual in American broadcasting, said Kaplan, and use of the VOA channel would cost the public far less than would building a new facility, which the administration argues will cost $10 million during its first year and $7 million its second.

The only private group that appeared to support wholeheartedly the administration's plans for Radio Marti was the Florida Association of Broadcasters, whose special counsel, Matthew Leibowitz, said: "Radio Marti will not cause interference. We already have it." Leibowitz endorsed the proposal to compensate American broadcasters for expenses incurred in competing with Cuban interference and refuted arguments heard in other subcommittees that such compensation will amount to millions of dollars in taxpayer revenues. Few U.S. stations can increase power without interfering with the signals of other American or Canadian or Mexican stations, said Leibowitz, so few would be eligible.

Leibowitz also urged Congress on behalf of the FAB to construct and operate jamming facilities that would "cause interference to Cuban radio operations and/or 'jam' Cuban radio operations, until such time that the illegal interference from Cuba ceases." He also supported a proposal in H.R. 5427 to create a presidential task force to study solutions for resolving the problem of Cuban interference.

Enders denied that the State Department chose 1040 kHz because Cuba had previously announced plans to build a 500 kW station that would operate on that frequency. The FCC recommended putting Radio Marti on 1040 kHz because "all other frequencies turned up serious interference problems either domestically or in Cuba," said Enders. The State Department asked for an AM frequency, he said, because an FM station would not reach all of Cuba. Although Russell Eagan, a spokesman for the Clear Channel Broadcasters Association, said it was his understanding that many Cubans own shortwave radios. Enders said the State Department rejected the idea of broadcasting by short wave, because "few Cubans have short-wave receivers."

Bernard Wunder, chief of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the agency that authorizes all frequencies assigned to the U.S. government, said he authorized the use of 1040 kHz for Radio Marti without considering the "need or justification" for such a station. "That decision had already been made and it had been ratified by the appropriate foreign policy authorities within the administration," he said. "NTIA, in this case, thus did not undertake the kind of detailed 'public interest' evaluation of the request that would be true, for example, in the case of the FCC."

In this instance, however, the FCC apparently did not conduct such a "public interest evaluation." Kalmann Schaefer, who is FCC Chairman, Mark S. Fowler's assistant for international communications, said the FCC moved "in accordance with established practices of frequency coordination between the executive branch and our agency," and, "utilizing the minimal information that we were provided," performed a frequency search with the "objective of minimizing potential interference to U.S. broadcasters as well as providing the best usable signal over Cuba." The decision to put 1040 into use and "all other decisions relating to the Radio Marti project," lie with the executive branch, he said.

The FCC could not have come up with the underutilized frequencies at either end of the AM band, said Schaefer, because those frequencies are not included in its computerized system.

To Swift's criticism that $17 million far exceeds the amount the State Department will need to build and begin operating Radio Marti, Enders replied that the station would require expensive equipment to reach all of Cuba and at the same time avoid interfering with WHO's signal. The station's staff will be paid at "government rather than commercial rates," he said, and its programing "must be absolutely trustworthy." That programing will come primarily from the station's headquarters in Washington, he said, but will also come from a five-person bureau in New York, which is the "center of all communications," and from an office in Miami.

Summers and Michael Rau, an NAB engineer, testified that the administration's request for $2.9 million in initial start-up costs is overblown.

Clifton White, chairman of the presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, said, however, it is "unfair to equate Radio Marti with a regular radio station." The government station, he said, "will need an unusually competent staff that will send out accurate information."

The presidential commission is "studying all of the alternatives" being suggested by private groups to the use of 1040 kHz, said White, but it will decide to use one of them only if Radio Marti is unable to reach the Cuban people because of jamming or counterbroadcasting by Cuba.

The Telecommunications Subcommittee has 60 days in which to act on the Radio Marti bill, after which it will revert automatically to the Foreign Affairs Committee for action on the floor. A subcommittee spokesman said after last week's hearing that the panel will most likely either substantially amend the bill or recommend to Congress that it be rejected altogether.

Comparable legislation is pending in the Senate, but neither the Foreign Relations nor the Commerce Committee has taken any action on it.

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[From Broadcasting, May 24, 1982]

## HOUSE TELCOMSUBCOM PULLS PLUG ON RADIO MARTI PLAN

(Amendment would keep government off any radio frequencies used by private broadcasters; action is in response to fear that Cuba service would cause interference to commercial broadcasters; shortwave is suggested as alternative.)

The House Telecommunications Subcommittee voted last Thursday (May 20) to prohibit the Reagan administration from building a powerful AM station to broadcast information about the Cuban government to the people of that country. Saying the administration's plan to broadcast the service on 1040 kHz was likely to result in a massive increase in the already growing problem of Cuban interference to U.S. commercial broadcasters, the committee amended a bill authorizing the service (H.R. 5427) to forbid the government from using "any frequency allocated to" or "within 10 kHz of any frequency allocated to nongovernment radio broadcasting."

The House Foreign Affairs Committee had previously passed H.R. 5427, which would allocate up to $17 million for the first two years' operation of the proposed service, to be called Radio Marti. The Telecommunications Subcommittee and its parent Energy and Commerce Committee have the power to amend the bill as it affects the spectrum ordinarily used by commercial and noncommercial broadcasters.

Representatives Thomas J. Tauke (R-Iowa) and Al Swift (D-Wash.) sponsored the amendment to prohibit use of any part of the AM band. According to Swift, the amendment would force the administration to use shortwave frequencies, which are "more appropriate for international broadcasting," and would permit use of multiple signals, which would be harder for the Cuban government to jam.

Representative James Collins (R-Tex.), the panel's ranking Republican, endorsed the Tauke-Swift amendment, saying he'd initially favored the Radio Marti plan, but now believes it would be "harmful to U.S. broadcasters" and is "likely to obtain nothing in the way of positive results."

Tauke noted that the amendment is different from one he originally circulated that would have permitted the government to put Radio Marti at either end of the AM band, on frequencies not now used by commercial broadcasters. The National Association of Broadcasters, during hearings on the bill (BROADCASTING, May 17), had proposed that those frequencies be used, but subcommittee members subsequently decided, according to a spokesman, to prohibit the use of any AM frequency.

Saying he has many Cuban constituents in his district who support the Radio Marti proposal, Representative Matthew J. Rinaldo (R-N.J.) led a brief stand against the Tauke-Swift amendment. "What it will really do is kill or cripple a project that is essential to the U.S.," he said. "We'd be sending a message to Fidel Castro that we're handing him a major propaganda victory on a silver platter."

Representative Carlos Moorhead (R-Calif.) joined Rinaldo in voting against the amendment. The full Energy and Commerce Committee will mark up H.R. 5427 on Wednesday and is expected to affirm the subcommittee's action.

Although the subcommittee could only amend the bill insofar as it would affect broadcasting in the AM band, the panel's chairman, Representative Timothy E. Wirth (D-Colo.), indicated that he and other members have other objections to the bill. "I must question the administration's spending priorities when they are willing to spend almost $18 million in an 18-month period to build one radio station to broadcast news and information to Cuba and they are unwilling to spend even one penny to build public radio facilities in the United States, which bring news and information to the American public," he said. "I will do everything I can to prevent this wasteful expenditure of funds for Radio Marti from resulting in even further cost to this country by forcing American broadcasters to bear the burden of its operation."

Wirth reassured those present at the markup that his subcommittee has the power to amend H.R. 5427, even though it is primarily a foreign policy measure. It is the subcommittee's job, he said, to address the "serious questions relating to the impact Radio Marti would have on the domestic broadcast industry."

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[From Broadcasting, June 7, 1982]

### LEG UP

If administration's proposed Radio Marti is approved by Congress to operate on 1040 kHz, it antenna will be ready for instant use. Navy is nearing completion of three-tower array on Florida's Saddlebunch Key—where administration plans to locate Radio Marti—for broadcast on 1040 kHz. Defense Department official James Duncan, said $1-million facility is needed to meet DOD "requirement" for use in "national or military emergency."

Word is that Radio Marti would not be required to pay construction costs but would rent antenna from Defense Department. Project could run into criticism in Congress, where some members already feel administration is proceeding too fast on Radio Marti without congressional approval.

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### HEAT FROM HILL

Word that Navy Department is building broadcast antenna array on Florida's Saddlebunch Key that could be used by Radio Marti ("Closed Circuit," June 7) has aroused interest of no fewer than three House subcommittees. Among concerns is that government is using funds—about $1 million—for station to broadcast to Cuba without congressional approval. Department of Defense says facility—four-tower array, not three, as originally believed in Washington—was originally conceived to serve DOD's needs and that it was simply designed to accommodate Radio Marti as well. Representative Thomas J. Tauke (R-Iowa), member of House Telecommunications Subcommittee, said "lot of faith" is needed to accept that premise. He and Representative Tim Wirth (D-Colo.), chairman of subcommittee, Friday were preparing letter to DOD on matter.

Staffers on House Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee were clearly upset at news of Navy project in Florida. State Department officials told subcommittee in October that work on Radio Marti would not proceed without congressional approval. Short time later, apparently, contract for construction of antenna was let. Staff of House Appropriations Committee has already completed report on matter and submitted it to Representative Neal Smith (D-Iowa), chairman of Appropriation's Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary.

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[From UPI, June 16, 1982]

### MARTI

KEY WEST.—The Navy is erecting four 250-foot transmitting antennas in the Florida Keys for use by Radio Marti, even though Congress has not yet authorized money for the propaganda program, it was reported, today.

The antennas are being built 12 miles north of Key West and a Navy spokesman admitted that they were designed for Radio Marti, the Miami Herald said.

The construction has infuriated the chairman of a House Subcommittee on Telecommunications . . . who says the construction could be "illegal." In a letter last week to State and Defense Department officials . . . Representative Timothy Wirth, a Democrat from Colorado . . . expressed his suspicions about the antennas.

Wirth was then paid a visit by Thomas Enders . . . Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs . . . who assured him that the Defense Department was building the transmitting towers for military purposes, not for Radio Marti.

In Key West, however, Navy officials tell a different story.

Lieutenant Commander Mark Neuhart . . . public affairs officer for U.S. Caribbean forces . . . said the antennas were designed for Radio Marti but they won't be used until Congress has given its approval.

State Department officials deny there was any cover-up of the construction. A Department spokesman said if Radio Marti is not granted funding, the antennas would still be used by the Government anyway.

Two of the towers are completed and all construction will be finished by late summer. If approved, Radio Marti would be similar to Radio Free Europe but would broadcast to Cuba.

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[From the Des Moines Register, June 19, 1982]

## RADIO MARTI OPPONENTS ARE OFFERED A COMPROMISE

(By Larry Fruhling)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The Reagan administration offered a compromise Friday aimed at soothing the opponents of Radio Marti, the broadcasting station that President Reagan wants built to direct propaganda messages to Cuba.

The proposal, taken to Congress by Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders, offers assurances that Radio Marti would not interfere with any commercial broadcasters in this country and that any Cuban attempts to jam the U.S. government station would cause no more than "minimal" problems for domestic broadcasters.

Enders, Reagan's diplomatic chief for Latin American affairs, discussed the proposal Friday afternoon with Iowa Representative Tom Tauke.

Tauke, a Republican, has been working to keep Radio Marti from using a commercial radio channel, mainly because the administration has proposed assigning the government station to 1040 kHz, the same AM frequency used by station WHO in Des Moines.

### NIGHTTIME RANGE

Official of WHO contend that if Radio Marti uses the 1040 frequency and Cuba jams the broadcasts as President Fidel Castro has promised, WHO's nighttime range would be reduced by more than 99 percent.

Tauke said it was not clear how the U.S. government could assure domestic broadcasters of no more than slight interference if Radio Marti's signal were jammed by Cuba. "We would want to tie that down pretty carefully," he said after meeting with Enders.

But Tauke also said the administration is lobbying Congress furiously to get Radio Marti approved, and that opponents of the project may have to settle for the best protections they can get for domestic broadcasters.

Meanwhile, government documents obtained by lawyers for WHO suggest that the administration began advancing plans for Radio Marti last fall, although the project still has not been approved by Congress and has run into stumbling blocks in two House subcommittees.

One document, written by Walter Jajko, a member of the group working on the technical aspects of the administration plan, last Oct. 22 said that "in an effort to prevent delays in getting Radio Marti on the air, the contract for the design of the antenna will be awarded as soon as possible."

### TRANSMITTER TOWERS

Jajko's memorandum, addressed to the Presidential Commission for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, dealt with what Jajko described as the design of "transmitter towers and associated equipment for Radio Marti . . . on Saddlebunch Key, Fla."

It became known this week that the Defense Department is close to completing the construction of radio transmission towers on Saddlebunch Key, which is about 15 miles north of Key West.

Pentagon officials concede that the facilities on Saddlebunch could be used by Radio Marti, but also insist that the transmitters have a "Department of Defense requirement that is independent of whether there is a Radio Marti or not." They say the Defense Department's purpose is secret.

Tauke said he believes the Pentagon came up with the idea of a military purpose for the towers already under construction as "an afterthought—to explain why the Department of Defense is proceeding on a project without congressional authorization."

"I believe the towers were built in order to get Radio Marti off the ground," Tauke said. "It appears as if there was never an appreciation by the administration of the fact they might have problems with Congress."

[From the Washington Post, July 2, 1982]

## PANEL DELAYS FUNDS FOR RADIO MARTI

### SENATOR PERCY SAYS COMMITTEE TO STUDY ALL ALTERNATIVES

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused yesterday to give quick approval to legislation authorizing $17 million to build Radio Marti, a government project to broadcast news to Cuba from Florida.

Despite pressure from administration officials and Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Chairman Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) said all alternatives will be carefully studied before the panel completes action on the proposal.

Helms accused some senators, whom he did not name, of being willing to go to Havana and have "ice cream cones" with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, but being unwilling to act on Radio Marti, which he said "is kind of my idea."

"We must get down to the bottom line: Are we going to favor truth or sit back and do nothing in the face of the arrogance of Fidel Castro?" Helms said.

Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders said Radio Marti—named for Cuban liberator Jose Marti—would be patterned after Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

However, Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) expressed concern that Castro had threatened to jam Radio Marti with a 500,000-watt AM station that in turn could have serious consequences for U.S. radio stations.

Grassley said radio station WHO in Des Moines, where President Reagan once worked as a sportscaster, shares Radio Marti's proposed frequency of 1040 kHz and "would be harmed immensely in the event that Cuba retaliates."

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[From the Chicago Tribune, July 5, 1982]

## RADIO FREE IOWA?

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has balked at one of the daffier ideas of the Reagan administration: the $17 million "Radio Marti" broadcasting station that Charles Z. Wick, director of the International Communications Agency would like to set up in Florida to blast American propaganda all over Fidel Castro's Cuba.

There is little need for this "Radio Free Cuba" when a far more effective manifestation of the American good life is already being beamed across the Gulf Stream by Florida's existing Spanish language stations in the form of commercials.

Whats' more, Radio Marti (named for the Cuban patriot José Marti, who was killed fighting the Spanish in 1895) could embroil the United States in a race we couldn't hope to win. Fidel Castro's weapons may be no match for ours, but his mouth has more megatonnage than anything we can respond with, including all the mouths in Congress combined.

If we insist on investing in Radio Marti, Mr. Castro has threatened to retaliate by jamming it with a 500,000 watt AM station of his own. Could the U.S. long survive a barrage of Fidel's six-hour harangues at a half-million watts?

This kind of jamming could reach all the way to Iowa, which worries the management of station WHO—where Ronald Reagan once worked. It broadcasts on the same frequency that Radio Marti would use, and could be drowned out by a Cuban Radio Anti-Marti. Midwestern farmers have enough problems without inflicting Fidel on them. As the Committee Chairman, Illinois Sen. Percy, has suggested, there are far better ways to spend that $17 million.

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## SENATE TAKES UP RADIO MARTI

A controversial U.S. proposal to build a high-powered AM station to broadcast information to the Cuban people about their government had its first hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last Thursday (July 1). While six witnesses, five of them from the Reagan administration, argued the proposal (S. 1853) is unlikely to cause increased Cuban interference to U.S. broadcasters, committee members appeared sharply divided on the issue.

The U.S. wants to "try talking to the Cuban people the way we talk to the Soviets and Eastern Europe with Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe," said Thomas O. Enders, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs. Fidel Castro's government could respond to the U.S. broadcasts, to be called "Radio Marti," by jamming their reception in Cuba increasing Cuban interference to U.S. stations or by counterbroadcasting to the American people, he said. The State Department "now believes" counterbroadcasting "is the direction in which Cuba is going."

Radio towers built by the U.S. Navy on Florida's Saddlebunch Key were built for classified "urgent military requirements in the Caribbean," said Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for policy. They were built on the same frequency to be used by Radio Marti, 1040 kHz, he said, because the government "did not want to inadvertently preclude" that service and because it would have U.S. taxpayers money. A U.S. military spokesman who told a Florida newspaper the towers were built for Radio Marti "was misquoted," said Ikle.

A congressional budget office estimate that increased Cuban interference as a result of Radio Marti could cost U.S. broadcasters over $40 million, "could be accurate," said Kalmann Schaefer, assistant to the chairman of the FCC for international affairs. Schaefer appeared to agree, however, with Clifton White, chairman of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, and former Senator Richard B. Stone, a member of that commission, that it would be difficult to attribufe increased Cuban interference to Radio Marti, because such interference has been a problem to U.S. broadcasters for 15 years.

The only witness to express reservations about the Radio Marti proposal, Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), said using 1040 kHz, the same frequency used by clear channel station WHO(AM) Des Moines, Iowa, could "spell the destruction of a major marketing and information tool to farmers in the Midwest," and, according to an NAB study, could result in interference to 200 other U.S. stations. Congress should consider alternative means of delivering Radio Marti, he said, including using "flexible" FM frequencies, broadcasting on 1200 or 1610 kHz or on shortwave or broadcasting from a ship. Some of these alternatives, he said, would result "in no cost to the U.S."

Noting the original idea for Radio Marti had been his, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) urged the committee to act quickly on S. 1853 and predicted the Senate will approve the measure once permitted to consider it. The committee had waited to hold hearings until after the presidential commission had issued its interim report (see box).

Helms was alone in expressing unqualified support for the proposal, however. Calling U.S. policy toward Cuba an "unutterable failure," Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), the committee's ranking minority member, said Radio Marti "would exacerbate" the high level of tension between the U.S. and Cuba. The committee should not act on S. 1853, he said, until the presidential commission has issued its final report.

Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.), who promised to offer an amendment to the bill requiring the U.S. to fully reimburse U.S. broadcasters for the cost of overcoming any increased interference as a result of Radio Marti, called S. 1853 "baloney" and "juvenile foreign policy."

Promising a full, objective analysis of the proposal before any action is taken, Committee Chairman Charles Percy (R-Ill.) said a Congressional Research Service study of the Radio Marti proposal had raised "a number of questions that must be answered," including whether the * * *

## OPTIONS OPEN

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, which is developing plans for the operation of Radio Marti, is not limiting its consideration of a frequency for that station to 1040 kHz. The commission, in an interim report to Congress released last week, said it is considering "the possibility of using additional frequencies in order to make Cuban jamming of Radio Marti broadcasts more difficult." It is also considering "a wide range of complementary technical facilities/or contingency use"—a reference, according to a spokesman, to the possible leasing of time on commercial stations and the use of shortwave.

The report acknowledges the risk of interference from Cuban stations on any frequency selected for Radio Marti. But it says that should not deter the U.S. from implementing its plans for using 1040 kHz, the clear channel station on which WHO(AM) Des Moines, Iowa, operates. The report notes that FCC studies indicate the use of any other frequency "would raise greater problems for other stations," and adds: "If Cuba persists in interfering with U.S. radio stations, the U.S. may have to consider appropriate action." A commission spokesman said that, at present, that appears to mean a decision only to file complaints with appropriate international bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union.

The report says Radio Marti broadcasts would not be responsible for causing Cuba to interfere with U.S. stations—although, it adds, Cuba would attempt to make the station "a scapegoat." The report says Cuban stations have been causing interference to U.S. stations for years "and would probably continue" regardless of whether Radio Marti goes on the air.

The report notes that Cuba has announced plans for two 500 kW transmitters. It says one already may be on the air on 1160 kHz. The other—scheduled to operate on the WHO-Marti frequency of 1040 kHz—"is believed ready for use now or very soon."

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## HISTORY OF RADIO STATION WHO—"THE VOICE OF THE MIDDLEWEST," DES MOINES, IOWA

On Saturday, April 10. 1982, Radio Station WHO, Des Moines, will observe 58 years of service to millions of radio families in Mid-America. On the occasion of its receipt of the broadcast industry's coveted "Mike Award" February 7, 1966, the Governor of Iowa, the Honorable Harold E. Hughes, described its history in the following manner:

"Steadily, reliably, and constantly, WHO has grown * * * ever pursuing a course of service."

From its first broadcast nearly 58 years ago, WHO has proudly met its obligations to the public with a programming philosophy of service through quality, integrity and responsibility.

Reflecting the pioneer spirit of the Palmer family, which acquired the young station from The Bankers Life Company of Des Moines in 1930—and despite a Depression-born skepticism about the future of radio broadcasting—WHO recognized early the need of a well-rounded radio service to its listeners.

In 1933, WHO was granted 50,000 watts to serve a vast segment of the Midwest, and in 1941 became a 1-A Clear Channel station to provide interference free service to distant areas.

Accepting the challenge of serving a wide area of audience, WHO took its first step in becoming a distinguished leader in broadcast journalism when it established a large, professionally staffed and fully equipped news department under the leadership of H. R. Gross and Jack Shelley.

One of the first truly non-network radio news operations in the nation, the WHO news Bureau (as it was then known) quickly achieved a reputation for responsible reporting and balanced coverage that still is demonstrated daily.

There is no greater measurement of the respect held for the WHO radio news department than that expressed by its peers—the National Association of Radio-TV News Directors who four times since the mid-Fifties named it the "Best Radio News Operation in the United States."

News stories normally left to the networks to cover became standard assignments for WHO's News Bureau staffers. During World War II, two full-time members of the News Bureau were accredited as war correspondents to both the European and Pacific theaters. WHO's listeners heard interviews with Iowans fighting in battle areas and first-hand accounts by its reporters of the "Battle of the Bulge," the signing of the German Army's surrender and the Japanese surrender aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri*. Later, the war in Vietnam was covered by WHO Radio News Director Bob Wilbanks.

The WHO News Bureau also served as the catalyst for many public service projects: During World War II, it sold $6,153,400 worth of Treasury Bonds to 25,000 investors in 46 states. Following the war, 17,000 listeners answered News Bureau appeals and dispatched 260,000 parcels (1,430 tons) of clothing to destitute families in Europe. The Greek government later named city streets for "WHO", "Des Moines" and "Iowa."

Later years found the radio news department turning its attention to other public needs, such as during recent spring floods in South Dakota when the department acted as a clearing house for information about Iowans trapped in the area and provided Red Cross chapters throughout the midlands with assistance for emergency appeals and messages.

Today, WHO Newsradio has a staff of 17, including two WHO Newsradio Washington reporters, plus 25 midwest correspondents. This is one of the largest 24-hour radio news staffs in mid-America and is responsible for a heavy schedule of newscasts that total 45 hours weekly. The staff is supported by extensive technical equipment and news-gathering services.

In keeping with its long tradition of nighttime news service to a wide geographical area, WHO Newsradio's 10:00–10:30 p.m. newscast draws on an 11-state regional news printer service, as well as its own staff and regional correspondents. A typical 10 p.m. newscast can include top news stories from Nebraska, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, the Dakotas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana and other mid-America states, plus multi-state weather forecasts as a service to farmers throughout rural regions of the country.

And, each year during the area's severe winter weeks, WHO Newsradio broadcasts as many as 400 to 500 school and business closings—many from surrounding states—during each day's early morning and evening newscasts. For many of the rural and small community schools, WHO Newsradio is the only "official" source of such information.

WHO's program history has been closely linked to the economic history of its primary and secondary service areas. Farming and agriculture-related business by far has been the most important industry in Iowa, and it has had a dominating significance in the surrounding states of the Midwest, South and West.

WHO broadcast its first farm program in 1934 and in August, 1936, established the radio industry's first broadcast department specializing in agricultural journalism.

In establishing the nation's first radio farm department, WHO adopted a schedule of farm information, news, weather, markets and other services of productive interest to farm families and businesses and industry allied to agriculture.

The WHO Farm Service Department, in its continuing endeavor to be of complete service to the agriculture industry, originated "National Soil Conservation Field Days," an annual event now rotated throughout the midwest. Described by Dr. Hugh Bennett, former Chief of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, as "one of the most important things that has taken place on American farm lands * * *", one of WHO's Field Day programs was attended by more than 250,000 people.

WHO has also sponsored or co-sponsored a number of other special agricultural events, including the Iowa School Fire Prevention campaign, WHO Farm Safety contests, farm family days, tractor rodeos, and master swine producers awards functions.

This tradition of service to the farmer continues unmatched in today's radio programming, with more than 150 separate farm programs broadcast weekly under the direction of WHO's four-member Farm Service Department.

Special attention is given by WHO's Farm Service Department to marketing and weather information, some of which is not available from most other radio stations in mid-America. For example, livestock and commodity reports broadcast early each morning and again during the 10 p.m. news cover not only Iowa market points, county elevator reports, The Chicago Board of Trade and The Commodity Mercantile Exchange, but also terminals at the following locations:

Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, West Fargo, Kansas City, Wichita, St. Joseph, Indianapolis, Louisville, and Sioux Falls.

Daily wide area state weather forecasts, vital to farmers and agricultural-related businesses, are presented at 5:45 a.m. and within the 10 p.m. news for the following states: Wyoming, Colorado, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, Minnesota, Illinois and Wisconsin.

Weather information is of vital concern to nearly everyone, and in an effort to determine exact needs of its listeners, WHO recently requested comments from listeners to the 5:45 a.m. weather. More than 200 letters and cards were received, with about one-third from states other than Iowa.

Some of the comments included:

"I listen to WHO's early morning weather every morning as I go to work * * *" Frank Ketson, R. 8, Kingsport, Tenn.

"Keep the weather news on * * *" R. A. Taylor, R. 2, Morristown, Tenn.

"Keep the weather report coming * * *" Al Heard, Saltsburg, Pa.

"We really enjoy the weather news * * *" Earl E. Schroeder, Columbus, Ga.

"Hearing your early weather news, we can usually predict our own a day or two ahead of time * * *" Ruth Braucht, Chestertown, Md.

"We hear you every morning on the farm program * * *" Robert M. Hubbard, Montgomery, Ala.

"Your weather reports are valued highly since they indicate what weather we can expect here the following day * * *" Paul A. Doyle, Pittston, Pa.

"The weather forecasts are valuable to me * * *" Edward Daily, RR No. 3, Milan, Mo.

"Keep those weather forecasts coming. Yours is the only clear, concise program I can find for the information I need * * *" N. Henkins, RR, Newark, Mo.

"We listen more to that (5:45 a.m.) forecast (program) than any other in the morning, because our weather comes from most of those states * * *" E. W. Hanson, 2614 Shelby Rd., La Crosse, Wis.

"WHO is the only station giving the weather for Missouri and all surrounding states and that is really helpful when traveling * * *" Carrol Surtzer, Bucklin, Mo.

"I like to hear the weather report for the crops, plus I get an idea on what we might expect in the way of weather coming this way * * *" Maurice Pahr, Bridgeport Twp., Saginaw, Mich.

"It is the best weather information we can get for our area." R. E. Bilderback, Trucking & Cornshelling, Bowen, Ill.

The response to WHO's long dedication to serving the agricultural industry is best evidenced by farmers' listening measurements. The 1980 Doane Farm Media Measurement Study for Iowa showed that 50 percent of Iowa's farmers indicated they depended upon WHO farm programs and farm broadcasters for markets, farm news, weather and other information—almost equal to all of the other commercial Iowa broadcasters and stations combined!

Additionally, the Arbitron Iowa Farm Radio Study of March/April 1981 gave WHO 75.2 percent share of the farm listenership in the ADI area vs. the number two station's 22.9 percent.

The significant contributions by the WHO Farm Service Department and members of its staff in the interests of farmers and agricultural-related audiences have been recognized through the years with hundreds of national, regional, and state awards and citations—including the famed duPont Award for "Outstanding Public Service." WHO three times has been the recipient of the prestigious "Oscar in Agriculture" for specific farm programs.

A recent and partial list of awards and recognition includes:

NAMA/Iowa Dept. of Agriculture "Friend of Agriculture" award "for providing needed information to farmers * * *"

Iowa Veterinary Medical Association award "for broadcasting needed information to livestock producers * * *"

Iowa State University "Friends of Extension" award for promoting farm safety * * *"

American Soybean Association "Broadcast Media Award" for "outstanding and long-term coverage of soybean related news to midwest farmers * * *"

Iowa Cattlemens Association "for coverage of cattlemens activities throughout Iowa * * *"

Iowa Beef Improvement Association "for outstanding service * * *"

Soil Conservation Society of America, Iowa chapter, "Friends of Conservation" award for "consistent coverage of soil conservation meeting and events * * *"

Iowa Wildlife Federation "Conservation Communicator of the Year" award.

Iowa Association of Future Farmers of America "Distinguished Service" award for communicating "rural America's story * * *"

Peace Corps citation for "recognition in the Peace Corps/Agriculture recruiting effort * * *"

Insurance Association "Loss Prevention Award" for coordinating state's fire prevention programs in rural schools.

Mid-America Dairymen award "for long and devoted service to dairymen and farmers * * *"

National Safety Council award "for exceptional service to farm safety * * *"

Agriculture Council of America citation "for support in achieving the goal of a better informed public * * *"

Geigy-National Association of Farm Broadcasters award "for excellence in farm broadcasting * * *"

4–H citation "for outstanding service and effective coverage of local, state and national 4–H events * * *"

And, a letter of special commendation from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Stabilization and Conservation Service for WHO Farmradio's "timely interviews concerning the 1978 disaster and set-aside program in aiding us to disseminate program details rapidly to the farmers * * * your radio broadcasts were one of the most important factors for an excellent sign-up in the set-aside program in Iowa * * *"

Today, WHO continues to afford this important farm broadcast service to the hundreds of thousands of farm and rural families in Iowa and surrounding states, with its observance of the following daily farm broadcast schedule, Monday through Saturday:

FARM SERVICE BROADCAST SCHEDULE, MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY

5:30–5:40 AM—General News.

5:40–5:45 AM—Farm News.

5:45–5:50 AM—11-State Weather Forecasts (Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Wyoming).

5:50–5:55 AM—Farm News.

5:55–6:00 AM—Previous Day's Closing Farm Market Quotations.

6:00–6:05 AM—Farm News 11-State Weather Forecasts.

6:05–6:15 AM—Anticipated Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals.

6:15–6:20 AM—Calendar of Day's Principal Agricultural Events.

6:20–6:30 AM—Summary, Farm News, 11-State Weather Forecasts, Previous Day's Closing Farm Market Quotations, Anticipated Receipts at Principal Livestock Terminals, Farm Calendar.

6:40–6:45 AM—Anticipated Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals.

9:30–9:35 AM—Opening Farm Markets.

10:30–10:35 AM—Opening Farm Markets.

11:30–11:40 AM—Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals.

11:55A–12 Noon—Farm News.

12 N–12:15 PM—Farm News, Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts, 11-State Weather Forecasts.

12:15–12:30 PM—Farm News and Commentary.

12:45–1:00 PM—Farm Commentary.

1:00–1:05 PM—Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts.

1:30–1:35 PM—Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts.

2:30–2:35 PM—Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts.

3:30–3:35 PM—Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts.

4:45–5:00 PM—Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts.

5:55–6:00 PM—Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts.

6:25–6:30 PM—Farm Markets Final, including Closing Farm Market Quotations, Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals, and 11-State Weather Forecasts.

10:00–10:15 PM—Within Body of General Newscast, 5-Minute Insert Covering Days Closing Farm Market Quotations, Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals, and 11-State Weather Forecasts.

WHO has always had a deep awareness of the public interest and involvement in its programming and in 1965 introduced to the community the first of a now greatly-expanded audience-participation telephone talk show concept. These eight separate programs, each with its own hosts, are now scheduled seven days a week for a total of 12½ hours daily and 75½ hours weekly.

Utilizing nine local and toll-free WATS telephone lines, interfaced with a specially designed computer control system to insure free and easy participation in the programs locally and throughout the nation, the talk shows afford air time for all shades of opinion and discussion. They are truly "public access" programs.

Total number of calls attempted and answered for each of WHO's talk shows are recorded on an automatic "call-counter" device constructed by Northwestern Bell and tied into WHO Talkradio's in-studio computer system, which also records origin of calls, whether caller is male or female, and subject matter to be discussed.

WHO's analyst during its play-by-play coverage of Iowa football; "Call Hayden Fry," the Iowa football coach; and "Call Lute Olson," the Iowa basketball coach.

Each of these shows is once per week.

The widespread interest in University of Iowa athletics through WHO broadcasts can be seen in the number of states represented by callers to the seasonal special talk shows: "Call Evy"—12 states; "Call Hayden Fry"—15 states; "Call Lute Olson"—13 states.

From its earliest broadcast years WHO has recognized the sharp interest its audience has in sports programming. The station's first college football play-by-play origination occurred in 1926 (Drake vs. Notre Dame) and it has maintained a strong posture in coverage of collegiate, high school and professional sports.

The 1982 University of Iowa football schedule marked WHO's 50th consecutive season of play-by-play coverage of the Hawkeyes, beginning with Ronald Reagan's first broadcast as WHO Sports Director.

WHO's coverage of Iowa football was best described in November, 1981, by a Minneapolis newspaper sports columnist in his characterization of Hawkeye football fans:

"They (Iowa fans) may wander the desert forever looking for the promised land of Pasadena, but you'll never hear them whimper. And as they go they will listen to information about the Hawkeyes from WHO Radio in Des Moines * * * WHO covers Iowa football like the networks cover political conventions. Thoroughly."

Iowa's fans, incidentally, did make it across the desert to Pasadena when the Hawkeyes won co-championship of the Big Ten Conference and played in the 1982 New Year's Day Rose Bowl game. Named as the "official" originating station for the play-by-play by the University of Iowa was WHO. Said C. W. Elliott, Director of Athletics, in announcing his selection of WHO as the university's "official" station:

"The WHO signal reaches more Iowa fans than any other station."

The station has been able to serve Iowa fans across the nation with its daytime play-by-play coverage of football and basketball by the use of a unique programming concept—nighttime rebroadcasts of those games.

Not all of WHO's programming centers around news blocks, farm news, talk shows or sports events. But all of it does carry the beat of information—even its "Country Music/USA", 1:00–5:30 a.m. nightly, which provides newscasts every half hour from the WHO 24-hour news staff, as well as a service particularly valuable to truckers and travelers: Continuous updates on weather forecasts from the direct wires of the National Weather Service and road conditions throughout the nation, including major travel advisories, storm warnings, and highway patrol road reports in any state whenever conditions warrant.

In addition to the regular sources of information about roads and weather conditions throughout the country, WHO's all-night is supported by a network of AAA Motor Club contacts along the major interstate routes who report to the station with last minute road and weather information.

Some WHO programming is designed to provide responsive service to a very specialized group of listeners. Each Sunday evening WHO broadcasts a locally-produced half-hour program—"The Voice of Southeast Asians"—entirely in Vietnamese and Thaidam-Lao languages and featuring music, news and public service information for the more than 4,000 natives of Southeast Asia now living in Iowa. WHO was the first radio station in the nation to broadcast a regularly scheduled program for Southeast Asians.

Occasionally, WHO's service to its public brings surprising—and dramatic—responses. On Wednesday, December 30, an unemployed Urbandale, Iowa, resident wrote the Des Moines Register he would commit suicide by midnight, December 31, so that his family would be eligible for welfare benefits. The letter, printed in that day's Register, received widespread attention and initiated a search by authorities for the writer.

The following day the man turned himself in to authorities and, according to the Register's story, he told authorities a listener's telephone call to WHO's "Clear Channel Conversation" Wednesday night, in which she pleaded to the writer to reconsider his threat, "persuaded him to change his mind—and to seek help."

The following Sunday—January 3—an Ankeny, Iowa, man called WHO's "Sunday Talk Radio" program and told hosts Dena Michaels and Jim Frye he planned to shoot his wife and then himself because, he said, life's problems were overwhelming him. For more than two hours, Ms. Michaels and Mr. Frye kept the caller on the air while authorities traced the call and reached the man.

The next day's Des Moines Tribune reported: "Local officials praised two WHO-Radio talk show hosts today for their 'diligence and sensitivity' * * * they did a super job of keeping him talking * * *"

However, as dramatic as those two program incidents were, it has been WHO's long history of constant dedication to programming excellence, to public service, to integrity and to pioneering in new broadcasting techniques that earned it The American Women in Radio-Television's 1979 award for: "Outstanding Achievement in Radio Station Performance."

But not all of WHO's wide area service is devoted to current on-air broadcasting. Little known by the public is special equipment installed at WHO's transmitter to facilitate continuation of radio transmission in the event of nuclear emergency. The equipment—"Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)"—was installed in cooperation with the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and the U.S. Navy.

WHO, along with a few other radio stations in the country, was selected by the Federal Government for the equipment on the basis of WHO's maximum amount of service to the maximum number of people over a long period of time.

The EMP, for which WHO bears all operation and maintenance costs, provides protection for the WHO transmitter, antenna system, emergency generator, selected program lines, underground broadcasting facilities and Emergency Broadcast System equipment. WHO's broadcast facilities thus can be used by authorities during the most severe national emergency.

Severe duplication or distortion of WHO's 1040 frequency would seriously diminish, if not destroy, the effectiveness of this federal civil preparedness and defense plan.

### "Clear Channel Conversation" (8 p.m. to 12 Midnite, Monday Through Friday, January 1 Through December 30, 1981)

*Summary of calls cleared for broadcast*

| | *Number* |
|---|---|
| Total calls received | 9,870 |
| Total Iowa calls received | 9,406 |
| Total U.S. calls received (not including Iowa) | 452 |
| Total Canadian calls received | 12 |
| Males, Iowa | 4,897 |
| Males, United States | 303 |
| Females, Iowa | 4,509 |
| Females, United States | 149 |
| Iowa communities represented | 482 |
| Total United States and Iowa communities represented | 702 |
| Canadian communities represented | 5 |
| Iowa counties represented | 99 |
| U.S. States represented (including Iowa) | 32 |
| Canadian provinces represented | 4 |

TOTAL NUMBER OF CALLS ATTEMPTED/ANSWERED: 66,662

Total number of calls attempted and answered for each of WHO-Radio's talk shows are recorded on an automatic "call-counter" device constructed by Northwestern Bell and tied into WHO Talkradio's in-studio computer system. Above information represents details for only those calls answered and "screened" by each show's producer.

WHO

"CLEAR CHANNEL CONVERSATION" IOWA TELEPHONE CALLS

8:00-12:00 Mid., Monday-Friday--Jan. 1 thru Dec. 30, 1981


3
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23
27
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8
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123
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128
46
37
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16
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16
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9
32
41
86
61
90
35
258
20
5
18
1
111
41
35
156
245
260
94
90
198
3
1
6
21
13
81
107
4,590
149
93
22
122
5
4
32
16
40
18
67
37
99
231
38
26
17
9
3
8
8
44
49
46
14
245
32
35
21
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23
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53
45
40
44
49
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## "CLEAR CHANNEL CONVERSATION" IOWA TELEPHONE CALLS

### 8:00-12:00 Mid., Monday-Friday--Jan. 1 thru Dec. 30, 1981

| | |
|---|---|
| Ackley | 3 |
| Adair | 4 |
| Adel | 8 |
| Afton | |
| Agency | 9 |
| Albert City | 5 |
| Albia | 11 |
| Alden | 5 |
| Algona | 10 |
| Alleman | 2 |
| Allerton | 4 |
| Allison | |
| Alta | 3 |
| Amana | 5 |
| Ames | 165 |
| Anamosa | |
| Anita | |
| Aplington | |
| Armstrong | |
| Ashton | |
| Atalissa | |
| Atkins | |
| Atlantic | 33 |
| Audubon | 10 |
| Aurelia | 3 |
| Avoca | |
| Badger | 2 |
| Bagley | 2 |
| Bancroft | 2 |
| Batavia | 5 |
| Baxter | 4 |
| Bayard | |
| Beacon | |
| Beaconsfield | |
| Beaman | 3 |
| Bedford | 3 |
| Belle Plaine | 25 |
| Belmond | 4 |
| Bennett | |
| Benton | 5 |
| Bettendorf | 2 |
| Birmingham | 3 |
| Blairsburg | |
| Blakesburg | 4 |
| Bloomfield | 35 |
| Bode | 2 |
| Bondurant | 5 |
| Boone | 137 |
| Brayton | |
| Brighton | 2 |
| Britt | 4 |
| Brooklyn | 8 |
| Buckingham | 3 |
| Buffalo Center | 4 |
| Burlington | 20 |
| Burt | 4 |
| Bussey | 4 |
| Callendar | |
| Cambridge | 4 |
| Carlisle | 2 |
| Carroll | 19 |
| Casey | 22 |
| Cedar Falls | 36 |
| Cedar Rapids | 147 |
| Centerville | 36 |
| Chapin | |
| Chariton | 35 |
| Charles City | 13 |
| Charlotte | |
| Charter Oak | 4 |
| Chelsea | 2 |
| Cherokee | 5 |
| Chester | 2 |
| Churdan | 7 |
| Clare | |
| Clarinda | 9 |
| Clarion | 15 |
| Clarksville | 2 |
| Clear Lake | 14 |
| Clermont | 2 |
| Clinton | 3 |
| Clio | |
| Clutier | |
| Coggon | |
| Colfax | 8 |
| Collins | 3 |
| Colo | 11 |
| Columbus Junction | 3 |
| Conesville | |
| Conrad | 3 |
| Coon Rapids | 17 |
| Coralville | 7 |
| Cornell | |
| Corning | 6 |
| Corydon | 13 |
| Coulter | 2 |
| Council Bluffs | 11 |
| Crawfordsville | |
| Cresco | |
| Creston | 31 |
| Dakota City | 4 |
| Dallas Center | 3 |
| Dana | |
| Danville | |
| Davenport | 30 |
| Dawson | 4 |
| Dayton | 3 |
| Decatur | 2 |
| Decorah | |
| Deep River | |
| Delta | 12 |
| Denison | 91 |
| Denver | 3 |
| Derby | 3 |
| Des Moines | 4,574 |
| Dexter | 12 |
| Dike | 16 |
| Donnan | |
| Donnellson | |
| Douds | |
| Dows | 2 |
| Drakesville | |
| Dubuque | 13 |
| Dumont | |
| Duncan | |
| Duncombe | 2 |
| Dunlap | 5 |
| Durango | 5 |
| Dysart | 3 |
| Eagle Grove | 12 |
| Earlham | 29 |
| Earling | |
| Earlville | 3 |
| Eddyville | 3 |
| Eldora | 20 |
| Elkader | |
| Elkhart | 3 |
| Elliott | |
| Ellsworth | 2 |
| Ely | |
| Emmetsburg | 5 |
| Estherville | 39 |
| Evansdale | 2 |
| Exira | 2 |

CLEAR CHANNEL CONVERSATION
Iowa Telephone Calls
Page Two

Fairbank
Fairfax
Fairfield 21
Farmington 2
Farnhamville 10
Farragut
Ferguson 8
Floyd
Fonda 32
Fontanelle 3
Forest City 20
Fort Dodge 61
Fort Madison 14
Fostoria
Fremont 7

Garden Grove 2
Garner 7
Garwin
Geneva
Gilbert 7
Gilbertville
Gilman 3
Gilmore City 6
Gladbrook 5
Glidden
Goodell
Gowrie 6
Grand Junction
Greene 3
Greenfield 10
Green Mountain
Grimes 2
Grinnell 55
Griswold 2
Grundy Center 6
Gruver
Guthrie Center 11

Hamilton 2
Hampton 11
Hancock 2
Hanlontown 2
Harcourt 5
Hardy 2
Harlan 13
Hartley
Havelock
Hawarden 2

Hazleton
Hedrick 3
Henderson
Highland Center
Hillsboro 2
Holland
Holstein
Homestead 2
Houghton
Hubbard 3
Hudson
Humboldt 29
Humeston 16
Huxley 6

Ida Grove 8
Independence 11
Indianola
Inwood 3
Iowa City 108
Iowa Falls 36
Ireton 2
Irwin 2

Jamaica
Jefferson 19
Jesup
Jewell 4

Kalona 3
Kamrar 4
Kanawha 2
Kellerson
Kelley 2
Kellogg 5
Kent
Keokuk 4
Keota 2
Keswick 4
Kirkman
Kiron 2
Klemme 2
Knierim
Knoxville 45

Lacona 3
Ladora
Lake City 4
Lake Mills

Lake Park
Lamoni 6
Langdon
Lansing
La Porte City
Larchwood
Laurens 69
Lawton
Le Grand
Lehigh 2
Leighton
Leland 2
Le Mars 4
Lenox
Leon 7
Lewis
Liberty Center
Libertyville 2
Liddersdale
Lincoln 2
Linden 3
Lineville 11
Liscomb 3
Livermore 7
Lockridge 4
Lohrville 5
Lorimer 11
Lovilia
Lowden 2
Lucas 5
Luther
Lu Verne 3
Lynnville
Lytton 4

Macksburg 4
Madrid 9
Mallard 2
Manchester 2
Manilla 2
Manning 3
Manson 7
Maquoketa
Marathon 6
Marcus 5
Marengo 3
Marion 41
Marshalltown 232
Mason City 107

CLEAR CHANNEL CONVERSATION
Iowa Telephone Calls
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Massena 3
Maxwell 6
Maynard
Melbourne 7
Melcher 7
Melrose 2
Menlo 6
Milford
Millersburg 2
Milo 24
Milton 6
Minburn 7
Mineola
Mingo 6
Mitchellville 2
Monroe 9
Montezuma 20
Montour
Montrose
Moorland 2
Moravia 3
Moulton 3
Mount Auburn
Mount Ayr 15
Mount Pleasant 24
Murray 13
Muscatine 12

Nashua 4
Nemaha 2
Nevada 15
Newhall
New Hampton 2
New Hartford
New London 6
New Sharon 7
Newton 99
New Virginia 2
Nichols
Nora Springs 2
North Liberty
Northwood 8
Norway
Numa 3

Oakland
Oelwein 9
Ogden 9
Okoboji 2
Olin
Ollie 2
Onawa
Onslow
Orient
Orleans
Osage 3
Osceola 35
Oskaloosa 214
Otho
Otley
Oto
Ottosen
Ottumwa 228
Oxford 3

Palmer
Palo 4
Panama
Panora 9
Parkersburg 4
Paton
Pella 18
Percival
Perry 53
Pershing
Peterson
Pilot Grove
Plainfield 3
Pleasantville 15
Pocahontas 15
Pomeroy 3
Popejoy 2
Postville
Prairie City 15
Prescott 2
Pulaski 4

Quasqueton

Radcliffe 6
Redding
Redfield 4
Red Oak 4
Reinbeck 4
Rembrandt 2
Renwick
Rhodes 2
Richland 3
Rinard 2
Ringsted
Rippey 4
Riverside
Rockford 3
Rock Rapids
Rockwell
Rockwell City 6
Roland 4
Rolfe
Rose Hill
Rowan 4
Rowley
Rudd 6
Russell

Sac City 23
Saint Ansgar 2
Saint Charles 16
Saint Marys 4
Sanborn 2
Schaller
Scranton 2
Searsboro 9
Sergeant Bluff 6
Seymour 9
Sheffield 18
Shelby 3
Sheldahl 2
Sheldon 5
Shell Rock 3
Shellsburg 52
Shenandoah 14
Sibley 3
Sigourney 9
Silver City
Sioux City 47
Sioux Rapids 3
Slater 3
Solon
Somers 3
Spencer 39
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Springville 2
Stanhope 2
Stanley
Stanton 2
State Center
Steamboat Rock 4

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Story City 18
Stratford 3
Stuart 25
Sully 2
Sumner
Sutherland
Swea City 2
Swisher

Tama 27
Terril
Thornton
Tiffin
Tingley 2
Tipton
Titonka
Toledo 8
Tracy 4
Traer 5
Truro 2

Union 13

Vail 2
Victor 3
Villisca
Vinton 9

Wall Lake 2
Walnut
Wapello 6
Washington 19
Waterloo 217
Waukee 3
Waverly 9
Wayland
Webster
Webster City 43
Wellsburg 2
West Bend
West Branch
Westgate
West Liberty
West Point 27
Westside 10
West Union
What Cheer 2

Whittemore
Williams 2
Williamsburg 6
Williamson 2
Wilton Junction
Winfield 2
Winterset 16
Woodbine
Woodburn
Woodward 10

Yale 4

Zearing 2

WHO

"CLEAR CHANNEL CONVERSATION" NATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS

8:00-12:00 Mid., Monday-Friday--Jan. 1 thru Dec. 30, 1981


CANADA=12
WASHINGTON
OREGON
CALIFORNIA
IDAHO
NEVADA
MONTANA
1
WYOMING
2
UTAH
ARIZONA
COLORADO
5
NEW MEXICO
NORTH DAKOTA
3
SOUTH DAKOTA
3
NEBRASKA
16
KANSAS
21
OKLAHOMA
23
TEXAS
105
MINNESOTA
29
IOWA
9,406
MISSOURI
80
ARKANSAS
28
LOUISIANA
10
WISCONSIN
8
ILLINOIS
14
MICH.
14
IND.
22
OHIO
19
KENTUCKY
2
TENNESSEE
13
MISS.
3
ALA.
6
GEORGIA
5
FLORIDA
2
S. CAR.
2
N. CAR.
3
VA.
W. VA.
2
PENNSYLVANIA
4
NEW YORK
4
N.J.
1
MD.
1
DEL.
D.C.
VT.
N.H.
MAINE
MASS.
CONN.
R.I.
PUERTO RICO=1

## "CLEAR CHANNEL CONVERSATION" NATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS

## 8:00-12:00 Mid., Monday-Friday--Jan. 1 thru Dec. 30, 1981

### ALABAMA (6)

Anniston 2
Birmingham
Mobile 2
Sheffield

### ARKANSAS (28)

Benton 4
Crystal Springs
Fayetteville
Fort Smith 6
Hardy
Hatfield
Jonesboro
Lakeview
Lincoln
Little Rock 5
Monticello
Mountain Home
Pine Bluff
Prairie Grove
Rogers
Waldron

### COLORADO (5)

Alamosa
Denver 3
Lafayette

### FLORIDA (2)

Jacksonville
Sarasota

### GEORGIA (5)

Atlanta 3
Buford
Jefferson

### ILLINOIS (14)

Avon
Carbondale
Carman
Champaign 4
Chicago 2
Henry
Murphysboro
Peoria
Rockford
Springfield

### INDIANA (22)

Bedford
Bloomington
Fort Wayne
Indianapolis 15
Lafayette 2
Laurel
Rockport

### KANSAS (21)

Abilene
Beaver
Cawker City
Ellsworth
Garden City 4
Goddard
Hutchinson 3
Manhattan 4
Newton
Topeka 2
Wichita 2

### KENTUCKY (2)

Lexington
Louisville

### LOUISIANA (10)

Alexandria 2
Bossier City
Lake Charles 3
Monroe
New Orleans
Noble

### MARYLAND (1)

Baltimore

### MICHIGAN (14)

Burlington
Cadillac 2
Clarklake
Dearborn Heights
Detroit 2
Flint
Houghton
Jackson
Lansing
St. Joseph
Wakefield
Waterford

### MINNESOTA (29)

Duluth 2
Fairmont 4
Fridley
Hutchinson 2
Jackson 2
Kensington
Lewiston
Little Falls
Minneapolis 11
Owatonna
Side Lake
Trimont
Willmar

CLEAR CHANNEL CONVERSATION
National Telephone Calls
Page Two

MISSISSIPPI (3)

Jackson 3

MISSOURI (80)

Brownwood
Carthage 6
Chillicothe
Doffey
Denver
Edina
Gainesville
Golden City
Joplin
Kansas City 13
Kearney
Kirksville 4
Mercer 3
Milan 4
Moberly
Princeton 2
Saint Joseph 5
Saint Louis 7
Saint Paul
Spickard 2
Springfield 7
Steelville
Trenton 6
Unionville 2
West Plains 6
Willard

MONTANA (1)

Melstone

NEBRASKA (16)

Comstock
Geneva
Lincoln 2
Nebraska City
Omaha 8
Ord 2
Royal

NEW JERSEY (1)

Camden

NEW YORK (4)

Albany
Buffalo
New York
Utica

NORTH CAROLINA (3)

Franklin
West Durham 2

NORTH DAKOTA (3)

Bismarck
Hamilton
Underwood

OHIO (19)

Adena
Akron 5
Canton 8
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Lima
Medina
Van Wert

OKLAHOMA (23)

Duncan
Elk City
Elmore City
Fort Sill
Geary
Oklahoma City 7
Seiling
Sentinel 2
Shattuck

OKLAHOMA (continued)

Stillwater
Tipton
Tulsa 4
Wright City

PENNSYLVANIA (4)

Altoona
Green Hills
Washington 2

SOUTH CAROLINA (2)

Pickens 2

SOUTH DAKOTA (3)

Faith
Rapid City
Watertown

TENNESSEE (13)

Bone Cave
Chattanooga 4
Huntingdon
Jackson
Knoxville 2
La Grange
Memphis
Nashville
Vonore

TEXAS (105)

Abilene
Amarillo
Austin 2
Brownsville
Brownwood 21
Bryan
Carrizo Springs

CLEAR CHANNEL CONVERSATION
National Telephone Calls
Page Three

### TEXAS (continued)

Comfort
Corpus Christi 3
Crockett
Dallas 10
Eagle Lake
Fort Worth 3
Franklin
Graham 2
Henderson 18
Houston 7
Johnson City
Kileen
Lexington
Longview 4
Lubbock 3
Midland
Nacogdoches
Nederland
Oilton
Oklaunion
Olden
Rockdale
San Antonio 6
Seminole
Stephenville
Tyler
Victoria
Wedgwood
Wildwood
Woodway

### WEST VIRGINIA (2)

Charleston
Parkersburg

### WISCONSIN (8)

Elkhorn
Monroe
Oshkosh 2
Sparta
Spencer
Spooner 2

### WYOMING (2)

Cheyenne
Kemmerer

### PUERTO RICO (1)

## "CLEAR CHANNEL CONVERSATION" CANADIAN TELEPHONE CALLS

## 8:00-12:00 Mid., Monday-Friday--Jan. 1 thru Dec. 30, 1981

### MANITOBA (1)

Winnipeg

### NEWFOUNDLAND (1)

Gander

### ONTARIO (2)

| | |
|---|---|
| Kitchener | 2 |

### SASKATCHEWAN (8)

| | |
|---|---|
| Regina | 4 |
| Saskatoon | 4 |

### "MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE" (12 MIDNITE TO 1 A.M., MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY, JANUARY 1 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1981)

*Summary of Calls cleared for Broadcast*

| | *Number* |
|---|---|
| Total calls received | 9,275 |
| Total Iowa calls received | 8,517 |
| Total U.S. calls received (not including Iowa) | 747 |
| Total Canadian calls received | 10 |
| Males, Iowa | 5,771 |
| Males, United States | 600 |
| Females, Iowa | 2,746 |
| Females, United States | 152 |
| Iowa communities represented | 485 |
| Total U.S. and Iowa communities represented | 845 |
| Canadian communities represented | 7 |
| Iowa counties represented | 96 |
| U.S. States represented (including Iowa) | 35 |
| Canadian provinces represented | 3 |
| U.S. territories represented | 1 |

TOTAL NUMBER OF CALLS ATTEMPTED/ANSWERED: 11,661

Total number of calls attempted and answered for each of WHO-Radio's talk shows are recorded on an automatic "call-counter" device constructed by Northwestern Bell and tied into WHO Talkradio's in-studio computer system. Above information represents details for only those calls answered and "screened" by each show's producer.

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WHO

## "MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE" IOWA TELEPHONE CALLS

12:00 Mid.-1:00 a.m., Mon.-Fri.--Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1981


2
3
3
43
13
4
3
1
4
1
6
4
20
18
28
54
18
4
2
16
29
24
33
77
39
17
19
1
7
5
8
16
36
137
70
87
31
135
6
5
2
2
24
55
65
143
242
209
75
35
48
4
5
5
9
83
164
4,781
196
64
17
39
2
4
7
3
34
22
53
89
151
102
46
36
4
1
9
6
46
49
56
33
134
63
15
15
10
6
9
16
59
64
24
37
14

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## "MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE" IOWA TELEPHONE CALLS

12:00 Midnight-1:00 a.m., Monday-Friday
January 1 through December 31, 1981

| | |
|---|---|
| Ackley | 6 |
| Adair | 5 |
| Adel | 37 |
| Afton | 4 |
| Agency | 3 |
| Albert City | 2 |
| Albia | 24 |
| Albion | 5 |
| Alden | 7 |
| Alexander | |
| Algona | 14 |
| Alleman | |
| Allerton | 3 |
| Alta | 4 |
| Alton | |
| Altoona | 10 |
| Ames | 169 |
| Anita | 9 |
| Ankeny | 9 |
| Aplington | 2 |
| Ashton | |
| Atkins | |
| Atlantic | 18 |
| Audubon | 5 |
| Aurelia | 4 |
| Badger | 5 |
| Bancroft | 14 |
| Barnes City | 5 |
| Batavia | 18 |
| Baxter | 4 |
| Bayard | 2 |
| Beacon | 2 |
| Beaman | 2 |
| Bedford | |
| Belle Plaine | 16 |
| Belmond | 7 |
| Benton | |
| Berwick | 19 |
| Bettendorf | |
| Birmingham | 2 |
| Blairsburg | |
| Blairstown | |
| Blakesburg | 9 |
| Blencoe | |
| Blockton | 3 |
| Bloomfield | 11 |
| Bonaparte | |
| Bondurant | 13 |
| Boone | 105 |
| Booneville | |
| Boxholm | 2 |
| Boyden | |
| Braddyville | |
| Bradford | 2 |
| Bradgate | 2 |
| Breda | |
| Brighton | 2 |
| Britt | 7 |
| Brooklyn | 9 |
| Brooks | 2 |
| Brunsville | |
| Buffalo Center | |
| Burlington | 13 |
| Burt | 2 |
| Bussey | 4 |
| Callendar | 5 |
| Cambridge | 3 |
| Carlisle | 37 |
| Carroll | 31 |
| Casey | 5 |
| Cedar Falls | 22 |
| Cedar Rapids | 42 |
| Centerville | 18 |
| Chariton | 40 |
| Charles City | 10 |
| Chelsea | 4 |
| Cherokee | 11 |
| Chillicothe | |
| Churdan | 4 |
| Cincinnati | 3 |
| Clare | 6 |
| Clarinda | 7 |
| Clarion | 18 |
| Clarksville | 3 |
| Clear Lake | 9 |
| Clive | |
| Colfax | 12 |
| Collins | 10 |
| Colo | 9 |
| Columbia | 2 |
| Columbus Junction | |
| Conrad | 2 |
| Conroy | |
| Coon Rapids | 8 |
| Coralville | 3 |
| Corning | 4 |
| Corwith | |
| Corydon | 11 |
| Coulter | 5 |
| Council Bluffs | 2 |
| Cresco | |
| Creston | 39 |
| Crystal Lake | 2 |
| Dakota City | 2 |
| Dallas | 2 |
| Dallas Center | 6 |
| Dana | 2 |
| Danville | |
| Davenport | 5 |
| Dawson | 2 |
| Dayton | 21 |
| Decatur | 2 |
| Decorah | 2 |
| Dedham | 6 |
| Deep River | 2 |
| Delhi | |
| Deloit | 2 |
| Delta | 9 |
| Denison | 17 |
| Denver | 2 |
| Des Moines | 4,694 |
| De Soto | |
| Dexter | 20 |
| Diagonal | 2 |
| Dickens | |
| Dike | 6 |
| Dolliver | |
| Donnelson | |
| Douds | 3 |
| Dows | 11 |
| Drakesville | 4 |
| Dubuque | 2 |
| Dumont | 4 |
| Duncan | 3 |
| Duncombe | 2 |
| Dysart | 9 |

MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE
Iowa Telephone Calls
Page Two

Eagle Grove 23
Earlham 12
Earlville 2
Eddyville 15
Eldon 4
Eldora 5
Elkhart 2
Elk Horn 2
Ellston 2
Ellsworth 2
Elwood
Emmetsburg 15
Estherville 2
Evans
Evansdale
Everly
Exira

Fairfield 40
Farmersburg
Farnhamville 2
Fertile
Floris 2
Floyd 3
Fonda
Fontanelle 10
Forest City 8
Fort Dodge 79
Fort Madison 6
Fostoria 2
Fremont 7

Galva
Garber
Garden Grove 2
Garner 7
Garwin 3
Gibson 2
Gilbert
Gilbertville 11
Gilman 7
Gilmore City 7
Gladbrook 5
Glidden
Goldfield 14
Goodell 2
Gowrie 6
Grand Junction 12
Granger 14

Grant 2
Gravity
Greene 4
Greenfield 5
Grimes 6
Grinnell 40
Griswold
Grundy Center 10
Guthrie Center 30

Halbur
Hamilton 3
Hampton 27
Hanlontown
Harcourt 3
Harlan 3
Hartford 5
Hartley
Harvey 3
Hawarden
Hedrick 3
Highlandville 2
Holstein
Hubbard 4
Hudson 8
Humboldt 21
Humeston 12
Huxley 4

Ida Grove 5
Independence 3
Indianola 7
Iowa City 31
Iowa Falls 45
Ira 2

Jefferson 43
Jesup 2
Jewell 4

Kalo
Kalona 5
Kanawha 5
Kellerton
Kellogg 10
Kensett
Keokuk 4
Keosauqua 5
Keota 3

Kesley
Kimballton 3
Kiron
Klemme
Knierim
Knoxville 69

Lacona 7
Lake City 4
Lake Mills 3
Lake View 5
Lamoni 4
Lamont
Lanesboro 3
La Porte City 5
Latimer
Laurens 8
Le Claire
Le Grand 11
Lehigh 4
Leland
Lenox
Leon 6
Letts
Lewis 3
Libertyville 5
Linden 7
Lineville 8
Linn Grove
Liscomb
Livermore 6
Lohrville 3
Lone Rock 3
Lone Tree 3
Lorimer 2
Lost Nation
Lovilia 4
Lucas 5
Luther
Lu Verne 2
Lytton 3

Macksburg
Madrid 13
Malcom
Mallard
Malvern
Manchester 2
Manilla

MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE
Iowa Telephone Calls
Page Three

Manly
Manson 11
Mapleton
Marathon 2
Marcus
Marengo 2
Marion 4
Marshalltown 167
Martensdale 3
Marysville 2
Mason City 40
Massena
Maxwell 3
Mediapolis
Melbourne 4
Melcher 13
Melrose 7
Menlo
Milford
Millersburg 2
Millerton
Milo 7
Milton 10
Minburn 7
Mingo 4
Mitchellville 12
Monroe 15
Montezuma 11
Montour
Montrose
Moorland 4
Moravia 5
Morning Sun
Morrison 2
Moulton 6
Mount Ayr 2
Mount Carmel 2
Mount Pleasant 6
Mount Union
Mount Vernon 2
Murray 11
Muscatine 4

Nashua 2
Nevada 20
Newhall
New Hampton 2
New Hartford
New London 2
New Providence 3
New Sharon 14
Newton 121
New Virginia 17
Nora Springs 2
North English 4
North Liberty
Norway 4
Numa

Odebolt 3
Oelwein
Ogden 18
Ollie
Onslow 4
Orange City
Orient 2
Osage 2
Osceola 33
Oskaloosa 64
Otley 3
Ottumwa 102
Oxford

Panora 8
Parkersburg 2
Paton 2
Paullina
Pella 27
Perry 26
Peru
Pilot Mound 4
Pisgah 5
Plainfield
Pleasantville 19
Pocahontas 10
Polk City 3
Pomeroy 3
Popejoy 2
Prairie City 17
Primghar
Prole
Promise City 14
Pulaski 9

Radcliffe 6
Rathbun 2
Readlyn
Reasnor 5
Redfield 2
Red Oak 5
Reinbeck 8
Rembrandt 4
Remsen 2
Renwick
Rhodes 5
Riverside
Rockford
Rockwell 2
Rockwell City 11
Roland 5
Rose Hill 9
Rowan 3
Royal
Rudd 2
Runnells 9
Russell 7
Ruthven
Rutland

Sac City 4
Saint Ansgar
Saint Anthony 2
Saint Charles 4
Saint Marys 5
Saint Paul
Schaller
Scranton 2
Searsboro
Selma 6
Seymour 10
Shambaugh
Sheffield
Sheldon
Shenandoah
Sibley
Sigourney 13
Sioux City 5
Slater 6
Somers
Spencer 15
Spirit Lake
Springville 2
Stanhope 2
Stanton
State Center 7
Steamboat Rock 2
Stockport 10

MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE
Iowa Telephone Calls
Page Four

| | |
|---|---|
| Storm Lake | 16 |
| Story City | 11 |
| Stratford | 3 |
| Strawberry Point | 5 |
| Stuart | 34 |
| Sully | 6 |
| Sumner | 4 |
| Swaledale | 2 |
| Swan | 3 |
| Swea City | 2 |
| Tama | 26 |
| Templeton | 2 |
| Terril | |
| Thayer | |
| Tingley | |
| Tipton | 3 |
| Titonka | 4 |
| Toledo | 18 |
| Tracy | |
| Traer | 9 |
| Trenton | |
| Treynor | |
| Truro | 6 |
| Union | 8 |
| Unionville | |
| Urbana | |
| Urbandale | 2 |
| Vail | |
| Van Horne | 3 |
| Van Meter | 3 |
| Van Wert | |
| Ventura | |
| Victor | 4 |
| Villisca | |
| Vincent | |
| Vinton | 8 |
| Wapello | |
| Washington | 19 |
| Waterloo | 58 |
| Waukee | 20 |
| Waukon | |
| Waverly | 11 |
| Wayland | 5 |
| Webster | 2 |
| Webster City | 55 |
| Weldon | |
| Wellman | 14 |
| Wellsburg | |
| Wesley | |
| West Bend | |
| West Branch | |
| West Grove | |
| Westside | 2 |
| Wever | |
| What Cheer | 13 |
| Whittemore | |
| Whitten | |
| Whittier | |
| Williams | 3 |
| Williamsburg | 4 |
| Williamson | 4 |
| Winterset | 29 |
| Wiota | 2 |
| Woodburn | 5 |
| Woodward | 18 |
| Woolstock | |
| Yale | 3 |
| Zearing | |

WHO

"MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE" NATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS

12:00 Mid.-1:00 a.m., Mon.-Fri.--Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1981


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WASHINGTON
OREGON
CALIFORNIA
5
NEVADA
IDAHO
1
MONTANA
14
WYOMING
19
UTAH
COLORADO
22
ARIZONA
3
NEW MEXICO
3
NORTH DAKOTA
15
SOUTH DAKOTA
8
NEBRASKA
57
KANSAS
38
OKLAHOMA
27
TEXAS
72
MINNESOTA
55
IOWA
8,517
MISSOURI
114
ARKANSAS
31
LOUISIANA
7
WISCONSIN
24
ILLINOIS
48
MICH.
23
IND.
27
OHIO
45
KENTUCKY
13
TENNESSEE
30
MISS.
14
ALA.
20
GEORGIA
11
FLORIDA
7
S. CAR.
N. CAR.
7
VA.
3
W. VA.
3
MD.
4
DEL.
D.C.
PENNSYLVANIA
2
N.J.
NEW YORK
5
VT.
N.H.
MAINE
MASS.
CONN.
R.I.
VIRGIN ISLANDS=1

## "MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE" NATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS

12:00 Midnight-1:00 a.m., Monday-Friday
January 1 through December 31, 1981

### ALABAMA (20)

Anderson
Birmingham 7
Brundidge
Bryant
Carlton 2
Collinsville
Fayette 2
Pell City 2
Russellville
Selma
Tuscaloosa

### ARIZONA (3)

Phoenix
Sun City 2

### ARKANSAS (31)

Batesville
Compton
Conway
Flippin
Fort Smith 11
Huntsville 2
Little Rock 3
Mena 3
Minturn
Pine Bluff
Rogers
Springfield
West Memphis 2
Wynne
Yellville

### CALIFORNIA (5)

Escondido
Los Angeles
Red Bluff
San Francisco 2

### COLORADO (22)

Alamosa
Boulder 2
Canon City 2
Craig 2
Denver 9
Holyoke
Lakewood 2
Loveland
Oak Creek
Sterling

### FLORIDA (7)

Middleburg 2
Ruskin
Saint Augustine
Tampa 2
Walnut Hill

### GEORGIA (11)

Atlanta 7
Fort Valley
Macon
Rome 2

### IDAHO (1)

Caldwell

### ILLINOIS (48)

Chadwick
Chicago 10
Coal Valley
Crescent City
Crossville 2
Dallas City 3
Danville
Decatur
Effingham
Eldorado

### ILLINOIS (continued)

Elmhurst
Freeport
Galesburg
Hudson
Lawrenceville
McHenry 2
Moline
Nauvoo 2
Noble
Norris City
Peoria 3
Quincy
Rock Island 10

### INDIANA (27)

Albion
Auburn
Bloomington 4
Carmel
Chesterton
Columbus 2
Elkhart
Evansville 2
Fort Wayne 3
Indianapolis 5
La Porte
Lafayette
Monticello
Muncie
North Vernon
South Bend

### KANSAS (38)

Atwood 3
Brewster
Conway
Dodge City 2
Emporia
Harlan
Junction City
Leavenworth 4
Manhattan 14

MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE
National Telephone Calls
Page Two

### KANSAS (continued)

Nashville
Saint George
Saint John
Wichita 7

### KENTUCKY (13)

Bowling Green
Central City 3
Georgetown 2
Glasgow
Pikeville 2
Princeton 2
Rockfield 2

### LOUISIANA (7)

Alexandria
Calhoun
Lake Charles 3
New Orleans 2

### MARYLAND (4)

Baltimore 4

### MICHIGAN (23)

Albion
Benton Harbor
Detroit 5
East Tawas
Escanaba
Ishpeming
Kalamazoo
Lansing 4
Lincoln Park 2
Memphis
Port Huron
Saint Joseph
Scotts
Sparta

### MINNESOTA (55)

Albert Lea 5
Austin 7
Avoca
Barnum
Blooming Prairie
Blue Earth
Brooklyn Center
Crookston
Fairmont
Glencoe
Hopkins
Hutchinson 15
Madelia
Minneapolis 8
Mora
Oklee
Park Rapids 2
Round Lake
Saint Paul 4
Sauk Centre
Sturgeon Lake

### MISSISSIPPI (14)

Bruce
Cleveland
Crawford 2
Ellisville
Hattiesburg
Jackson 2
Meridian
Oxford
Pittsboro
Summit
Tupelo
Waynesboro

### MISSOURI (114)

Albany
Bethany 3
Blythedale
Brookfield
Buffalo
Cabool
Cainsville
Carthage 7
Coffey
Downing 2
Eagleville
Edina
Edwards
El Dorado Springs
Fenton
Grant City 5
Green City
Hamilton
Hatfield
Humansville
Independence
Jefferson City 2
Kahoka
Kansas City 19
Kennett
Kingston
Kirksville 2
La Grange
Lake Ozark 2
Lanagan
Lancaster 2
Lucerne 5
Madison
Mercer 3
Milar
Milo
Moberly
Mountain View 5
Ozark
Pittsburg
Powersville 2
Princeton 2
Queen City 4
Redford
Rockport
Rolla
Round Spring

MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE
National Telephone Calls
Page Three

### MISSOURI (continued)

Saint Joseph
Saint Louis 2
Sedalia
Springfield 4
Sulphur Springs
Trenton 2
Unionville 2
Warsaw
Wayland
Worthington 2

### MONTANA (14)

Billings 4
Colstrip
Ekalaka
Fairfiew 2
Great Falls
Havre
Miles City 4

### NEBRASKA (57)

Alliance 2
Atkinson
Auburn
Butte
Hastings
Hay Springs
Indianola
Lincoln 7
North Platte 3
Omaha 16
O'Neill
Plattsmouth 2
Potter 11
Royal
Scottsbluff
Sidney 2
Valentine 2
Western
Whiteclay
York

### NEW MEXICO (3)

Albuquerque
Farmington
Trementina

### NEW YORK (5)

Horseheads 2
New York 3

### NORTH CAROLINA (6)

Asheville
Fort Bragg 4
Highlands

### NORTH DAKOTA (15)

Bismarck
Burnstad
Dickinson 2
Fairfield 2
Grand Forks 4
Jamestown 2
Minot 2

### OHIO (45)

Barberton
Cincinnati
Cleveland 2
Columbus 3
Dayton
Delaware
Graytown
Hamilton
Hubbard
La Rue
Toledo 31
Youngstown

### OKLAHOMA (27)

Ada
Alva
Broken Bow
Carter
Checotah
Guymon
Hartshorne
Lawton 2
McAlester
Oklahoma City 3
Owasso 3
Shattuck
Shawnee
Tryon
Tulsa 7
Watson

### PENNSYLVANIA (2)

Pittsburgh 2

### SOUTH DAKOTA (8)

Black Hawk 2
McIntosh
Pierre 2
Wagner
Wessington Springs
Whitewood

### TENNESSEE (30)

Briceville
Chattanooga
Columbia 7
Dyersburg 2
Elizebethton
Huntingdon 2
Jackson
Martin
Memphis 3
Nashville 6
Paris
Ripley
Shelbyville 2
Trenton

MIDNIGHT EXCHANGE
National Telephone Calls
Page Four

### TEXAS (72)

Abilene
Amarillo 5
Arlington
Austin
Baytown
Beaumont
Brownfield
Cleveland 2
Dallas 8
Dublin 2
Elkhart
Farwell 3
Fort Worth 6
Galveston 3
Gonzales
Hereford
Houston 8
Huntington
Liberty 2
Lubbock 9
McKinney
Mesquite
Midland
New Boston
Odessa
Paris 2
Sweetwater
Temple 3
Texarkana 2
Wolfforth

### VIRGIN ISLANDS (1)

Saint Thomas

### VIRGINIA (3)

Richmond 3

### WEST VIRGINIA (3)

Asbury
Charleston
Colliers

### WISCONSIN (24)

Antigo
Black River Falls
Columbus
Milwaukee 3
Osceola
Spooner 14
Waupaca
Weyauwega 2

### WYOMING (19)

Casper 8
Lusk 6
Medicine Bow
Pinedale
Sheridan 2
Torrington

### ONTARIO, CANADA (6)

Kenora
Kingston
Listol 3
Toronto

### QUEBEC, CANADA (1)

Montreal

### SASKATCHEWAN, CANADA (3)

Regina 2
(town not specified) 1

## INITIAL CORRESPONDENCE AND REPLIES

PALMER COMMUNICATIONS INC.,
*Des Moines, Iowa, October 23, 1981.*

Hon. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY,
U.S. SENATE,
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CHUCK: As you know, Station WHO, operating from Des Moines, Iowa, has for more than 55 years provided a valuable broadcast service, day and night, to the residents of the entire State of Iowa. The station's extensive coverage of farm topics and news during the early morning hours has been especially important to the agricultural population it serves and has been the source of a variety of awards. In large part this wide area coverage has been possible because Station WHO has operated on a Class I-A clear channel frequency, 1040 kHz, and the FCC has never allowed another station to broadcast on that frequency during the nighttime hours. WHO has been conscious of the significant benefits its nighttime operation has provided to the people of the State of Iowa, and over the years has participated in numerous FCC proceedings and expended large sums of money to preserve its clear channel status.

Presently, we are concerned because of apparently reliable information coming to our attention to the effect that the Federal government, through the Voice of America or a similar agency, contemplates setting up a broadcast operation on 1040 kHz somewhere in the Florida Keys, beamed toward the Caribbean area. Apparently, this is occurring outside the processes of the FCC.

We are aware that the national interest may well be served by our government having the ability to disseminate broadcast information in this area of the Western Hemisphere. However, the people of Iowa would be irreparably damaged if this were done in a manner that would adversely affect the ability of Station WHO to serve its present coverage area. Therefore, may I request that you look into this matter to determine if our information is substantially accurate. If it is, we would hope responsible officials could be urged to make every effort to find and utilize a frequency other than 1040 kHz, or, at a minimum, if this is not possible and use of that frequency can be justified as absolutely necessary, to make certain the proposed station is designed and operated in such a manner to prevent degradation of the WHO service.

We shall appreciate your investigating this matter, and look forward to hearing from you. If you have any questions that we may answer, please feel free to call me.

Sincerely,

ROBERT H. HARTER.

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PALMER COMMUNICATIONS INC.,
*Des Moines, Iowa, October 23, 1981.*

Hon. ROGER JEPSEN,
*U.S. Senate,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR ROGER: As you know, Station WHO, operating from Des Moines, Iowa, has for more than 55 years provided a valuable broadcast service, day and night, to the residents of the entire state of Iowa. The station's extensive coverage of farm topics and news during the early morning hours has been especially important to the agricultural population it serves and has been the source of a variety of awards. In large part this wide area coverage has been possible because Station WHO has operated on a Class I-A clear channel frequency, 1040 kHz, and the FCC has never allowed another station to broadcast on that frequency during the nighttime hours. WHO has been conscious of the significant benefits its nighttime operation has provided to the people of the state of Iowa, and over the years has participated in numerous FCC proceedings and expended large sums of money to preserve its clear channel status.

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Western Hemisphere. However, the people of Iowa would be irreparably damaged if this were done in a manner that would adversely affect the ability of Station WHO to serve its present coverage area. Therefore, may I request that you look into this matter to determine if our information is substantially accurate. If it is, we would hope responsible officials could be urged to make every effort to find and utilize a frequency other than 1040 kHz, or, at a minimum, if this is not possible and use of that frequency can be justified as absolutely necessary, to make certain the proposed station is designed and operated in such a manner to prevent degradation of the WHO service.

We shall appreciate your investigating this matter, and look forward to hearing from you. If you have any questions that we may answer, please feel free to call me.

Sincerely,

ROBERT H. HARTER.

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PALMER COMMUNICATIONS INC.,
*Des Moines, Iowa, November 5, 1981.*

Mr. KIRK FERRELL,
*Administrative Assistant, Office of Hon. Roger W. Jepsen,*
*U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR KIRK: We appreciate your and Senator Jepsen's interest in our concern about the Federal government's possible use of WHO's Class I-A Clear Channel frequency of 1040 kHz. We understand a Federal agency contemplates use of the frequency for a broadcast service beamed toward the Caribbean area, via a facility to be located in the Florida Keys. You indicated Assistant Secretary of State Enders confirmed the latter as the probable location, but was unable to provide you with any additional information.

As I mentioned, the "Voice of America" did make use of WHO's frequency on a previous occasion during, and prior to, the Kennedy Administration. The facility employed on that occasion was also beamed toward the Caribbean area. Although its transmission was directionalized toward that specific area, it did degrade WHO's nighttime signal, and thus its service to listeners in the southeastern area of the country.

I am enclosing a map reflecting the perimeters of the present nighttime signal of WHO, and that which would be generated by another station operating on WHO's frequency, with a "non-directional" antenna, and like power of 50,000 watts, from a location in the Florida Keys. Within the area overlapped by both contours, designated "Interference Zone", the signals of each station, i.e., WHO and the proposed facility, would set up a level of interference with one another precluding satisfactory reception of either. There would also be a secondary area, extending well beyond this primary "Interference Zone", in which reception of either station would be difficult, at best. The contour appearing on the map presumes the proposed facility would operate with no more than 50,000 watts power. If its power authorization exceeds that level, the perimeter of its primary, let alone secondary coverage area would extend considerably beyond that reflected on the map. That would set up intolerable interference levels within a far larger portion of the area now covered by WHO's nighttime signal. And in that regard, it is important to remember a considerable portion of WHO's "nighttime" service to its rural and agricultural audience is rendered during presunrise, or "nighttime" hours, i.e., 5:00–6:30 AM. Interference with its signal during those hours would adversely affect its ability to continue its award winning service to rural America.

We recognize the possible need of the Federal government to render a broadcast service to the Carribean area. Should such a need prevail, we respectfully request consideration be given to the use of a frequency other than that of WHO. If that is not possible, we then request every effort be made to design and operate the proposed facility in such a manner as to prevent degradation of WHO's service.

I hope you and Senator Jepsen will find this helpful.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

ROBERT H. HARTER.

PALMER COMMUNICATIONS INC.,
*Des Moines, Iowa, November 9, 1981.*

Mr. KIRK FERRELL,
*Administrative Assistant, Office of Hon. Roger W. Jepsen,*
*U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR KIRK: As an addendum to my letter of November 5, I am enclosing a copy of a letter, and enclosures, Mr. William F. Rust, Jr., President of Rust Communications Group, Inc., recently addressed to Mr. Sol Taishoff, Chairman and Editor of Broadcasting Publications, Inc. I believe you and Senator Jepsen will also find this of interest when reviewing our concern over the possible use of WHO's frequency of 1040 kHz by the Federal government. Mr. Rust is a long-time friend and widely recognized as one of our industry's foremost executive engineers.

In his letter to Mr. Taishoff, Mr. Rust raises the question of why the Federal government should build "another" station to provide a radio service to the Carribean area, when they already have a high powered, directionalized facility performing that function from a site at Marathon, Florida. Mr. Rust is quite familiar with that operation, as it employs the former Class I-A, Clear Channel frequency of 1180 kHz assigned to his station, WHAM, Rochester, New York. He specifically mentions interference WHAM has suffered from the jamming tactics Cuban stations employ to interfere with reception of the Marathon station in that country. They would undoubtedly resort to similar tactics to preclude reception of any programming broadcast via 1040 kHz. That would set up "additional" levels of interference to the WHO signal.

I hope you and Senator Jepsen will find this additional documentation of reasons for our concern helpful. If you wish or need additional information, please call me.

Thank you again for your and the Senator's interest.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

ROBERT H. HARTER.

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NOVEMBER 3, 1981.

Mr. ROBERT HARTER,
*WHO Radio,*
*Des Moines, Iowa.*

DEAR BOB: I thought that you might be interested in the attached papers.

Regards,

W. F. RUST, Jr.

RUST COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, INC.,
*Leesburg, Va., November 3, 1981.*

Mr. SOL TAISHOFF,
*Editor, Broadcasting Publications, Inc.,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SOL: There seems to be nothing new under the sun, and the same political boondoggles are rediscovered again and again. Why must we spend millions to build "Radio Marti" to propagandize Cuba, when we have had a "Radio Marti" operating at Marathon on the Florida Keys since 1962? This is a high powered AM station with a directional antenna aimed at Cuba and operated by the Voice of America. It has been broadcasting the "truth" to Cuba on WHAM's formerly Clear Channel of 1180 kHz ever since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The operation has been in violation of FCC allocations and international treaties. After many years of effort, WHAM gave up the struggle to get the Marathon station closed down. I understand that it is now broadcasting only between 7-10 AM and 5-8 PM. Although the VOA station is directional and protects WHAM somewhat, Castro has used jammers operating on 1180 kHz which interfere in all directions.

Several stations were built during the Cuban missile crisis that were like the Marathon operation. One was operated by the Navy on 1040 kHz (WHO's frequency), but was later abandoned after severe hurricane damage. There were one or two more similar stations, but all were soon abandoned except the one on 1180 kHz at Marathon. It has been costing the taxpayers money and interfering with WHAM illegally for 19 years. President Reagan's budget balancers could save the taxpayers some money by either using the Marathon installation for "Radio Marti" or by closing it down.

WHAM worked hard from 1962 to 1966 to get this albatross off of 1180 kHz but we got nowhere. The attached letter from John Chancellor, when he was Director of the Voice of America, is typical. We raised serious questions but we got no answers or action to help the situation.

I have enjoyed all of the radio broadcasting history in recent issues of "Broadcasting." In retrospect, I find it incredible that American Industry spent almost nothing on developing radio and electronics technology during the 20 years prior to World War II.

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM F. RUST, Jr.

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VOICE OF AMERICA,
U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
*Washington, D.C., December 28, 1966.*

Mr. W. F. RUST, Jr.,
*Rust Broadcasting Co., Inc.,*
*Rochester, N.Y.*

DEAR BILL: I have passed your letter of December 21st on to our USIA General Counsel, Dick Schmidt. We'll be going over carefully the various points you have made, and we'll get back to you after the first of the year.

You write well. I'm sorry that more of the mail I read isn't this well done, but I'm happy that very little of my correspondence raises problems as knotty as yours.

Very sincerely yours,

JOHN CHANCELLOR,
*Director.*

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U.S. SENATE,
*Washington, D.C., November 12, 1981.*

Mr. ROBERT H. HARTER,
*President, Palmer Communications, Inc.,*
*Des Moines, Iowa.*

DEAR BOB: Thank you for alerting me to the possibility of another radio station in the Florida Keys being able to broadcast on 1040 kHz. I have contacted the Federal Communications Commission about this matter and will let you know as soon as I have a response.

Sincerely,

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY,
*U.S. Senator.*

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U.S. SENATE,
*Washington, D.C., November 12, 1981.*

Mr. ROBERT HARTER,
*President, Palmer Communications, Inc.,*
*Des Moines, Iowa.*

DEAR ROBERT: Thank you for your correspondence regarding the possible use by the federal government of WHO's I-A Clear Channel frequency of 1040 kHz.

My office has contacted the Department of State concerning your inquiry. As soon as a response is received, we will be in touch with you.

Sincerely,

ROGER W. JEPSEN,
*U.S. Senator.*

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U.S. SENATE,
*Washington, D.C., January 7, 1982.*

Mr. ROBERT HARTER,
*President, Palmer Communications, Inc.,*
*Des Moines, Iowa.*

DEAR ROBERT: Enclosed is a copy of a response received from the Department of State concerning the federal government's use of WHO's Class I-A clear channel frequency of 1040 kHz.

I hope the information is helpful. If my office can be of further assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely,

ROGER W. JEPSEN,
*U.S. Senator.*

Enclosure.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
*Washington, D.C., December 29, 1981.*

Hon. ROGER W. JEPSEN,
*U.S. Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR JEPSEN: I am responding to your letters of November 12 and 17 to Assistant Secretary Fairbanks regarding the concern expressed by Palmer Communications, Inc., about the Federal Government's proposed use of 1040 kHz for broadcasting to Cuba.

The frequency 1040 kHz is tentatively selected for use by Radio Broadcasting to Cuba after a careful examination of alternative frequencies in coordination with the Federal Communications Commission and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration. It is intended that the antenna array will be designed to provide maximum feasible protection to station WHO's service area.

Use of the VOA station at Marathon, Florida, was considered and rejected because such use would be inconsistent with the legislated purpose of VOA. Although VOA is broadcasting to Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, there is an essential difference between the programming mandates of VOA and Radio Broadcasting to Cuba. The VOA is charged with the general reporting of events throughout the world, including the United States. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba will focus on Cuba by telling the truth to the Cuban people about their government's domestic mismanagement and its promotion of subversion and international terrorism in this Hemisphere and elsewhere, and it will tell the Cuban people what these activities cost in terms of living standards for them and their children and will correct the false image they have been given of Cuba's international reputation.

I hope this information will be useful to you.

Yours sincerely,

ALVIN P. DRISCHLER,
*Deputy Assistant Secretary*
*for Congressional Relations.*

Enclosure: Correspondence returned.

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U.S. SENATE,
*Washington, D.C., February 8, 1982.*

Mr. ROBERT H. HARTER,
*President, Palmer Communications Inc.,*
*Des Moines, Iowa.*

DEAR BOB: Enclosed please find the letter I received from the Department of State regarding a new radio station broadcasting to Cuba. I hope this addresses some of your concerns about this issue and that you will let me know if there is anything else I can do for you.

Sincerely,

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY,
*U.S. Senator.*

Enclosure.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
*Washington, D.C., February 1, 1982.*

Hon. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY,
*U.S. Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR GRASSLEY: I refer to your January 5 letter to Assistant Secretary Thomas Enders on behalf of Mr. Robert H. Harter concerning Radio Broadcasting to Cuba (RBC), commonly called Radio Marti.

The President has announced his intention to establish a program of A.M. broadcasting to Cuba, and Senator Percy introduced legislation to that effect in the Senate November 16. While no final decision on a frequency has been made, 1040 kHz is under definite consideration. Those involved are quite sensitive to the interests of other broadcasters, especially U.S. commercial stations such as WHO. Every effort will be made to protect their interests, including the use of highly directional antennae.

Mr. Harter's concerns will be brought to the attention of the President's Commission on Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, which may well wish to discuss them with him.

Sincerely,

ALVIN PAUL DRISCHLER,
*Acting Assistant Secretary*
*for Congressional Relations.*

Enclosure: Correspondence returned.

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[H.R. 5427, 97th Cong., 2d sess.]

A BILL To authorize support to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the Congress hereby finds and declares—

(a) that it is the policy of the United States to support the right of the people of Cuba "to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers," in accordance with article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) that, consonant with this policy, Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, in its planned broadcasting to Cuba, may be effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas to the people of Cuba, and in particular accurate information about Cuba; and

(c) that such broadcasting by Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, operating in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States and in accordance with high professional standards, would be in the national interest.

SEC. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the purposes of this Act $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1982, and for fiscal year 1983 such funds as may be necessary.

SEC. 3. Funds or other support authorized by the Act may be granted to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, only upon the following conditions:

(a) that Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, is operating in a manner not inconsistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States and in accordance with high professional standards and in the national interest; and

(b) that Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, keeps records which fully disclose the source and use of support provided pursuant to this Act, or from any other person or organization, which are available at all times to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller General for the purpose of audit or examination or for any other purpose.

SEC. 4. Pending the statutory designation of an appropriate Federal granting and oversight agency, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for making grants of funds and for approving other support authorized by this Act. The Secretary shall determine when the conditions of section 3 have been met and shall have authority to establish such other terms and conditions as he deems appropriate.

SEC. 5. When Federal funds have been made available to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, pursuant to this Act, any agency or instrumentality of the United States is authorized to sell, loan, lease, or grant property (including interests therein) to, and to perform administrative and technical support and services for the operations of Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, and the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba on a reimbursable basis or, at the direction of the President, without reimbursement. Any reimbursement shall be credited to the appropriation from which the support or services were derived.

SEC. 6. The Secretary of State is authorized to accept and use, on behalf of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, donations of funds, property, and services of any kind, which may be made available for the purposes of the Commission and of this Act.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Engelhardt.

Mr. Eddens?

## STATEMENT OF JAMES R. EDDENS, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, RADIO STATION WOW, OMAHA, NEBR.

Mr. EDDENS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Jim Eddens. I am vice president and general manager of Radio Station WOW in Omaha, Nebr. I appear before this committee as a representative of one of the 200 AM stations that has been or will be affected by Cuban interference.

According to a study done by the National Association of Broadcasters, Station WOW will lose interference-free coverage from its present 2.9 millivolt per meter down to 5.01 millivolts per meter. This is an approximately 49 percent loss of our nighttime and predawn interference-free area. The WOW signal will be reduced in area from 19,300 square miles to 9,700 square miles.

Like Station WHO in Des Moines, we furnish large amounts of news, market reports and farm information to a nighttime and presunrise area covering portions of five States. As recently as last week, we received a listening report from a man in Minnesota in which he mentioned Cuban interference to our signal. Even though this report was from beyond our normal interference-free area, it shows that the Cuban station is already there and operating at some significant power.

Having read the response prepared for this committee as well as other current information, it is my strong opinion that Radio Marti will do nothing but aggravate an already serious interference problem to commercial broadcasters.

Station WOW is owned and operated by the Meredith Corp., whose corporate headquarters are at Des Moines, Iowa. Meredith Corp. is a publicly owned communications corporation which publishes Better Homes and Gardens, Successful Farming, Metropolitan Home and Sail magazines, and is active in a wide range of printing, publishing, and home service activities.

In addition to Station WOW, Meredith Corp. is the licensee of sister Station KEZO–FM, Omaha and stations WGST–AM and WPCH–FM in Atlanta, Ga., KCMO–AM and KCEZ–FM, Kansas City, Mo. Meredith is also the licensee of television broadcast stations at Syracuse, N.Y., Bay City-Saginaw-Flint, Mich., Pittsburgh, Pa., and Kansas City, Mo., and is a minority owner of a television station at Orlando, Fla.

I wish to begin my statement by saying that I fully understand that the issue of Radio Marti involves questions of the foreign policy and, ultimately, the security of the United States, which I do not think myself competent to address. My purpose in coming before you today is to emphasize that, in addition to those issues, there are other issues presented by this proposal that are significant in terms of the public interest. I hope that my testimony here will help this committee by drawing attention to domestic matters of importance which might not receive adequate attention.

In the earlier hearings before this committee and in the House of Representatives, the basic facts regarding the potential impact of the Radio Marti proposal on our domestic broadcast industry have been established.

The selection of the frequency 1040 kHz for the high powered transmission facility in the Florida Keys will present a threat to the nighttime skywave service area of class I–A clear channel station WHO, Des Moines, Iowa. With adequate directional antenna facilities, the Radio Marti transmitter can provide adequate protection to that service.

The greater threat to station WHO comes not from Radio Marti, itself, but from the likely efforts of Cuba to jam Radio Martis transmissions. Cuba has been reported to have used various jamming techniques against U.S. stations in the past, and may be expected to resort to similar measures against Radio Marti, at least on an intermittent basis, in the future. Given the amount of power which will be necessary effectively to jam Radio Marti's signal and the direction in which that power must be transmitted, interference to station WHO is predictable.

It is important for this committee to realize that this issue affects more than station WHO or only clear channel stations and secondary nighttime skywave services in the United States. It affects a wide range of AM broadcast services throughout the country. In fact, to put it more accurately, the possible impact of Radio Marti on our relations with Cuba has the potential of adversely affecting the quality of domestic AM radio service to the residents throughout the United States.

The larger threat to AM stations in the United States is not the result of the Radio Marti proposal or the prospect of Cuban jamming. That threat comes from the proposals of Cuba to expand its use of the AM band in a manner which goes far beyond what may reasonably be considered necessary to serve Cuba's domestic needs.

In the context of the negotiations of the region 2 medium wave broadcast agreement concluded last year, Cuba proposed a large number of new stations and major changes in existing stations, some with powers from 3 to 10 times higher than the highest power permitted stations in the United States. If implemented, those proposals will create havoc among U.S. AM broadcast stations and the public which they serve.

The AM stations owned and operated by Meredith Corp. are typical of the broad range of regional broadcast stations which will be adversely affected should Cuba make good on its proposal to add numbers of new high powered nondirectional AM stations for the stated purpose of improving "domestic" service within Cuba.

Station WOW in Omaha is a class III–A station which has been in operation continuously since April 1923. As a class III–A station, it is one of only two regional stations in the United States which operate with 5-kW power both day and night without use of a directional antenna. Its superior facilities permit WOW to provide groundwave service to the five-State area described above. Cuba has proposed to build and may already have built a 150-kW nondirectional station on WOW's frequency of 590 kHz.

As the NAB study shows, if Cuba makes good on that threat, WOW will lose approximately one-half of its primary nighttime service area. There are 19 other nighttime operations on 590 kHz in the continental United States. Many will also experience severe day or nighttime interference if the Cuban notification is implemented.

Meredith Station KCMO, Kansas City, Mo., is a class II station which operates on class I–B frequency 810 kHz with power of 50 kW by day and 5 kW at night, employing a directional antenna at night.

It has been in operation since June 1936. Cuba has proposed to begin a new nondirectional 10-kW operation on 810 kHz. A 10-kW nighttime operation on that frequency will surely have an adverse impact on KCMO and on such stations as WGY, Schenectady, N.Y., which is the dominant signal on that channel in the Eastern United States.

The third AM station owned by the Meredith Corp. is station WGST, Atlanta, Ga. WGST is a class III–A station, which operates on 920 kHz with 5 kW daytime and 1 kW at night. It has been on the air since March 1922.

Let me press on with the matter.

In concluding with this testimony, it appears to me, as it appears to many other broadcasters, that the only way to reach a solution to the Cuban interference problem is to sit down with Cuba and work out our differences. The facts are that Cuba can achieve most, and perhaps all, of what it wants in ways which are consistent with our own self interest. There appears to be a basis for fruitful negotiations provided we take care not to let the broader issues which divide us get in the way.

If we must await a general settlement of all of the grievances between Cuba and the United States before we can address the problem of Cuban interference to the United States, it appears to me that the chances of resolving that issue are slim.

The United States has worked with Cuba on ad hoc problems such as aircraft hijacking. Direct bilateral negotiation of the AM radio issue should at least be tried.

My fear is that, if Radio Marti becomes a reality, a solution to the AM interference problem will become much more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. That is the dilemma which faces this committee. A decision to authorize and to fund Radio Marti may mean the American people will have to accept a substantial degradation in the quality of their AM service, particularly at night. The benefits to be received from implementing the Radio Marti plan may outweigh the cost of degrading AM radio service.

That is an assessment which I am not in a position to make. But one thing is sure. Radio Marti will not come cheaply.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Eddens prepared statement follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES R. EDDENS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: My name is Jim Eddens. I am Vice President and General Manager of Radio Station WOW, Omaha, Nebraska. I appear before this Committee as a representative of one of the 200 AM stations that has been or will be affected by Cuban interference.

According to a study done by the National Association of Broadcasters, Station WOW will lose interference-free coverage from its present 2.9 millivolt per meter down to 5.01 millivolts per meter. This is an approximately 49 percent loss of our nighttime and pre-dawn interference free area. The WOW signal will be reduced in area from 19,300 square miles to 9.700 square miles.

Like Station WHO in Des Moines, we furnish large amounts of news, market reports and farm information to a nighttime and to a pre-sunrise area covering portions of five states. As recently as last week, we received a listening report from a man in Minnesota in which he mentioned Cuban interference to our signal. Even though this report was from beyond our normal interference-free area, it shows the Cuban station is already there and operating at some significant power. Having read the response prepared for this Committee as well as other current information, it is my strong opinion that Radio Marti will do nothing but aggravate an already serious interference problem to commerical broadcasters.

Station WOW is owned and operated by Meredith Corporation, whose corporate headquarters are at Des Moines, Iowa. Meredith Corporation is a publicly owned communications corporation which publishes Better Homes and Gardens, Successful Farming, Metropolitan Home and Sail magazines and is active in a wide range of printing, publishing and home services activities. In addition to Station WOW, Meredith Corporation is the licensee of sister Station KEZO (FM), Omaha, and Stations WGST–AM and WPCH–FM, Atlanta, Georgia, KCMO(AM) and KCEZ(FM), Kansas City, Missouri. Meredith is also the licensee of television broadcast stations at Syracuse, New York, Bay City-Saginaw-Flint, Michigan, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Kansas City, Missouri, and is a minority owner of a television station at Orlando, Florida.

I wish to begin my statement by saying that I fully understand that the issue of Radio Marti involves questions of the foreign policy and, ultimately, the security of the United States, which I do not think myself competent to address. My purpose in coming before you today is to emphasize that, in addition to those issues, there are other issues presented by this proposal that are significant in terms of the public interest. I hope that my testimony here will help this Committee by drawing attention to domestic matters of importance which might not receive adequate attention.

In the earlier hearings before this Committee and in the House of Representatives, the basic facts regarding the potential impact of the Radio Marti proposal on our domestic broadcast industry have been established. The selection of the frequency 1040 kHz for the high powered transmission facility in the Florida Keys will present a threat to the nighttime skywave service area of Class I–A Channel Station WHO, Des Moines, Iowa. With adequate directional antenna facilities, the Radio Marti transmitter can provide adequate protection to that service. The greater threat to Station WHO comes not from Radio Marti, itself, but from the likely efforts of Cuba to jam Radio Marti's transmissions. Cuba has been reported to have used various jamming techniques against United States stations in the past, and may be expected to resort to similar measures against Radio Marti, at least on an intermittent basis, in the future. Given the amount of power which will be necessary effectively to jam Radio Marti signal and the direction in which that power must be transmitted, interference to Station WHO is predictable.

It is important for this Committee to realize that this issue affects more than Station WHO or only Clear Channel stations and secondary nighttime skywave services in the United States. It affects a wide range of AM broadcast services throughout the country. In fact, to put it more accurately, the possible impact of Radio Marti on our relations with Cuba has the potential of adversely affecting the quality of domestic AM radio service to residents throughout the United States.

The larger threat to AM stations in the United States is not the result of the Radio Marti proposal or the prospect of Cuban jamming. That threat comes from the proposals of Cuba to expand its use of the AM band in a manner which goes far beyond what may reasonably be considered necessary to serve Cuba's domestic needs. In the context of the negotiations of the Region 2 Medium Wave Broadcast Agreement concluded last year, Cuba proposed a large number of new stations and major changes in existing stations, some with powers from three to ten times higher than the highest power permitted stations in the United States. If implemented, those proposals will create havoc among United States AM broadcast stations and the public which they serve.

The AM stations owned and operated by Meredith Corporation are typical of the broad range of Regional broadcast stations which will be adversely affected should Cuba make good on its proposal to add numbers of new high powered nondirectional AM stations for the stated purpose of improving "domestic" service within Cuba.

Station WOW in Omaha in a Class III–A station which has been in operation continuously since April 1923. As a Class III–A station, it is one of only two regional stations in the United States which operate with five kilowatts power both day and night without use of a directional antenna. Its superior facilities permit WOW to provide groundwave service to the five state area described above. Cuba has proposed to build and may already have built a 150 kW nondirectional station on WOW's frequency 590 kHz. As the NAB study shows, if Cuba makes good on that threat, WOW will lose approximately one-half of its primary nighttime service area. There are 19 other nighttime operations on 590 kHz in the continental United States. Many will also experience severe day or nighttime interference if the Cuban notification is implemented.

Meredith Station KCMO, Kansas City, Missouri, is a Class II station which operates on Class I-B frequency 810 kHz with power of 50 kW day and 5 kW night, employing a directional antenna at night. It has been in operation since June 1936. Cuba has proposed to begin a new nondirectional 10 kW operation on 810 kHz. A 10 kW nighttime operation on that frequency will surely have an adverse impact on KCMO and on such stations as WGY, Schenectady, New York, which is the dominant signal on the channel in the eastern United States.

The third AM station owned by Meredith Corporation is Station WGST, Atlanta, Georgia. WGST is a Class III-A station, which operates on 920 kHz with 5 kW daytime and 1 kW at night. It has been on the air since March 1922. Cuba has proposed to build a new station on 920 kHz to operate nondirectionally with power of 10 kW at Camaguey in central Cuba. Because of the relative closeness of Atlanta to Camaguey, it is expected that the new Cuba operations will reduce the nighttime primary service area of WGST from 277.9 square miles to 179 square miles, a loss of 35.6 percent. In addition to WGST, there are 26 fulltime AM stations in the continental United States which will to a greater or lesser extent experience increased interference from this new Cuban proposal.

What strikes me as being so significant is the fact that what is true for Meredith's three AM stations is true for many, many more stations throughout the country. If Cuba goes ahead with its announced plans, there will be a major adverse impact on the quality of radio services which the people of the United States will receive. In many cases stations which have been relied on for years for news, weather and other program services will no longer be receivable because of Cuban interference.

As I hope you can see, we are not talking just about WHO's secondary service area or even the primary service areas of a handful of stations in Florida, but literally hundreds of stations throughout the country. The adverse impact of Cuban interference will be felt by listeners who will be numbered in the millions. It is obvious that a solution to the problem of Cuban intereference to AM radio reception in the United States is a subject deserving of priority treatment at every level of government.

During the course of the Region 8 negotiations, members of the United States Delegation had several opportunities to discuss with members of the Cuban delegation the effects of the Cuban proposals and potential alternative measures which would reduce the threat to our stations. While such contacts did not mature into a Cuban compromise, some of those who participated in those discussions believe that there are engineering means available which will permit the Cubans to achieve their domestic service goals with a minimum impact on stations in the United States.

It is probably too much to say that the United States proposal to construct Radio Marti alone caused Cuba to walk out on the Region 2 negotiations. There were obviously other factors not the least of which was Cuba's defeat in the final days of the Conference when it tried to make 48 changes in its proposals for the purpose of solving interference problems with Mexico, Venezuela and other Latin countries at the expense of the United States. However, it is not too much to say that the Radio Marti proposal, which had received widespread publicity shortly before Cuba's walkout, contributed to Cuba's decision or, at least, provided a pretext for it. In either exent, Radio Marti is clearly an issue which arouses strong emotions within the Cuban government.

It appears to me, as it appears to many broadcasters that the only way to reach a solution to the Cuban interference problem is to sit down with Cuba and work out our differences. The facts are that Cuba can achieve most, and perhaps all, of what it wants in ways which are consistent with our own self interest. There appears to be a basis for fruitful negotiations provided we take care not to let the broader issues which divide us get in the way. If we must await a general settlement of all of the grievance between Cuba and the United States before we can address the problem of Cuban interference to the United States, it appears to me that the chances of resolving that issue are slim indeed. The United States has worked with Cuba on ad hoc problems such as aircraft hijacking. Direct bilateral negotiation of the AM radio issue should at least be tried.

My fear is that, if Radio Marti becomes a reality, a solution to the AM interference problem will become much more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. That is the dilemma which faces this Committee. A decision to authorize and fund Radio Marti may mean that the American people will have to accept a substantial degradation in the quality of their AM service, particularly at night. The benefit to be received from implementing the Radio Marti plan may out-

**weigh the cost of degraded AM radio service. That is an assessment which I am not in a position to make. But one thing is sure. Radio Marti will not come cheaply.**

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Eddens. Now comes my North Carolina friend.

## STATEMENT OF CY N. BAHAKEL, JR., DIRECTOR OF RADIO OPERATIONS, BAHAKEL COMMUNICATIONS, CHARLOTTE, N.C.

Mr. BAHAKEL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Cy N. Bahakel, Jr., and I am the director of radio operations of Bahakel Communications. Our company owns and operates a number of communications enterprises including 11 radio stations located throughout the United States. On behalf of our company, I thank you for permitting us this opportunity to appear and share our views with you.

Our company is headquartered in Charlotte, N.C. Among the broadcast stations that we operate are AM radio stations KXEL located in Waterloo, Iowa, and WDOD located in Chattanooga, Tenn., and it is on behalf of these two specific stations that I am appearing today.

While neither of these two stations operates on the frequency to be used by Radio Marti, both stations would receive increased technical interference if the Cuban Government should implement its threat to increase the number and power of its AM radio stations.

As you know, at the Region II World Administrative Radio Conference held last December, Cuba announced its intention to increase dramatically the power of many of its existing AM stations and to build 90 new AM stations. If that happens, the result could be devastating to AM broadcast service in the United States. This would result in a significant loss of AM service to the American people, and it would have serious financial consequences for many of those stations affected.

The extent of technical interference that would be sustained by AM stations throughout the United States, including our two stations, has been impressively documented in an engineering study commissioned by the National Association of Broadcasters. I understand this study has been filed with the committee and we recommend it for your careful consideration.

The question American radio broadcasters—and I am sure the members of this committee—are asking at this moment is whether the establishment of Radio Marti would have any effect on Cuba's pending threat to increase the power and number of its radio stations. No one, of course, at this time, knows the answer to this question. I have confidence in the Congress and the State Department to determine what nexus, if any, exists between those two issues.

Those of us in the broadcasting industry are, naturally, very concerned that the establishment of Radio Marti at this time might only serve to promote the Cuban Government into carrying through with its plan. We are aware, of course, that the problem of Cuban interference is not new and that it existed long before Radio Marti was first proposed. But the Cuban threat if carried out would, as you are aware, elevate the interference problem to an unprecedented level.

I would urge this committee, as I am sure it will, to weigh carefully the potential benefits of Radio Marti service to the Cuban people against the potential harm that might result to domestic broadcast services here at home. The decision is a difficult one.

Again, thank you very much for allowing me this opportunity to appear and be heard.

Mr. Chairman, to summarize this statement, we wish to bring attention to the effect on 200 U.S. AM radio stations of the Cuban plan to implement more AM service.

Senator HELMS. Thank you. Mr. Summers.

## STATEMENT OF JOHN B. SUMMERS, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SUMMERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To begin with, I would like to say a few words about AM broadcasting in this country. There are 4,600 AM stations which reach 99 percent of American households. If you include FM stations, there are over 3,000 communities that have their own local radio station. This is a system of radio broadcasting which is unparalleled in the world today.

We are able to maintain this very complex system through delicate engineering; mostly through the use of directional antennas. In effect, we have 4,600 stations coexisting as part of an intricate jigsaw puzzle. Cuba now threatens to devastate this system.

Previous Government witnesses before this committee have outlined Cuba's past record in terms of the NARBA agreement, the Rio de Janeiro Conference, and so forth, so I won't reiterate that whole history. The fact is, as other witnesses have pointed out today, Cuba intends to implement an inventory of some 182 stations which would, in effect, double the number of stations in that country today.

Two of these stations would operate with 500 kW of power, which is 10 times the maximum power permitted in this country. Also, Cuba does not employ directional antennas.

Stations in the southeastern part of this country have been experiencing Cuban interference for many, many years. But now we see interference cropping up in other areas of the country, and it is clear that if they implement this inventory of 182 stations there is going to be interference throughout the country.

Because of this, we did a study to determine just what the impact would be. I would like today to formally submit this study for the record. Other people have alluded to it today. It shows that some 200 stations in 34 States would be affected by Cuban interference. Just some of the specifics quickly—of the 59 clear channel stations in this country today, 10 would lose their entire nighttime service and 37 of these 59 stations would lose large portions of their service. As an example, a station as far away from Cuba as KSL in Salt Lake City, which operates on 1160 kHz, would lose 99.3 percent of its nighttime service.

There are many examples of existing interference. WICC in Bridgeport, Conn., suffers Cuban interference at twice the levels permitted by the old NARBA agreement. There is a station. CMBB, in Guanabacoa, Cuba, which operates sporadically on 25 kW, and when it does operate it causes interference to stations in Arkansas, Texas, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Rhode Island, Florida, Tennessee, Georgia, and Virginia.

I could go on and on with specific examples of existing interference. Suffice it to say that we have a very bad situation which is getting worse daily.

Now, where does Radio Marti fit into this whole picture? Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that the NAB is not in the foreign relations business. We take no position as to whether there should or should not be a Radio Marti. We do note, however, that interference existed long before Radio Marti was proposed and will probably exist whether there is a Radio Marti or there is not a Radio Marti.

Our position is that we believe Congress must be aware, however, of a possible relationship between Radio Marti and Cuban interference. We have previously testified in the House that we would suggest that Radio Marti operate on a frequency just above or just below the AM frequency band.

It is well documented that radio receivers can receive frequencies 5 or 10 kHz above and below the AM band. So a station could operate there and be received in Cuba on normal radio receivers and not cause interference to any U.S. commercial radio station. These frequencies are used today. If you are familiar with national parks, as you enter some parks signs will tell you to tune to, say, 1610, which is 5 kHz above the AM band, and if you do so you will hear a tape recording giving you information about the park and what you can see and do there.

Solutions to the Cuban interference problem. I have to stress, as Mr. Engelhardt did earlier, that there are no fully adequate technical solutions. Technical adjustments are not fully effective because the situation changes daily in Cuba. Cuban stations are known to change frequency and to change power. A simple turning of a screw in Cuba can create a whole new set of interference problems.

We do favor compensation for U.S. stations taking actions to mitigate the effects of Cuban interference, but once again, that is by no means a total solution. The NAB position is that the only permanent solution to the Cuban interference problem is a diplomatic one. And we urge Congress and the administration to work toward negotiating with Cuba for a solution to this horrendous Cuban interference problem.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Summers' prepared statement follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN B. SUMMERS

Mr. Chairman. My name is John B. Summers. I am Executive Vice President and General Manager of the National Association of Broadcasters. NAB represents over 4,634 radio stations and the major commercial radio networks serving this nation.

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss both real and potential interference to AM broadcasting that threatens to seriously disrupt the truly remarkable AM broadcasting system that serves this country.

Forty-six hundred AM stations operate in the United States, delivering service to 99 percent of American households. AM radio reaches 96 percent of all adults each week, and over half of the people in America rely on radio to bring them the first news of the day. Approximately 3,000 communities in this country are served by their own local radio stations.

An understanding of why our AM broadcast system is so pervasive and so reliable underscores the seriousness of Cuban interference. Our broadcast system has evolved into a complex and delicately engineered system designed to maximize overall coverage and quality radio reception. Because there are so many stations and so many people to serve, many U.S. stations must employ sophisticated directional antennas. With directional antennas, we are able to control the service area the station's signal will cover and minimize interference to other stations. Today our national broadcast system is an intricate jigsaw puzzle permitting several thousands of stations to coexist without interfering with each other. The Federal Communications Commission oversees the growth and maintenance of the AM broadcast system.

Now, Cuba threatens to devastate that carefully engineered system. During the past few years, NAB has become aware of the magnitude of that threat. We have spoken with White House, State Department and FCC officials, and have appeared before Congressional hearings to apprise our government of the need to solve the intensifying Cuban interference problem. Most recently, of course, these discussions have taken place within the context of proposed legislation to authorize Radio Marti. Throughout these discussions, NAB has maintained that Radio Marti and its possible relationship to Cuban interference cannot be analyzed outside the context of the history of U.S. relations with the Cuban government, and, in particular, efforts of the two nations to agree to mutually acceptable AM broadcast systems.

In 1959, Cuba and the United States signed the North American Regional Broadcast Agreement, known as the NARBA Treaty. This agreement promised its signatory countries protection from destructive radio interference. Although the NARBA Treaty was signed by the Batista government, Castro generally abided by its terms for quite some time. Last year, however, Cuba formally abrogated the NARBA Treaty.

Over the past few years, AM broadcasters in the Southeastern United States have suffered increasing and unacceptable levels of interference from Cuban stations. The escalating Cuban interference problem is best explained against the backdrop of the Region 2 Medium Frequency Broadcasting Conference—a diplomatic effort to establish uniform technical standards and to design a mutually acceptable plan for AM broadcasting in this hemisphere. The Second Session of the Region 2 Conference took place in Rio de Janiero last December.

At the Region 2 Conference, Cuba submitted an inventory or list of 182 AM radio stations which it proposed to operate. The inventory consisted of both existing and proposed stations and the frequencies and power levels at which the Cubans wanted to broadcast. If accepted, the Cuban inventory would have more than doubled the number of AM stations in that country. The inventory called for two of those stations to operate at power levels of 500 kW, a level 10 times greater than the highest power level allowed in the United States. Cuba does not use directional antennas to prevent one station's signal from interfering with another, so a 500-kW Cuban station broadcasting in all directions would wreak interference havoc from New York to California and throughout the Caribbean.

The Rio Conference rejected the Cuban inventory, and the Cuban delegation walked out of the Conference. As a result, Cuba is now a non-signatory to the Region 2 agreement. It operates its broadcast facilities as an outlaw nation, refusing to use directional antennas and ignoring the Region 2 agreement.

The implications for American radio stations are alarming. No longer are broadcasters in the Southeast the only ones to experience Cuban interference. All across the nation, broadcasters and the public can expect substantial radio interference as the Cuban government continues to expand its broadcast operations.

NAB has just completed a study on actual and projected Cuban radio interference to U.S. stations. We have some startling projections.

If Cuba proceeds with its inventory, AM radio stations in 34 states and the District of Columbia would experience interference and reduced listening areas. Altogether, over 200 U.S. stations would be affected.

The United States has 59 clear channel stations. These are stations that operate at the maximum 50 kW power level both day and night. Their protected nighttime service area extends 750 miles in all directions. A clear channel station's service area more than doubles at night due to changes in the atmosphere. Because radio signals travel so far at night, it takes only one kilowatt of power from a Cuban station to eliminate vast portions of the nighttime service areas of many U.S. clear channel stations. Ten clear channel stations would lose their entire nighttime coverage areas to proposed Cuban interference. Thirty-seven clear channel stations would lose large portions of their coverage areas. Very few clear channel stations would continue to provide interference-free service to the public.

Our study of Cuban interference contains several maps that graphically illustrate our findings. One of particular interest is a map depicting KSL in Salt Lake City, Utah. KSL is one of the clear channel stations that operates at 50 kW day and night. Its service area is a circle 1,500 miles in diameter. KSL operates on the same channel, 1160 kHz, as one of the proposed Cuban "superstations." If that superstation goes into operation, KSL would lose 99.3 percent of its nighttime service area to Cuban interference.

In addition to projecting interference from Castro's proposed stations, our study documents actual cases of interference. It shows that much of the United States is currently experiencing radio interference from Cuba. WICC in Bridgeport Conn., has had interference levels twice as strong as those allowed under the NARBA Treaty. Cuba station CMBB is sporadically on the air from Guanabacoa, Cuba, at 25 kW. Whenever it broadcasts, it causes interference to stations in Texarkana, Ark.; Houston, Tex.; Allentown, Pa.; Louisville, Ky.; Providence, R.I.; Leesburg-Eutis and South Miami, Fla.; Memphis, Tenn.; Atlanta, Ga., and Norfolk, Va.—all these stations operate on the same channel. Cuban signals from 820 on the AM dial have been strong enough to wipe out most, if not all, the nighttime service area of WBAP in Fort Worth, Tex.; and also cause interference in Coffeyville, Kans.; Jacksonville, Fla. and New Orleans, La.

It is possible to go on and on. Yet, we have only begun to document the severity of the problem. Cuban interference is real and appears to be worsening throughout the United States.

So where does Radio Marti fit into this scenario? As I emphasized in testifying on May 10, 1982, before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, Radio Marti must not be seen as a miracle bargaining chip that can be traded for the solution to our interference problems. Nor should it be used as a smoke screen to mask the full history and complexity of the Cuban interference problem. U.S. stations were experiencing unacceptable levels of Cuban interference before Radio Marti became an issue, and destructive interference may well persist in the absence of a Radio Marti. But this is not to suggest that there is no relationship between the authorization of Radio Marti and the Cuban interference problem. Radio Marti is but another variable in the difficult situation that AM broadcasters face as a result of our relationship with the Cuban government. This means that Congress must be aware of the possible relationship between Radio Marti and Cuban interference. If Cuba decides to use high-power transmitters on 1040 kHz to broadcast "counter programming" to the United States in retaliation for Radio Marti, the Cuban government could not only prevent reception of Radio Marti in Cuba, but it could cause massive interference to Station WHO and other U.S. stations operating on 1040 kHz.

Indeed, in a speech on April 4, 1982, Fidel Castro warned that Cuba would retaliate against Radio Marti in some way. "Logically," he said, it would be better if such a confrontation "does not take place." But he added that Cuba is preparing "outstanding replies" to Radio Marti.[1]

NAB has neither the desire nor the expertise to help chart the foreign policy options of our government. Nor do we feel it is our role to second guess foreign policy decisions that have already been made. It appears, however, that the interference war that Cuba is waging against U.S. broadcasters is escalating, and we urge Congress, the State Department and the Administration to explore all diplomatic means possible to stop it. In this regard, we must stress that there are no fully adequate technical solutions to Cuban interference.

Some propose that we can keep on building more powerful stations and, therefore, overcome the interference problem. But increasing power can cause interference to other U.S. stations, and readjusting technical equipment often requires advance approval from the FCC, a process which takes time and large amounts of money. In the meantime, it is the public that suffers the loss of service.

But more importantly, the Cuban interference situation changes daily. Our analysis of FCC data shows the Cubans seldom operate the same station at the same power level on the same frequency for very long. It takes nothing more than a turn of a screw in Cuba to give U.S. broadcasters a whole new set of interference problems. Interference must be corrected at its source, not at the point of reception. In the long run, no amount of money spent by U.S. broadcasters can remedy this. From any perspective, the complete solution to Cuban interference must be arrived at diplomatically.

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[1] Havana Domestic Service in Spanish, 2206 GMT, Apr. 4, 1982, cited in "Radio Marti," a report prepared by the Congressional Research Service (June 28, 1982).

In the interim, NAB does favor compensation to stations to enable them to mitigate the effects of Cuban interference through limited facilities changes that can be authorized without causing harmful interference to other stations. We stress, however, that financial assistance is no substitute for a lasting diplomatic resolution of the Cuban interference problem.

Therefore, we urge Congress and the Administration to work toward negotiating with Cuba for a solution to this problem. Cuba's proposed inventory would not only cause substantial interference to stations in the United States and other countries, but to Cuban stations as well. During the Cuban-American bilateral meetings in 1981, Cuban engineers appeared willing to resolve our mutual problems. Thus, it seems that Cuba's choice of location, power, and frequency of radio stations stems from political rather than technical considerations. Cuba's own needs for radio coverage can be accommodated, indeed improved, by proper and not necessarily expensive engineering.

During your consideration of legislation to authorize Radio Marti, we urge that you explore the possible relationship between Radio Marti and Cuban interference. In doing so, we hope that you will appreciate the scope and seriousness of the interference problem, and will work earnestly to bring about a permanent solution.

# Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcast Stations

March 1, 1982

## CUBAN INTERFERENCE
## TO UNITED STATES AM BROADCASTING

I. Introduction

II. Effects of Cuban Proposals on U.S. Broadcast Stations
  A. Proposed Interference Maps
  B. Frequency Study Data

III. Actual Station Interference
  A. Documented Interference Map
  B. Cuban Signal Strength Measurements

IV. History

V. Appendix
  A. Engineering Statement
  B. Cuban Inventory
  C. Acknowledgements

# Introduction

## CUBAN INTERFERENCE
## TO UNITED STATES AM BROADCASTING

Interference caused by Cuban radio transmission has steadily worsened radio reception in the Southeastern United States. Recent international developments now make Cuban interference a national rather than just regional concern. The present and projected disruption of service is devastating to both the public and radio broadcasters.

At the recent Region 2 (Western Hemisphere) Radio Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Cuba submitted an inventory of 187 AM radio stations to operate throughout their country. The inventory consisted of both existing and proposed stations as well as suggested frequencies and power levels. Two of the proposed stations would operate at 500 kilowatts -- by contrast, the highest powered U.S. stations operate at 50 kilowatt levels. The Rio Conference rejected the Cuban proposal and the Cuban delegation walked out of the Conference. As a result, Cuba is now a non-signatory to the international agreement. It operates its broadcast facilities as an outlaw nation, guided by no international restrictions.

The implications for American radio stations are frightening. The interference they can expect to receive will, in many instances, block out over half the service they provide. The effect on the public is an enormous loss of news, information and entertainment.

This report is designed to graphically illustrate the real and potential problems visited upon U.S. broadcasters and the public by Cuban interference.

## EFFECTS OF CUBAN PROPOSALS
## ON U.S. BROADCAST STATIONS

AM radio stations in 32 states plus the District of Columbia will experience interference and reduced listening areas should Cuba proceed with its proposed inventory of broadcast facilities. Altogether, over 200 U.S. stations will be affected. Ten clear channel radio stations will lose their entire nighttime coverage area. Thirty-seven clear channel stations would lose large portions of their wide area coverage. Only six clear channel stations would continue to provide interference-free service.

The following maps are graphic examples of what happens to existing U.S. stations' service areas when interference is received from proposed Cuban stations at the proposed power levels.

Frequency data sheets analyzing each U.S. AM channel accompany the maps. They illustrate the effect of each proposed Cuban station on all U.S. frequencies.

# Proposed Interference Maps


February 1982
▨ Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference
KAMD CAMDEN, AR
910 KHZ 0.5 KW, 5 KW-LS U DA-2
Existing coverage 160 square miles
Reduced coverage 70 square miles
IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C.
Consulting Electrical Engineers
Camden
U S NAVAL AMMUNITION DE
DALLAS COUNTY
OUACHITA COUNTY
CLARK COUNTY
CALHOUN COUNTY
Ouachita River
Missouri
Little Bay Lake
Frenchport
Lookout tower
Oil and Gas Field
5 0 5 10 15 20 Statute Miles


FEBRUARY 1982
IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C.
Consulting Electrical Engineers
▨ Daytime Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference
WQAM MIAMI, FL
560 KHZ 1 KW, 5 KW-LS U
Existing daytime coverage 15,940 square miles
Reduced daytime coverage 250 square miles
TALLAHASSEE
WAKULLA
CLINCH
ALACHUA
PUTNAM
LEVY
MARION
VOLUSIA
CITRUS
LAKE
SEMINOLE
HERNANDO
ORANGE
PASCO
OSCEOLA
POLK
MANATEE
HARDEE
SARASOTA
DE SOTO
CHAR
OKEECHOBEE
Cape Kennedy
Cape Sable
Cape Romano
North Bimini
Marquesas Keys
Key West
FLORIDA KEYS
25 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 MILES



FEBRUARY 1982

▨ Daytime Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference

**WSUN ST. PETERSBURG, FL**
**620 KHZ 5 KW U DA-N**

Existing daytime coverage 9,390 square miles
Reduced daytime coverage 2,120 square miles

## IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.

Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electrical Engineers

F L O R I D A
JACKSON
GADSDEN
LEON
TALLAHASSEE
CALHOUN
LIBERTY
GULF
FRANKLIN
St George Island
MADISON
HAMILTON
SUWANNEE
LAFAYETTE
COLUMBIA
BAKER
UNION
BRADFORD
NASSAU
DUVAL
JACKSONVILLE
CLAY
ST JOHNS
PUTNAM
FLAGLER
ALACHUA
Gainesville
LEVY
MARION
VOLUSIA
LAKE
SEMINOLE
ORANGE
Orlando
Cape Canaveral
PASCO
OSCEOLA
PINELLAS
HILLSBOROUGH
Clearwater
Tampa
INDIAN RIVER
OKEECHOBEE
ST LUCIE
HIGHLANDS
Sebring
MARTIN
GLADES
Moore Haven
La Belle
HENDRY
PALM BEACH
West Palm Beach
BROWARD
Fort Lauderdale
COLLIER
Cape Romano
DADE
Sanibel
WARE
CLINCH
ECHOLS
THOMAS
BROOKS
LOWNDES
GRADY
DECATUR
HOUSTON
MILLER
25 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 MILES



February 1982

▨ Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference

WPLO ATLANTA, GA
590KHZ 5KW U DA-N

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Existing coverage | 387 | square miles |
| Reduced coverage | 78 | square miles |

IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.

Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electrical Engineers

CHEROKEE
BARTOW
FORSYTH
GWINNETT
COBB
DOUGLAS
FULTON
DEKALB
ROCKDALE
CLAYTON
HENRY
NEWTON
WALTON
COWETA
SPALDING
BUTTS
MERIWETHER
MONROE
Marietta
Smyrna
East Point
Hapeville
College Park
Forest Park
Jonesboro
Conyers
Lithonia
Douglasville
Newnan
Griffin
Lawrenceville
Buford
Roswell
Alpharetta
Woodstock
Covington
Stockbridge
Fayetteville
Jackson
Forsyth
0 10 20 30 40 Miles


February 1982
▨ Coverage lost to Potential Cuban interference
WLCS BATON ROUGE, LA
910 KHZ 1 KW U DA 1
Existing coverage 314 square miles
Reduced coverage 76 square miles
IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C.
Consulting Electrical Engineers
BATON ROUGE
Baker
20 Statute Miles
30 Kilometers


February 1982
▨ Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference
WOKK MERIDIAN, MS
910 KHZ 1 KW, 5 KW-LS U
Existing coverage 277 square miles
Reduced coverage 38 square miles
IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C.
Consulting Electrical Engineers
MERIDIAN
KEMPER COUNTY
LAUDERDALE COUNTY
NEWTON COUNTY
JASPER COUNTY
CLARKE COUNTY
SUMTER COUNTY
CHOCTAW COUNTY
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
5 0 5 10 15 20 Statute Miles


February 1982
Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference
OMAHA
Council Bluffs
Lincoln
Grand Island
IOWA
MISSOURI
St Joseph
Topeka
Independence
Des

WOW OMAHA, NE
590KHZ 5KW U

Existing coverage 19,352 square miles
Reduced coverage 9,273 square miles

IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.

Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electrical Engineers



February 1982

▨ Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference

WSJS WINSTON-SALEM, N.C.
600KHZ 5KW U DA-2

Existing coverage 998 square miles

Reduced coverage 338 square miles

IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.

Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electrical Engineers

STOKES
ROCKINGHAM
FORSYTH
GUILFORD
DAVIE
DAVIDSON
RANDOLPH
CABARRUS
WINSTON-SALEM
GREENSBORO
HIGH POINT
Thomasville
Lexington
Salisbury
Asheboro
Kannapolis
Concord
CHARLOTTE
Reidsville
Mocksville
Yadkinville
Danbury
Walkertown
Pfafftown
Vienna
Lewisville
Clemmons
Farmington
Kernersville
Jamestown
Archdale
Trinity
Spencer
Miles


February 1982
Muncie
Randolph
Henry
Greenville
Sidney
Piqua
Troy
Urbana
Springfield
London
Dayton
Middletown
Hamilton
Wilmington
Hillsboro
Maysville
Madison

▨ Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference

WKRC CINCINNATI, OH
550KHZ 1KW, 5KW-LS U DA-2

Existing coverage 3,584 square miles
Reduced coverage 1,362 square miles

IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.

Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electrical Engineers



February 1982

▨ Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference

WIS COLUMBIA, SC
560 KHZ 5 KW U DA-N

Existing coverage 1,403 square miles
Reduced coverage 789 square miles

IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.

Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electrical Engineers

NATIONAL FOREST
FAIRF
KERSHA
NEWBERRY
LEXINGTON
RICHLAND
CALHOUN
ORANGEBURG
KEN
BAR
COLUMBIA
West Columbia
Cayce
Lexington
Forest Acres
Winnsboro
Newberry
Prosperity
Batesburg
Leesville
Gilbert
Red Bank
Springdale
Pineridge
Gaston
Swansea
Pelion
Eastover
Gadsden
Hopkins
Horrel Hill
Camden
Lugoff
Blythewood
Killian
Pontiac
Ballentine
Irmo
Lake Murray
Chapin
Little Mountain
Pomaria
Jenkinsville
Monticello
Strother
Blair
Salem Crossroads
Simpson
Ridgeway
Smallwood
Longtown
Wateree Lake
State Park
Dentsville
Capitol View
Dixiana
South Congaree
St Matthews
Fort Motte
Wagener
New Holland Crossroads
Steedman
Samaria
Monetta
Kneece
Summit
Crossroads
Mount Willing
Foxtown
Perry
Thor
Woodford
North
Couchton
Montmorenci
Oakwood
Windsor
White Pond
Williston
Elko
Blackville
Norway
Cope
Cordova
Orangeburg
Rowesville
Bowman
Cameron
Elloree
Creston
Lone Star
Reevesville
St George
Hagood
Horatio
Boykin
Du Bose Park
10 0 10 20 30 40 Miles



February 1982

▨ Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference

WTAR NORFOLK, VA
790 KHZ 5 KW U DA N

Existing coverage 2,128 square miles

Reduced coverage 880 square miles

IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON D.C.

Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electrical Engineers

Hog Island
Cape Charles
HAMPTON
NEWPORT NEWS
NORFOLK
Cape Henry
Chincoteague Island
ASSATEAGUE ISLAND
77°
76°
75°
10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Statute Miles
II
III
IV
V
VI


February 1982

▨ Coverage lost to Potential Cuban Interference

**WMAL WASHINGTON, D.C.**
**630KHZ 5KW U DA-2**

Existing coverage 2,006 square miles
Reduced coverage 1,332 square miles

**IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE**

**NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS**
**WASHINGTON D.C.**

Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electrical Engineers

HAGERSTOWN
WILMINGTON
BALTIMORE
ANNAPOLIS
WASHINGTON
ARLINGTON
FALLS CHURCH
ALEXANDRIA
SILVER SPRING
BETHESDA
EASTON
CAMBRIDGE
FREDERICKSBURG
N



FEBRUARY 1982

COVERAGE LIMITED BY
POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE

EXISTING SECONDARY
SERVICE COVERAGE

WMAQ, CHICAGO, IL
670 KHZ 50 KW U
Existing coverage 1,339,321 square miles
Reduced coverage 23,257 square miles

IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electronics Engineers

DOMINION OF CANADA
NORTH DAKOTA
SOUTH DAKOTA
NEBRASKA
IOWA
KANSAS
OKLAHOMA
ARKANSAS
TEXAS
LOUISIANA
ILLINOIS
OHIO
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTH CAROLINA
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW YORK
FLORIDA
GULF OF MEXICO
CUBA
Statute Miles


FEBRUARY 1982
DOMINION OF CANADA
COVERAGE LIMITED BY POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE
EXISTING SECONDARY SERVICE COVERAGE
NEW MEXICO
TEXAS
NEBRASKA
KANSAS
COLORADO
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
LOUISIANA
GULF OF MEXICO
WHO DES MOINES, IA
1040 KHZ 50 KW U
Existing coverage 1,714,337 square miles
Reduced coverage 5,926 square miles
IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electronics Engineers
Statute Miles


FEBRUARY 1982
OF CANADA
COVERAGE LIMITED BY POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE
EXISTING SECONDARY SERVICE COVERAGE
IOWA
OHIO
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTH CAROLINA
ARKANSAS
LOUISIANA
GULF OF
ATLANTIC
CUBA
WJR DETROIT, MI
760 KHZ 50 KW U
Existing coverage 1,173,548 square miles
Reduced coverage 19,380 square miles
IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electronics Engineers
Statute Miles


FEBRUARY 1982
COVERAGE LIMITED BY POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE
EXISTING SECONDARY SERVICE COVERAGE
IOWA
OHIO
PENNSYLVANIA
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTH CAROLINA
ARKANSAS
LOUISIANA
MAINE
DEL.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GULF OF MEXICO
BAHAMA ISLANDS
Statute Miles

WCBS NEW YORK, NY
880 KHZ 50 KW U
Existing coverage 896,114 square miles
Reduced coverage 6,452 square miles

IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electronics Engineers


D O M I N I O N
WASHINGTON
MONTANA
NORTH DAKOTA
OREGON
IDAHO
SOUTH DAKOTA
NEVADA
UTAH
NEBRASKA
COLORADO
KANSAS
ARIZONA
NEW MEXICO
TEXAS
Statute Miles

FEBRUARY 1982

COVERAGE LIMITED BY
POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE

EXISTING SECONDARY
SERVICE COVERAGE

KSL SALT LAKE CITY, UT
1160 KHZ 50 KW U
Existing coverage 1,406,910 square miles
Reduced coverage 9,439 square miles

IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electronics Engineers

FREQUENCY STUDY DATA

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States
AM Stations

550 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMAA, | Pinar del Río, P. R. | 22-26-00 | 83-40-00 | 30 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WGGA | Gainesville, GA | 5.26 | 12.48 | 308.8 | 102.6 | 66.7 |
| WCBI | Columbus, MS | 13.88 | 18.73 | 91.8 | 60.1 | 34.5 |
| KSD | St. Louis, MO | 4.56 | 5.20 | 7,841.3 | 6,815.7 | 13.1 |
| WGR | Buffalo, NY | 4.02 | 4.67 | 2,733.8 | 2,452.5 | 10.0 |
| WKRC* | Cincinnati, OH | 2.90 | 4.59 | 3,583.8 | 1,962.0 | 45.3 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 14,584.5 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 3,156.6 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 11,392.9 square miles. |

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*See map.

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

560 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMIA, | Ciego de Avila, C. A. | 21-53-00 | 78-43-00 | 10 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WQAM | Miami FL | 2.98 | 23.36 | 2158.7 | 387.0 | 82.1 |
| WIS* | Columbia, SC | 4.65 | 7.47 | 1402.9 | 788.6 | 43.8 |
| KLVI | Beaumont, TX | 3.62 | 4.34 | 11,501.3 | 9752.8 | 15.2 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 15,062.9 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 4,134.5 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 10,928.4 square miles. |

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*See map.

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 570 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMEA, | Santa Clara, V. C. | 22-27-00 | 79-53-00 | 30 |
| CMNA | Pilon, Gr. | 19-56-00 | 79-19-00 | 10 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WAAX | Gadsden, AL | 11.22 | 14.30 | 200.0 | 140.9 | 29.6 |
| WPLP | Pinellas Park, FL | 7.64 | 33.69 | 205.0 | 22.56 | 89.0 |
| WACL | Waycross, GA | 8.36 | 21.21 | 394.6 | 105.7 | 73.2 |
| WGMS | Bethesda, MD | 6.97 | 8.27 | 319.4 | 253.4 | 20.7 |
| WVMI | Biloxi, MS | 17.39 | 20.32 | 77.5 | 67.0 | 13.5 |
| WMCA | New York, NY | 3.06 | 3.69 | 3,196.7 | 2,337.8 | 26.9 |
| WSYR | Syracuse, NY | 3.72 | 4.02 | 2,912.2 | 2,674.2 | 8.2 |
| WWNC | Asheville, NC | 3.36 | 9.20 | 1,517.0 | 545.8 | 64.0 |
| WKBN | Youngstown, OH | 3.95 | 4.20 | 4,529.1 | 4,255.7 | 6.0 |
| WFAA | Fort Worth, TX | 3.31 | 4.01 | 15,763.5 | 12,811.0 | 18.7 |

Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: 29,115.0 square miles.
Total reduction in coverage: 5,901.0 square miles.
Predicted remaining coverage: 23,214.0 square miles.

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United State AM Stations

580 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMMF | Baracoa, Cu | 20-21-00 | 74-30-00 | 5 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WDBO | Orlando, FL | 2.78 | 6.75 | 2,179.0 | 912.5 | 58.1 |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 590 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMCA | San Ant Vegas, P. R. | 22-48-00 | 82-14-00 | 150 |
| CMMA | Guantanama, Gu. | 20-09-00 | 75-10-00 | 5 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour |  | Coverage Area |  | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) |  |
| WDLP | Panama City, FL | 8.37 | 60.04 | 117.0 | 8.7 | 92.6 |
| WPLO | Atlanta, GA | 9.30 | 34.12 | 387.2 | 86.4 | 77.7 |
| WRTH | Wood River, IL | 13.08 | 16.01 | 463.0 | 325.0 | 29.8 |
| WVLK | Lexington, KY | 14.37 | 17.38 | 248.8 | 186.9 | 24.9 |
| WEEI | Boston, MA | 2.50 | 5.10 | 2,538.1 | 1,388.4 | 45.3 |
| WKZO | Kalamazoo, MI | 11.17 | 12.92 | 411.4 | 347.7 | 15.5 |
| WOW* | Omaha, NE | 2.98 | 5.01 | 19,352.4 | 9,722.7 | 49.8 |
| WROW | Albany, NY | 9.33 | 9.85 | 379.4 | 352.8 | 7.0 |
| WGTM | Wilson, NC | 9.83 | 21.52 | 471.1 | 198.3 | 57.9 |
| WARM | Scranton, PA | 6.57 | 8.21 | 1,389.3 | 1,133.4 | 18.4 |
| WMBS | Uniontown, PA | 5.69 | 9.72 | 744.1 | 370.6 | 50.2 |
| KLBJ | Austin, TX | 11.09 | 15.46 | 617.0 | 358.2 | 41.9 |
| WLVA | Lynchburg, VA | 7.36 | 15.56 | 274.6 | 110.5 | 59.8 |
| KHQ | Spokane, WA | 2.64 | 2.99 | 7,050.1 | 6,174.5 | 12.4 |

Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: 34,443.5 square miles.
Total reduction in coverage: 13,679.4 square miles.
Predicted remaining coverage: 20,764.1 square miles.

---

*See map.

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United State AM Stations

### 600 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMKA | San German, S. C. | 20-35-00 | 76-07-00 | 150 |
| CMAA | Bahia Honda, P. R. | 22-55-00 | 83-10-00 | 1 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WICC | Bridgeport, CT | 4.68 | 7.38 | 662.3 | 569.1 | 14.0 |
| WOKV | Jacksonville, FL | 9.50 | 35.9 | 556.9 | 146.3 | 74.0 |
| WMT | Cedar Rapids, IA | 2.50 | 3.50 | 11,308.0 | 7,785.0 | 31.0 |
| WCAO | Baltimore, MD | 3.93 | 7.50 | 2,622.0 | 1,400.0 | 47.0 |
| WTAC | Flint, MI | 8.25 | 8.45 | 379.7 | 366.3 | 4.0 |
| WSJS* | Winston-Salem, NC | 5.03 | 12.41 | 997.6 | 338.3 | 66.0 |
| WREC | Memphis, TN | 2.50 | 7.25 | 8,980.0 | 2,756.0 | 69.0 |

Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: 22,507.0 square miles.
Total reduction in coverage: 12,146.0 square miles.
Predicted remaining coverage: 13,361.0 square miles.

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*See map.

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

610 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMJA | Mayari Arriba, Ho. | 20-25-00 | 75-30-00 | 1 |
| CMGA | Trinidad, S. S. | 21-47-00 | 79-59-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour |  | Coverage Area |  | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) |  |
| WIOD | Miami, FL | 2.39 | 9.13 | 5,300.0 | 1,394.0 | 73.7 |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 620 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMDA | Colon, Mz. | 22-43-00 | 80-55-00 | 30 |
| CMKF | Moa, Ho. | 20-40-00 | 74-56-00 | 1 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WSUN | St. Petersburg, FL | 2.50 | 36.26 | 3,424.7 | 612.5 | 82.1 |
| WJDX | Jackson, MS | 8.28 | 12.69 | 703.7 | 376.1 | 46.6 |
| WDNC | Raleigh-Durham, NC | 9.70 | 11.52 | 348.7 | 285.1 | 18.2 |
| WRJZ | Knoxville, TN | 5.26 | 9.01 | 945.0 | 547.3 | 42.1 |
| KWFT | Wichita Falls, TX | 4.15 | 4.69 | 11,901.2 | 10,269.5 | 13.7 |
| WTMJ | Milwaukee, WI | 2.50 | 2.71 | 11,587.1 | 10,736.5 | 7.3 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 28,910.4 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 6,083.4 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 22,827.0 square miles. |

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 630 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMHA | Camaguey, Cg. | 21-23-00 | 77-59-00 | 30 |
| CMOA | Isla Juventud, I. J. | 21-42-00 | 82-45-00 | 10 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WMAL* | Washington, D. C. | 2.88 | 4.32 | 2,006.1 | 1,331.6 | 33.6 |
| WKBX | Savannah, GA | 9.44 | 20.13 | 617.3 | 271.8 | 56.0 |
| WLAP | Lexington, KY | 5.03 | 6.31 | 1,153.1 | 859.6 | 25.5 |
| KXOK | St. Louis, MO | 2.50 | 3.28 | 3,973.8 | 6,876.1 | 23.4 |
| WMFD | Wilmington, NC | 10.15 | 13.15 | 286.0 | 221.1 | 22.7 |
| WPRO | Providence, RI | 4.22 | 4.81 | 869.4 | 789.2 | 9.2 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 13,905.7 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 3,556.3 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 10,349.4 square miles. |

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*See map.

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 660 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMDC | Colon, Mz. | 22-43-00 | 80-54-00 | 30 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour |  | Coverage Area |  | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) |  |
| WNBC | New York, NY | 0.5 (50% skywave) | 3.03 (groundwave) | 655,229.5 | 8,211.2 | 98.7 |

## 670 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMBC | Arroyo Arenas, Ha. | 23-03-00 | 82-28-00 | 50 |
| CMNC | Media Luna, Gr. | 20-09-00 | 77-26-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour |  | Coverage Area |  | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) |  |
| WMAQ | Chicgo, Il (See map) | 0.5 (50% skywave) | 3.76 (groundwave) | 1,339,320.7 | 23,257.3 | 98.3 |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

690 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMEC | Santa Clara, V. C. | 22-26-00 | 79-54-00 | 50 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WAPE | Jacksonville, FL | 22.3 | 39.3 | 282.7 | 145.0 | 48.7 |
| KGGF | Coffeesville, KS | 5.09 | 6.14 | 6,914.6 | 5,550.4 | 19.7 |
| WTIX | New Orleans, LA | 8.27 | 16.61 | 1,974.8 | 934.6 | 52.7 |

Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: 9,172.1 square miles.
Total reduction in coverage: 2,542.1 square miles.
Predicted remaining coverage: 6,630.0 square miles.

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

740 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMAC | Pinar del Rio. P. R. | 22-19-00 | 83-39-00 | 30 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour |  | Coverage Area |  | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) |  |
| WSBR | Boca Raton, FL | 7.20 | 37.35 | 199.6 | 28.2 | 85.8 |
| KTRH | Houston, TX | 6.29 | 10.84 | 10,978.7 | 6,956.7 | 36.6 |
| KCMC | Texarkana, TX | 10.69 | 12.03 | 199.2 | 171.5 | 13.9 |
| WKIS | Orlando, FL | 13.64 | 31.85 | 110.1 | 38.0 | 65.5 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 11,487.6 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 4,293.2 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 7,194.4 square miles. |

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 760 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMKC | Cacocun, Ho. | 20-34-00 | 76-17-00 | 75 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WJR | Detroit, MI<br>(See map) | 0.5<br>(50% skywave) | 3.22<br>(groundwave) | 1,173,547.9 | 19,379.8 | 98.3 |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

## 790 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMBB | Guanabacoa, Ha. | 23-07-00 | 82-16-00 | 50 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| KOSY | Texarkana, AR | 9.18 | 12.52 | 170.3 | 113.0 | 33.6 |
| WLBE | Leesburg-Eustis, FL | 13.62 | 46.13 | 79.7 | 16.2 | 79.7 |
| WNWS | S. Miami, FL | 7.31 | 58.53 | 1,113.8 | 88.0 | 92.1 |
| WQXI | Atlanta, GA | 16.22 | 24.14 | 64.1 | 39.7 | 38.1 |
| WAKY | Louisville, KY | 8.87 | 11.92 | 268.5 | 184.4 | 31.3 |
| WTNY | Watertown, NY | 4.34 | 4.74 | 558.1 | 507.8 | 9.0 |
| WAEB | Allentown, PA | 4.84 | 6.17 | 483.7 | 372.4 | 23.0 |
| WEAN | Providence, RI | 2.79 | 3.62 | 9,836.0 | 789.8 | 19.7 |
| WMC | Memphis, TN | 3.41 | 11.41 | 3,672.2 | 993.8 | 72.9 |
| KULF | Houston, TX | 8.00 | 13.30 | 2,375.5 | 1,499.6 | 36.9 |
| WTAR* | Norfolk, VA | 3.09 | 9.21 | 2,128.2 | 859.7 | 59.6 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 11,897.7 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 6,433.3 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 5,464.4 square miles. |

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*See map.

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 360 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMDB | Colon, Mz. | 22-43-00 | 80-55-00 | 30 |
| CMMB | Baracoa, Gu. | 20-20-00 | 74-29-00 | 10 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WAZE | Dunedin, FL | 9.38 | 36.63 | 179.6 | 18.8 | 89.5 |
| WDMG | Douglas, GA | 19.74 | 30.15 | 212.2 | 127.0 | 40.2 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 391.8 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 246.0 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 145.8 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 880 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMAB | Pinar del Rio, P. R. | 22-19-00 | 83-39-00 | 30 |
| CMKG | Moa, Ho. | 20-40-00 | 74-56-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WCBS | New York, NY<br>(See map) | 0.5<br>(skywave) | 2.70<br>(groundwave) | 696,114 | 6,452.0 | 99.1 |

## 890 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMHB | Camaguey. Cg. | 21-23-00 | 77-59-00 | 30 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WLS | Chicago, IL | 0.5<br>(skywave) | 2.24<br>(groundwave) | 1,497,078 | 18,925.0 | 98.7 |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 910 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMBD | Guanabacoa, Ha. | 23-06-00 | 82-17-00 | 75 |
| CMMD | Guantanamo, Gu. | 20-07-00 | 75-13-00 | 1 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour |  | Coverage Area |  | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) |  |
| KRIO | McAllen, TX | 7.44 | 13.01 | 1,324.5 | 779.7 | 41.1 |
| KIKM | Sherman, Tx | 5.52 | 9.29 | 1,844.2 | 827.3 | 55.1 |
| WRNL | Richmond, VA | 5.21 | 10.59 | 428.6 | 217.7 | 49.2 |
| KAMC | Camden AR | 8.15 | 15.31 | 160.1 | 70.3 | 56.1 |
| KPOF | Denver, CO | 2.97 | 3.52 | 2,531.3 | 2,071.5 | 18.2 |
| WPLA | Plant City, FL | 11.50 | 61.41 | 161.3 | 15.2 | 90.6 |
| WGAF | Valdosta, GA | 10.79 | 43.86 | 170.8 | 37.2 | 78.2 |
| WSUI | Iowa City, IA | 4.37 | 5.33 | 2,363.6 | 1,899.7 | 19.6 |
| WLCS | Baton Rouge, LA | 9.11 | 25.88 | 314.0 | 76.3 | 75.7 |
| WFDF | Flint, MI | 6.27 | 6.59 | 638.1 | 601.9 | 5.7 |
| WOKK | Meridian, MS | 4.35 | 25.86 | 277.2 | 37.6 | 86.4 |
| WLAS | Jacksonville, NC | 22.05 | 27.16 | 191.3 | 152.1 | 20.5 |
| WPFB | Middletown, OH | 10.33 | 12.15 | 81.9 | 67.5 | 23.7 |
| KGLC | Miami, OK | 6.83 | 8.03 | 704.6 | 568.9 | 19.3 |
| WGBI | Scranton, PA | 4.54 | 5.09 | 372.2 | 328.8 | 11.7 |
| WSBA | York, PA | 5.77 | 8.29 | 353.0 | 237.1 | 32.8 |
| WORD | Spartanburg, SC | 9.57 | 21.19 | 99.7 | 40.1 | 59.8 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 12,346.5 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 4,192.4 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 8,154.1 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

920 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMHD | Camaguey, Cg. | 21-20-00 | 77-52-00 | 10 |
| CMND | Bayamo, Gr. | 20-21-00 | 76-37-00 | 1 |
| CMOD | Isla Juventud, I. J. | 21-52-00 | 82-47-00 | 1 |
| CMED | Santa Clara, V. C. | 22-26-00 | 79-56-00 | 1 |
| CMDJ | Cardenas, Mz. | 23-02-00 | 81-12-00 | 0.25 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WKYD | Andalusia, AL | 8.22 | 10.44 | 240.4 | 179.3 | 25.4 |
| WMEL | Melbourne, FL | 7.93 | 15.78 | 179.4 | 78.2 | 56.4 |
| WGST | Atlanta, GA | 3.22 | 5.06 | 277.9 | 179.0 | 35.6 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 697.7 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 261.2 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 436.5 square miles. |

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 930 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMKD | Holguin, Ho. | 20-51-00 | 76-16-00 | 10 |
| CMDD | Camaguey, Cg. | 23-01-00 | 81-35-00 | 1 |
| CMID | Ciego de Avila, C. A. | 21-50-00 | 78-45-00 | 1 |
| CMAD | Pinar del Rio, P. R. | 22-23-00 | 83-41-00 | 1 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WJAX | Jacksonville, FL | 8.31 | 10.70 | 626.2 | 494.1 | 21.1 |
| WKXY | Sarasota, FL | 17.41 | 21.98 | 22.8 | 17.9 | 21.5 |
| WMGR | Bainbridge, GA | 11.88 | 13.53 | 94.9 | 80.0 | 15.7 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 743.9 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 151.9 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 592.0 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

950 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMBE | Arroyo Arenas, Ha. | 23-03-00 | 82-28-00 | 5 |
| CMNE | Bayamo, Gr. | 20-23-00 | 76-37-00 | 1 |
| CMHE | Camaguey, Cg. | 21-21-00 | 77-52-00 | 1 |
| CMEE | Santa Clara, V. C. | 22-24-00 | 79-57-00 | 0.25 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WLSQ | Montgomery, AL | 8.24 | 10.36 | 241.6 | 181.9 | 24.7 |
| WLOF | Orlando, FL | 6.71 | 15.15 | 232.5 | 102.9 | 55.7 |
| WGOV | Valdosta, GA | 5.28 | 11.55 | 145.6 | 63.1 | 56.7 |
| WSPA | Spartanburg, SC | 5.75 | 7.24 | 381.1 | 305.1 | 19.9 |
| KPRC | Houston, TX | 3.51 | 4.15 | 6,544.8 | 5,592.5 | 14.6 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 7,545.6 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 1,300.1 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 6,245.5 square miles. |

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 960 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMAE | Pinar del Rio, P.R. | 22-25-00 | 83-42-00 | 1 |
| CMDE | Matanzas, Mz. | 23-01-00 | 81-35-00 | 1 |
| CMFE | Cienfuego, Cf. | 22-08-00 | 80-27-00 | 1 |
| CMIE | Ciego de Avila, C.A. | 21-50-00 | 78-45-00 | 1 |
| CMKE | Holguin, Ho. | 20-51-00 | 76-16-00 | 1 |
| CMME | Guantanamo, Gu. | 20-07-00 | 75-13-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WERC | Birmingham, AL | 3.38 | 4.10 | 1,283.0 | 1,079.0 | 16.0 |

### 970 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMAI | Consolacion, P. R. | 22-30-00 | 83-31-00 | 1 |
| CMOE | Gerona, I. J. | 21-52-00 | 82-47-00 | 1 |
| CMGE | Sancti Spiritus, S.S. | 21-56-00 | 79-27-00 | 1 |
| CMJE | Santiago de Cuba, S.C. | 20-01-00 | 75-49-00 | 1 |
| CMLE | Victoria delas Tunas, L.T. | 20-56-00 | 76-56-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/C[illegible]an ([illegible]/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WFLA | Tampa, FL | 8.74 | 11.91 | 714.4 | 563.5 | 21.1 |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

980 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMBU | Centro Habana, Ha. | 23-04-00 | 82-23-00 | 10 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| | | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Call | Location | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Precentage Lost |
| KMBZ | Kansas City, MO | 3.55 | 3.60 | 6,217.0 | 6,122.0 | 1.5 |
| WPIP | Pompano Beach, FL | 5.71 | 24.43 | 275.5 | 48.2 | 82.5 |
| WSIX | Nashville, TN | 9.66 | 10.89 | 422.7 | 373.8 | 11.6 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 6,915.2 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 371.2 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 6,544.0 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

990 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMAM | Guane, P. R. | 22-12-00 | 84-03-00 | 10 |
| CMAN | LaPalma, P. R. | 22-44-00 | 83-32-00 | 1 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WFAB | Miami-S. Miami, FL | 5.81 | 22.34 | 335.7 | 127.9 | 61.9 |
| WHOO | Orlando, FL | 7.79 | 18.16 | 204.8 | 87.1 | 57.5 |
| WNOX | Knoxville, TN | 7.61 | 9.14 | 325.3 | 273.3 | 16.0 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 865.8 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 377.5 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 488.3 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 1010 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMON | C. Australia, Mz. | 22-29-00 | 81-07-00 | 10 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KLRA | Little Rock, AR | 5.16 | 6.12 | 644.4 | 539.3 | 16.3 |
| WCBF | Tampa, FL | 8.91 | 20.63 | 96.3 | 33.9 | 64.8 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 740.7 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 167.5 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 573.2 square miles. |

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 1020 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMMO | Baraboa, Gu. | 20-21-00 | 74-30-00 | 10 |
| CMHP | Guantanamo, Gu. | 20-07-00 | 75-13-00 | 10 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| KDKA | Pittsburgh, PA | 0.5 (skywave) | 2.03 (groundwave) | 1,162,762.2 | 8,550.8 | 99.3 |

### 1040 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMBX | Wajay, Ha. | 23-01-00 | 82-26-00 | 500 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WHO | Des Moines, IA (See map) | 0.5 (skywave) | 13.7 (groundwave) | 1,714,337 | 5,926.0 | 99.65 |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 1100 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMBW | Centro Habana, Ha. | 23-04-00 | 82-23-00 | 10 |
| CMNN | Media Luna, Gr. | 20-09-00 | 77-26-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WWWE | Cleveland, OH | 0.5<br>(skywave) | 2.08<br>(groundwave) | 1,059,199.8 | 11,080.8 | 98.9 |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 1160 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMBV | Wajay, Ha. | 23-01-00 | 82-26-00 | 500 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| KSL | Salt Lake City, UT (See map) | 0.5 (skywave) | 3.95 (groundwave) | 1,406,910.5 | 9,439.2 | 99.3 |
| WJJD | Chicago, IL | 5.71 | 12.13 | 1,405.9 | 652.3 | 53.6 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 1,408,316.4 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 1,398,224.9 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 10,091.5 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

1130 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMGL | Sancti Spiritus, S.S. | 21-54-00 | 79-26-00 | 10 |
| CMJW | Mayari Arriba, Ho. | 20-25-00 | 75-30-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WHAM | Rochester, NY | 0.5 (skywave) | 1.40 (groundwave) | 775,250.4 | 8,051.3 | 99.0 |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 1260 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMBM | Regla, Ha. | 23-07-00 | 82-20-00 | 10 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WWDC | Washington, D. C. | 2.78 | 3.72 | 502.9 | 377.0 | 25.0 |
| WHTT | Miami, FL | 7.57 | 25.58 | 400.9 | 155.6 | 61.2 |
| WIYD | Palatka, FL | 14.52 | 21.42 | 23.6 | 15.2 | 35.6 |
| WIBV | Belleville, IL | 3.28 | 3.97 | 2,419.9 | 2,061.4 | 14.8 |
| WNDE | Indianapolis, IN | 2.50 | 2.96 | 2,575.5 | 2.230.3 | 13.4 |
| KGBX | Springfield, MO | 3.16 | 3.72 | 1,285.6 | 1,108.0 | 13.8 |
| WNXT | Portsmouth, OH | 4.74 | 5.77 | 82.9 | 68.3 | 17.6 |
| WCHV | Charlottesville, VA | 6.33 | 6.51 | 71.4 | 69.4 | 2.8 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 7,362.7 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 1,277.5 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 6,085.2 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

## 1290 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMEO | Rancho Velaz, V. C. | 22-53-00 | 80-23-00 | 1 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| | | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Call | Location | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
| WTMC | Ocala, FL | 7.24 | 9.48 | 145.0 | 109.4 | 24.6 |
| WIRK | West Palm Beach, FL | 4.92 | 8.71 | 210.6 | 128.4 | 39.0 |
| WWSA | Savannah, GA | 5.54 | 6.88 | 370.7 | 324.2 | 12.5 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 726.3 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 164.3 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 562.0 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 1310 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMOL | Isla Juventud, I. J. | 21-42-00 | 82-45-00 | 10 |
| CMEP | Sagua La Grande, V. C. | 22-48-00 | 80-06-00 | 1 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WISE | Asheville, NC | 10.28 | 11.52 | 40.0 | 35.4 | 11.5 |
| WDOD | Chattanooga, TN | 3.10 | 5.60 | 390.4 | 209.8 | 46.3 |
| WDXI | Jackson, TN | 7.42 | 8.48 | 98.9 | 86.3 | 12.7 |
| KAAM | Dallas, TX | 3.72 | 4.26 | 3,350.4 | 2,910.8 | 13.1 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 3,879.7 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 637.4 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 3,242.3 square miles. |

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 1320 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMEN | Caibarien, V. C. | 22-31-00 | 79-28-00 | 1 |
| CMDA | Santiago de Cuba, S.C. | 20-00-48 | 75-49-00 | 1 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WLQY | Hollywood, FL | 12.99 | 15.17 | 216.9 | 193.2 | 10.9 |
| WVOJ | Jacksonville, FL | 4.24 | 6.16 | 641.2 | 462.8 | 27.8 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 858.1 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 202.1 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 656.0 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

1330 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMCB | Havana, Ha. | 23-06-30 | 82-22-24 | 1 |
| CMKM | Banes, Ho. | 20-59-00 | 75-43-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WFBC | Greenville, SC | 3.16 | 3.31 | 380.7 | 364.2 | 4.3 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 380.7 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 16.5 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 364.2 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

1360 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMHW | C. Ramierez, Cg. | 21-23-00 | 78-24-00 | 10 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Precentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WDRC | Hartford, CT | 2.50 | 2.60 | 458.7 | 442.1 | 3.6 |
| WZNG | Cypress Gardens, FL | 9.44 | 17.82 | 68.5 | 35.8 | 47.7 |
| WKAT | Miami Beach, FL | 5.54 | 23.14 | 458.7 | 262.7 | 42.7 |
| WAZA | Bainbridge, GA | 16.83 | 19.35 | 47.5 | 40.3 | 15.2 |
| WSAI | Cincinnati, OH | 2.56 | 2.84 | 1,849.0 | 1,690.0 | 8.6 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 2,882.0 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 411.0 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 2,471.0 square miles. |

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 1380 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMHY | Cent. Brasil, Cg. | 21-47-00 | 77-57-00 | 10 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WDAT | Ormond Beach, FL | 17.31 | 20.27 | 37.2 | 32.9 | 11.6 |
| WNSI | St. Petersburg, FL | 5.01 | 17.51 | 863.8 | 561.4 | 35.0 |
| WAOK | Atlanta, GA | 5.80 | 7.23 | 163.6 | 133.8 | 18.2 |
| WWNK | St. Louis, MO | 2.50 | 2.69 | 1,656.0 | 1,543.0 | 6.8 |
| WAWZ | Zarephath, NJ | 3.08 | 3.35 | 565.1 | 524.9 | 7.1 |
| WBNX | New York, NY | 2.93 | 3.13 | 558.7 | 535.9 | 4.1 |
| WRAQ | Asheville, NC | 5.96 | 6.99 | 70.0 | 59.8 | 14.6 |
| WTOB | Winston-Salem, NC | 6.11 | 7.65 | 58.1 | 46.3 | 20.3 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 3,973.0 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 535.0 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 3,438.0 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 1390 Kilohertz

**Proposed Cuban Stations:**

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMHL | Camaguez, Cg. | 21-20-00 | 77-52-00 | 5 |
| CMCM | Jaruco, Ph. | 23-02-00 | 82-00-00 | 1 |

**U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Stations:**

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WCSC | Charleston, SC | 3.22 | 6.86 | 392.9 | 248.6 | 36.7 |

Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: 392.9 square miles.

Total reduction in coverage: 144.3 square miles.

Predicted remaining coverage: 248.6 square miles.

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 1410 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMAQ | Pinar del Rio, P. R. | 22-23-00 | 83-41-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour |  | Coverage Area |  | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) |  |
| WUNI | Mobile, AL | 3.63 | 4.88 | 610.9 | 540.2 | 11.6 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 610.9 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 70.7 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 540.2 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

## 1430 Kilohertz

**Proposed Cuban Station:**

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMIN | Moron, C. A. | 22-06-00 | 78-37-00 | 10 |

**U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:**

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | |
| WQDI | Homestead, FL | 7.52 | 24.26 | 188.9 | 43.5 | 77.0 |
| WQPD | Lakeland, FL | 8.19 | 19.42 | 55.2 | 22.2 | 59.8 |
| WWGS | Tifton, GA | 21.16 | 23.81 | 25.3 | 22.3 | 11.9 |
| KELI | Tulsa, OK | 3.08 | 3.45 | 2,362.8 | 2,126.9 | 10.0 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 2,632.2 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 417.3 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 2,214.9 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

1440 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMIL | Ciego de Avila,-C.A. | 21-52-00 | 78-44-00 | 5.0 |

U. S. Stations Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WHHY | Montgomery, AL | 4.08 | 6.22 | 395.0 | 263.2 | 33.4 |
| WAYK | Lehigh Acres, FL | 4.13 | 15.60 | 375.3 | 91.0 | 75.8 |
| WAJL | Winter Park, FL | 9.11 | 14.91 | 41.8 | 25.1 | 40.2 |
| WGIG | Brunswick, GA | 11.16 | 14.21 | 71.3 | 59.6 | 16.4 |
| KMLB | Monroe, LA | 3.74 | 4.45 | 329.0 | 279.9 | 14.9 |
| WQOK | Greenville, SC | 7.90 | 8.95 | 86.7 | 76.7 | 11.5 |
| WHIS | Bluefield, WV | 4.41 | 4.65 | 72.5 | 68.8 | 5.1 |

Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: 1,371.6 square miles.
Total reduction in coverage: 507.3 square miles.
Predicted remaining coverage: 864.3 square miles.

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

## 1460 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMHZ | Sola, Cg. | 21-40-00 | 76-45-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| | | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Call | Location | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
| WPDQ | Jacksonville, FL | 6.74 | 7.79 | 234.8 | 202.2 | 13.9 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 234.8 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 32.6 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 202.2 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed
Cuban Stations Interference to Existing
United States AM Stations

1470 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMDP | Cardenas, Mz. | 23-02-00 | 81-12-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| | | Interference-Free Contour | | Coverage Area | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Call | Location | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
| WBIG | Greensboro, NC | 3.67 | 4.11 | 473.6 | 429.2 | 9.4 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 473.6 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 44.4 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 429.2 square miles. |

Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

1550 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMOR | Neuva Geroma, P. H. | 22-52-00 | 82-47-00 | 1 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour Existing (mV/m) | Interference-Free Contour w/Cuban (mV/m) | Coverage Area Existing (Sq. Mi.) | Coverage Area w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WRHC | Coral Gables, FL | 9.70 | 11.45 | 63.0 | 51.1 | 18.9 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 63.0 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 11.9 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 51.1 square miles. |

## Tabulation of Data Pertinent to Proposed Cuban Stations Interference to Existing United States AM Stations

### 1590 Kilohertz

Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Latitude (°-'-") | Longitude (°-'-") | Power (kW) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CMNM | Manzanilla, Gr. | 20-20-00 | 77-08-00 | 0.500 |

U. S. Station Receiving Interference from Proposed Cuban Station:

| Call | Location | Interference-Free Contour |  | Coverage Area |  | Percentage Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Existing (mV/m) | w/Cuban (mV/m) | Existing (Sq. Mi.) | w/Cuban (Sq. Mi.) |  |
| WALG | Albany, GA | 2.67 | 2.85 | 227.7 | 214.4 | 5.8 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Total existing coverage by these U. S. stations: | 227.7 square miles. |
| Total reduction in coverage: | 13.3 square miles. |
| Predicted remaining coverage: | 214.4 square miles. |

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## Additional U. S. Class I Stations With Partial Skywave Coverage Loss Due to Cuban Interference

| Frequency (kHz) | Call | Location | Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| 640 | KFI | Los Angeles, CA | I-A |
| 650* | WSM | Nashville, TN | I-A |
| 750* | WSB | Atlanta, GA | I-A |
| 780 | WBBM | Chicago, IL | I-A |
| 820* | WBAP | Fort Worth, TX | I-A |
| 830 | WCCO | Minneapolis, MN | I-A |
| 850 | KOA | Denver, CO | I-A |
| 1060 | KYW | Philadelphia, PA | I-B |
| 1070 | KNX | Los Angeles, CA | I-A |
| 1110* | KFAB | Omaha, NE | I-B |
| 1190 | WOWO | Fort Wayne, IN | I-B |
| 1200* | WOAI | San Antonio, TX | I-A |
| 1500 | WTOP | Washington D. C. | I-B |
| 1510* | WLAC | Nashville, TN | I-B |
| 1520 | WKBW | Buffalo, NY | I-B |
| 1520 | KOMA | Oklahoma City, OK | I-B |
| 1530* | WCKY | Cincinnati, OH | I-B |
| 1540 | KXEL | Waterloo, IA | I-B |
| 1560 | WQXR | New York, NY | I-B |

* These stations would suffer a substantial loss in nighttime groundwave coverage area.

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### Additional U. S. Class I Stations With Major Skywave Coverage Loss Due to Cuban Interference

| Frequency (kHz) | Call | Location | Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| 700 | WLW | Cincinnati, OH | I-A |
| 710 | WOR | New York, NY | I-B |
| 720 | WGN | Chicago, IL | I-A |
| 770 | WABC | New York, NY | I-A |
| 810 | WGY | Schenectady, NY | I-A |
| 840 | WHAS | Louisville, KY | I-A |
| 870 | WWL | New Orleans, LA | I-A |
| 1000 | WCFL | Chicago, IL | I-B |
| 1080 | WTIC | Hartford, CT | I-B |
| 1080 | KRLD | Dallas, TX | I-B |
| 1090 | KAAY | Little Rock, AR | I-B |
| 1090 | WBAL | Baltimore, MD | I-B |
| 1110 | WBT | Charlotte, NC | I-B |
| 1120 | KMOX | St. Louis, MO | I-A |
| 1130 | KWKH | Shreveport, LA | I-B |
| 1130 | WNEW | New York, NY | I-B |
| 1140 | WRVA | Richmond, VA | I-B |
| 1210 | WCAU | Philadelphia, PA | I-A |

NOTE: These statons would suffer a major reduction in nigthtime groundwave coverage area.

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On the following frequencies, proposed Cuban stations cause minor interference to U. S. stations:

1250, 1270, 1400, 1420, 1450, 1480, 1490, 1580.

On the following frequencies, proposed Cuban stations cause no interference to U. S. stations:

540, 730, 800, 900, 940, 950, 1410.

Numerous local stations in the southeast United States operating on 1230 kHz and 1340 kHz will receive interference from proposed 10-kW Cuban stations operating on those frequencies.

Interference on the following frequencies was not analyzed due to errors in the computer data base employed:

680, 1280, 1300, 1370.

## ACTUAL STATION INTERFERENCE

Much of the United States is currently experiencing radio interference from Cuba. Several stations in Florida have been granted Special Temporary Authority from the FCC to operate with greater powers and/or alternative directional antennas to recoup as much lost service area as possible. Other stations, including some far north, have reported "substantial" interference from Cuba -- impairing their ability to serve the public with an interference-free signal.

For example, NAB has received correspondence from WICC, Bridgeport, Connecticut, 600 on the AM dial. WICC states that two out of three times it has conducted measurements on Cuban broadcast signals, the signal strengths have been at least twice as strong as otherwise allowed for protection of the WICC service area under the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA). With WICC experiencing actual interference, the following stations which operate on the same frequency are also likely to have their service areas reduced:

| | |
|---|---|
| WCAO | Baltimore, MD |
| WMT | Cedar Rapids, IA |
| WOKV | Jacksonville, FL |
| WRCC | Memphis, TN |
| WSJS | Winston-Salem, NC |

The signal strengths from Cuba are stronger to the South. However, as the attached Cuban Signal Strength Measurements indicate, the presence of strong signals on WICC's channel is intermittent, fluctuating week to week.

WPLP, Pinellas Park, Florida, operates on the 570 frequency at 500 watts of power with different directional antennas day and night. WPLP measured Cuban signal strength to support an FCC application for recovery of lost service area due to interference. The engineering study showed a Cuban station on 570 operating at a power level of at least 50 kilowatts, whereas the Cuban inventory indicated they would have two stations operating at 30 and 10 kilowatts, respectively. Obviously, Cuba has opted for one stronger station instead. WPLP's documentation of the 50 kilowatt Cuban signal means that the following U.S. stations are also receiving interference on the 570 frequency:

| | |
|---|---|
| WAAX | Gadsden, AZ |
| WACL | Waycross, GA |
| WFAA | Fort Worth, TX |
| WGMS | Bethesda, MD |
| WKBN | Youngstown, OH |
| WMCA | New York, NY |
| WPLP | Pinellas Park, FL |
| WSYR | Syracuse, NY |
| WUMI | Biloxi, MS |
| WWNC | Asheville, NC |

Using signal strength measurements based on the proposed Cuban inventory, estimates can be made of the actual interference received by U.S. AM stations. CMBB is the station proposed to operate on 790 from Guanabacoa, Cuba, at a power level of 25 kilowatts. Whenever CMBB is on the air, the following stations receive nighttime Cuban interference:

| | |
|---|---|
| KOSY | Texarkana, AR |
| KULF | Houston, TX |
| WACB | Allentown, PA |
| WAKY | Louisville, KY |
| WEAN | Providence, RI |
| WLBR | Leesburg-Eustis, FL |
| WMC | Memphis, TN |
| WNWS | South Miami, FL |
| WQXI | Atlanta, GA |
| WTAR | Norfolk, VA |

The FCC has measured Cuban signals on the 820 frequency strong enough to eliminate most, if not all, the nighttime service area of WBAP, Fort Worth, Texas. These measurements also indicate probable interference to:

| | |
|---|---|
| KGGF | Coffeyville, KS |
| WAPE | Jacksonville, FL |
| WTIX | New Orleans, LA |

U.S. Class I 50 kilowatt stations operate at night with protection out to a distance of 750 miles. A low-power non-directional Cuban station can substantially reduce this service area. For example, CMDC in Colon, Cuba is listed as operating on the 660 frequency. CMDC would have to be operating at 2.5 kilowatts to produce the FCC-measured signal strength. Even at that low level, CMDC would severely limit the southern coverage of WNBC, New York.

In September, 1980, WINZ, Miami, Florida on 940 filed with the FCC to increase nighttime power from ten to twenty-five kilowatts to recover lost service area from Cuban interference. At the Region 2 Conference in Rio, Cuba proposed several one kilowatt stations on 940, and as of February 9, 1982, it did not yet appear that these were on the air. Nonetheless, WINZ has been experiencing substantial Cuban interference when Cuba has elected to broadcast into the United States.

WQBA, Miami, Florida on 1140 has also filed with the FCC to change its operating precedure so as to recapture portions of its service area lost to Cuban interference. The documented interference is on file with the FCC. In this instance the interference is caused by two Cuban stations, one on 1140 and one on 1142.3, each beaming radio signals without any broadcasts on the frequency. In effect, turning on the transmitter but sending no voice broadcasts. The result is known as a "beat note," an unpleasant, whistling sound received by those tuning in to WQBA. The Cuban jamming of 1140 also causes interference to other stations on the frequency such as WRVA, Richmond, Virginia.

This is a representative sample of the devastating effects of the Cuban problem which adversely affects both broadcasters and the public. NAB will continue to compile documentation of Cuban interference experienced by AM stations nationwide.

A map of WPLP, Pinellas Park, Florida follows, illustrating the current Cuban interference situation on the 570 frequency.

Additionally, Cuban signal strength measurements taken by the FCC are listed along with each U.S. frequency demonstrating the indiscriminate and fluid interference problem.

# Documented Interference Map


FEBRUARY 1982
IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON ,D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C.
Consulting Electrical Engineers
WPLP PINELLAS PARK, FL
570 KHZ 1 KW U DA-2
Authorized daytime coverage 5061 square miles
Reduced daytime coverage 1110 square miles
Daytime Coverage lost to Measured CMHI interference
CITRUS
HERNANDO
OSCEOLA
HILLSBOROUGH
PINELLAS
INDIAN
HARDEE
MANATEE
OKEECHOBEE
HIGHLANDS
SARASOTA
DE SOTO
GLADES
CHARLOTTE
LAKE OKEECHOBEE
LEE
HENDRY
E X I C O
Statute Miles

## CUBAN SIGNAL STRENGTH MEASUREMENTS

The Federal Communications Commission performed field measurements to document Cuban radio signal strength on three separate dates, March 31, 1981, January 21, 1982 and February 9, 1982. The results illustrate the constant change in signal strength that causes interference for U.S. stations. All measurements were made at Key Marathon, Florida in uV/m.

| Frequency | Signal Strength | | | Bearing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 3/31/81 | 1/21/82 | 2/9/82 | |
| 550 | 4800 | 730 | 850 | 225° |
| 570 | 4200 | 4200 | - | - |
| 590 | 890 | 890 | - | - |
| 600 | 5400 | 5400 | - | - |
| 630 | 2700 | 2700 | - | - |
| 640 | 5400 | 5400 | - | - |
| 660 | - | - | 1420 | 165° |
| 670 | 190 | 190 | - | - |
| 680 | - | - | 320 | 165° |
| 690 | 5100 | 3300 | 2920 | 165° |
| 710 | 3400 | 3400 | - | - |
| 730 | - | 2100 | - | - |
| 760 | 1400 | 1400 | 1900 | 225° |
| 780 | 480 | 480 | - | - |
| 790 | - | - | 5100 | 235° |
| 820 | - | - | 2350 | 225° |
| 840 | 1000 | - | 750 | 165° |
| 860 | 430 | 430 | 1140 | 240° |
| 880 | 260 | 260 | 240 | 235° |

| Frequency | Signal Strength |  |  | Bearing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | 3/31/81 | 1/21/82 | 2/9/82 |  |
| 890 | - | - | 95 | 165° |
| 910 | 95 | 550 | 85 | 145° |
| 920 | 700 | 700 | 600 | 190° |
| 930 | 500 | 500 | 490 | 190° |
| 950 | - | - | 520 | 225° |
| 960 | - | - | 85 | 180° |
| 980 | 1100 | 1100 | 740 | 225° |
| 990 | - | - | 60 | 225° |
| 1010 | - | 530 | - | - |
| 1020 | 550 | 550 | 450 | 240° |
| 1040 | 500 | 500 | 65 | 140° |
| 1050 | - | - | 70 | 140° |
| 1080 | - | 1000 | 950 | 220° |
| 1090 | - | - | 120 | 240° |
| 1120 | - | - | 380 | 225° |
| 1160 | - | - | 3150 | 225° |
| 1180 | - | - | 125 | 220° |
| 1190 | - | - | 470 | 145° |
| 1210 | - | - | 175 | 145° |
| 1220 | - | 1400 | 1250 | 190° |
| 1240 | 400 | 400 | 330 | 190° |
| 1250 | - | 450 | 580 | 145° |
| 1280 | - | 950 | 90 | 165° |
| 1290 | - | - | 800 | 165° |
| 1310 | - | - | 750 | 145° |

| Frequency | Signal Strength | | | Bearing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 3/31/81 | 1/21/82 | 2/9/82 | |
| 1330 | - | - | 85 | 190° |
| 1340 | 350 | - | 330 | 165° |
| 1390 | - | 400 | 340 | 225° |
| 1440 | - | - | 80 | 180° |
| 1460 | - | 1490 | - | - |
| 1470 | 950 | 950 | - | - |

## HISTORY OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE

In 1959, Cuba and the United States signed the North American Regional Broadcast Agreement (NARBA) which gave both nations satisfactory protection against radio interference. Although NARBA was signed by the Batista government in Cuba, until recently, signals broadcast by the Castro regime did not depart drastically from its terms.

In the last two years, AM broadcast stations in the U.S. began suffering unacceptable levels of interference from Cuban stations. Concurrently, preliminary negotiations for a new radio treaty among the nations of the western hemisphere -- at the 1980 Region 2 Conference in Buenos Aires -- were underway. The purpose of the 1980 Region 2 agreement was to establish technical standards for a mutually satisfactory broadcast service for all countries of the hemisphere and to promote the orderly and efficient expansion of AM broadcast service.

Cuba formally denounced NARBA in November, 1980, but did participate in the 1981 Region 2 Conference in Rio de Janeiro. At the Rio Region 2, participating nations were asked to submit inventories or lists of their existing stations and those of planned stations. The inventories submitted by Cuba were devastating to AM broadcasting in the U.S. The Cubans proposed a "block shift" -- an all or nothing proposal -- that would lessen or eliminate interference problems in other countries and shift them to the U.S. The proposal was an obvious ploy to gain the support of other nations at the expense of U.S. broadcasting.

The strategy promoted some nations to support Cuba's "block shift" inventory. But the U.S. delegation made it clear that it would not sign any agreement calling for "the mutilation of our own broadcast service." This ultimately sent Cuba and the U.S. into bilateral negotiations which ended when Cuba withdrew from the final negotiating session at the Rio Region 2 Conference last December.

The Rio Region 2 agreement ultimately signed by the U.S. and other countries will not go into effect until July 1, 1983, and has not been ratified by the Senate. But countries that participated in the Conference adopted resolutions for interim protection of AM broadcasting in this hemisphere until 1983. One such resolution provides that any country that did not sign the agreement, but that participated in the negotiations -- such as Cuba -- would not receive protection for its stations that are interfering with those of signatory nations. This means that Cuba's destructive interference to AM broadcast stations in the U.S. is a glaring violation of international law.

Cuba's denunciation of NARBA, her anti-U.S. inventories at Region 2 and recent illegal levels of interference in the U.S. appear to be part of Castro's "Five Year Plan" to install high power Czechoslovakian-built transmitters and double the number of Cuban AM stations from 90 to over 180. This would give the Castro regime a greatly enhanced presence over the airwaves in Central and South America. But Cuba's plans to broadcast illegally far beyond her borders and her persistent refusal to use directional antennas in doing so, continues to wreak havoc for AM broadcasting in the U.S.

# Appendix

ENGINEERING STATEMENT

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

## Technical Summary Regarding Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcast Stations

The maps contained in this report, which show existing interference to United States AM broadcast stations and prospective additional interference from Cuban stations, are divided into three groups:

1. Nighttime interference to Class III stations on regional channels.

2. Nighttime interference to Class I stations on clear channels, and

3. Daytime interference to regional stations.

The facilities of United States stations studied were determined from current FCC lists. Cuban stations are those shown in the Cuban inventory just prior to the Region 2 Conference including the changes involving 28 channels proposed by the Cubans shortly before the end of the Conference. A complete listing of the Cuban inventory employed is contained elsewhere in this report.

Nighttime interference to Class III regional stations was determined as outlined in Section 73.182 of the FCC Rules. Appropriate vertical angles and 10-percent skywave factors are those specified in the FCC rules. Employing FCC computer-generated studies, the extent of groundwave coverage was determined based on interference-free coverage under the existing allocation scheme. The proposed interference level was determined based on the facilities for the proposed Cuban station(s) listed for that frequency. In addition to the maps, a tabulation also provides the areas of interference to the United States stations considered in the study and summarizes the total loss of coverage on the frequency due to Cuban interference. The tabulation is organized by frequency.

Maps showing nighttime interference to regional channels depict groundwave coverage prior to and subsequent to operation of the proposed Cuban station(s). Additional interference by the Cuban station(s) is shown by means of cross-hatching. The area in square miles lost to interference is indicated.

Nighttime interference to Class I stations on clear channels is treated similarly to the regional channels except that Class I stations provide "secondary" or skywave service to very large areas. On the clear channel maps provided, the skywave service of those stations is completely lost due to proposed Cuban interference. Nighttime interference is great enough to also adversely affect groundwave coverage of the clear channel stations. In fact, coverage of the clear channel stations shown is similar to Class III stations on regional channels. The nighttime interference studies show that skywave interference would affect stations in most of the United States. However, during daytime hours, groundwave interference from some Cuban stations is expected in Florida and in states along the Gulf of Mexico. Daytime interference is also possible to southern stations near the Atlantic coast. The third set of maps indicates daytime interference to the groundwave service area of stations from proposed Cuban stations. One of the maps showing interference to station WPLP is based on field strength measurements on the Cuban station thereby providing certainty as to actual interference.

Interference calculations were made employing current FCC rules and standards, which include nighttime interference calculations based on 10-percent-of-the-time skywave fields. Groundwave contours are projected on the basis of conductivities shown on the Commission's conductivity map.

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Jules Cohen & Associates, P. C.
1730 M Street, N. W., Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20036

February 24, 1982

# CUBAN INVENTORY
# OF
# EXISTING & PROPOSED STATIONS

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FILE: FCC    GENERATED ON 111681 AT  22.678          XXXXX PAGE    1 XXXXX             LAST UPDATED ON
FREQ CALL   CT  LATITUDE   LONGITUDE      POWER   HRS DIR F/R D/I    ELECT.    RMS    ST          CITY
KHZ  SIGN                                                    ST.     HT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOWER      CURRENT    ORIENTATION   SPACING   PHASING   ELECT. HT.

NUMBER     RATIO        (DEGREES)   (DEGREES) (DEGREES)  (DEGREES)
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 540 CMNA   CU  20-20- 0 N  77- 8- 0 W     1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  60.00000  190.75 GR MANZANILLO
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 550 CMAA   CU  22-26- 0 N  83-40- 0 W    30.00000 U  -N   /A  /J  84.99999  193.60 PR PINAR DEL RIO
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 560 CMIA   CU  21-53- 0 N  78-43- 0 W    10.00000 U   N   /B  /J  80.99999  192.96 CA CIEGO DE AVILA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 570 CMMA   CU  19-56- 0 N  77-19- 0 W    10.00000 U   N   /B  /P  82.00000  192.96 GR PILON
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 570 CMEA   CU  22-27- 0 N  79-53- 0 W    30.00000 U   N   /A  /J  83.00000  193.60 VC SANTA CLARA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 580 CMDF   CU  20-21- 0 N  74-30- 0 W     5.00000 U   N   /B  /J  65.00000  190.98 GU BARACOA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 590 CMKA   CU  20- 9- 0 N  75-10- 0 W     5.00000 U   N   /B  /J  65.00000  193.17 GU GUANTANAMO
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 590 CMCA   CU  22-40- 0 N  82-14- 0 W   150.00000 U   N   /A  /J 127.00000  205.32 PH SN ANT VEGAS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 600 CMAA   CU  22-55- 0 N  83-10- 0 W     1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  65.00000  190.75 PR BAHIA HONDA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 600 CMKA   CU  20-33- 0 N  76- 7- 0 W   150.00000 U   N   /A  /J 130.00000  207.49 SC SAN GERMAN
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 610 CMJA   CU  20-25- 0 N  75-30- 0 W     1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  65.00000  190.75 HO MAYARI ARRIBA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 610.CMSA   CU  21-47- 0 N  79-59- 0 W     1.00000 U . N   /C  /J  51.00000  188.57 SS TRINIDAD
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 620 CMKF   CU  20-40- 0 N  74-56- 0 W     1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  68.00000  192.96 HO MOA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 620 CMBA   CU  22-43- 0 N  80-55- 0 W    30.00000 U   N   /A  /J  90.99999  195.84 MZ COLON
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 630 CMMA   CU  21-23- 0 N  77-59- 0 W    30.00000 U   N   /A  /J  91.99999  195.84 CG CAMAGUEY
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 630 CMGA   CU  21-42- 0 N  82-45- 0 W    10.00000 U   N   /B  /P  68.00000  192.96 IJ ISLA JUVENTUD
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 640 CMLA   CU  20-57- 0 N  76-57- 0 W    10.00000 U   N   /B  /J  91.99999  195.20 LT VICTORIA DE LAS TU
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 650 CMFA   CU  22- 5- 0 N  80-27- 0 W     1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  71.00000  192.96 CF CIENFUEGOS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 650 CMJA   CU  20- 1- 0 N  75-50- 0 W     1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  71.00000  190.75 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 660 CMBC   CU  22-43- 0 N  80-54- 0 W    30.00000 U   N   /A  /J  94.99999  195.34 MZ COLON
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 670 CMNC   CU  20- 9- 0 N  77-26- 0 W     1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  73.99999  192.96 GR MEDIA LUNA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 670 CMBC   CU  23- 3- 0 N  82-29- 0 W    50.00000 U   N   /A  /J  96.99999  197.69 HA ARROYO ARENAS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 680 CMIC   CU  21-53- 0 N  78-43- 0 W    10.00000 U   N   /B  /P  97.99999  197.45 CA CIEGO DE AVILA
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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KHZ  SIGN                                                  ST.   HT.
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TOWER     CURRENT    ORIENTATION   SPACING   PHASING   ELECT. HT.

NUMBER    RATIO       (DEGREES)   (DEGREES) (DEGREES)  (DEGREES)
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===================================================================================================
 680 CMAC  CU  22-54- 0 N  83-10- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  76.00000  192.96 PR BAHIA HONDA
===================================================================================================
 680 CMDB  CU  20- 0-48 N  75-49- 0 W    0.50000 N   N 2 /   /N 111.95999  175.00 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA
===================================================================================================
 690 CMEC  CU  22-26- 0 N  79-54- 0 W   50.00000 U   N   /A  /J  76.00000  193.19 VC SANTA CLARA
===================================================================================================
 700 CMJC  CU  20-25- 0 N  75-30- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  76.00000  192.96 HO MAYARI ARRIBA
===================================================================================================
 700 CMDC  CU  21-42- 0 N  82-45- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P  76.00000  192.96 IJ ISLA JUVENTUD
===================================================================================================
 710 CMLC  CU  20-55- 0 N  76-54- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P  78.00000  192.96 LT VICTORIA DE LAS TU
===================================================================================================
 710 CMDC  CU  23- 3- 0 N  81-35- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  77.00000  195.20 MZ MATANZAS
===================================================================================================
 720 CMKC  CU  20-20- 0 N  74-29- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P  78.99999  192.96 GU BARACOA
===================================================================================================
 720 CMSC  CU  21-46- 0 N  79-59- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  78.99999  192.96 SS TRINIDAD
===================================================================================================
 730 CMHC  CU  21-21- 0 N  77-55- 0 W   30.00000 U   N   /A  /J 107.00000  198.11 CG CAMAGUEY
===================================================================================================
 740 CMAC  CU  22-19- 0 N  83-39- 0 W   30.00000 U   N   /A  /J 107.99999  198.11 PR PINAR DEL RIO
===================================================================================================
 750 CMFC  CU  22- 5- 0 N  80-27- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  82.00000  195.20 CF CIENFUEGOS
===================================================================================================
 750 CMJC  CU  20- 1- 0 N  75-50- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  71.00000  192.96 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA
===================================================================================================
 760 CMKC  CU  20-34- 0 N  76-17- 0 W   75.00000 U   N   /A  /D 111.00000  200.88 HO CACOCUM
===================================================================================================
 770 CMKC  CU  19-56- 0 N  77-19- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 111.00000  202.05 GR PILON
===================================================================================================
 780 CMKC  CU  20-40- 0 N  74-56- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  86.00000  195.20 HO MOA
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===================================================================================================
 800 CMAB  CU  22-54- 0 N  83-10- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  87.99999  195.20 PR BAHIA HONDA
===================================================================================================
 800 CMEB  CU  22-27- 0 N  79-53- 0 W   30.00000 U   N   /A  /J 116.99998  202.72 VC SANTA CLARA
===================================================================================================
 810 CMMB  CU  20- 9- 0 N  75-10- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 115.00000  202.05 GU GUANTANAMO
===================================================================================================
 820 CMIB  CU  21-52- 0 N  78-44- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J  90.00000  195.20 CA CIEGO DE AVILA
===================================================================================================
 820 CMNB  CU  20-20- 0 N  77- 8- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  90.00000  195.20 GR MANZANILLO
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KHZ  SIGN                                                  ST.    HT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOWER     CURRENT    ORIENTATION   SPACING   PHASING   ELECT. HT.

NUMBER     RATIO       (DEGREES)   (DEGREES) (DEGREES)  (DEGREES)
=========================================================================================================
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=========================================================================================================
 830 CMFB   CU  22- 9- 0 N  80-26- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  90.99999  195.20 CF CIENFUEGOS
=========================================================================================================
 840 CMOB   CU  21-42- 0 N  82-45- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P  94.00000  195.20 IJ ISLA JUVENTUD
=========================================================================================================
 840 CMLB   CU  20-57- 0 N  76-57- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 120.99999  204.39 LT VICTORIA DE LAS TU
=========================================================================================================
 850 CMJB   CU  21-22-36 N  77-55- 6 W    1.00000 N   N 2 /   /C 111.95999  175.00 CG CAMAGUEY
=========================================================================================================
 850 CMJB   CU  20-25- 0 N  75-30- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  94.00000  195.20 HO MAYARI ARRIBA
=========================================================================================================
 850 CMGB   CU  21-46- 0 N  79-59- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  93.00000  195.20 SS TRINIDAD
=========================================================================================================
 860 CMMB   CU  20-20- 0 N  74-29- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P  94.00000  192.96 GU BARACOA
=========================================================================================================
 860 CMDB   CU  22-43- 0 N  80-55- 0 W   30.00000 U   N   /A  /O 125.99999  205.07 MZ COLON
=========================================================================================================
 870 CMNB   CU  19-53- 0 N  77-20- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 125.00000  204.40 GR PILON
=========================================================================================================
 870 CMGB   CU  21-56- 0 N  79-27- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  94.99999  195.20 SS SANCTI SPIRITUS
=========================================================================================================
 880 CMKG   CU  20-40- 0 N  74-56- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  96.99999  197.45 HO MOA
=========================================================================================================
 880 CMAB   CU  22-19- 0 N  83-39- 0 W   30.00000 U   N   /A  /J 129.00000  207.45 PR PINAR DEL RIO
=========================================================================================================
 890 CMHB   CU  21-23- 0 N  77-59- 0 W   30.00000 U   N   /A  /O 130.00000  205.07 CG CAMAGUEY
=========================================================================================================
 900 CMKB   CU  20-44- 0 N  76-19- 0 W  200.00000 U   N   /A  /O 132.00000  208.90 HO CACOCUM
=========================================================================================================
 910 CMBD   CU  23- 6- 0 N  82-17- 0 W   75.00000 U   N   /A  /O 133.00000  207.94 HA GUANABACOA
=========================================================================================================
 910 CMMD   CU  20- 7- 0 N  75-13- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 103.99999  197.45 GU GUANTANAMO
=========================================================================================================
 920 CMDJ   CU  23- 2- 0 N  81-12- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J  73.99999  191.20 MZ CARDENAS
=========================================================================================================
 920 CMED   CU  22-26- 0 N  79-56- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 100.00000  197.45 VC SANTA CLARA
=========================================================================================================
 920 CMOD   CU  21-52- 0 N  82-47- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  83.00000  195.19 IJ ISLA JUVENTUD
=========================================================================================================
 920 CMHD   CU  21-20- 0 N  77-52- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 107.00000  199.74 CG CAMAGUEY
=========================================================================================================
 920 CMND   CU  20-21- 0 N  76-37- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  72.00000  192.96 GR BAYAMO
=========================================================================================================
 930 CMDD   CU  23- 1- 0 N  81-35- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  75.00000  192.96 MZ MATANZAS
=========================================================================================================
FILE: FCC    GENERATED ON 111681 AT  22.878           ***** PAGE    4 *****           LAST UPDATED ON
FREQ CALL   CT  LATITUDE   LONGITUDE      POWER   HRS DIR F/R D/I   ELECT.   RMS   ST        CITY
KHZ  SIGN                                                     ST.    HT.
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TOWER     CURRENT    ORIENTATION   SPACING   PHASING   ELECT. HT.

NUMBER     RATIO       (DEGREES)   (DEGREES) (DEGREES)  (DEGREES)
===========================================================================================================
 930 CMID   CU  21-50- 0 N  78-45- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 101.00000  197.45 CA CIEGO DE AVILA
===========================================================================================================
 930 CMAD   CU  22-23- 0 N  83-41- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 101.00000  197.45 PR PINAR DEL RIO
===========================================================================================================
 930 CMKD   CU  20-51- 0 N  76-16- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 103.00000  197.45 HO HOLGUIN
===========================================================================================================
 930 CMFD   CU  22- 9- 0 N  80-26- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 104.99999  197.45 CF CIENFUEGOS
===========================================================================================================
 940 CMDI   CU  22-43- 0 N  80-54- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 103.00000  197.92 MZ COLON
===========================================================================================================
 940 CMLD   CU  20-56- 0 N  76-56- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 101.99999  197.45 LT VICTORIA DE LAS TU
===========================================================================================================
 940 CMGI   CU  21-34- 0 N  79-26- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 103.99999  197.45 SS SANCTI SPIRITUS
===========================================================================================================
 940 CMJD   CU  20- 1- 0 N  75-50- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 104.99999  197.45 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA
===========================================================================================================
 950 CMBE   CU  23- 3- 0 N  82-28- 0 W    5.00000 U   N   /B  /J 143.00000  211.83 HA ARROYO ARENAS
===========================================================================================================
 950 CMHE   CU  21-21- 0 N  77-52- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 108.99999  199.74 CG CAMAGUEY
===========================================================================================================
 950 CMEE   CU  22-24- 0 N  79-57- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /P  75.00000  193.42 VC SANTA CLARA
===========================================================================================================
 950 CMNE   CU  20-23- 0 N  76-37- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 111.99999  199.74 GR BAYAMO
===========================================================================================================
 960 CMKE   CU  20-51- 0 N  76-16- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 107.99999  199.74 HO HOLGUIN
===========================================================================================================
 960 CMFE   CU  22- 8- 0 N  80-27- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 108.99999  199.74 CF CIENFUEGOS
===========================================================================================================
 960 CMME   CU  20- 7- 0 N  75-13- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 111.00000  199.74 GU GUANTANAMO
===========================================================================================================
 960 CMIE   CU  21-50- 0 N  78-45- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 111.99999  199.74 CA CIEGO DE AVILA
===========================================================================================================
 960 CMDE   CU  23- 1- 0 N  81-35- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  83.00000  192.96 MZ MATANZAS
===========================================================================================================
 960 CMAE   CU  22-25- 0 N  83-42- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 111.99999  199.74 PR PINAR DEL RIO
===========================================================================================================
 970 CMAI   CU  22-30- 0 N  83-31- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 137.99998  213.03 PR CONSOLACION
===========================================================================================================
 970 CMDE   CU  21-52- 0 N  82-47- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 107.99999  199.74 IJ GERONA
===========================================================================================================
 970 CMSE   CU  21-56- 0 N  79-27- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 107.99999  199.74 SS SANCTI SPIRITUS
===========================================================================================================
 970 CMJE   CU  20- 1- 0 N  75-49- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  72.99999  192.96 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA
===========================================================================================================
 970 CMLE   CU  20-56- 0 N  76-56- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 111.00000  199.74 LT VICTORIA DE LAS TU
===========================================================================================================
FILE: FCC    GENERATED ON 111681 AT  22.878           ***** PAGE    5 *****              LAST UPDATED ON
FREQ CALL   CT  LATITUDE  LONGITUDE     POWER   HRS DIR F/R D/I   ELECT.    RMS   ST           CITY
KHZ  SIGN                                                   ST.    HT.
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TOWER     CURRENT    ORIENTATION   SPACING   PHASING   ELECT. HT.

NUMBER     RATIO       (DEGREES)   (DEGREES) (DEGREES)  (DEGREES)
======================================================================================================
 980 CMBU   CU  23- 4- 0 N  82-23- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J  90.00000  195.20 HA CENTRO HABANA
======================================================================================================
 990 CMAN   CU  22-44- 0 N  83-32- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P  86.00000  195.20 PR LA PALMA
======================================================================================================
 990 CMAM   CU  22-12- 0 N  84- 8- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 118.99999  204.40 PR GUANE
======================================================================================================
1000 CMAO   CU  22-42- 0 N  83- 2- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 115.00000  202.05 PR SAN CRISTOBAL
======================================================================================================
1000 CMAW   CU  22-40- 0 N  83-56- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 144.00000  214.03 PR MATAHAMBRE
======================================================================================================
1010 CMDN   CU  22-29- 0 N  81- 7- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 113.00000  199.74 MZ C AUSTRALIA
======================================================================================================
1020 CMMP   CU  20- 7- 0 N  75-13- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 115.00000  202.05 GU GUANTANAMO
======================================================================================================
1020 CMMQ   CU  20-21- 0 N  74-30- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 118.99999  204.40 GU BARACOA
======================================================================================================
1040 CMBX   CU  23- 1- 0 N  82-26- 0 W  500.00000 U   N   /A  /P 220.00000  272.89 HA WAJAY
======================================================================================================
1060 CMLO   CU  20-45- 0 N  77-34- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 115.99999  202.05 LT AMANCIO
======================================================================================================
1060 CMLQ   CU  21-12- 0 N  76-37- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 113.99999  202.05 LT PUERTO PADRE
======================================================================================================
1070 CMAP   CU  22-55- 0 N  83-10- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 115.00000  199.74 PR BAHIA HONDA
======================================================================================================
1070 CMAL   CU  22-23- 0 N  83-41- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 115.99999  202.05 PR PINAR DEL RIO
======================================================================================================
1080 CMCU   CU  22-51-11 N  82- 1-46 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 127.00000  204.40 PH GUINES
======================================================================================================
1090 CMLL   CU  20-55- 0 N  76-54- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 115.00000  202.05 LT VICTORIA DE LAS TU
======================================================================================================
1100 CMBW   CU  23- 4- 0 N  82-23- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 123.99999  204.40 HA CENTRO HABANA
======================================================================================================
1100 CMNN   CU  20- 9- 0 N  77-26- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 125.00000  206.76 GR MEDIA LUNA
======================================================================================================
1110 CMKL   CU  20-51- 0 N  76-16- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 122.00000  204.40 HO HOLGUIN
======================================================================================================
1120 CMKQ   CU  20-39- 0 N  75-40- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 122.99999  204.40 HO MAYARI
======================================================================================================
1120 CMCW   CU  22-48- 0 N  82-15- 0 W    5.00000 U   N   /B  /J 122.00000  202.30 PH ARTEMISA
======================================================================================================
1130 CMKU   CU  20-35- 0 N  75-14- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 123.99999  204.40 HO SAGUA DE TANAMO
======================================================================================================
1140 CMNW   CU  19-53- 0 N  77-20- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 168.00000  226.70 GR PILON
======================================================================================================
1160 CMBV   CU  23- 1- 0 N  82-26- 0 W  500.00000 U   N   /A  /P 120.00000  204.64 HA WAJAY
======================================================================================================
FILE: FCC    GENERATED ON 111681 AT  22.878          ***** PAGE    6 *****          LAST UPDATED ON
FREQ CALL  CT  LATITUDE   LONGITUDE     POWER   HRS DIR F/R D/I   ELECT.   RMS   ST       CITY
KHZ  SIGN                                                   ST.   HT.
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TOWER     CURRENT    ORIENTATION   SPACING   PHASING   ELECT. .T.

NUMBER     RATIC       (DEGREES)   (DEGREES) (DEGREES)  (DEGREES)
====================================================================================================
1180 CMJW   CU  20-25- 0 N  75-30- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 130.00000  206.76 HO MAYARI ARRIBA
====================================================================================================
1180 CMGL   CU  21-54- 0 N  79-26- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 129.00000  206.76 SS SANCTI SPIRITUE
====================================================================================================
1190 CMGO   CU  22-18- 0 N  79-13- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 130.99998  206.76 SS YAGUAJAY
====================================================================================================
1190 CMJL   CU  20- 1- 0 N  75-48- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 130.99998  206.76 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA
====================================================================================================
1200 CMGM   CU  21-47- 0 N  79-59- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 101.00000  197.45 SS TRINIDAD
====================================================================================================
1200 CMJQ   CU  20-10- 0 N  75-58- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 130.00000  206.76 SC PALMA SORIANO
====================================================================================================
1210 CMBN   CU  23- 7- 0 N  82-18- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 133.00000  209.15 HA GUANABACOA
====================================================================================================
1210 CMJX   CU  19-58- 0 N  76-26- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 133.00000  209.15 SC CHIVIRICO
====================================================================================================
1220 CMDM   CU  22-48- 0 N  81- 1- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 133.99998  209.15 MZ C ESPANA
====================================================================================================
1230 CMMW   CU  20- 4- 0 N  74-38- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 133.00000  217.20 GU IMIAS
====================================================================================================
1230 CMDM   CU  23- 1- 0 N  81-35- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J  99.00000  197.45 MZ MATANZAS
====================================================================================================
1230 CMHN   CU  21-41- 0 N  77-26- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 140.99998  212.08 CG GUAIMARO
====================================================================================================
1250 CMBU   CU  22-17- 0 N  81-12- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J  90.00000  193.42 MZ PLAYA LARGA
====================================================================================================
1260 CMBM   CU  23- 7- 0 N  82-20- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 118.99999  202.05 HA REGLA
====================================================================================================
1270 CMNR   CU  20-23- 0 N  76-37- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 139.00000  209.15 GR BAYAMO
====================================================================================================
1270 CMDO   CU  22-36- 0 N  81-13- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 139.00000  209.15 MZ TORRIENTE
====================================================================================================
1270 CMGR   CU  21-56- 0 N  79-27- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 139.00000  209.15 SS SANCTI SPIRITUS
====================================================================================================
1280 CMEL   CU  22-26- 0 N  79-56- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 143.00000  211.57 VC SANTA CLARA
====================================================================================================
1290 CMBL   CU  23- 4- 0 N  82-23- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 186.99998  242.92 HA CIUDAD HABANA
====================================================================================================
1290 CMED   CU  22-53- 0 N  80-23- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 142.00000  211.58 VC RANCHO VELOZ
====================================================================================================
1300 CMNQ   CU  20-17- 0 N  76-46- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 125.99999  206.76 GR E BUEYCITO
====================================================================================================
1310 CMOL   CU  21-42- 0 N  82-45- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /P 144.00000  214.03 IJ ISLA JUVENTUD
====================================================================================================
1310 CMEP   CU  22-48- 0 N  80- 6- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 144.00000  214.03 VC SAGUA LA GRANDE
====================================================================================================
FILE: FCC    GENERATED ON [illegible] AT [illegible]          [illegible] PAGE   [illegible]          LAST UPDATED ON
FREQ CALL   CT  LATITUDE   LONGITUDE     POWER   HRS DIR F/R D/I   ELECT.    RMS   ST        CITY
KHZ  SIGN                                                    ST.    HT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOWER     CURRENT    ORIENTATION  SPACING  PHASING   ELECT. HT.

NUMBER     RATIO       (DEGREES)  (DEGREES) (DEGREES)  (DEGREES)
===================================================================================================
1320 CMDA   CU  20- 0-48 N  75-49- 0 W    1.00000 N   N 3 /   /H 111.95999  175.00 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA
===================================================================================================
1320 CMEN   CU  22-31- 0 N  79-28- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 145.00000  214.03 VC CAIBARIEN
===================================================================================================
1330 CMCB   CU  23- 6-30 N  82-22-24 W    1.00000 N   N 3 /   /C 111.95999  175.00 HA HAVANA
===================================================================================================
1330 CMKM   CU  20-59- 0 N  75-43- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 145.99998  214.03 HO BANES
===================================================================================================
1340 CMFL   CU  22-14- 0 N  80-24- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 147.00000  214.03 CF PALMIRA
===================================================================================================
1340 NEW    CU  19-53-11 N  75- 9-24 W    0.25000 U   N 4 /   /H 122.00000  203.00 GU GUANTANAMO BAY
===================================================================================================
1350 CMLM   CU  21-12- 0 N  76-37- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 147.99998  217.02 LT PUERTO PADRE
===================================================================================================
1350 CMFM   CU  22-23- 0 N  80-55- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 147.99998  204.39 MZ A D PASAJEROS
===================================================================================================
1360 CMHW   CU  21-23- 0 N  78-24- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 149.00000  216.50 CG C RAMIREZ
===================================================================================================
1370 CMHX   CU  21-33- 0 N  77-16- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 150.00000  216.50 CG NUEVITAS
===================================================================================================
1380 CMHY   CU  21-47- 0 N  77-57- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 151.00000  216.50 CG CENT BRASIL
===================================================================================================
1390 CMHL   CU  21-20- 0 N  77-52- 0 W    5.00000 U   N   /B  /P 153.00000  216.76 CG CAMAGUEY
===================================================================================================
1390 CMCH   CU  23- 2- 0 N  82- 0- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J  89.00000  195.20 PH JARUCO
===================================================================================================
1400 CMHV   CU  21-41- 0 N  77-26- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 154.00000  216.50 CG GUAIMARO
===================================================================================================
1410 CMHP   CU  20-44- 0 N  78- 0- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 154.99998  219.01 CG SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR
===================================================================================================
1410 CMHR   CU  20- 7- 0 N  75-13- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 154.00000  219.01 GU GUANTANAMO
===================================================================================================
1410 CMAQ   CU  22-23- 0 N  83-41- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 154.99998  219.01 PR PINAR DEL RIO
===================================================================================================
1420 CMHN   CU  20-20- 0 N  74-29- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 154.99998  219.01 GU BARACOA
===================================================================================================
1420 CMDQ   CU  22-43- 0 N  80-54- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 156.00000  217.02 MZ COLON
===================================================================================================
1430 CMIN   CU  22- 6- 0 N. 78-37- 0 W   10.00000 U   N   /B  /J 157.00000  219.01 CA MORON
===================================================================================================
1440 CMIL   CU  21-52- 0 N  78-44- 0 W    5.00000 U   N   /B  /J 157.99998  219.27 CA CIEGO DE AVILA
===================================================================================================
1440 CMCL   CU  22-48- 0 N  82- 1- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 157.99998  219.53 PH GUINES
===================================================================================================
1450 CMDX   CU  22-16-20 N  83-50- 0 W    0.25000 N   N 4 /   /N 111.95999  150.00 GU BARACCA
===================================================================================================
FILE: FCC     GENERATED ON 111681 AT  22.878            ***** PAGE    8 *****        LAST UPDATED ON
FREQ CALL   CT  LATITUDE   LONGITUDE      POWER   HRS DIR F/R D/I   ELECT.   RMS   ST          CITY
KHZ  SIGN                                                    ST.    HT.
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TOWER     CURRENT    ORIENTATION   SPACING   PHASING   ELECT. HT.

NUMBER     RATIO       (DEGREES)   (DEGREES) (DEGREES)  (DEGREES)
======================================================================================================
1450 CMLN   CU  20-45- 0 N  77-34- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 159.00000  221.55 LT C AMANCIO R
======================================================================================================
1450 CMJN   CU  20- 1- 0 N  75-49- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 106.00000  197.45 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA
======================================================================================================
1460 CMHZ   CU  21-40- 0 N  76-45- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 159.00000  221.55 CG SOLA
======================================================================================================
1470 CMDP   CU  23- 2- 0 N  81-12- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 118.00000  204.39 MZ CARDENAS
======================================================================================================
1480 CMHR   CU  21-30- 0 N  78-13- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 162.99998  224.65 CG FLORIDA
======================================================================================================
1490 CMKW   CU  20-39- 0 N  75-40- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 164.00000  226.71 HC MAYARI
======================================================================================================
1490 CMCW   CU  22-57- 0 N  82- 9- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J  86.00000  193.42 PH SAN JOSE
======================================================================================================
1500 CMKR   CU  20-52- 0 N  76-16- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 164.00000  224.11 HO HOLGUIN
======================================================================================================
1500 CMEM   CU  22-24- 0 N  79-57- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /P 110.00000  200.22 VC SANTA CLARA
======================================================================================================
1510 CMHM   CU  21-21- 0 N  77-52- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 166.00000  224.11 CG CAMAGUEY
======================================================================================================
1510 CMCO   CU  22-53- 0 N  82-30- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 107.99999  202.53 PH SAN ANTONIO DE LOS
======================================================================================================
1520 CMJU   CU  20-10- 0 N  75-58- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 166.00000  224.11 SC PALMA SORIANO
======================================================================================================
1530 CMIN   CU  22- 6- 0 N  78-37- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 168.00000  226.71 CA MORON
======================================================================================================
1540 CMJZ   CU  20-11- 0 N  75-51- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /J 168.00000  226.71 SC SAN LUIS
======================================================================================================
1550 CMHO   CU  21-33- 0 N  77-16- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 169.99998  227.25 CG NUEVITAS
======================================================================================================
1550 CMOR   CU  21-52- 0 N  82-47- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 168.99998  229.33 PH NUEVA GERONA
======================================================================================================
1560 CMIR   CU  21-50- 0 N  78-45- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 169.99998  229.33 CA CIEGO DE AVILA
======================================================================================================
1560 CMDR   CU  23- 3- 0 N  81-35- 0 W    1.00000 U   N   /C  /P 169.99998  226.71 MZ MATANZAS
======================================================================================================
1560 CMJM   CU  20- 1- 0 N  75-48- 0 W    0.50000 U   N   /C  /P 171.00000  229.61 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA
======================================================================================================
1580 CMHQ   CU  20-44- 0 N  78- 0- 0 W    0.25000 U   N   /C  /J 173.00000  227.25 CG SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR
======================================================================================================
1590 CMNN   CU  20-20- 0 N  77- 8- 0 W    0.50000 U   N   /C  /J 174.00000  234.95 GR MANZANILLO
======================================================================================================

PRINT MENU
    (A)LL RECORDS PRINTED
    (U)SER SELECTED RECORDS PRINTED
    (T)ERMINATE PRINT OPTION
SELECTION ? T


PROGRAM OPTIONS

(U)PDATE DATA BASE
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## Acknowledgements

This study would not have been possible without the computer facilities and cooperation of the Federal Communications Commission. We would also like to extend our appreciation to the offices of Jules Cohen and Associates for their technical and engineering expertise.

National Association of Broadcasters
March 1, 1982

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Summers. Senator Hawkins, we now have a Floridian to wind up this panel. Mr. Leibowitz, we welcome you, sir.

## STATEMENT OF MATTHEW L. LEIBOWITZ, SPECIAL COUNSEL, FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, MIAMI, FLA.

Mr. LEIBOWITZ. Thank you. My name is Matthew Leibowitz. I am special counsel for the Florida Association of Broadcasters, and I am the general counsel for the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association. Thus, I represent the first casualties of this undeclared radio war which Cuba has waged against the United States for the last 13 years.

Today's hearing concerns the administration's proposal to construct and operate Radio Marti. I come before you today to discuss history and current events surrounding Cuban radio interference.

Cuban radio interference is not new. In south Florida, we have been experiencing this phenomenon for 13 to 15 years. WQBA in Miami is a Spanish language station which has been intentionally jammed by the Cuban Government for at least 13 years. Approximately 5 years ago, the level of interference increased dramatically and has continued since that time. As a result, approximately one-half of the AM stations in south Florida are adversely affected.

During the last 12 months there has been a substantial increase in the amount of interference not only in south Florida, not only in the Southeast, but throughout the country. Out of the proposed 180-some-odd station inventory that Cuba filed with the ITU, approximately 140 of these stations are now in operation. This represents a substantial increase from the 90-odd stations that were operating prior to the Rio negotiations.

Only relatively recently has the U.S. Government allowed limited relief to the broadcasters who have been adversely affected by this illegal interference. The FCC and the State Department allow special temporary authority to stations to recoup lost service area. This is a very complex engineering matter due to the fact that the broadcasters must maintain protection to other U.S. stations and to third countries. Therefore, only eight stations, all located in south Florida, have been able to take advantage of this proposal.

To date, I can report to you that none of these stations has had to change that engineering modification due to changes in reaction or retaliation from the Cuban Government. The STA's do work to an extent; they don't totally recoup all the lost service area but they do help.

This relief is critical. Lost service area translates into lost revenue. These stations cannot continue to operate and wait for the eventual ultimate solution. They may not be around that long, to see the outcome of so-called negotiations.

Senate bill 1853 concerns the Radio Marti proposal. The South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association is clearly on record supporting Radio Marti. The FAB is on record supporting H.R. 5427. The House bill includes the Radio Marti proposal but also includes compensation for affected radio stations and calls for the establishment of a presidential task force.

Compensation is a critical element of the House bill, and it is lacking in the Senate bill. It is appropriate for the U.S. Government to assist radio stations who are victims of the Cuban Government's illegal actions. Critics argue that such compensation would total in excess of $40 million, in an attempt to discredit this proposal. That is simply not true.

The truth of the matter is that as a result of the restrictions placed upon those broadcasters by the FCC and the State Department, only a handful of stations can take advantage of this temporary authority. Thus, we are not talking about 200 to 300 radio stations. We are talking 8, 15, 20, maybe 30. In addition, the average cost of such modifications to date are less than $100,000.

Therefore, we respectfully urge this committee to amend the existing Senate bill 1853 to include not only authorization for such compensation, but actual funding to assist stations that have been adversely affected by the illegal interference and have sought to overcome it by engineering modifications.

A second critical element of the House bill which is absent from the Senate bill is the call for the creation of a presidential task force. When the Cuban interference problem first began to arise as a matter of discussion here in Washington, the discussion was dealt with on a technical basis only.

It is obvious to all that the issue is really much greater than that. There are political and foreign policy issues that must be dealt with. Therefore, we need a coordinated effort of all branches of Government, the FCC, the State Department, the Congress, the White House, the NTIA, and yes, the private sector, to all work together to seek an acceptable resolution and to speak from the same perspective. That is not the case today.

Again, I respectfully urge the committee to include this matter in the Senate bill.

With respect specifically to the Radio Marti proposal, we do not accept the theory that there is linkage between Radio Marti and Cuban radio interference. The Cuban inventory clearly laid out the 180-odd station proposal that the Cuban Government anticipated implementing in a 5-year period. It included at that time two 500-kW stations. The shift of frequencies of those 500-kW stations was announced in bilateral discussions prior to the announcement of Radio Marti. The 48-station shift that was proposed in Rio must be viewed as a political gesture and not a reaction to Radio Marti.

The increased interference is merely a continuation of the process that began many years ago. It is not related to Radio Marti, and it closely parallels the modified inventory. Marti does not cause radio interference. We have had radio interference for 13 years. It is putting the cart before the horse.

While we debate Radio Marti and the alleged linkage, Cuba continues not only to implement its new stations, but Cuba seeks to cloak these stations with the sanction of international law. It has only recently become public that the IFRB in Geneva notified the U.S. Government on March 12, 1982 that the 48-station modification proposal, which was rejected in Rio, is being sanctioned in Geneva.

What does this mean? It means that the U.S. stations will be required to protect the very same stations that are creating interference in the United States. In fact, I am reluctant to report that the FCC today is protecting Cuban radio stations, even though some of those stations or other stations interfere with our stations presently operating in this country.

The United States can no longer afford the luxury of participating in international agreements which protect other countries radio operations at the expense of our own. The U.S. Government must make a clear statement—we will not protect any Cuban radio station until interference from Cuba ceases.

There is no easy solution. The ultimate answer probably does lie in negotiations. But let me stress that those negotiations must have parameters. We will not negotiate away any existing station, nor should the U.S. Government require substantial changes to any existing facility.

To date, Cuba has failed to negotiate in good faith. Perhaps that is because Castro has no incentive to come to the table. As a result, the FAB Board of Directors in January 1982 adopted a resolution which calls upon the U.S. Government to jam Cuban radio operations or construct and operate facilities to interfere with Cuban operations, until such time as the overall interference problem ceases to exist.

At this date, 24 other State broadcast associations are on record as supporting this proposal. Three other associations call for immediate Government action. We are reluctant to propose this course of action, but it may be the only way to resolve the existing conflict.

In summary, Florida broadcasters support Radio Marti, but we call upon this committee to include in the bill compensation for adversely affected broadcasters who seek to modify their facilities as a result of the interference, and a call for a Presidential task force.

We call on this committee to specifically address the fundamental issue here as it exists today. Existing Cuban radio interference and the existing adverse effect on radio stations today in the United States. Thank you.

[Mr. Leibowitz' prepared statement follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATTHEW L. LEIBOWITZ

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Matthew L. Leibowitz. I am the special counsel for the Florida Association of Broadcasters with respect to the Cuban Radio Interference Issue, and I am General Counsel for the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association.

On behalf of these associations, I would like to express my appreciation to you for providing us with this opportunity to discuss with you an existing severe problem that has faced AM radio stations for the past 15 years. The problem to which I refer is "Radio Interference From Cuba."

Unlike FM broadcasting and television broadcasting, AM radio broadcast signals have the physical characteristics to travel hundreds of miles, and in some cases thousands of miles, as the result of the method of dissemination. Thus, it is necessary to closely coordinate AM radio stations to avoid interference.

In this country, this coordination is under the auspices of the Federal Communications Commission. In the international arena, for this hemisphere, AM broadcasting was governed primarily by the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA) which was ratified by the Senate on February 23, 1960.

Despite the fact that both the United States and Cuba were signatories to NARBA, Cuba violated this agreement by broadcasting jamming signals for approximately the last 13 years to intentionally interfere with WQBA, Miami, Fla. The jamming was produced by transmitting two signals, one on each side of WQBA's signal, thus creating a heterodyne tone. This tone would increase or decrease in prominence, depending on your location with respect to the WQBA transmitter. However, from almost any location in Miami, WQBA's city of license, the tone is audible. The tone detracts from WQBA's regular broadcasting and would tend to dissuade continued listening. It should be noted that WQBA is the only commercial radio station in the United States that is presently or has been jammed by the Cuban Government.

Approximately 5 years ago, Cuba initiated broadcast operations which created interference to other U.S. domestic stations, especially those located in South Florida. This interference was intensified approximately 2 years ago.

Unlike the situation with WQBA, a listener to these domestic stations would believe that he was tuned in to two stations simultaneously, one the domestic station and one the Cuban station.

A third example of Cuban radio interference was Cuba's use of a super power AM broadcast signal to deliver into the United States an English version of Radio Moscow via Radio Havana at 600 kHz. This signal was received at night as far north as Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. It is estimated that this station was operating with 150,000 watts of power, or three times the most powerful AM radio operation in the United States. This station changed frequency in early December, and at this time appears to be off the air.

All of the Cuban stations involved in this jamming or interference were being operated in violation of the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement.

The United States Government's position during this period, as enunciated by the State Department and carried out by the FCC was that the United States remained a signatory to NARBA and thus United States stations would continue to abide by the terms of that Agreement, even though they were receiving illegal interference from Cuba, which reduced their coverage in their primary service area.

However, in November 1980, Cuba officially notified Canada that they would abrogate the treaty the following year. In face of this notice of abrogation, and in face of a marked increase in the number of stations falling victim to the illegal interference from Cuba, and as a result of the Florida Broadcasters' lobbying efforts, the State Department and the FCC modified its position. The State Department issued a blanket authorization under which a domestic station would be allowed to increase its power to compensate for illegal interference, but only to recoup lost service area, and so long as it did not interfere with stations located in a third nation, such as Canada or Mexico. Under this policy which the FCC initiated approximately 1 year ago, the Commission began to provide expedited relief, on a temporary basis, to any station who conformed to the State Department criteria and which also did not create interference to any other domestic station. However, it is important to understand that this policy of temporary relief was designed only to recoup lost service area and specifically prohibited stations from increasing their former service area. Unfortunately, the number of stations that could take advantage of this new policy was greatly limited. The following stations have received partial relief: WPLP, WKAT, WINZ, WIOD, WQBA, WNWS, WEAT and, just recently, WVCG. All of these stations are located in south Florida. Stations located in other areas would find it difficult, if not impossible, to comply with the interference restrictions.

It should be recognized that each of these stations expended considerable funds in engineering and legal fees to receive only a special temporary authority from the FCC, and most of the stations had to make substantial capital expenditures for new equipment or new land.

Subsequently, reacting to Cuba's notice of abrogation, the FCC issued a public notice indicating that all domestic stations were entitled to drop any protection that had previously been required under NARBA to Cuban operations as of early November 1981. Nevertheless, any grant made as a result of the abrogation would be subject to future negotiations with Cuba. Thus, Broadcasters were presented with the difficult decision of whether to invest thousands, and perhaps millions, of dollars to improve their facilities, in face of the uncertainties of a negotiated settlement with the Castro regime. In fact, only a handful of applications were filed.

In addition to NARBA, the United States participated in the Regional Administration Medium Frequency Broadcasting Conference. The purpose of the conference was to develop a coordinated use of AM radio throughout the Western Hemisphere.

The Cuban interference question was a primary issue that had to be resolved by the conference. As part of this process, Cuba had proposed an inventory of 188 stations. One-third of these stations, if put into operation, would create interference to U.S. broadcast stations, not only in South Florida, but throughout the continental United States. Particular concern was directed to two stations which were proposed to operate with 500,000 watts of power, or 10 times the most powerful AM stations in the United States. The FCC calculated that these stations would create interference as far away as Hawaii or Alaska.

Prior to the conference, there were some promising signs as a result of two bilateral negotiations between Cuba and the United States. However, ultimately Cuba walked out of the conference in Rio.

Before proceeding further, the Florida Broadcasters wish to note that the U.S. delegation was successful in resolving many other AM concerns. Thus, the United States delegation and its chairman, Kalmann Schaefer, should be congratulated for their efforts and successes. Nevertheless, despite their efforts, the Cuban problem remains with us and, in fact, is worse today than it was prior to the Rio negotiations.

In early December, while the Rio negotiations were taking place, the Cubans instituted the beginning of a substantial shift of their broadcast operations. As a result of the shift, approximately 29 stations changed frequency, location and/or power within 3 weeks. This information was first supplied to the FCC by the Florida Broadcasters. It is important to note that the shifting of the Cuban radio operations continues to this day, and the pattern closely parallels the "modified Cuban inventory."

Although the Rio conference rejected a proposed shift of 48 radio stations in the Cuban inventory, it now appears that the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), which operates as the arm of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), has proposed to accept the Cuban shifting of frequencies, despite its rejection at the Rio conference. This position was formalized in a letter to the United States from the IFRB dated March 12, 1982 (A copy of which is attached to this testimony). From information made available to us from the State Department and the FCC, it appears that the U.S. Government has objected to this acceptance by the IFRB and the United States has asked for a reconsideration. The precise significance of this action by the IFRB is under much debate within the halls of the State Department and the FCC and in the private sector. However, it appears likely that the IFRB is now sanctioning under International Law the Cuban proposal, as modified, and thus U.S. stations would be required to provide protection to those stations which the Rio conference rejected because of the substantial adverse impact to U.S. broadcast stations. The negative impact upon U.S. stations throughout our country cannot be understated. It is the position of the Florida Broadcasters that the U.S. Government must adopt a position that we will honor no treaty which requires protection to any Cuban radio station when, simultaneously, Cuba is operating radio stations which presently interfere with U.S. radio operations and when Cuba proposes additional stations which will create further massive interference. The United States can no longer afford the luxury to participate in international agreements when the American public is being denied the ability to listen to broadcasts from their local AM radio stations due to illegal Cuban radio operations and, as a result thereof, AM radio stations throughout this country are losing substantial revenues.

An issue that has further complicated the discussions in the United States concerning Cuban radio interference is the proposed construction and operation of Radio Marti, the subject to Senate bill 1853.

The South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association is on record supporting the administration's proposal to build and operate Radio Marti. Their resolution is appended hereto.

The Florida Association of Broadcasters is on record supporting H.R. 5427, as passed by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which reflects the acceptance of the Fascell Proposal, H.R. 5427. Thus, this bill now includes compensation for broadcasters who are victims of illegal Cuban radio interference, and it also calls for the establishment of the Presidential Task Force to deal with this pressing issue. A copy of the FAB resolution is also appended hereto.

With respect to the Radio Marti operation itself, we have some thoughts which are appropriate for discussion today.

In the first instance, many have suggested that Radio Marti operation will only aggravate the Cuban interference problem.

While it is true that the Cubans have implicated Radio Marti in the discussions of radio interference, it is also true that Castro proposed his 180-station inventory over a year prior to the first public discussion of the Radio Marti operation. This inventory, as it originally was proposed, includes high-powered stations, such as Radio Moscow. In addition, after Radio Marti was announced, the Cubans participated in at least two discussions with U.S. Representatives on the interference issue. Furthermore, the increase in Cuban radio interference that we are now experiencing, is merely a continuation of the process which began approximately 5 years ago; and the shift in operations appeared to be, in large part, reflecting the changes as proposed in the inventory. Thus, to suggest that Radio Marti will cause Cuban radio interference is at least, in part, putting the cart before the horse.

While it is also true that the United States will have the Voice of America station in Marathon, Florida and Radio Marti in operation, the Cubans have proposed in excess of 60 radio stations that will cause interference to United States stations. Obviously, there is a clear quantitative difference between the two nations' proposed operations.

Furthermore, both the Voice of America station and the Radio Marti station were proposed on frequencies which were carefully selected so they would not cause interference to Cuban radio operations. However, the Cuban proposal clearly contemplated major interference to U.S. broadcast operations.

An additional distinction can be drawn in that Radio Marti, as proposed, will broadcast factual news and information to Cuba. In contrast, the English version of Radio Moscow, which is directed at the United States, is clearly a propaganda station designed to export the Soviet Union's views and philosophy. Moreover, many Spanish language broadcasts from Cuba are directed at the people of Latin America and the Caribbean; and they are employed to advocate Castro's revolutionary philosophy.

A second major element of the Fascell Radio Marti Bill, which is absent from Senate Bill 1853, is the authorization of compensation for expenses which radio licensees incurred in mitigating the effects by the Government of Cuba which interfere with the transmission or reception of the broadcasts of those licensees. The Florida Broadcasters believe it is certainly appropriate for our Government to provide compensation to those broadcasters who have fallen victim to Castro in this undeclared radio war. In an attempt to discredit this proposal, some parties have grossly exaggerated the amount of potential compensation. Some parties suggest that the total compensation will easily exceed $40 million since 200 to 300 radio stations may be adversely affected by the Cuban interference.

While it is true that 200 to 300 stations may be adversely affected by these illegal operations, it is also true that, due to the complex interference requirements of the FCC and the need to protect other countries' radio operations, only a small number of stations are presently eligible for relief from the FCC in terms of increased power or modification to their authorized service areas. In fact, this limitation applies to the majority of the 36 Florida stations that are projected to be victims of Castro's radio operations.

To date, in the entire country only eight radio stations have been allowed to increase power or modify their authorized service area in an attempt to overcome Cuban radio interference.

Although WQBA in Miami was required to spend approximately $1 million, most of the other radio stations spent less than $100,000. For instance, both WINZ and WEAT each spent approximately $60,000. The total expenditure for all those stations that have received relief from the F.C.C. approximates only $3 million. Furthermore, only a minimum number of additional stations will be able to modify the facilities and thus be eligible for compensation.

Accordingly, the $40 million estimate is a total distortion of the potential cost of the compensation program. Therefore, we respectfully urge the Senate to require either complete or partial compensation and authorize funds for those stations that have been adversely affected and have been required to modify their facilities in an attempt to overcome the Cuban radio interference; and we urge the Senate to specifically appropriate funds for this purpose.

The ultimate question that must be addressed by all branches and departments of this Government is, "What does the future hold for broadcasting in the United States with respect to interference from other countries?"

Little is known as to Castro's future operations. However, the United States should not allow Castro to dictate the United States' broadcast policy to the United States Government and United States broadcasters.

To insure continuity and unanimity in our efforts, the Florida Broadcasters support the Fascell proposal of the establishment of a Presidential task force to deal with this complex issue, and we therefore respectfully urge the Senate to adopt a similar measure. We respectfully suggest that this Task Force should include representatives from the White House, the State Department, the Federal Communications Commission, the Congress and broadcasting representatives.

As Florida Broadcasters, we are not optimistic that a solution to the Cuban radio interference can simply be negotiated as an isolated concern between the United States Government and the Cuban Government.

However, we continue to support the attempts of the United States Government to enter into negotiations with the Cuban Government in an effort to seek mutually acceptable conditions under which each nation's AM radio stations would operate. However, these negotiations must be entered into with clearly established parameters. It is unacceptable to require, as a result of these negotiations, for any station to go off the air or to be modified in any substantial way if that station was constructed and operated in conformance with the NARBA.

Unfortunately, we recognize the inability, to date, to enter into serious discussions with the Castro government on these issues. Perhaps the underlying reason for this failure is the absence of incentives for Castro to come to the negotiating table. Accordingly, the Board of Directors of the Florida Association of Broadcasters, on January 31, 1982, adopted the following Resolution:

"Whereas, the United States radio stations have been receiving illegal radio interference from Cuba for over 13 years, and

Whereas, Florida radio stations have been specifically adversely affected by illegal interference from Cuba, and,

Whereas, negotiations between the United States and Cuba, to date, have been unable to resolve the illegal radio interference,

Be it Resolved, that the Florida Association of Broadcasters urges the United States Government to undertake a project to construct and operate radio facilities that will cause interference to Cuban radio operations, and/or 'jam' Cuban radio operations, until such time that the illegal interference from Cuba ceases."

The Florida Broadcasters are not alone in calling for this action. As of this date, the following 24 State broadcast Associations are on record supporting the FAB resolution: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Florida, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia and Wyoming. In addition, the State Broadcast Associations of Alaska, California and Illinois have expressed support for immediate Government action.

It is our genuine hope that measures of this nature would not be necessary. However, methods must be found to stimulate the Castro government's desire to resolve this continuing problem.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, unfortunately we are unable to provide you with any easy solution to these issues. There are none. Nevertheless, the Florida Broadcasters believe that, through efforts like this committee's hearing, which brings together representatives from all levels of Government and representatives of the Broadcast Industry, solutions can be found to these grave issues confronting us today.

Thank you.

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INTERNATIONAL FREQUENCY REGISTRATION BOARD, I.F.R.B.,
*Geneve, le, Place des Nations, March 12, 1982.*

### I.F.R.B. CIRCULAR-LETTER NO. 508

Subject: Medium-frequency assignments to broadcasting stations in Region 2—Interim post-conference procedures and notification of assignments to stations in service under Article 12 of the Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1979.

References: Final Acts of the Regional Administrative Radio Conference, Rio de Janeiro, 1981 (RARC, Rio de Janeiro, 1981). Resolution No. 501 of the WARC, Geneva, 1979; Resolution provisionally numbered PL/1 of the RARC, 1981; Resolution provisionally numbered COM 4/1 of the RARC, 1981; Resolution provisionally numbered COM 4/2 of the RARC, 1981.

To the DIRECTOR-GENERAL.

DEAR SIR: The World Administrative Radio Conference, Geneva, 1979, by its Resolution No. 501, decided that the notification and registration procedures shall apply fully to assignments in the bands 535 kHz to 1605 kHz to broadcasting stations in Region 2 as from the date of entry into force of the Final Acts of the RARC, Rio de Janeiro, 1981. The RARC, Rio de Janeiro, 1981, decided that its Final Acts shall enter into force on 1 January 1982 and, in Resolution No. PL/1, resolved that the Board consider as notified under Article 12 of the Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1979, on 1.1.82 those stations appearing in the Plan on behalf of signatory countries and indicated in the Basic Inventory as being in operation. In "resolves 4" of the same Resolution, the IFRB is required to "request the non-signatory countries to notify the assignments to their stations that are in operation or to confirm that the information submitted for the Basic Inventory is to be considered as notification on 1 January 1982."

2. In accordance with "resolves 4" of Resolution No. PL/1, the Board sent to all non-signatory countries Members of the Union on 23 November 1981 a telex requesting them: "either notify as early as possible in accordance with Article 12 of the Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1979, frequency assignments to all MF broadcasting stations which are in operation or confirm that the information submitted on such stations for the Basic Inventory is to be considered as notified to the IFRB in accordance with RR Article 12 stop in common with the notification date adopted for assignments of participating countries appearing in the Plan and previously indicated as being in operation, the date of receipt of your notices sent in response to the present request will be considered as first January 1982 stop in the absence of a reply by 31 January 1982, the Board will consider as notified on first January 1982 those assignments to MF broadcasting stations of your country indicated in the Basic Inventory as being in operation, with the characteristics as shown therein stop".

3. In Resolution No. COM 4/2, the Conference adopted provisions on the action to be taken with respect to assignments appearing in List B of the Plan on behalf of non-signatory countries. "resolves 1" of this Resolution reads:

"resolves that the assignments of non-signatory countries in List B shall bear a symbol to indicate that a signatory country shall not be required to take the assignment into account in transferring its station from List B to List A or in modifying the Plan; however, for operating stations as at 10 November 1981, this symbol shall be applicable as from 1 August 1982. In the case of participating countries which did not sign the Final Acts, this symbol shall be applicable from 1 January 1982. When the IFRB receives from the non-signatory country a letter undertaking to observe the provisions of Resolution [COM 4/1, COM 4/2 and PL/2], the symbol shall be deleted in accordance with resolves 5, and the IFRB shall inform by circular telegram all the administrations in the Region of the action taken;".

(*a*) countries having participated in the Conference which have not signed the Final Acts: Cuba;

(*b*) countries not having participated in the Conference: Barbados, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Suriname (three of these countries replied to the IFRB telex of 23 December 1981).

4. By the date limit set in the telex of 23 December 1981, the IFRB received from the Administration of Cuba a telex confirming the assignments appearing in the Basic Inventory as modified by the communication to the Board on 5.12.81 at the Conference. In consequence, the Board has considered as notified under RR Article 12 on 1 January 1982 all Cuban assignments in the Basic Inventory with the indication "in operation" including the frequency changes communicated on 5 December 1981. It is to be noted that the symbol added to stations of Cuba in List B of the Plan concerns the examinations made in application of Resolution No. COM 4/1 and is not entered in the Remarks Column of the Master Register and does not concern the examination made when considering notices submitted by any other country under RR Article 12.

5. The following relates to the assignments appearing in the Basic Inventory on behalf of Cuba.

5.1 On 5 December 1981, the delegation of Cuba submitted to the Conference through the IFRB 48 requests for frequency changes listed in *Annex A*. As required by the procedures adopted by Committee 4, these requests were signed by the Chairman of Planning Group B.

5.2 Due to time and material limitations, the calculations concerning the frequency changes handed to the Cuban delegation were limited to the "SKY ONE" programme, which permitted the delegation to estimate the interference received but not the interference caused. However, after a short period of time, the Cuban delegation and the Planning Group were given the results of the "SKY MANY" programme with which to evaluate the effect of the frequency changes on other assignments.

5.3 The question of principle of acceptance of frequency changes without prior approval of the planning groups was discussed by Committee 4 at its seventh meeting on 7 December 1981 and it was agreed that these changes had to be considered in the planning group.

5.4 The summary record of the eighth meeting of Committee 4 contained the following report from the Chairman of Planning Group B (Document No. 172, page 2):

"1.1 The Chairman of Working Group B said that at its meeting the previous evening, the Working Group had agreed to conduct an overall analysis of the changes introduced and their effects. Of the 12 administrations represented 10 had accepted the changes proposed by Cuba, one had opposed them and one other had abstained. It had been pointed out that the Working Group's acceptance of the changes should not be construed to mean acceptance of any resulting incompatibilities; on the contrary, it was recognized that negotiations would be needed in that connection."

After a lengthy discussion, the proposal of the Working Group was put to a vote by secret ballot and was rejected by 11 votes to 9 with 3 abstentions. As a result of the vote, Planning Group B was given the task of considering the proposed frequency changes frequency by frequency. Before the end of this study, the Cuban delegation informed the Plenary of its withdrawal from the Conference.

6. In addition to action under "resolves 1" of Resolution No. COM 4/2, the Conference requested the Secretary of the Conference and the IFRB to communicate with the country mentioned in paragraph 3a above (Cuba) with a view to obtaining a reply before 1.1.82 on whether or not that Administration intended to apply the provisions of Resolutions No. COM 4/1, No. COM 4/2 and No. PL/2.

7. The following exchange of communications between ITU and Cuba resulted from the application of Resolution No. COM 4/1:

| From | To | Date | Subject |
|---|---|---|---|
| Secretary of Conf. | CUB | 19.12.81 | The contents of Resolution No. COM 4/2 were contained in the telex in extenso and Cuba was requested to reply to the IFRB. |
| IFRB | CUB | 21.12.81 | The telex (1) referred to the telex from the Secretary of the Conference of 19.12.81, (2) mentioned that the contents of Annexes 1, 2 and 3 of Resolution No. COM 4/1 would be communicated in a separate telex and (3) requested Cuba to reply to the IFRB by 1.1.82. |
| IFRB | CUB | 23.12.81 | The contents of Annexes 1, 2 and 3 to Resolution No. COM 4/1 were contained in the telex in extenso. |
| IFRB | CUB | 23.12.81 | The IFRB requested Cuba to notify by 31.1.82 stations in service or to confirm that stations indicated as in service in the Basic Inventory are notified for RR Article 12. The telex contained the statement that in the absence of a reply, the Board would consider the stations indicated in the Basic Inventory as in service as notified on 1.1.82. |
| CUB | Secretary of Conf. | 28.12.81 | The telex contained a reply to the telex of 19.12.81 and was received in the ITU on 29.12.81; a copy was communicated by the Secretary of the Conference to the IFRB on 1.1.82. |
| IFRB | CUB | 8.01.82 | The Board communicated to Cuba its understanding of the Cuban reply to the Secretary of the Conference and fixing date limit of 31.1.82 for Cuba to reply to the IFRB on this understanding. |
| IFRB | CUB | 20.01.82 | Board reminded Cuba for a reply by the date limit. |
| CUB | IFRB | 29.01.82 | Cuba reply to the IFRB confirming its reply to the Secretary of the Conference; the telex contained certain indications concerning the operation of their stations; Cuba requested that Members of the Region be informed of the parameters of Cuban BC stations and offered to supply any further information the Board may require. |

8. The Board is taking the following action in this connection:

8.1 With reference to Cuban assignments appearing in the Plan, the frequencies of which have not been changed, the Board, in application of "resolves 1" of Resolution No. COM 4/2, will add an appropriate symbol in the Remarks Column of List B of the Plan to indicate that the assignment will not be taken into account when the Board considers either modifications to the Plan or transfers from List B to List A, submitted by a signatory country. In addition, in accordance with "resolves 2", frequency assignments to stations of other administrations in List B which were prevented from being entered in List A as a consequence of an incompatibility only with the Cuban stations shall be transferred to List A with an appropriate symbol to indicate this situation;

8.2 With reference to Cuban frequency assignments appearing in the Plan (List A or List B), for which changes to the frequencies (see Annex A) were submitted in the communication received from Cuba during the Conference, these assignments appear in the Plan on the frequencies notified before the Conference because the Conference would not accept the frequency changes for inclusion in the Plan other than after consideration on a frequency by frequency basis (see paragraph 5.4 above). As the Conference was unable to do this and as the stations appearing in the Plan on behalf of Cuba will no longer be taken into account by the Board when examining modifications to the Plan received from other administrations, the Board, in keeping with this procedure is taking the following action:

(*a*) the Cuban frequencies in the Plan shall be modified in accordance with the communication received by the Board on 5 December 1981 and the original frequencies shall be indicated in the Remarks Column by an appropriate symbol;

(*b*) frequency assignments to stations of Cuba appearing in List A, the frequencies of which have been modified, shall be examined from the point of view of incompatibility with other assignments in List A and List B; where there is an incompatibility, the Cuban stations shall be transferred to List B, the other stations concerned shall be maintained in List A;

(*c*) frequency modifications proposed by Cuba to their stations in List B shall be made without further examination;

(*d*) frequency assignments to stations of other administrations in List B which were prevented from being entered in List A as a consequence of an incompatibility only with Cuban stations shall be transferred to List A with an appropriate symbol to indicate this situation.

9. The Board is proceeding to take all action in accordance with the Final Acts including giving all possible assistance to Administrations in carrying out the interim post-Conference procedures.

Yours faithfully,

F. G. Perrin, *Chairman.*

## ANNEX A

(to IFRB Circular-letter No. 508)

| IFRB Serial No. | Frequency in Basic Inventory (kHz) | Proposed Frequency (kHz) | Name of station | List in the Plan (A or B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 624 | 550 | 1160 | WAJAY | B |
| 629 | 580 | 550 | PINAR DEL RIO | B |
| 3896 | 820 | 980 | CHABANA | B |
| 684 | 910 | 920 | SANTA CLARA | B |
| 686 | 920 | 930 | CIEGO DE AVILA | B |
| 687 | 920 | 930 | PINAR DEL RIO | B |
| 689 | 930 | 940 | VICTORIA TUNAS | B |
| 691 | 940 | 930 | HOLGUIN | B |
| 692 | 950 | 910 | GUANTANAMO | B |
| 693 | 950 | 920 | ISLA JUVENTUD | B |
| 694 | 950 | 940 | S. SPIRITUS | B |
| 695 | 960 | 930 | CIENFUEGOS | B |
| 696 | 960 | 940 | STGO DE CUBA | B |
| 697 | 970 | 920 | CAMAGUEY | B |
| 699 | 980 | 950 | ARROYO ARENAS | B |
| 700 | 980 | 920 | BAYAMO | B |
| 701 | 990 | 970 | GERONA | B |
| 702 | 990 | 960 | HOLGUIN | B |
| 703 | 990 | 970 | S. SPIRITUS | B |
| 704 | 1000 | 950 | CAMAGUEY | B |
| 705 | 1000 | 960 | CIENFUEGOS | B |
| 706 | 1000 | 970 | STGO DE CUBA | B |
| 707 | 1010 | 1040 | WAJAY | B |
| 708 | 1020 | 960 | GUANTANAMO | B |
| 709 | 1020 | 950 | SANTA CLARA | B |
| 710 | 1020 | 970 | VICTORIA TUNAS | B |
| 711 | 1030 | 950 | BAYAMO | B |
| 712 | 1030 | 960 | CIEGO DE AVILA | B |
| 713 | 1030 | 960 | MATANZAS | A |
| 714 | 1030 | 960 | PINAR DEL RIO | B |
| 715 | 1040 | 1060 | PUERTO PADRE | B |
| 716 | 1040 | 1000 | SAN CRISTOBAL | B |
| 717 | 1050 | 1070 | BAHIA HONDA | B |
| 718 | 1050 | 1090 | VICTORIA TUNAS | B |
| 720 | 1060 | 1070 | PINAR DEL RIO | B |
| 721 | 1070 | 1020 | GUANTANAMO | B |
| 722 | 1070 | 990 | LA PALMA | B |
| 723 | 1080 | 1020 | BARACOA | B |
| 724 | 1080 | 990 | GUANE | B |
| 725 | 1090 | 1000 | MATAHAMBRE | B |
| 3899 | 1140 | 1100 | CHABANA | B |
| 733 | 1140 | 1100 | MEDIA LUNA | B |
| 734 | 1150 | 1300 | E BUEYCITO | B |
| 3900 | 1160 | 1080 | GUINES | B |
| 736 | 1170 | 1140 | PILON | B |
| 748 | 1240 | 1010 | C AUSTRALIA | B |
| 754 | 1280 | 1230 | GUAIMARO | B |
| 757 | 1300 | 1280 | SANTA CLARA | B |

Note: The other basic characteristics of each assignment appear in the Basic Inventory or in a supplement thereto.

### FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS RESOLUTION

ADOPTED JANUARY 31, 1982, BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Whereas, United States radio stations have been receiving illegal radio interference from Cuba for over thirteen years and,

Whereas, Florida radio stations have been specifically adversely affected by the illegal interference from Cuba, and

Whereas, Negotiations between the United States and Cuba, to date have been unable to resolve the illegal radio interference.

Be it resolved, That the Florida Association of Broadcasters urge the United States Government to undertake a project to construct and operate radio facilities that will cause interference to Cuban radio operations, and/or "jam" Cuban radio operations, until such time that the illegal interference from Cuba ceases.

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### RADIO MARTI

Whereas, the United States radio stations have been receiving illegal radio interference from Cuba for over 13 years, and,

Whereas, Florida radio stations have been specifically adversely affected by the illegal interference from Cuba,

Be it resolved, that the Florida Association of Broadcasters supports the Administration's proposal of Radio Marti, in that Radio Marti will broadcast news and information to Cuba; and the Florida Association of Broadcasters supports the proposal of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee to provide compensation for Florida stations that have been adversely affected by Cuban interference and have expended substantial sums of money to attempt to recoup lost service area due to this interference; and the Florida Association of Broadcasters supports the Committee's request for a Presidential Task Force to concern itself with illegal Cuban radio interference.

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### SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION

Whereas . . . members of the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association are uniquely suited to understand and appreciate the nature of the repressive government of Fidel Castro on the island of Cuba.

And whereas the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association recognizes the need for the truth to be heard on the island of Cuba,

Be it therefore,

*Resolved,* That the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association does now support the concept of Radio Martí, in that Radio Martí will broadcast news and information to Cuba.

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much. I would say to my colleagues that it is a pleasure to have broadcasters appear, because they understand the meaning of the green light and the yellow light and the red light because they watch them all the time. We have a vote on, and I would advise Senators that the vote is up or down on Senator Ford's amendment to the proposed constitutional amendment related to the requirement for a balanced Federal budget.

I hate to ask you to do this but could I respectfully request that you stand at ease while we go to vote. We will then return and we will have a few questions for you. I apologize for the delay for you, but there is no alternative to it. That's the way we work or don't work, as the case may be.

The committee will stand in recess for a few minutes.

[Brief recess.]

Senator HELMS. We thank our distinguished panel for its patience. I have been thinking about training some carrier pigeons to carry our ballots over to the Senate floor so we won't have to interrupt our proceedings in committee.

We are delighted to recognize the able Senator from Florida, Senator Hawkins for any statement she may wish to offer.

Senator Hawkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence. I know that we are under time constraints.

As you know, Florida is very interested in Radio Marti and I appreciated Mr. Leibowitz so ably stating our position. The President's proposal to broadcast to the people of Cuba is long overdue. The proximity of an anti-American Cuba to Florida is of particular concern to the citizens of our State and is one of the reasons why it is so imperative that we in the United States do all we can to give the Cuban people an alternative to their daily diet of Communist propaganda.

This is the intent of Radio Marti; named after Jose Marti, Cuba's greatest hero. The regional high esteem in which Marti is still held is almost as widely felt in the Caribbean, as is the regional distrust shown for Fidel Castro and his Soviet-made policy.

Shortly before President Reagan's inauguration, Jamaica's Prime Minister, Edward Seaga, closed his country's Embassy in Cuba. This was but one of many recent actions taken by Castro's neighbors in response to his revolutionary rhetoric and military activity. Other countries that have suffered strained or broken relations with the Castro regime read like a guidebook to Latin America. Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama.

The actions taken by these countries are events the Cubans should know about but do not. Under Radio Marti they would. Through these broadcasts, the Cuban people would hear the news of events that occur throughout the Caribbean and throughout the world. They would learn the state of affairs inside their own country. They would be encouraged to think for themselves and draw their own conclusions. In short, Radio Marti would be a beacon of news, information, and even hope in a country starving for truth and freedom.

It is without question in the best interest of the free world to provide this type of information to Cuba, just as we now provide it to countries in Eastern Europe. President Reagan's announcement of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, a foreign policy proposal to advance the freedom of prosperity of the Caribbean nations, has generated renewed optimism for political and economic stability in this area.

I am aware of the seriousness of Castro's radio interference. I have lived in Florida for 27 years. The people of South Florida have lived with such interference for the past 13 years, as Mr. Leibowitz told you. In regard to this issue, the National Security Adviser, William P. Clark, has sent a letter to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and I agree with Judge Clark when he said that, "Informing the Cuban people is the keystone of this administration's efforts to address the growing Soviet-Cuban presence in the Caribbean." He added that Radio Marti represents one of the few peaceful options available to the United States in this very sensitive and vital area.

I believe it would be most unfortunate if we were intimidated into restricting Radio Marti for fear that the Cuban Government might continue to disregard international agreements on radio broadcasting. As Judge Clark has further pointed out, basing U.S. policy on presumed threats from a foreign power is, in any event, an unacceptable precedent.

In addition, the group most affected by Castro's radio interference, the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association, endorses the establishment and purpose of Radio Marti. Just as it is important to all Floridians, I believe this project must be important to all Americans. At this time of budgetary austerity, the expense of any Government program, old or new, is a matter of serious concern. The stations' cost will be $8 million per year. The proposed budget should be examined in light of Castro's aggressive policies in the Caribbean and the Soviet $8 to $10 million daily subsidy to Castro's government.

Radio Marti, by informing the Cuban people, will help diffuse the war hysteria which the Castro regime fosters in Cuba. As the Miami Herald said in an editorial endorsing the Radio Marti proposal, there is no freedom of expression in Cuba. The flow of information is tightly controlled by the Communist dictatorship. As long as that remains true, the U.S. Government has a right, yes, even a duty, to fill the void by broadcasting the truth to Mr. Castro's captives.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Helms**. Thank you, Senator Hawkins. Let me say to the panel and to others that as a broadcaster, I am not at all unsympathetic to your apprehensions.

Moreover, there has been a common thread, as I detected it, more pronounced in some testimony than in others, that something ought to be done about the situation with respect to Mr. Castro. So we have no problem about a virtual unanimity on that question. But how to do it is another thing.

I am reminded of Will Rogers. Shortly before he died in a plane crash with Wylie Post, he was asked by a news reporter what he would do to counter, eradicate or eliminate the German submarine menace in the Atlantic. Will Rogers thought for a minute and said, "Drain the Atlantic." The reporter said, "Well, how are you going to do that?" He then said, "Well, I am the idea man; you work out the details." [General laughter.]

That is pretty much the way we are in terms of this.

Now, as Senator Hawkins has said, there is apprehension about the presumption that Mr. Castro might retaliate against Radio Marti. Certainly, that is a possibility. But I wonder if any member of the panel would be willing to estimate or give me his estimate of the probability of any specific response he might choose, such as high power jamming. Have you thought about the specifics of that? Precisely what would he do? Mr. Engelhardt, you are way over there on the end, so I will look at you first.

Mr. **Engelhardt**. Senator, are you asking what we as broadcasters might do or what the industry as a group might do?

Senator **Helms**. I am talking about this. Let us assume Radio Marti went on the air. Give me an estimate of what you think Mr. Castro would do in response to Radio Marti. Now, we all have heard general apprehensions stated, but technically, feasibly, perhaps, what do you think Castro actually will do?

Mr. **Engelhardt**. Sir, there is no doubt in my mind that he would retaliate with high power. I had the opportunity to hear a very high powered station on the air in southern Florida. I listened to it on a commercial radio that I bought in southern Florida, and the power of that station—well, the station is currently operating on the same frequency that KSL, Salt Lake is operating on. The power is so great that I could hear the announcer in Havana breathing in the control room at 1 o'clock in the morning.

That wasn't a 50 kW station, sir. The power of it was far in excess of that. I don't know what.

We are told that the Cubans do have transmitting equipment that is made in Czechoslovakia. We are told that it is modular type, can be stacked together and paralleled to accomplish whatever power they choose. To shift the frequency of that transmitter is relatively easy. As Mr. Summers testified, it is just a twist of a screw; they can put it on 1040, they can put it on 770, they could put it on wherever they want.

Senator HELMS. So you are saying that rather than go the jamming route, he would just increase the power of his stations?

Mr. ENGELHARDT. I think he would put it—well, if Radio Marti is placed on 1040, he will put a station on 1040 and he will do it at high power. Whether it is going to be 250 kW, 300 kW or 500 kW I think is academic, but there isn't any doubt in my mind that he will do it and do it rather quickly.

Senator HELMS. What do you think of Judge Clark's statement that yielding to threats is unacceptable?

Mr. ENGELHARDT. Sir, I don't argue with the concept of Marti; that is, the delivering of information. Technically, the position is that it can be done in many ways, and that all those alternatives were not considered very well in the initial stages of all of this.

Senator HELMS. But I presume we are all agreed that Radio Marti, both as a concept and as an active entity, is and would be legal.

[Mr. Engelhardt nods affirmatively.]

[Mr. Eddens nods affirmatively.]

Senator HELMS. Does the United States have permission from all of the international bodies which govern such broadcasting?

[Mr. Eddens nods affirmatively.]

Senator HELMS. Let the record note that Mr. Eddens nodded affirmatively. What do you know about Cuba's current activities in broadcasting to Latin America? I think I am going to ask my friend from Florida this question. The word "propaganda" has been used in these hearings from time to time with reference to Radio Marti. Would you consider that Mr. Castro's broadcasts are propaganda?

Mr. LEIBOWITZ. Senator, unfortunately, I don't have the specifics with me. But in general, one can view many of the stations that are operating or proposed to be operated, the purpose of the omnidirectional pattern appears to be to reach Central America, Latin America, and the Caribbean Basin. In fact, Castro is presently using many of those frequencies today to beam into those areas.

Propaganda—in fact, the Miami Herald about 9 months ago reported that there was a very unusual dialect being broadcast on one frequency which is only spoken in the hills of the Guatemalan Indians. And they were advocating the overthrow of the Guatemalan Government.

In the United States, there was one frequency that was used apparently as a propaganda tool here, which was the rebroadcast of Radio Moscow over Radio Havana on 600 on the dial. It has been off the air for a while. Eventually, it went up to 1160 or 1040.

Mr. Eddens. It is back on now.

Mr. Leibowitz. Oh, it is? Well, it was off. But that obviously is a propaganda station directed to the United States. It is in English.

Senator Helms. Mr. Summers, you mentioned interference from Cuba as a political weapon employed by Cuba to affect U.S. policy. You pointed out in your fine statement that it is not a technical hang-up really, but a political one. Is it fair to say that in the words of some, Cuba is trying to blackmail the United States, using our free radio airwaves as hostages in order to influence or even dictate U.S. policy?

Mr. Summers. Well, I cannot read their minds. But from what we know, there was a point in the negotiations before the Rio de Janeiro conference where our engineers, as I understand it, from the FCC and the State Department met with the Cubans, and it appeared that the Cubans were ready, willing, and able to resolve the then-existing interference problems.

I am also aware that at least one other country that borders on the Caribbean which has had interference problems with the Cubans reports that they are about to resolve those problems. Yes; I have to agree that this interference is politically motivated and that they are capable of resolving the technical problems.

Senator Helms. I see that my time is up.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome Mr. Jim Eddens to our panel, WOW Radio is one of my favorites, especially in an election year back in Omaha, Nebr. [General laughter.]

On behalf of Senator John Glenn, I would like to ask unanimous consent that a letter he received from a constituent—Mr. Jack Banks, the farm services director of Station WLW in Cincinnati, Ohio—be put into the record.

Senator Helms. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[Mr. Banks' prepared statement follows:]

### Prepared Statement of Jack Banks, Farm Services Director, WLW Radio 7, Cincinnati, Ohio

Gentlemen: I am writing to express my sincere concern over the Administration's intention to construct an AM radio station at Saddlebunch, Florida for broadcasts beamed to Cuba. In my view, Senate Bill 1853 will have an extremely adverse impact on the American agricultural producer, the U.S. broadcast industry, the National Defense, and would be a total waste of the taxpayers monies in these tough times.

The Cuban Government has indicated that it may build and operate 180 AM radio stations, some with very large wattage, from one end of the island to the other. The National Association of Farm Broadcasters has estimated that operation of those stations will cause interference to more than 200 U.S. stations in 32 states and the District of Columbia. The administration intends to use 1040 kHz for "Radio Marti," and in response the Cuban Governnent has announced plans to operate a 500,000 watt station on the same frequency in order to counter Marti's programming. I should point out that the largest powered station on the AM band anywhere in this Country is only 50,000 watts. WHO in Des Moines operates on this same frequency, and Cuba's response will have the effect of jamming WHO, reducing it's nighttime coverage area from a radius of 800 to only 45 miles, from more than 1,700,000 square miles to just 5,900 square miles.

Approximately 40 million Americans are now able to receive WHO at night would lose that service should the actions outlined above take place. The hours of 5 to 6:30 AM are considered nighttime hours during much of the year for AM broadcasting. These times are essential to the American producer in that much information is passed along in that period. Thousands of farmers listen to these reports, and depend on them to aid them in making their marketing decisions. "Radio Marti" could cause the Cubans to retaliate, and thus wipe this necessary service off the air causing in irreparable loss to the farmer.

I personally think we should annex Cuba, then if problems arise there, nuke them til they glow in the dark, but since that is unlikely, in light of the number of radio stations that will be affected by the Cuban inventory, it is clear that last summers bilateral negotiations between the two countries must be reopened in as constructive an atmosphere as possible. It is equally clear that the passage of S. 1853, and the operation of "Radio Marti" will be regarded by Cuba as a provocative, destablilizing gesture, and will minimize the chances of a successful round of negotiations with Cuba.

In your deliberations of S. 1853, I urge you to weigh Marti against the great harm it will do our Country.

Thank you for your consideration of this matter.

Senator Zorinsky. Incidentally, Mr. Banks requested that his letter be read before the committee. However, I want to cite just one paragraph here. I think we could put him down as leaning against communism definitely, although he indicates that he feels that we should negotiate with the Cubans.

He says:

> I personally think we should annex Cuba, then if problems arise there, nuke them til they glow in the dark, but since that is unlikely, in light of the number of radio stations that would be affected by the Cuban inventory, it is clear that last summer's bilateral negotiations between the two countries must be reopened in as constructive an atmosphere as possible.

I would like to ask the members of the broadcasting industry this question. In light of the possible adverse effects, direct or indirect, of Radio Marti on U.S. commercial broadcasting, would you support—and I would like each of you to answer this briefly—would you support an amendment to the Radio Marti authorization requiring Radio Marti to follow normal FCC commercial licensing procedures? Obviously, during the licensing procedure issues could be brought up such as the impact on, if any, or damage done to the commercial broadcasting industry.

Would you like to start, Mr. Leibowitz?

Mr. Leibowitz. First of all, Senator, as a practitioner before the FCC, I am not sure the Commission has any procedures that right now are in place to evaluate that type of application. As I have stated on the record, the Florida broadcasters are in support of Radio Marti. We have not taken a position with respect to the frequency. Obviously, we would like it to be the frequency which least affects other commercial operations. But more importantly, I must stress again we do not see the linkage. Cuban interference has been here. It is here today and is going to be here tomorrow regardless of Radio Marti.

Senator Zorinsky. Well, then, there is no normal FCC commercial licensing procedure through which the station could apply?

Mr. Leibowitz. Well, there is obviously a normal licensing procedure for commercial stations and noncommercial stations. But I would suggest to you, sir, that those procedures would be totally inapplicable for this type of operation.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you.

Mr. Summers.

Mr. Summers. I would agree also. In my other life as general counsel of the NAB, and being somewhat familiar with the communciations law, there is just no provision in the Communications Act for the FCC to have anything to do with a Government station.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Summers, did you in your statement indicate that currently through the broadcast of several American radio stations in the Cuban area that Cubans are receiving a lot of information as to the truth about Marxism in their country? I think one panelist did.

Mr. SUMMERS. No, it was not I.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Bahakel, did you comment about that in your testimony?

Mr. BAHAKEL. I do not believe it was me.

Senator ZORINSKY. I thought it was somebody.

Mr. LEIBOWITZ. Senator, I did not. But to clarify the record, there are reports, which apparently have been validated, that there are some south Florida radio stations that are received in only the northern part of Cuba, though not throughout the island. But there is reception of several Miami stations in the northern coastal area.

Senator ZORINSKY. Jim.

Mr. EDDENS. In reviewing the previous testimony and in the information I prepared for this committee, as I understand the FCC rules, there are no regulations that would cover this sort of radio station. It is by Executive order. That is my understanding of the matter.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Engelhardt, do you have a comment?

Mr. ENGELHARDT. Sir, as I understand it, the Commission regulates the domestic commercial stations, and again the provision is not there for it. The position that we took earlier is that there are other ways to deliver that information, and we would suggest that those other ways be sought out and utilized.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you.

Mr. Summers, radio relations between the United States and Cuba are governed by the 1950 Geneva Convention, which states the principle that AM radio broadcasting should be utilized for domestic purposes. Would Radio Marti violate the convention in that effect? Or again would you say that this is one of a kind and would not be covered under that convention?

Mr. SUMMERS. I am not trying to dodge the question. Though I just proclaimed myself as somewhat of an expert on the Communications Act, I am not really an expert on the ITU regulations. I really could not answer that question. I know what you are saying. This would not be—certainly would not be—a domestic broadcast station. But whether it actually violates the ITU regulations, I am just not in a position to say.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Leibowitz, you said something about the cost incurred by the broadcast industry if Castro did utilize these jamming-type devices and interferences.

It is indicated by the Congressional Budget Office that $40 million would be required. You indicated that was not realistic. What, in your estimation, do you feel could be the damage?

Mr. LEIBOWITZ. As I understand it, that report was written on the basis of the NAB study which indicated there are in excess of 200 stations that may be affected. Then they took an engineering calculation as to cost and simply multiplied it out. Unfortunately, the limitations that are placed upon a station seeking modification are so extreme that only a handful of stations today, eight, have been able to take advantage of that process, and only a minimal of additional stations would be subject to that process.

Senator ZORINSKY. What would a guestimate be?

Mr. LEIBOWITZ. I would suggest to you that an average of $125,000 per station would be an accurate estimate, multiplied times perhaps 20 stations.

Senator ZORINSKY. Times 20 stations?

Mr. LEIBOWITZ. Correct, sir.

Senator ZORINSKY. Let me ask, Mr. Engelhardt, this question. You stated that no U.S. Government representative involved in the planning of Radio Marti contacted WHO on the impact of Radio Marti's use of 1040. What was the response after you contacted them? Did they say they meant to talk to you about it or that there was no set format to initiate a conversation with WHO?

Mr. ENGELHARDT. Yes, sir. To this date, no one has contacted us by letter, by telephone, by telegram, mailgram, whatever. To this date, no one from our Federal Government has contacted us.

We had to seek out various members of the Presidential commission, and the response was varied. In some instances, we were told it was our American duty to be up front and that we should be proud to sacrifice our station for that purpose. The response was varied.

Senator ZORINSKY. But you never were sought out for any comments or to ask your views?

Mr. ENGELHARDT. No, sir. Only one man in the group of people whom we contacted said that he would have liked to have come to Des Moines to tell us about it. And we suggested to him that had we known, we would have sent the plane fare, and he did not respond to it.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you.

Mr. Eddens, an earlier USIA study on radio broadcasting to Cuba rejected the 1040 frequency. One reason was the interference it would cause Latin American users, such as stations in Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela. Why do you believe that 1040 was chosen for Radio Marti? Is there a significant reason in the broadcasting industry so as to use that?

Mr. EDDENS. Again, in reading the testimony that surrounds Radio Marti, it was not clear why, of all the channels available, that one was picked, except by coincidence. It could have been picked by the Cuban Government in announcing at approximately the same time they were going to use the 1040 channel. I do not really think there was much connection between the two, though, Senator. I really cannot answer you. But there is a chance that that could have been one reason.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Senator Zorinsky.

I was just sitting here thinking that I probably am the only member of the Foreign Relations Committee and perhaps one of only two in the Senate who has ever participated in filing an application with the FCC. I can imagine what the bureaucracy would be if they had to file the kind of application for renewal or whatever that you folks are so accustomed to. I guess they could get by with 4,000 in new employees and a budget of several million dollars. Well, I am joking.

Do you have any questions, Senator?

Senator HAWKINS. I understand that Cuba has been constructing two 500-kW radio stations. And in view of the expense to which Cuba has gone to build these stations, does it not seem reasonable to you gentlemen for Cuba to use these stations when they become available, Radio Marti or no Radio Marti? Are there any volunteers? I thought you would all be clamoring to respond.

Mr. Leibowitz.

Mr. LEIBOWITZ. Well, again, it is our position that those two 500-kW stations——

Senator HELMS. Would you pull up the microphone?

Mr. LEIBOWITZ. Yes. The two 500-kW stations that were included in the original inventory as filed. From testimony of Secretary Enders before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, apparently there is information to believe that those stations are built. It is just a question of when they are going to be turned on.

And based upon our observations down in Florida, Castro has followed the modified inventory, and the new stations that have been put on the air parallel very closely the modified inventory. Therefore, we believe Radio Marti or not, the basic inventory as modified will be placed on the air.

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Gentlemen, thank you for coming here today. I can assure you that your testimony and the additional material that you have filed will not be treated casually. There is a difference of opinion on this committee and in the Senate on this question. But I do thank you, and I do apologize for the inordinate delay caused by the rollcall votes. Please have a nice trip home. And thank you very much.

Now we will hear from panel No. 2, consisting of Dr. Dorothy Dillon, former assistant director for Latin America, USIA; Philip Nicolaides—I believe I have heard of him a time or two—former deputy director for commentary and analysis of the Voice of America; John S. Nichols, assistant professor of the Department of Journalism at Pennsylvania State University; Colonel Sam T. Dickens, counsel for Inter-American Security and New World Dynamics, Washington, D.C.; Manuel Gomez, president of the Cuban American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba, in New York; and Frank Calzon, executive director of the Cuban-American National Foundation.

I would ask you fine citizens to please come forward. Dr. Dillon, you are on the far right or the far left, depending on which way you want to put it. Mr. Nicolaides, you are next. I would ask you all to be seated, please, in order.

[Pause.]

Senator HELMS. Reading from my left to my right now, we have Dr. Dillon, Mr. Nicolaides, Mr. Nichols, Colonel Dickens, Mr. Gomez, and Mr. Calzon. Is that right? I believe it is. Very well, why do we not have ladies first? Perhaps I ought to explain, or maybe I ought to get the staff to do it, that I believe each of you has been contacted in the hope that formal statements can be summarized in 5 minutes, with the understanding that the full text of your statement will be printed in the record. However, the Chair is not heavyhanded about the gavel. We want to give you every opportunity today. We are not only pleased to have you here today, we are grateful for your willingness to come and testify.

## STATEMENT OF DR. DOROTHY DILLON, FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR LATIN AMERICA, USIA, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dr. DILLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before the committee today on Radio Marti. As some of you know, I have been involved with Latin America for about 40 years, 30 of them as a Government official primarily with what is now the International Communication Agency. And in its former incarnation as the U.S. Information Agency [USIA], I was the assistant director in charge of Latin America in the midseventies.

So my concern with Radio Marti is from the point of view of its effectiveness as a tool of public diplomacy. The promoters and supporters of Radio Marti say that they hope to inform the Cuban people about their problems, their domestic and their foreign problems, with the hope that this will somehow make the Cuban people—well, more dissatisfied or more disenchanted than they already are with their domestic situation and hence will make the Government somewhat more responsible.

The trouble with that scenario, from my point of view, is that since the Cuban Government is a totalitarian government, the Cuban people are hardly in a position to throw the rascals out at the next election. And as for their disenchantment, I think that we already are fairly aware that they are, through the fact that hundreds of thousands of Cuban refugees have departed from Cuba. As recently as 2 years ago, we had 125,000 Marielitos who came to the United States, and probably more would have come in if Mr. Castro had not turned off the spigot.

Therefore, I wonder if we really have to tell the Cubans about their problems. It seems to me that a good many are already well aware of their problems.

Also, as has been pointed out by previous witnesses, the Cubans are not completely isolated from non-Communist sources. They do pick up private radio from the United States in Havana. They even pick up television from the United States. We know that at least in part of the island the Voice of America comes in loud and clear. They can pick up the BBC and a number of other radio stations.

Therefore, the question in my mind is what do we hope to achieve with this new program that we cannot already achieve through the Voice of America and other instruments?

I have not seen in the report of the Commission any great attention paid to the previous 13 years in which we broadcast special radio programs to Cuba both under Democratic and Republican administrations. That is "Cita con Cuba." In the end, it was decided to terminate that program because the consensus in the Agency was that it was not any more effective than the Voice of America by itself and, therefore, could not really accomplish anything that could not be accomplished by the Voice of America itself.

I am concerned about the fact that we are talking about millions of dollars for a new program of dubious effectiveness, and this at a time when we are well aware that the budgetary constraints on our total information and cultural programs are extremely severe.

As I watch the total information and cultural program geared to Latin America of the U.S. International Communication Agency declining since fiscal year 1969, I must say I am more concerned about doing something about keeping the rest of Latin America informed, particularly about what Castro and his agents may be doing, than informing the Cuban people as such.

So therefore from that point of view, I am concerned about seeing money spent on a new program of questionable effectiveness rather than keeping up already effective information and cultural programs designed for the whole area of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Finally, I would like to mention that from a policy point of view, I ask the question at least: Are we interested or are we not interested in eventually normalizing relations with Cuba? We deal with the Soviet Union: we deal with the People's Republic of China. Why not eventually with Cuba? In other words, we deal with a lot of governments that we do not like.

If we are interested in normalizing relations with Cuba, then it seems to me that a Radio Marti would not be a very conducive way of bringing Cuba to the negotiating table.

I will not dwell upon the possibility of jamming. That has already been dealt with. I think the only thing that I would like to say there, in conclusion, is since it will be very easy for Cuba to jam Radio Marti if it does go on the air, it is not likely to be on the air very long. And therefore, what have we gained in the process, and are we not perhaps worse off than before we began? Thank you very much.

[Dr. Dillon's prepared statement follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DOROTHY DILLON

What do the supporters of a new, special radio program designed exclusively for Cuba expect to achieve? I understand that it is their hope that by informing the Cuban people about the internal problems of their society and by pointing out how Castro's interventions in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America have exacerbated those problems, opinion in Cuba will eventually become a force to restrain the government and make it more responsive to the real needs of the Cuban people.

The difficulty with that scenario is that the Cuban people, living as they do in a totalitarian state—as we are so frequently reminded by our own government—are hardly in a position to throw the rascals out in the next election no matter how disenchanted they may be. That hundreds of thousands of Cubans are disenchanted we know only too well from our own experience and that of other nations with hosts of Cuban refugees. We did not need a Radio Marti to stimulate their departure or that of some 125,000 Marielitos a few years back, with or without an outward push from Castro. Do we wish to stimulate the departure of additional thousands of Cubans for the shores of the United States when we are having difficulty absorbing those who came in 1980?

While it is not the intention of those who support the establishment of Radio Marti to incite insurrection in Cuba, we should not forget the unfortunate role that U.S. official broadcasting played at the time of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 when we learned to our dismay that the Hungarians had been encouraged by our broadcasts to believe that we would assist them if they rose against their Communist masters. I do not believe that we are any more ready to help the Cubans in 1982 than we were to help the Hungarians in 1956.

Cuba is not isolated from non-Communist sources of information. U.S. domestic radio programs can be picked up in Cuba and the Latin American broadcasts of the U.S. International Communications Agency (USICA) can be heard loud and clear. For some thirteen years in the 1960's and 1970's, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), ICA's predecessor, broadcast a special program to Cuba, Cita con Cuba. While there may have been some justification for that program in its early days—and that can be debated—by the 1970's the consensus was that Cita con Cuba was not achieving anything that could not be achieved by the regular Latin American broadcasts of the VOA. Thus the decision was made to terminate the program.

Given the above, I see no justification for committing very scarce resources, both human and financial, to Radio Marti. Cuba does not need its own version of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. Even those two programs with all their years of experience find it difficult to fill their broadcast time with news and other information and are reduced to reading books to their listeners. If they have this kind of problem, how could Radio Marti fill 14 or more hours a day of broadcast time? The VOA broadcasts only 11½ hours a day to all of Latin America of which 5½ hours are in Spanish. The balance is in English and Portuguese.

While one may argue about whether the expectations of the promoters of Radio Marti are justified or not, no one can argue with the fact that USG resources are severely strained as our projected hundreds of billions of dollars of budget deficits testify. How then can one justify allocating tens of millions of dollars or more to a new program of dubious effectiveness while we continue each year to cut rather than expand proven information and cultural programs designed for whole areas of the world rather than just one country? How can we waste that amount of money on one Cuban radio program while the total USICA program for all of Latin America and the Caribbean continues to decline year after year. As the Assistant Director (Latin America) of the U.S. Information Agency from 1973–76, I found myself having to cut some 40 local positions and over 30 American officer and staff positions in our posts overseas, close certain branch posts, and downgrade our support to binational centers in order to preserve sufficient funds to maintain at least the quality if not the quantity of our programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Before that cut, USIA programs in the area had already been significantly reduced from their high point in the late 1960's. The level of the current USICA program in the area is even lower than after my substantial cuts of the mid seventies. (Example: There were over 1,000 American and national employees in Latin America in FY 1969; in the midseventies this number had gone down to about 800; currently there are only 711 officers and staff to cover 26 posts.)

Apart from the program considerations discussed above, I should also like to call attention to a policy consideration which certainly needs to be kept in mind when making a decision on Radio Marti. Do we or do we not wish eventually to work out a more normal relationship with the Government of Cuba? Should we not explore the current conciliatory offers emanating from Cuban officials? Is there not at least the possibility that an easing of current tensions with Cuba could act as a more effective constraint on future Castro adventurism than a new and more vitriolic war of words on the radio, a war which would probably not last very long anyway since the Cuban Government can and probably would jam Radio Marti and along with it a significant percentage of U.S. domestic radio stations? If this occurs, are we not worse off than before the advent of Radio Marti?

[The following statement was subsequently received for the record:]

### STATEMENT ON RADIO MARTI BY DR. DOROTHY DILLON, FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (LATIN AMERICA), U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

Documents dealing with the decision to terminate Cita con Cuba in the early 1970's are no longer on file in the U.S. Information Agency. Files dating back to that period are in storage. (Presumably those files could be retrieved.)

Based on the memory of officials of the Agency who were involved in the decision at the time, however, the consesus seems to be that Cita con Cuba was no more effective than the other programs of the Voice of America broadcast to Latin America and hence there was no longer any special reason for continuing it. Originally, the program had been designed to indicate to the Cuban people that we still wished to communicate with them even though we had broken diplomatic relations with their government. Over the years the content of Cita changed and the length of its broadcast was shortened. By the 1970's Cita con Cuba was reduced to two one-half programs a day and program content was little different from the other VOA programs going to the region.

Since it was not possible to carry out research on the effectiveness of the program in Cuba, the Agency did attempt to determine its usefulness by interviewing Cuban refugees who came to the United States. From those interviews it appeared that many Cubans listened to VOA programs, including Cita con Cuba. At least the name was recognized.

With the passage of time, USG attitudes toward Cuba changed somewhat and as periodic efforts were made to begin the normalization of relations with Cuba, it was felt that Cita con Cuba was a holdover from an earlier era and no longer served a purpose. While budgetary constraints are always a factor in any program decision, budget was not the main consideration in the decision to discontinue Cita con Cuba.

As indicated in my statement to the Committee, Cuba is not cut off completely from non-Communist sources of information. The Voice of America in both short and medium wave comes in loud and clear. U.S. domestic radio and television stations can also be picked up in Cuba, especially in Havana, thus giving the Cubans a non-U.S. Government source of information. Other non-Communist radio programs can also be heard such as BBC, German radio, etc. However, the most effective medium of communication with the Cuban people is person-to-person contact. Thus we should encourage rather than discourage this type of contact between Americans and Cubans and between Cuban refugees living in the United States and their family and friends in Cuba. As a means of communication, radio is far less effective than personal contact and many of the other informational and cultural program instruments of the U.S. Information Agency. As a program instrument, radio is preserved as a crisis facility, that is, an instrument that can be used when all other program instruments are cut off for one reason or another.

VOA broadcasts in Spanish to Latin America and the Caribbean could easily and inexpensively be expanded rather than initiating another special program for Cuba after abandoning the previous one on the basis of past experiences. Radio Martí will only serve as another irritant in our relations with Cuba at a time when we should challenge Castro's contention that he wants to improve relations with the United States. Radio Martí will only make matters worse rather than better, while at the same time it will give Castro the pleasure and satisfaction of jamming it or overriding it along with many other domestic radio stations, something which he has already proved he can do with ease.

VOA's charter permits it to broadcast news dealing with the United States or any other part of the world and commentary devoted to U.S. policy positions. VOA broadcasts to Latin America can deal with news and commentary about Cuba as well as with any other subject. We know from Agency research on VOA broadcasts to the Caribbean area that the VOA is far more popular in that region than the Voice of Cuba and we also know that many Cubans, including Cuban officials, listen to VOA broadcasts. Why jeopardize our current VOA programs by starting Radio Martí which can and will be jammed? A modest expansion of VOA broadcasts to Latin America and the Caribbean could be interpreted in the region as evidence of increased U.S. interest in the area, something which the Latin Americans have been seeking. Radio Martí can only be interpreted as a provocation to Cuba and evidence of our continued frustration in dealing successfully with a small island close to our shores whose government with massive assistance from the Soviet Union has defied us for over 20 years.

Senator **Helms**. Thank you.
Mr. Nicolaides.

## STATEMENT OF PHILIP NICOLAIDES, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS, VOICE OF AMERICA, FALLS CHURCH, VA.

Mr. **Nicolaides**. Thank you very much, Senator, and Senator Hawkins.

I would like to point out, by the way, before I proceed, that we have "normalized" relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc nations, and we still broadcast Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. So I do not see the logic of that particular thrust.

The most striking feature of the project we are discussing today is that we are very late. The Voice of America recently celebrated its 40th anniversary, and we have been broadcasting to the oppressed people behind the Iron Curtain through Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe for about 30 years.

The American people and the Congress have understood the importance of bringing the truth to people who live in totalitarian societies where a dictator or a ruling clique has virtually total control of all access to information and news. Yet today, more than 20 years after Castro seized power in Cuba and began to transform it into a closed Communist society, we have no broadcasts targeted to the people of Cuba.

The Voice of America, it is true, broadcasts about 5 hours a day in Spanish to Latin America. But these broadcasts are general in content. They are not focused on the special concerns and the special situation of the 10 million people enslaved in Cuba. Moreover, they are shortwave broadcasts, principally, and the people of Cuba have little or no access to shortwave receivers.

However, there is more than one AM radio in Cuba, for every six persons. Our opportunity to communicate with the people of Cuba is very great. In fact, that is why Castro is so worried. We should avail ourselves of that opportunity without further delay.

Of all the enslaved peoples in the world, none should haunt the American conscience more painfully than the people of Cuba. They are our next-door neighbors. We played an important role in their fight for independence from European colonial rule, a rule, I would add, which at its worst was never nearly as oppressive as that which they endure today under the Soviet puppet regime of Fidel Castro.

The most painful part of the story is that elements of the U.S. media and the U.S. Government must bear a great share in the responsibility for Cuba's loss of freedom and the rise to power of Fidel Castro.

Some mention must be made of these facts, for perhaps our unconscionable failure to set up surrogate radio broadcasting to Cuba long ago. The New York Times recently ridiculed the Radio Marti proposal as an attempt to "placate an ideological claque—editorial, July 23, 1982—to appease congressional rightwingers."

Radio Marti, as you must be aware, has strong bipartisan support. Only a few weeks ago it was unanimously endorsed by the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party's miniconvention. The 37th General Assembly of the Inter-American Press Association last October passed a resolution urging its members to "make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba and support any means that would help achieve that objective."

In 1980 the Coalition for a Democratic Majority published a study which urged that we set up a "Radio Free Cuba" of the intelligence, imagination, and skill of a Radio Free Europe. Senators Jackson and Moynihan are among the leaders of this Coalition for a Democratic Majority.

Are these people all part of an "ideological claque" as the Times would have us believe? Why this bristling animus, this name-calling? Perhaps they do not want us to recall the shameful role of the New York Times in bringing Castro to power.

The father of one of the members of this panel, who happens not to be here at the moment, himself a distinguished Senator, heard the following testimony from our former Ambassador to Cuba:

> The U.S. Government agencies and the U.S. press played a major role in bringing Castro to power. Three front-page stories in the New York Times in

> early 1957, written by the editorialist Herbert Matthews, served to inflate Castro to world stature and world recognition. Until that time, Castro had been just another bandit in the Oriente Mountains of Cuba with a handful of followers who had terrified the campesinos * * * throughout the countryside. * * * The crusader role which the press and radio bestowed on the bearded rebel blinded the people to the left-wing political philosophy which even then was already on record.

Once Matthews in the Times had sounded the pitchpipe for the oratorio of adulation for Castro, others soon joined the chorus: among them, Edward R. Murrow, Ed Sullivan, and Jack Paar.

Long after Castro had begun to show his true colors, his praises continued to resonate through the American liberal community. Here is Norman Mailer's adoring apostrophe:

> So, Fidel Castro, I announce to the city of New York that you gave all of us who are alone in this country some sense that there were heroes in the world. * * * It was as if the ghost of Cortez had appeared in our century riding Zapata's white horse. You were the first and greatest hero to appear in the world since the Second World War.

Unfortunately, Mailer still is misjudging murderers.

I could go on in this vein. There are many more quotations available. You may want to refer to Paul Hollander's book "Political Pilgrims," where I got some of these jewels. But there are other tragic chapters in our relationship with Cuba for which the Cuban people, the American people, and the people of the world have already paid a high price: the bungled Bay of Pigs invasion, the concessions made during the Cuban missile crisis, our failure to support anticommunist anti-Castro elements in Angola.

Yes, there is ample cause for many Americans to feel a sense of guilt about the rise of Castro. But there are two ways of dealing with guilt. One is to deny it, and the other is to do something to make reparation. I suggest that to setup a station, Radio Marti, to bring the truth, to feed the oppressed Cuban people the truth they hunger for, is a long overdue act of reparation.

We can bring to the people of Cuba the fact of Castro's misrule, corruption, mismanagement, and the exportation of tens of thousands of Cuban boys to fight and die thousands of miles away in the cause of Soviet imperialism.

Unlike Poland, Cuba is an island, thousands of miles from the Soviet Union. We know the power of radio to assist in the growth and the birth and the question of Solidarity, which created a little area of freedom for a time and gave the Polish people and—we think, perhaps—all the people of Eastern Europe a taste for freedom, that taste that terrifies dictators.

But Cuba is not surrounded by Soviet tanks, and who can say what may happen if a drive for greater freedom begins to take shape in Cuba. We already know, of course, there is deep dissatisfaction there with the Castro regime. A million Cubans left before the Mariel exodus, and during Mariel, as it was pointed out, 125,000 Cubans fled. That is an astonishing 1.3 percent of the entire population of Cuba.

The neutralization of Cuba as a Soviet military and intelligence base would be an incomparable victory for the cause of freedom. It would be a devastating setback for the Soviet Union. Radio Marti would be a signal that we see this as something that can happen if the Cuban people are determined and kept informed.

In closing, let me quote from the words of that Senator I quoted before, Senator Thomas J. Dodd:

> The problem of Latin America will never be solved, and will have no security in this hemisphere unless we embark on a simultaneous program, without delay and with all possibly urgency, to put an end to the menace of Castroism. * * *

I urge this committee and the Congress to act without further delay in approving S. 1853 to authorize support for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc. Thank you.

[Mr. Nicolaides' prepared statement follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILIP NICOLAIDES

I am pleased and honored by this opportunity to express my views on a project which can make a great difference to the American people, to our traditional friends, the people of Cuba, to the security of the Western Hemisphere, and to the peace and security of the world—Radio Marti.

Let me introduce myself briefly: My name is Phillip Nicolaides, I have spent a lifetime in communications, journalism, advertising, public relations, radio and television writing, directing, and producing. I have managed political campaigns. I have been a radio commentator. Recently I served in this Administration with the ICA where I was Deputy Director for Commentary and Analysis at the Voice of America. I am acutely aware of the immense potential of international radio broadcasting.

The most striking feature of the project we are discussing is that we are very late. The Voice of America recently celebrated its 40th Anniversary. We have also been broadcasting to the oppressed people behind the Iron Curtain through Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe for many, many years. The American people and the Congress have understood the importance of bringing the truth to people who live in totalitarian societies where a dictator or a ruling clique has virtually total control of all access to information and news. Yet today, more than 20 years after Castro seized power in Cuba and began to transform it into a closed society, a communist dictatorship, a Soviet satellite and beachhead in the Western Hemisphere, we have no broadcasts targeted to the people of Cuba.

Voice of America, it is true, broadcasts about 5 hours a day in Spanish to Latin America. But these broadcasts are general in content. They are not focussed on the special concerns and the special situation of the ten million people of Cuba. Moreover, they are short wave broadcasts, and the people of Cuba have little or no access to short wave receivers. Despite this the Voice of America receives letters—some 50 a month—from Cuba. Surely this demonstrates the hunger these people have for news and information that is not controlled by their government.

While short wave receivers are in extremely short supply in Cuba, AM radios are not. Indeed, there is more than one radio in Cuba for every six persons. Our opportunity to communicate with the people of Cuba is very great. We should avail ourselves of that opportunity without further delay.

Of all the enslaved peoples in the world, none should haunt the American conscience more painfully than the people of Cuba. They are our next-door neighbors. We played an important role in their fight for independence from European colonial rule—a rule, I should add, that at its worst was never nearly as oppressive as that which they endure today under the Soviet puppet regime of Fidel Castro. We helped them wipe out the scourages of yellow fever and malaria and to establish modern sanitation. Our tourism and trade helped them to reach economic growth and prosperity which was the envy of less favored nations of the hemisphere.

The most painful part of the story is that elements of the United States' media and the United States Government must bear a great share in the responsibility from Cuba's loss of freedom and the rise to power of Fidel Castro. It is beyond the appropriate scope of my testimony today to trace the history of our complicity in the enslavement of this friendly nation by a brutal, megalomaniacal catspaw for our most dangerous global foe, the Soviet Union. Yet some mention may be made of these facts, for perhaps it is our haunting sense of guilt that is responsible for the unconscionable failure to set up surrogate radio broadcasting to Cuba long ago. Perhaps this guilt is at the root of the resistance still expressed in certain quarters to the proposal this panel is now considering.

The New York Times recently ridiculed the Radio Marti proposal as an attempt to "placate an ideological claque * * * to appease Congressional right-wingers" and even to provide a job for someone they identify as "F. Clifford White." (N.Y. Times, July 23, 1982) I suppose they were referring to F. Clifton White. No matter. Their reasoning is as bad as their spelling.

Radio Marti, as you must be aware, has strong bi-partisan support. Only a few weeks ago it was unanimously endorsed by the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party's mini-convention. The 37th General Assembly of the Inter-American Press Association at its 37th Assembly last October in Rio de Janeiro passed a resolution urging its member to "make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective." In 1980 the Coalition for a Democratic Majority published a study by the distinguished British historian Hugh Thomas which urged that we set up "a Radio Free Cuba of the intelligence, imagination and skill of a Radio Free Europe. * * * Some of the programs concerned," he continued, "might emphasize such things as the human cost of Castro's African adventure (and) other subjects not usually discussed by the censored Cuban media." Senators Jackson and Moynihan are among the leaders of this Coalition for a Democratic Majority. Are these elements of an "ideological claque," as the Times would have us believe?

Why this bristling animus, this contempt, this name calling? Perhaps they do not want us to recall the shameful role of the New York Times in bringing Castro to power in Cuba, especially the laundatory and misleading articles by Herbert L. Matthews, beginning in 1957. Matthews assured the readers of the Times that Castro's men "adored him" and that he had "caught the imagination of the youth of Cuba all over the island." And Matthews went on to state that "there is no communism to speak of in Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement."

The father of one of the members of this panel, himself a distinguished Senator, heard the following testimony from our former ambassador to Cuba:

"The U.S. Government agencies and the U.S. press played a major role in bringing Castro to power. Three front-page articles in the New York Times in early 1957, written by the editorialist Herbert Matthews, served to inflate Castro to world stature and world recognition: Until that time, Castro had been just another bandit in the Oriente Mountains of Cuba with a handful of followers who had terrified the campesinos * * * throughout the countryside. * * * The crusader role which the press and radio bestowed on the bearded rebel blinded the people to the leftwing political philosophy with which even at that time he was already on record." [1]

Once Matthews in the Times had sounded the pitch pipe for the oratorio of adulation for Castro others soon joined the chorus: Edward R. Murrow, and even Ed Sullivan and Jack Paar.

Long after Castro had begun to show his true colors, his praises continued to resonate through the American liberal community:

Here is Norman Mailer's adoring apostrophe:

"So, Fidel Castro, I announce to the City of New York that you gave all of us who are alone in this country * * * some sense that there were heroes in the world. * * * It was as if the ghost of Cortez had appeared in our century riding Zapata's white horse. You were the first and greatest hero to appear in the world since the Second World War."

It would not be the last time Mr. Mailer would misjudge a murderer—with tragic consequences!

Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones wrote that Castro was "one of the most charming and entertaining men either of us had ever met. * * * personally overpowering."

A writer for the Nation found him "utterly devoted to the welfare of his people * * * the poor, not the rich."

For Abbie Hoffman he kindled ithyphallic fantasies: "He is like a mighty penis coming to life, and when he is tall and straight, the crowd immediately is transformed."

Senator McGovern found his less tumescent side appealing: "In private conversation, at least," the Senator discovered, Castro is "softspoken, shy, sensitive."

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[1] Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, "Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean," Hearings, Part 9, August 1960, pp. 685–7.

If anyone can bear any more of this mawkishness I refer him to Paul Hollander's insightful book, Political Pilgrims (New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981.), from which these gems have been mined.

There are other tragic chapters in our relationship with Cuba for which the Cuban people, the American people, and the people of the world have already paid a high price: the bungled Bay of Pigs invasion; the concessions made during the Cuban Missile Crisis; our failure to support anti-Communist, anti-Castro elements in Angola.

Yes, there is ample cause for many Americans to feel a sense of guilt about the rise of Castro and his continuance in power on a strategic island 90 miles from our shores. Psychologists tell us that there are two ways to deal with guilt: One way is denial. We black out events which are painful and cause us shame. We lash out angrily at anything which reminds us of that we would rather forget. But there is another way. It is the way of confession, contrition, and reparation. I submit that a radio station to feed the oppressed Cuban people hungry for truth is a long overdue act of reparation.

We can bring to the people of Cuba the facts of Castro's misrule—corruption, mismanagement at home, and the exportation of tens of thousands of Cubans to fight and die thousands of miles away in the interest of Soviet Imperialism.

We can give the Cuban people back their history. In this connection it is well to keep in mind that six out of every ten Cubans was 7 years old or younger when Castro came to power. In their schools and through their controlled media they have been taught nothing but slanders about the United States, about the free economic system, about the open society. They have been dunned incessantly with the glories of Castro, communism, and the Socialist Camp. Yet through it all there is still a great reservoir of good feeling toward America. It goes beyond the superficial—rock music, blue jeans, and baseball. When they get the chance to flee, here is where they come. The least we can do is break through the curtain of propaganda. The least we can do is talk to them. The least we can do is tell them the truth which they long to hear. In their Gospels as in ours it is written: "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free."

It is universally conceded that American broadcasting—especially Radio Free Europe—was an indispensable help to the Polish people as Solidarity began to build its strength around the nation. Solidarity, of course, is now repressed, underground, but still very much alive. It gave the Polish people a taste of freedom. Freedom is intoxicating, habit forming. Who can say how long before Solidarity again asserts itself and forces the Communist rulers to back down and make concessions? We have cause to wonder if Solidarity could have been suppressed as much as it was or would have been suppressed if it were not for the threat of thousands of Soviet tanks poised at Poland's borders.

But Cuba is an island thousands of miles from the Soviet Union. There are no Soviet tanks poised along its borders. Who can say what may happen if a drive for greater freedom begins to take shape in Cuba? We know there is deep dissatisfaction there with the Castro regime. A million Cubans left even before the Mariel exodus. And during the Mariel exodus in just a few months some 125,000 Cubans fled, an astounding 1.3 percent of the population.

The neutralization of Cuba as a Soviet military and intelligence base, as a breeding farm for cannon fodder for Soviet interventionism in Africa and elsewhere, as a training ground for guerrilla and terrorist movements would be an incomparable victory for the cause of freedom. It would be a devastating setback for the Soviet Union. Radio Marti would be a signal that we see this as something than *can* happen if the Cuban people are determined and kept informed.

In closing, let me quote from the words of a great Senator. They are as true today as they were when he spoke to them 17 years ago:

"The problem of Latin America will never be solved, and we will have no security in this hemisphere unless we embark on a simultaneous program, without delay and with all possible urgency, to put an end to the menace of Castroism, and to bring the American revolution to the suffering and impoverished and freedom-hungry peoples of the hemisphere."[3]

I urge this committee and the Congress to act without further delay in approving S. 1853, to authorize support to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc.

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Nichols.

[Mr. Nichols' biographical data follows:]

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[3] Remarks of Senator Thomas J. Dodd, American Legion Convention, Portland, Oreg., August 25, 1965.

### BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF JOHN S. NICHOLS

John S. Nichols is an assistant professor of journalism at the Pennsylvania State University and a specialist in international communication and comparative foreign journalism.

Nichols is the author of "Cuban Mass Media: Organization, Control and Functions" (Journalism Monographs, 1982) and chapters on the Cuban media in "Cuba: Internal and International Affairs," World Press Encyclopedia, "Keeping the Flame: Media and Government in Latin America" and "Case Studies of the Mass Media in the Third World." His other scholarly and professional works, mostly on international communication topics, appear in Journalism Quarterly, Public Opinion Quarterly, Gazette, International Development Review, The Quill and numerous daily newspapers.

In 1980 and 1981, Nichols was one of five academic specialists who conducted seminars on Cuba sponsored by the Office of Long Range Assessments and Research of the U.S. Department of State. He has met with President Fidel Castro, Cuban media policymakers and journalists while conducting field research in Cuba in 1977 and 1979.

Nichols holds a BA, MA and Ph. D. in journalism and mass communication from the University of Minnesota. Prior to entering academe, he was a newspaper reporter and professional journal editor and, from 1968 to 1970, was a field artillery officer in the U.S. Army.

## STATEMENT OF JOHN S. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF JOURNALISM, THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY PARK, PA.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I appreciate very much this opportunity to appear before you to discuss Radio Marti. My name is John Nichols from Penn State University. I am a specialist in international communication. I think it is important to emphasize that I do not have a political, economic, or emotional interest in the outcome of the Radio Marti debate.

The Radio Marti proposal is predicated upon the outmoded "bullet" theory of communication and demonstrates the seemingly perpetual misunderstanding of how international propaganda works. According to the "bullet" theory, which was popular during World Wars I and II, members of the audience are like ducks sitting on a pond, and all the communicator needs is a rifle, the proper ammunition, and a good aim in order to achieve a communication effect.

With the development of more sophisticated research since World War II, communication researchers began to realize what should have been obvious all along: In order for communication to take place, the message must not only be created and transmitted, it also must be received and accepted.

Members of the audience are not passive recipients of messages designed by a master propagandist. Rather, the audience actively selects or rejects available messages based on complex psychological processes and social relationships. In short, the audience, not the communicator, has the final say.

Multitudes of studies demonstrate that international propaganda frequently is ineffective and often has a boomerang effect. For example, U.S. forces listened to Tokyo Rose during World War II, enjoying the music and mentally filtering out or reinterpreting the propaganda so as to reinforce their predispositions. And in one instance, after Rose apologized on the air for not having the latest jazz records, U.S. bombers also dropped a package of jazz albums in a subsequent bombing raid over Tokyo.

Communication research has come a long way since the "bullet" theory in World War II. Unfortunately, Government application of the research has not come as far. The myth of the omnipotent propagandist is particularly dysfunctional because it tends to lull governments into the erroneous belief that a propaganda campaign can replace meaningful policies and actions.

Given this understanding of communication research, will Radio Marti be effective in its stated mission of bringing Cuban domestic news to Cubans?

First, Radio Marti, as the voice of the U.S. Government, is not likely to be credible in Cuba. While many Cubans, particularly Cuban youth, are highly attracted to U.S. culture, including blue jeans, the Yankees, and pop music, they are also highly nationalistic, and regardless of their level of support for the Castro government, dislike or at least distrust the U.S. Government.

Second, Radio Marti does not have the newsgathering capabilities to collect reliable Cuban domestic news. None of the Radio Marti staff will be stationed in Cuba to report the news firsthand, and few of the wire services for which Radio Marti intends to subscribe have representation in Havana.

Radio Marti must rely almost totally on secondary sources frowned on in standard Western journalistic practice. Consequently, only a minority of Radio Marti's proposed programing deals with domestic Cuban affairs. The majority includes sports, world and regional news, music, the type of content that is already available to Cubans on Voice of America and commercial radio from Miami. It is important to note that many of these and other stations, easily heard in Cuba, broadcast in Spanish and also report Cuban domestic news.

Third, I think it is safe to assume that the active ingredient in Radio Marti's programing is Cuban domestic news and that the administration is not asking the U.S. taxpayers to pay $17.7 million primarily to broadcast baseball and pop music to Cuba. If the news is the active ingredient, then why not devote 100 percent of Radio Marti's air time to the news?

The answer, of course, is very simple: Cuban audiences probably would not listen to the U.S. Government's version of Cuban domestic affairs unless Radio Marti also broadcasts baseball and pop music. In propaganda parlance, this entertainment content is called "facilitative communication."

Propagandists assume that the large audience gathered by facilitative communication also listens to and accepts the persuasive messages interwoven in the broadcasts. However, research indicates that this assumption is invalid. Audiences frequently listen to the facilitative communication while rejecting or reinterpreting the accompanying propaganda, such as in the case of Tokyo Rose.

Although the administration has repeatedly claimed that Radio Marti will not engage in propaganda. Radio Marti's proposed use of facilitative communication is a tacit admission that it will be broadcasting propaganda and that Cuban audiences might not be interested in the U.S. Government version of their news.

The most incredible aspect of the Radio Marti proposal is that the administration offers no research to support its claims of the station's potential effectiveness. The administration merely says, if Radio Free

Europe is successful in Poland, then Radio Marti obviously will be effective in Cuba. I call the committee's attention to the table and discussion in my written testimony indicating that the Polish analogy is flawed and that the statistics used are inaccurate.

The simple fact that the administration would assume that the effects of Radio Free Europe could be transplanted into the entirely different communication context of Cuba demonstrates that it subscribes to the "bullet" theory.

If Radio Marti does have an effect, it is most likely to strengthen Cuban support for Castro. For two decades, Castro has been extremely effective in translating tangible signs of U.S. hostility into domestic Cuban support. Therefore, Radio Marti will supply a highly audible symbol of U.S. hostility which Castro could muster into domestic support for the very policies that the United States is trying to undercut.

Mr. Chairman, my conclusion is simply this: Two wrongs don't make a right. Castro has inundated his people with dull propaganda manipulated by the government. But broadcasting propaganda manipulated by the U.S. Government does not solve the problem, it only compounds the problem.

The available research strongly indicates that Radio Marti's most significant communication effect will be for the U.S. taxpayers to supply $17.7 million of baseball and pop music to people who, for the most part, detest our Government.

And the most significant foreign policy effect is to solidify the Cuban domestic support, and perhaps the international support, for Castro's policies. That constitutes neither good international communication policy nor good foreign policy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Nichols' prepared statement follows:]

## Prepared Statement of John S. Nichols

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss Radio Marti.

My name is John Nichols from Penn State University. I am a specialist in international communication, and for the last 5 years, most of my academic research has been devoted to studying communication to, from and within the island of Cuba. My research is based on both primary and secondary data, including interviews with the Cuban man-on-the-street, most of the major Cuban media policymakers and President Castro himself.[1]

I think it is important to emphasize that I do not have a political, economic or emotional interest in the outcome of the Radio Marti debate. I am here simply to offer the committee my professional judgment that Radio Marti will not be particularly effective in communicating to the Cuban people an alternative view of their own condition and of the outside world.

### HOW INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA WORKS

The Radio Marti proposal is predicated on the outmoded "bullet" theory of communication and demonstrates a seemingly perpetual misunderstanding of how international propaganda works. According to the "bullet" theory, members of the audience are like ducks sitting on a pond. All the communicator needs is a rifle, the proper ammunition and good aim in order to achieve a communication effect. Virtually all of the propaganda activity during World Wars I and II was based on this simplistic theory. We now know that most of that propaganda was either ineffective or had an effect other than intended.

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[1] I am indebted to Mr. Orville L. Freeman, chairman of Business International Corporation and former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, for introducing me to President Castro and for generally supporting my research on Cuba. However, Mr. Freeman is not responsible for my conclusions.

With the development of more sophisticated research since World War II, communication researchers began to realize what probably should have been obvious all along—that in order for communication to take place a message must not only be created and transmitted, it also must be received, accepted and internalized. The major conclusion of multitudes of studies is that members of the audience are not passive recipients of messages designed by a master propagandist to persuade or inform. Rather the audience actively selects or rejects available messages based on complex psychological processes and social relationships.[2]

Members of the audience actively avoid messages that could create inner tension or conflict with those around them, and they actively seek out messages that conform with their preconceived notions or help to improve their interpersonal relations. For example, the primary audience for news stories about the relationship between cigaret smoking and cancer is people who do not smoke. Smokers, even if they are seriously dissatisfied with their habit and would like to quit, tend to avoid such news stories; however, if smokers are confronted with such stories, they are likely to mentally twist the information so that it doesn't question their decision to smoke.

In some cases, a "boomerang" effect occurs when a smoker is confronted with unsettling information about cancer. This information allows the smoker an opportunity to relationalize his smoking behavior and may actually result in an increase in smoking.[3] ("Anyone can quit smoking, but it takes a man to face cancer.")

To the extent that an audience is persuaded by a message, it is usually for a low-involvement decision such as the choice between two nearly identical, low-cost products such as laundry soap. Mass communication research has not found large-scale effects from informational or persuasive campaigns dealing with high-involvement topics such as family and cultural values, nationalism, ideology, etc.[4] In sum, people's basic opinions, attitudes and understanding of issues and events are not easily changed by mass communication. Any effect that does occur is not the wholesale, mainline effect that the "bullet" theory implies, rather it is largely the product of the motivations and needs of the audience and far less the intent of the communicators. In short, the audience—not the communicator—has the final say.[5]

Research conducted after World War II and the Cold War (during which the "bullet" theory was popular) indicates that international propaganda is largely a conservative force—not a force of change. The major effect is to solidify the existing positions of the propagandist and his audience.[6]

In "International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Approach," Ralph K. White, a professor of psychology and Sino-Soviet studies at George Washington University and consultant to the U.S. Information Agency, demonstrated how Soviet citizens responded to the news of the Cuban missile crisis. Despite their dissatisfaction with the harsh political and economic realities of Soviet life and despite compelling evidence of Soviet aggression by installing offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba, the Soviet citizens rejected the U.S. version of the crisis and tended to believe their own government. "The mass media of one country are comparatively powerless in the face of unconsciously motivated inattention in the other country," he concluded.[7]

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[2] Melvin L. De Fleur and Everette E. Dennis, "Understanding Mass Communication" (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981), pp. 264–294; Wilbur Schramm and William E. Porter, "Men, Women, Messages and Media: Understanding Human Communication" (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1982), p. 172; and Leo W. Jeffres and Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, "Mass Media: Audience and Effects" (Dubuque, Iowa: Gorsuch-Scarisbrick Publishers, forthcoming).

[3] Irving L. Janis and M. Brewster Smith, "Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., "International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis" (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 197. Also see Amitai Etzioni, "Human Beings Are Not Very Easy To Change After All," Saturday Review, June 3, 1972, pp. 45–47.

[4] George Comstock et al., "Television and Human Behavior" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 311–384; Ralph K. White, "Images in the Context of International Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.," in Kelman, "International Behavior," pp. 238–276; and Etzioni.

[5] Janis and Smith, "Effects of Persuasion," p. 193 and passim.

[6] L. John Martin, "International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control" (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 16–20; L. John Martin, "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," in Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John C. Merrill, eds., "International and Intercultural Communication" (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1976), pp. 262–272; and Janis and Smith, passim.

[7] White, "Images in International Conflict," pp. 238–276.

Even in cases when people become seriously disaffected with their government or distrustful of the domestic media, they are not indiscriminate in their use of foreign media. For example, during the Vietnam war, Viet Cong soldiers did not trust Radio Hanoi or Radio Liberation because the broadcast content did not square with observable reality, but by the same token, they also distrusted Radio Saigon and Voice of America, which represented the enemy. The predictable result of the dilemma was to seek out a third-party source of information. Consequently, the Viet Cong were heavy listeners of the BBC, voice of a neutral party.[8]

Even in the relatively rare circumstances where audiences, usually because of a scarcity of alternative media, listen to the voice of a hostile nation, unintended effects frequently follows.[9] For example, U.S. forces listened to Tokyo Rose during World War II enjoying the entertainment and mentally filtering or reinterpreting the political information so as to reinforce their convictions. There is also evidence that Tokyo Rose had a significant "boomerang" effect. Donald R. Browne reports in International Radio Broadcasting that after Rose said in one of her broadcasts that she was sorry that she did not have the latest jazz records, U.S. bombers also dropped a package of jazz albums on a subsequent bombing raid over Tokyo.[10] Clearly, Tokyo Rose, although widely listened to by American GIs, did not undercut U.S. fighting effectiveness and probably enhanced it.

Two professors of psychology specializing in opinion formation, Irving L. Janis of Yale University and M. Brewster Smith of the University of California-Berkeley, reviewed the academic literature on international education and persuasion for International Behavior and concluded that particularly during times of crisis, "foreign propaganda that directly advocates counter-norm ideas (such as explicit attacks accusing the nation's leaders of corruption or immorality) will have little chance of being effective among the population at large, except among those dissident sectors least motivated to maintain their national affiliation." [11]

They summarized the body of research as follows:

"* * * even when the source is regarded as fairly trustworthy and benign, the net effect of communications in the mass media seems to be mainly a matter of reinforcing pre-existing images and attitudes * * * Attempts at producing changes in social or political prejudices and stereotypes generally meet with an extraordinarily high degree of psychological resistance, the sources of which we are now beginning to understand. In fact, most of what we are able to learn from existing research is useful mainly for analyzing why attempts at education and mass persuasion fail.

"* * * the 'persuader,' hidden or otherwise, is far from the powerful, perhaps sinister, figure that he is sometimes supposed to be. And anyone who looks to the existing social sciences to provide him with guiding principles and shining new psychological devices for substantially improving the effectiveness of communications in the mass media is bound to be severey disappointed * * *

"Simply to scotch the myth of the omnipotent propagandist would itself be a worthy contribution, since this myth tempts governments to substitute public relations 'gimmicks' for needed policies and actions" [12]

Communication research has come a long way since the "bullet" theory in World War II. Unfortunately, government application of the research has not come as far.

### *Application of Propaganda Research to Cuba*

Given this understanding of basic international communication research, how can we expect Cuban audiences to respond to Radio Marti? Whether they listen to Radio Marti and how they respond are dependent on a unique combination of the following: the credibility of the U.S. Government as a source of information, the content of the broadcasts, the physical channels of communications, and most important, the needs and motivations of the Cuban audience.

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[8] Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," in Pool and Wilbur Schramm, eds., "Handbook of Communication" (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1973), p. 470.

[9] Janis and Smith, "Effects of Persuasion," p. 193.

[10] Donald R. Browne, "International Radio Broadcasting: The Limits of Limitless Medium" (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 91.

[11] Janis and Smith, "Effects of Persuasion," pp. 201–202.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 195–196.

*Source.*—Cubans are reminded daily in their schools, media, libraries, exhibits and posters that the United States invaded their country in 1961 and has enforced a trade embargo on the island for two decades, that the CIA conducted a secret war of sabotage against the country and attempted to assassinate Cuba's charismatic president, etc.[13] Recently, Cubans have been forcefully reminded that another U.S. radio station directed at Cuba, Radio Swan, heralded the 1961 invasion of the island.[14]

While many Cubans, particularly the Cuban youth, are highly attracted to U.S. culture, including blue jeans, the New York Yankees, and pop music, they also are highly nationalistic and, regardless of their level of support for the Castro government, dislike the U.S. Government. Even political marginals who are disenchanted with the Cuban government and would like to emigrate to the United States are at least suspicious of the U.S. Government. Preliminary research indicates that those Cubans who came to the United States in the 1980 Mariel boat exodus did so primarily for family and economic reasons and not substantially because of a political affinity for the U.S. Government.[15]

In sum, Radio Marti, as a voice of the U.S. Government, probably would not be accepted in Cuba. Cubans of all walks of life have reported to researchers that, although they frequently listen to U.S. radio, they do not find the news, especially about Cuban domestic affairs, to be credible.[16]

*Content.*—Radio Marti also does not have the news gathering resources to collect the type of information that would be of interest to a broad range of Cubans. Cuban audiences are not as educated and sophisticated as U.S. audiences, and although Cubans are inculcated in an international perspective, they are primarily concerned with the quality of public services, availability of certain commodities in their neighborhood stores, local social events and other day-to-day matters.[17] Desire for parochial news is particularly common in developing countries[18] but is also common in developed countries.[19]

State Department planners propose collecting the type of material "which will attract Cuban audiences and meet (Radio Marti)'s aims" in the following ways: (1) original content generated by the Radio Marti staff, (2) news from international and regional wire services, and (3) secondary sources such as travelers to Cuba, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (a division of the Central Intelligence Agency that monitors broadcasts from foreign countries, including Cuba), newspaper and periodical subscriptions, and other documents not originally intended for Radio Marti's use.

Radio Marti will have a staff of 159 including 83 editors, commentators, analysts, correspondents, writers and broadcasters stationed in Washington, New York, Miami and other U.S. cities—but none, of course, will be stationed in Cuba to collect first-hand information on the domestic issues and events that are of greatest concern to the Cuban people.[20]

In addition, Radio Marti is asking for appropriations of $600,000 to subscribe to various wire services.[21] However, less than a half dozen news agency correspondents and stringers are currently stationed in Cuba, and only a handful of other correspondents have regular access to the country. The Associated Press and

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[13] "Bill Moyers' Journal: The CIA's Secret Army," Transcript, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 1977 and Educational Broadcasting Corporation, 1981.

[14] For background on Radio Swan, see Howard H. Frederick, "La Guerra Radial: Radio Wars Between Cuba and the United States," in Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko, eds., Critical Communication Review, vol. II: "Changing Patterns of Communication Control" (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp., forthcoming).

[15] For example, see Peter Winn, "Is the Cuban Revolution Failing?" CubaTimes, Summer 1980, pp. 13–17; Virginia Dominquez, "Defining Refugee: Haitians and Cubans," CubaTimes, Fall 1980, pp. 11–15; and "The Cuban Exodus: A Symposium," Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos 11 & 12 (July 1981 and January 1982), pp. 1–103.

[16] Nonrandom field interviews in Cuba during 1977, 1979 and 1982.

[17] Ernesto E. Rodriguez, "Public Opinion and the Press in Cuba," Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos 8 (July 1978), pp. 51–65.

[18] Daniel Lerner, "The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East" (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958).

[19] For example, see Gerald Alperstein, "The Influence of Local Information on Daily Newspaper Household Penetration in Canada," no. 26 in News Research Reports (American Newspaper Publishers Association), May 23, 1980.

[20] "RBC Programming," declassified document, U.S. Department of State, n.d. Released to Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, attorneys representing WHO radio, pursuant to their Freedom of Information Act request for documents on broadcasting to Cuba. The number of requested staff varies slightly in different documents and testimony.

[21] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, "Departments of Commerce, Justice, and States, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983." Hearings, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 6. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 578.

United Press International, the two U.S. wire services to which Radio Marti intends to subscribe, do not have correspondents in Cuba and cover the country by exchanging news files with Prensa Latina, the Cuban official news agency, or from listening posts in third-party countries, such as Mexico.[22] At least one Western wire service with representation in Cuba already has refused to cooperate with Radio Marti,[23] and given past behavior and recent statements by the Cuban government, those correspondents who do collaborate with Radio Marti probably will be expelled from the country.[24]

Therefore, despite scores of Radio Marti staffers and more than a half million dollars in wire service costs, probably only two or three correspondents will actually be on the scene collecting information, and they are there at the pleasure of the Cuban Government.

In addition, recent U.S. Government regulations ban travel to Cuba for all U.S. citizens, except journalists and scholars, many of whom are constrained by their respective codes of ethics from cooperating significantly with a government propaganda station and who have proprietary interests in the information they collect, and people who have relatives in Cuba.[25] Cuban-Americans also are hampered in their ability to collect accurate and comprehensive information for Radio Marti because they are not, for the most part, trained observers, some might approach the subject with strong predispositions, and all are limited in their travel by the Cuban Government.[26]

Consequently, Radio Marti will have to rely almost totally on untrained observers, dissidents, intelligence agencies or other secondary sources of information frowned on in standard Western journalistic practice. Or they will use previousy published statistics, reports, and other information (much of it originating from the Cuban Government) and rewrite that information to achieve the station's mission of broadcasting the "truth" to the Cuban people.

The rationale for starting Radio Marti instead of expanding existing VOA service to the island is that Radio Marti is intended to bring "reliable news about Cuban life" to the Cuban people, a mission that the State Department says is inconsistent with the VOA charter.[27] However, the paucity of sources about Cuban domestic affairs has resulted in proposed Radio Marti programming that is remarkably similar to current VOA programming heard in Cuba. A State Department document indicates that the minority of proposed programming for Radio Marti deals with Cuban domestic affairs. The majority of the proposed broadcast schedule includes sports, music, hispanic culture, world and regional news and other programs "of interest to Cubans." In other words, most of Radio Marti's proposed content is already available to Cubans on VOA and does not conform with Radio Marti's primary mission of broadcasting news about Cuban domestic affairs.[28]

*Channel.*—Cuban leaders have intimated that if Radio Marti goes on the air, the Cuban Government might respond by jamming the signal.[29] In the past, Cuba has jammed other stations directed specifically at Cuba and has sporadically interferred with Voice of America, commercial stations from Miami and other stations in the Caribbean not targeted at but easily heard in Cuba.[30] In short, how can Radio Marti have a direct communication effect on Cubans if it cannot be received in Cuba?

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[22] John Spicer Nichols, "Republic of Cuba," in George Thomas Kurian, ed., World Press Encyclopedia (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1982), pp. 265–267.

[23] Frederick, "La Guerra Radial".

[24] For example, Jose Prado, Radio Havana, May 4, 1982, interviewed by Lucinda Deskins, research assistant, Pennsylvania State University. Also see Nichols, "Republic of Cuba," pp. 265–267.

[25] Barbara Crossette, "U.S., Linking Cuba to 'Violence,' Blocks Tourist and Business Trips." The New York Times, April 20, 1982.

[26] For example, see "Cuba Silent on Why It Holds Expatriate From West Side," The New York Times, April 10, 1982, p. 27.

[27] Statement of Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 1, 1982, unpublished.

[28] "RBC Programming," declassified document, U.S. Department of State. The same problem plagued "Cita Con Cuba," Voice of America's Cuban service in the 1960s and 1970s and predecessor to Radio Marti. A House committee reported that one of the reasons for closing down the VOA Cuban service was the lack of news available to broadcast. See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, "International Shortwave Broadcast Satellites: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti." 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 23.

[29] For a summary of the jamming issue, see Nina M. Serafino, Marchia S. Smith, and David R. Siddall. "Radio Marti." Congressional Research Service Report prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 28, 1982. The reports contains the best summary and analysis of the political, communication and technical issues related to Radio Marti.

[30] Frederick, "La Guerra Radial."

Furthermore, radio may not be as powerful a medium for reaching Cubans as commonly believed, although it is probably the only viable medium for this undertaking. By Third World standards, Cuba is media-rich—quantitatively if not qualitatively. More than 100 newspapers and periodicals of diverse contents are distributed widely in Cuba. Two television channels, scores of radio stations plus numerous repeaters in the countryside blanket all of the island.[31] By 1980, 78 percent of Cuban homes had a radio and 56 percent had a television. Most of the homes without TV were not electrified.[32] The tremendous growth of the Cuban television system in the past decade is comparable to the period of transition in the 1950's and 1960's when U.S. families began to huddle around the TV set instead of the radio, and the function of radio changed from an important source of news, public affairs analysis and variety entertainment to largely background music and occasional news headlines.[33]

Not only will Radio Marti have quantitative competition from Cuban channels of communication, it also will have some qualitative competition from news and entertainment sources outside of Cuba. Cubans receive with ease radio signals from the southern portion of the U.S. (particularly Miami), Mexico, and the neighboring Caribbean Islands, and depending on the weather, acceptable TV signals can be received from Miami. Many of these channels broadcast in Spanish and carry news about Cuba and its relations with the outside world.[34] In short, the U.S. State Department's belief in "the Cuban government's totalitarian monopoly on information available to the Cuban people" is illusory.[35]

*Audience.*—The most important question in this analysis is which of the many channels of communication will Cuban audiences choose. There is considerable evidence that, despite recent attempts by the Cuban Government to diversify its media content,[36] Cuban audiences generally are weary of the dull propaganda and lifeless entertainment in their domestic media. For example, Cuba's Opina magazine reported that 75 percent of the Cubans polled disapproved of the domestic television programming.[37]

Radio Marti hopes to exploit this weakness by broadcasting news, sports, music and other entertainment. Their assumption is that Cuban audiences are like sponges eagerly waiting to soak up this type of programming if only the U.S. Government would broadcast it. The point of my entire testimony is that this assumption is probably not correct.

The active ingredient in the proposed Radio Marti programming is the news, analysis and other information about Cuban life. During a period of reduced Federal funding for U.S. public broadcasting and meaningful cultural and education activities here and abroad, the Administration obviously has not proposed Radio Marti to broadcast primarily U.S. baseball and pop music, types of programming that Cubans already receive from VOA and Miami radio. Why, then, not devote 100 percent of Radio Marti's airtime to Cuban domestic news?

The answer, of course, is very simple: Cuban audiences are not like sponges waiting to soak up the U.S. Government's version of Cuban domestic news and would not listen to Radio Marti unless it also broadcasts baseball and pop music.

In propaganda perhaps, this is called facilitative communications.[38] Broadcasting sports and music is not the reason for spending millions of dollars, it is merely the sugar coating that is intended to attract the audience and make the news programming palatable. This kind of propaganda is built on the assumption that the large audience gathered by the facilitative communication also will listen to, accept and internalize the persuasive messages that are interwoven in the broadcasts.

However, the assumption is frequently invalid.[39] As the foregoing review of propaganda effects indicates, audiences of facilitative communication are not passive recipients of the accompanying persuasive message. Given the U.S. Government's lack of source credibility and Radio Marti's inability to collect comprehensive and accurate information about the day-to-day concerns of the Cuban people, the portion of the Cuban audience that tunes into Radio Marti probably will listen to the facilitative communication while rejecting or reinterpreting the accompanying propaganda, much in the same way that American GIs listened to Tokyo Rose.

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[31] Nichols, "Republic of Cuba."

[32] Elaine Fuller. "Production Quotas and Profits." CubaTimes. Spring 1982. p. 8.

[33] Melvin L. De Fleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach, "Theories of Mass Communication" (New York: Longman, Inc., 1982). pp. 88–92; and Comstock, et al., Television, p. 334.

[34] Nichols, "Republic of Cuba," p. 267. Frederick, "La Guerra Radial."

[35] Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, p. 35.

[36] John Spicer Nichols, "The Mass Media: Their Functions in Social Conflict," in Jorge I. Dominguez, ed., "Cuba: Internal and International Affairs" (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1982). pp. 101–104.

[37] "Criticism and the Mass Media. "Cuban Update, April 1980, p. 6.

[38] Martin, "Effectiveness of Propaganda," p. 265.

[39] Ibid. If propaganda has not proven to be effective, why have so many governments spent so much money for so many years broadcasting propaganda? "If (propaganda) practices live on, it is not so much because they are known to be effective as it is that they are simply known—that they have become familiar over time," Browne, International Radio Broadcasting, p. 86.

This process is routine in media behavior in all countries, including the United States. Approximately half of U.S. television viewers leave the room, change channels or engage in some other behavior when commercials replace the facilitative programming. Of those who continue viewing, only a tiny percentage are able to recall the sponsor much less the content of the advertising message.[40]

In sum, although Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders has repeatedly testified that Radio Marti will not engage in propaganda,[41] Radio Marti's proposed use of facilitative communication is a tacit admission that it will be broadcasting propaganda and that Cuban audiences might not be interested in the U.S. Government perspective on their internal affairs.

Browne summed up the issue in "International Radio Broadcasting: The Limits of the Limitless Medium:"

"The establishment and maintenance of credibility do not rest on an abstract definition of truth; they have far more to do with what listeners are willing to accept as credible. While that is true for all international stations, it seems especially so for stations which have as their most basic purpose the transmission of information about life in someone else's country." [42]

## DOCUMENTATION OF THE COSTS BUT NOT THE BENEFITS OF RADIO MARTI

Testimony before various committees of Congress and a detailed report by the Congressional Research Service document the substantial costs of putting Radio Marti on the air.[43] The Administration is asking for $10 million to establish the station in fiscal year 1982 and another $7.7 million to operate it in fiscal year 1983.[44] If Cuba responds by jamming Radio Marti or otherwise disrupting U.S. domestic broadcasting, many U.S. commercial stations will lose profits, and their audience will lose much of the diversity of news, opinion and entertainment that they now enjoy on U.S. radio.[45] In addition, a House of Representative's version of the Radio Marti enabling legislation authorizes compensatory payments to U.S. broadcasters affected by Cuban interference. Those payments could exceed $40 million, according to an estimate by the Congressional Budget Office.[46]

Given the documentation of real and potential cost of Radio Marti, the proponents of the station would seem to have the burden to prove that Radio Marti will achieve its stated objectives and that its benefits outweigh the costs. However, the Administration has presented no evidence of the station's potential effectiveness. Radio Marti has been proposed, a quasi-governmental parent organization has been incorporated, a Presidential Commission has been impaneled to determine broadcast practices and content, construction of the transmitter has begun, staff has been hired, and funding from Congress has been requested, all before conducting a systematic and valid study of the station's potential effectiveness. The Presidential Commission for Broadcasting to Cuba contracted for an audience survey of Cuban exiles in the United States scheduled for completion in summer 1982.[47] Aside from concerns about any research that is designed to support decisions that are already made, the specific research for Radio Marti is conceptually flawed. It is built on the assumption that the media habits of those who left Cuba can be generalized, at least in some respects, to those who remained in Cuba.[48] Previous research on this issue indicates that the exact opposite is true—that even though the demographics of the exiles may be similar, their psychographics and media behavior are very different.[49] In short, the Radio Marti proposal is not based on demonstrable evidence that Cubans will listen and respond in the intended way. It is based primarily on guesswork.

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[40] Comstock, Television, pp. 141–161, 366–368.

[41] For example, see Statement of Enders before Senate Foreign Relations, p. 7.

[42] Browne, p. 148.

[43] Serafino, et. al., "Radio Marti."

[44] Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, p. 538.

[45] For example, see testimony of Robert G. Engelhardt, vice president of Palmer Communications, Inc., before the House Telecommunication Subcommittee, May 10, 1982. Palmer Communications is the licensee of WHO Radio (Des Moines, Iowa), which broadcasts on the same channel (1040 kHz) as proposed for Radio Marti and, therefore, is most likely to be affected by Cuban jamming.

[46] Serafino, et. al., "Radio Marti," appendix II.

[47] Serafino, et. al., "Radio Marti," p. 37.

## FAULTY ANALOGY OF POLAND AND RADIO FREE EUROPE

In the absence of valid research to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of Radio Marti, the State Department has offered the model of U.S. broadcasting to East Europe: If Radio Free Europe (RFE) is tremendously effective in Poland, then Radio Marti will be similarly successful in Cuba. Again, this argument is built on a "bullet" theory of communication assuming that audiences in the entirely different communication contexts of Poland and Cuba will respond in substantially the same way.

As Professor William LeoGrande, Director of Political Science at the American University, pointed out in testimony before other congressional committees, a similar effect is unlikely. Communism was forced on Poland by the Soviet Union. As a direct result, the vast majority of Poles are opposed to the Soviet imposed form of government and direct intense nationalistic hatred toward the U.S.S.R. At the same time, Poles also have a very positive, almost romantic, attitude toward the geographically-distant United States.[50]

On the other hand, communism came to Cuba by a social revolution. Due in part to the revolutionary roots of the government and the charismatic appeal of President Castro, the majority of Cuban people support or at least accept as legitimate the Castro government.[51] And regardless of the level of support for the Castro government, most Cubans are highly nationalistic and dislike the U.S. Government.[52]

Under these very different conditions, Radio Free Europe and Radio Marti are likely to have very different levels of source credibility with their respective audiences. Moreover, Polish listenership to Radio Moscow (instead of Radio Free Europe) would seem to be a better predictor of potential listenership to Radio Marti in Cuba. According to estimates by the U.S. International Communication Agency, 3.5 percent of adults living in urban Poland listen to Radio Moscow at least once per week.[53]

Although Polish audiences are far more receptive to U.S. propaganda, not even Radio Free Europe claims the kinds of successes attributed to it by the Administration. Assistant Secretary Enders testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1982 that "Radio Free Europe now has perhaps 70 percent of the Polish radio audience." However, according to the annual reports to Congress by the Board for International Broadcasting, the oversight agency for RFE, from 1966 to 1980, a median of 57 percent of Polish people over the age of 14 listened to RFE once per month or more.[54] There are indications that listenership to RFE in Poland increased temporarily in late 1980 and 1981 during the escalation of the Polish crisis. In the fall of 1980, the Board conducted two less-methodologically rigorous "spot surveys" of Polish travelers in Western capitals. In these two surveys, 60 percent and 70 percent of the Polish travelers said they listened to RFE once a month or more. Because Polish travelers are an atypical group, the Board's researchers normally weigh the responses to simulate the actual Polish population;[55] however, because the researchers determined that "the sample was not good enough to be taken seriously," the unweighted data were circulated internally and not published in the Board's report to Congress.[56]

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[48] Ibid., p. 38. Statements by the researcher in the Congressional Research Service report indicate that he is aware of limitations of the survey design. Whether his client is also aware of the limitations is dubious.

[49] Janis and Smith, "Effects of Persuasion," p. 202. Also see discussion of Bias Type I in Gerald Hursh-Cesar and Prodipto Roy, eds., "Third World Surveys: Survey Research in Developing Nations" (Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India Limited, 1976), p. 201. Hursh-Cesar is research director of the U.S. International Communication Agency.

[50] Discussion of Poland is a synthesis of statement of William M. LeoGrande before the Committee on Appropriations, unpublished, April 21, 1982; and personal communication with Dr. Trond Gilberg, Slavic-Soviet Language and Area Center, the Pennsylvania State University, July 19, 1982.

[51] The best available evidence—from U.S. intelligence agencies, academic studies and journalistic assessments by newspapers of widely ranging editorial positions—indicates that Castro is a popular leader and political marginals are in a minority in Cuba. For example, see Jan Knippers Black, et al., Area Handbook for Cuba, DA Pam 550–152, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 298; Hugh Thomas, "The Cuban Revolution" (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), pp. 710–712; Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, "Impact of Cuban-Soviet Ties in the Western Hemisphere," hearings, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 14–15, April 5 and 12, 1978. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 15; Jonathan Kwitny, "The Average Cuban: Economic Well-Being Political Repression," The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 1981, p. 1; James Nelson Goodsell, "Castro's Cuba: Still some shortages, but * * *" The Christian Science Monitor, January 21, 1979, pp. 12–13; and Jon Nordheimer, "20 Years with Fidel," The New York Times Magazine, December 31, 1978, pp. 16+.

[52] Enrique A. Baloyra, "The Madness of the Method: The United States and Cuba in the Seventies," in John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz, eds., "Latin America, The United States, and the Inter-American System" (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 134.

[53] Elaine El Assal, "VOA and Western Radio Listening in Urban Poland: 1977," Research Report. Office of Research, U.S. International Communication Agency, October 26, 1980, p. 13.

In late 1981, after the two spot surveys and before Assistant Secretary Enders' testimony, the Soviet jamming of RFE intensified to the "highest levels in history." Board engineers in the field say that the jamming is so severe that widespread Polish listenership to RFE is physically impossible. How far RFE listenership in Poland has dropped cannot be determined, however, because martial law travel restrictions have prevented researchers from interviewing a sufficient sample of Polish travelers, according to the Board.[57]

Assistant Secretary Enders also has repeatedly claimed that the RFE audience in East Europe expanded "little by little" to its current level. The implication of his statement is that if the RFE audience has steadily increased, then another radio station with low initial credibility, i.e., Radio Marti, can slowly but surely chip away at the psychological resistance of a distrustful audience, i.e., the Cuban people. However, statistics reported to Congress by the Board for International Broadcasting indicate quite the opposite. Listenership to RFE in East Europe has remained remarkably constant since 1966, the first year for which the Board reported figures to Congress. (See Table A.) If the RFE example proves anything, it proves that in international propaganda, "What you see is what you get." The initially moderate level of listenership to RFE has remained moderate, and the initially low level of Radio Marti listenership probably will remain low.

There are two exceptions to the constant level of East European listenership to RFE. First, listenership temporarily increases during times of crisis, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Polish riots in 1970, and presumably the Polish martial law in 1981, and then recedes to the normal levels.[58] Second, listenership to RFE in Czechoslovakia has actually declined since 1969. The Board attributes this decline to Czech audiences' preference for the increasingly accessible slop-over signal from radio and TV stations in West Germany and Australia.[59] As discussed above, Cuban audiences also have easy access to slop-over radio and TV signals for Florida and elsewhere.

### RADIO MARTI'S DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE IN CUBA

Why is the Cuban Government so sensitive to Radio Marti, particularly since the listenership to and acceptance of the propaganda will probably be quite small? Communist governments are more opinion conscious than any other form of government. Whereas authorization dictators, such as the Russian czars of Nicaragua's Somoza, are generally indifferent to public opinion and claim their legitimacy by devine right or a well-armed military, and democratic governments claim their legitimacy from the support of 50 percent plus one of the electorate, Communist governments claim their legitimacy from the masses. In theory, Comunist governments not only wish to rule the country but also seek to mobilize the entire population behind collective goals. All citizens not only must consent to the government but also must be active participants in the government. Any dissent tears at the legitimacy of government. Under this theory, public opinion and government propaganda are not only important but are the keystone to the whole process of government.[60]

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[54] Respondents are defined as listeners if they listen to RFE once or more per month no matter how short the time period. The widely-quoted statement that "an impressive 55 percent of adults in Poland * * * tune in RFE at least once a week" (Kenneth L. Adelman, "Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time," Foreign Affairs 59 (Spring 1981), pp. 922.) is inaccurate. The 57 percent median is derived from The Board for International Broadcasting, Third Annual Report, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977; and subsequent annual reports through 1982.

[55] Browne, International Radio Broadcasting, p. 329.

[56] The Board for International Broadcasting, Eighth Annual Report. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 14–17. Personal communication with spokesman of Board, July 9, 1982.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," p. 468; and Board for International Broadcasting, Eighth Annual Report, p. 16.

[59] Board for International Broadcasting, Eighth Annual Report, p. 17.

In addition, most revolutionary governments come to power on a wave of propaganda and tend to overestimate its power. During the Cuban guerrilla war, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara (two of the best-known propagandists in recent times) used Radio Rebelde (Rebel Radio) as both a propaganda medium and an operational tool for communicating coded military information. After the guerrilla forces gained control of the government, Castro continued to use the media as essential instruments for forging social cohesion around the revolutionary government. Government use of the media was so widespread, that the revolution was often described as "government by television" during the 1960's.[61]

Over a period of time, the Cuban leaders, like most Communist leaders, began to believe their own myth that people can be easily manipulated by propaganda and, consequently, became fearful that alien and dangerous voices would reach the people. The Cuban leaders responded to the perceived threat with rigid control on the domestic communication network. This rigidity invariably leads to stilted and boring media content, which encourages the audiences to seek alternative information sources, which in turn, forces the government to control the media more tightly. No Communist government, including Cuba, has been able to break out of this vicious cycle.[62]

Because of this approach to public opinion, Communist governments are particularly vulnerable to political harassment via foreign radio broadcasts. They can maintain parity in military hardware with dollar-for-dollar expenditures, but in the war of words, Communist countries must spend much more for jamming than the West spends in broadcasting. The Soviet Union currently spends roughly twice the amount on jamming that the U.S. spends on broadcasting to the East Bloc.[63] Further, Communist countries cannot respond in kind. Because the legitimacy of Western democratic government is not similarly threatened by outside information, the United States does not have to jam or retaliate against Communist broadcasting to this country. For example, in the 1960s, while Cuban officials seethed over Radio Swan (the CIA station targeted at Cuba), Radio Free Dixie (the Cuban radio station directed at blacks in the Southern U.S.) was not jammed and went unnoticed by the vast majority of the U.S. people.[64]

Consequently, although Radio Marti will not be an effective source of communication, it will be a potent political weapon that will force the Cubans to spend far more than Radio Marti's $10 million in start-up costs in order to jam the signal and modernize their media to compete for domestic Cuban audiences. In this respect, a radio war with the United States can be very disruptive for Cuba.

Cuba is a poor and technologically isolated country that will be engaged in a very expensive and technologically advanced means of confrontation with the United States. In the more than two decades of the Cuban revolution, there has been a technological explosion in communications, but Cuba has not been able to keep pace with the developments. In fact, much of the second-hand U.S. broadcasting equipment that was introduced into Cuba in the 1950's was still in use in 1981 and was nearing the point where repairs and cannibalization would no longer keep it in operation.[65]

The Cuban leadership will be confronted with the dilemma of either surrendering in the radio war with the United States or reallocating resources from other sectors of Cuba's fragile economy. Based on Cuba's past performance, there is little likelihood that the resources will be drawn from the Cuban military budget[66] or from Castro's Montecristo allowance. Nor does past behavior reveal any reluctance to undertake the reallocation at substantial domestic cost. In the 1976–1980 economic period, the number of television sets in electrified homes increased by more than 123 percent, while the output of basic commodities, such as food and clothing, showed only small gains or actually declined during the same period.[67] Thus the likely impact of Radio Marti will be the postponement of domestic social and economic projects and, in turn, the continued or additional sacrifices of the Cuban people. In effect, Radio Marti probably will severely injure the very people it is allegedly designed to help.

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[60] Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies."

[61] Robert N. Pierce with John Spicer Nichols, "Keeping the Flame: Media and Government in Latin America" (New York: Hastings House, Publishers, 1979), p. 82.

[62] Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies."

[63] Board for International Broadcasting, Eighth Annual Report, p. 2.

[64] Frederick, "La Guerra Radial."

[65] Nichols, "Mass Media in Social Conflict," pp. 79–82.

[66] Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Armed Forces and Foreign Relations," in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, eds., Cuba in the World (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), pp. 53–86.

### POTENTIAL NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

In addition to the actual domestic costs of building and maintaining the station and the potential costs of Cuban disruption of the U.S. broadcasting system, putting Radio Marti on the air might negatively affect U.S. foreign policy interests. In International Radio Broadcasting, Browne warns that an important risk of anti-government broadcasts is that "they might strengthen the listener's resolve to support his or her leaders." [68] Such an outcome in Cuba seems likely. For two decades, Castro has been extremely effective in translating tangible signs of U.S. hostility into domestic Cuban support for his policies. When U.S. relations with Cuba deteriorate, Castro's internal support tends to be at its highest, and vice versa.[69] Therefore, Radio Marti will supply a highly audible symbol of U.S. hostility that Castro might be able to use for mobilizing Cuban domestic support for the very same policies that the United States is trying to undercut.

Moreover, Radio Marti might further tarnish the U.S. image in the Third World. One of the most persistent criticisms of the United States among Third World leaders is regarding its international communications policies. In recent years, this complaint has been manifested in the New World Information Order debate in UNESCO. Countries with a variety of ideological stripes, including Costa Rica, Chile, and Cuba, have called for an end of the U.S. informational and cultural "invasion" of the Third World.[70] Consequently, Radio Marti could alienate Third World countries that would normally support U.S. policy toward Cuba and, in addition, discredit meaningful U.S. cultural, educational and informational activities, such as VOA, not only in Cuba, but also around the world.[71]

### CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, my conclusion is simply this: Two wrongs don't make a right. Castro has inundated his people with dull propaganda manipulated by the government, but broadcasting propaganda manipulated by the U.S. government does not solve the problem. It only compounds it.

While other witnesses have documented the considerable costs of Radio Marti, the Administration has offered only claims of the station's potential effectiveness. In fact, the available research strongly indicates that the only significant communication outcome is for U.S. taxpayers to supply $17.7 million of baseball and pop music to people who, for the most part, detest our Government. The most significant foreign policy effect is to enrage Castro, at the possible cost of solidifying domestic and international support for his policies. That constitutes neither good international commmunication policy nor good foreign policy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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[67] Nichols, "Mass Media in Social Conflict," pp. 80–81.

[68] Browne, International Radio Broadcasting, p. 72.

[69] Baloyra, "Madness of the Method," p. 134; Dominguez, Cuba, p. 200; and Edward Gonzalez, "The United States and Castro; Breaking the Deadlock," Foreign Affairs 50 (July 1972): 722–737.

[70] For an excellent summary of the issue, see Jim Richstad and Michael A. Anderson, eds., "Crisis in International News: Policies and Prospects" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

[71] Barbara Crossette, "U.S Diplomats in Cuba Dissent on Radio Plan," The New York Times, October 29, 1981, p. A3.

Table A

Percent Listenership to Radio Free Europe in Eastern Europe by Year.*

| | 66 | 67/68 | 68 | 68/69 | 69/70 | 70/71 | 71/72 | 72/73 | 73/74 | 74/75 | 75/76 | 76/77 | 77/78 | 78/79 | 79/80 | 80/81 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Czechoslovakia | 46 | 51 | 37 | 65 | 57 | 50 | 45 | 35 | 39 | 39 | 37 | 38 | 36 | 35 | 37 | - |
| Hungary | 53 | 53 | - | 55 | 52 | 78 | 53 | 53 | 55 | 49 | 47 | 51 | 49 | 49 | 51 | - |
| Poland | 53 | 58 | - | 67 | 59 | 83 | 60 | 57 | 57 | 56 | 51 | 50 | 46 | 50 | 55 | - |
| Romania | - | 50 | - | 60 | 63 | 66 | 57 | 56 | 60 | 57 | 57 | 61 | 57 | 53 | 54 | - |
| Bulgaria | - | 38 | - | 42 | 40 | 50 | 46 | 43 | 43 | 36 | 38 | - | 24 | 32 | 37 | - |

Source: The Board for International Broadcasting, Third Annual Report. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 21; Fourth Annual Report (1978), p. 21; Fifth Annual Report (1979), pp. 20-21; Sixth Annual Report(1980), pp. 16-17; Seventh Annual Report (1981); and Eighth Annual Report (1982), p. 17.

*Estimate (by computer simulation) of percent of East Europeans over the age of 14 who listened to RFE once or more per month.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, sir.
Colonel Dickens.

## STATEMENT OF COL. SAMUEL T. DICKENS, USAF (RET.), COUNCIL FOR INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Colonel DICKENS. Senator Helms, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you for the Council on Inter-American Security and New World Dynamics.

The United States in its over 200 years of history has symbolized freedom and hope for millions throughout the world. This is just as true today as it was during the peak mass emigration movements to U.S. shores.

Our free world leadership role insists we maintain true to our beliefs in freedom and the dignity of man. We cannot remain silent to the repression of any people by their own leaders any more than we can remain silent witnesses to the terrorism and subversion carried out by the Soviet Union's surrogate in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba.

Man's most potent weapon, safeguarding his own survival and future, is the truth. To forsake the truth is the first obvious sign of moral decay either in man or in nation. If the United States is to remain true to the ideals of our founding fathers and to the generations of those who forged this great Nation, we must continue to stand in the world as a beacon of liberty, freedom, and truth.

Today, millions of Cubans are fulfilling the desires of the few, sacrificing their own aspirations for a better life in order that the Kremlin leaders and the Red, fascist militarist, called Fidel Castro, can expand the control of the Soviet empire.

This bearded ruler of some 10 million Cubans officially bears the name of Generalissimo, or supreme general. He employs a standard method of all totalitarian leaders in subjugating his subjects to his will, the lie. In much the same way that Hitler and Mussolini controlled Germany and Italy during World War II, Castro controls the Cuban ability to reason by controlling what they see and hear.

We called it the "big lie" then, and it is the same thing today. Only now it is employed in a more sophisticated manner in controlling the minds of men. And the battle today is for the mind, make no mistake about that.

When we do not counter the lie, we are diminished in the process. The erosion begins, and with it, more acceptable does the lie become. As the lie is repeated over and over again, it somehow becomes the truth. No, do not accept that lie. It is not only for those Cubans that we counter the lie, it is for ourselves as well.

Cubans deserve an opportunity to retain hope. They deserve to know how democratic societies live and how individuals fulfill their own aspirations. They need to know how their sacrifices feed the militaristic ambitions of their leader and the Soviets in Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean Basin.

There are those who believe we can yet wean the bearded one from Marxism to our democratic ways. We have tried many times and failed. Just this year, Castro publicly scorned U.S. efforts and explained to reporters how little the United States understood of his dedication to communism in believing that we could lure him away.

President Carter's efforts to extend the olive branch were answered by increased deployment of Cuban military forces overseas, unprecedented support for rebel forces in Central America, and a larger Soviet military presence within Cuba itself. Have we already forgotten the Mig-23 squadrons, the new naval acquisitions, and the Soviet brigade?

The 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement put a crack in the Monroe Doctrine which will not be healed until we rid the hemisphere of communism. When the United States agreed to accept Fidel Castro's Cuba and did little to prevent his exportation of terrorism, subversion, and revolution to the rest of the hemisphere, our beacon of liberty flickered and dimmed.

While the United States treated Fidel Castro as some sort of a "nino mimado," or spoiled brat, he conducted his dirty work. Many of our friends fought for survival in their struggle against guerrilla activities fueled by Cuba. But we felt snug at home, satisfied that the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis protected our southern flank, making it secure. Now our southern flank is no longer secure and, in fact, is eroding rapidly.

The truth, our greatest moral weapon, should be called to duty. Fidel Castro's sugarcane curtain should be breached with information for Cubans about Cuba and its sordid role in world affairs. Cubans need to know that there is at least another side to the coin in the information they are receiving.

Where we in the United States have access to more information than any other nation in the world, we still as individuals have to provide the focus for the information we receive. If we allow others to provide that focus for us, our knowledge is limited. For those of us who wish to be well informed of events occurring in Latin America, we read Spanish. If we did not, national news and television would provide a focus provided by the editors and producers, severely hampering our search for truth.

But in the closed society, best exemplified by Communist, totalitarian control over their subjects, there is only one focus, one viewpoint, and there is very little the individual can do to expand his knowledge and search for truth.

That is why Radio Marti is necessary, Radio Marti must provide a very special focus of informaton for a very special viewing audience. That focus cannot be provided by a typical commercial broadcasting station. We need special packaging for a special audience, an audience so fed on lies that lies have become the truth.

Radio Marti should not be in the business of creating false hopes, encouraging liberation and promises of U.S. armed intervention. But to deny Cubans access to the truth—what the United States has stood for these many years—whatever the reasons or excuses, would always still be only excuses, and weak ones at that, and would be a tragedy indeed. Thank you.

Senator Helms. Thank you, Colonel. You know, I have been in the Senate for many years, as a member of the Agriculture Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee. And let me say that never have I heard more eloquent testimony than that given by the two panels thus far. Now, we may not agree always, but the Chair wants to express its admiration for the quality and the conviction of the testimony.

Mr. Gomez, we will hear from you next.

[Mr. Gomez' biographical data follows:]

### Biographical Data of Manuel R. Gomez

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#### EDUCATION

B.A. Biochemistry. Harvard College, Cambridge, MA, 1969; M.S. Environmental Health Sciences, Hunter College, New York, N.Y., 1977; and Doctoral Candidate Columbia University, School of Public Health, New York, N.Y., 1982.

#### EMPLOYMENT

Present: Assistant Professor. Hunter College School of Health Sciences, 440 East 26th Street, New York, N.Y. 10010.

1976-79—Director. Occupational Safety and Health Program, INFORM (a public interest research and education group), 25 Broad Street, New York, N.Y. 10004.

1975-76—Industrial Hygienist. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), U.S. Department of Labor, Queens Area Office, New York.

1973-75—Senior Industrial Hygienist. New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, Newark, N.J.

1971-73—Community Mental Health Worker. Lincoln Community Mental Health Services, Lincoln Hospital, Bronx, N.Y.

#### CONSULTING EXPERIENCE

Winter 1982—Consultant to Colombia's Social Security Institute through the Pan American Health Organization. Bogota, Colombia, S.A.

Summer 1980—Consultant to the Ministry of Health, Nicaragua, through the Pan American Health Organization. Managua, Nicaragua, C.A.

Spring 1980—Prepared and conducted training course for Dupont's European operations. Geneva, Switzerland.

Fall 1978—Prepared and conducted training course for Dupont's Latin American operations in Spanish. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, S.A.

#### PUBLICATIONS

"At Work in Copper," INFORM, 1979.

"Occupational Health in Cuba", AJPH, May 1981, Vol. 17, No. 5.

#### PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

American Public Health Association; American Industrial Hygiene Association; Society for Occupational and Environmental Health; and Certified in "Comprehensive Practice" by American Board of Industrial Hygiene.

References furnished upon request.

## STATEMENT OF MANUEL R. GOMEZ, PRESIDENT, CUBAN-AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA, WOODSIDE, N.Y.

Mr. Gomez. Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee, my name is Manuel Gomez. I am the president of the Cuban-American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba.

Our group was founded in early 1977 and we have been active since that time in practically every State where Cuban-Americans live. We seek to improve relations between Cuba and the United States by engaging in a wide range of public education activities. We are thankful that we have the opportunity to express our views at these hearings.

Much of the opposition to the idea of Radio Marti has centered around the issues of possible Cuban retaliation, which could in turn affect as many as 200 U.S. radio stations. A number of observers have also pointed to the high price tag, $10 million now and $7.5 million or more for every operating year thereafter. Added to the possible funds which may later have to be appropriated to assist U.S. stations affected by Cuban retaliation, the price tag does indeed sound steep at a time of severe domestic budget cuts.

We agree wholeheartedly with these objections to Radio Marti, but rather than repeat what others have already said, we should like to emphasize a few other issues that have received less attention, namely some incorrect assumptions made by the advocates of the proposal, and particularly the fatal shortcomings of the idea as an instrument of policy toward Cuba.

Many would argue, in fact, that if the objectives of Radio Marti are in our national interest and achievable, the idea should be pursued despite some possible sacrifices. So the main thrust of our comments today will be that the proposal will prove contrary to our national interest, that it is based on faulty premises, and that it does not have realistic or achievable foreign policy goals.

One of the totally incorrect assumptions underlying Radio Marti is the idea that, because the station's editorial policy will not explicitly encourage emigration from Cuba to the United States, the actual consequence will be consistent with the station's intentions. That is wishful thinking at best.

There is a long history of the United States encouraging emigration from Cuba, up to and including the Mariel exodus. Those Cubans who have an interest in emigrating know this backdrop well, and a radio station beaming to them about how bad things are in Cuba or are supposed to be will inevitably be interpreted as meaning a welcome reception in U.S. shores, no matter what the announcers say. In the absence of any meaningful cooperation between the two Governments on immigration-emigration issues, the radio station is certain to exacerbate an already difficult issue.

Another incorrect assumption is that the station would be able to broadcast objective and verifiable information about Cuba. Yet the source of much of that information will inevitably be the Cuban-American community, by way of visitors to Cuba, correspondence, and the like. Such information will necessarily be filtered by the more militantly anti-Castro sectors of our community.

While I am very proud to be a Cuban-American and of the many achievements of our community, I must confess that objective and dispassionate information about Cuba has not been our greatest strength over the years. This is particularly true of many of our media and civic figures. Already, several Cuban-Americans close to the idea and possible reality of Radio Marti can be identified with strongly partisan sectors associated in the past with exaggeration and misinformation. This is a sign that there will inevitably be intense—and I would argue successful—pressures on the station to become more and more of a propaganda mouthpiece.

After all, it is unlikely that the Cuban Government will permit the correspondents of this proposed mininetwork to roam freely about Cuba gathering unflattering news.

It is also important to weigh the hemispheric consequences of the project. A costly, propagandistic anti-Castro effort in the austere 1980's is not precisely what our neighbors in Latin America are most anxious to see. I dare to speculate that the proposed staff of 168 people is a number far larger than the number of doctors, engineers, and other technicians that we lend to the countries in the Caribbean region. Such lopsided priorities in our regional policy, when even the timid and controversial Caribbean Basin initiative is not off the ground, will hurt us with our neighbors.

The most devastating weakness of the Radio Marti proposal, however, is that as an instrument of policy it cannot hope to encourage any moderation or change in those policies of the Cuban Government which clash with our interests. We understand that this is to be one of the principal goals of the station, since it is the premise implicit in statements by its proponents, such as in Secretary Enders' testimony, and also explicit in the Presidential Commission's interim report.

In fact, if we quote from the interim report, the station "can assist an orderly process of evolution in Cuba toward domestic and international policies more conducive to hemispheric and international understanding." In fact, the broadcasters will do just the opposite.

There is no doubt that the Cuban Government itself will harden its positions in response to yet another hostile sign from the Reagan administration. More significantly, however, we must face the hard fact that the majority of Cubans will likewise react to the station as a hostile act. The consequence will be an increase of tensions with Cuba, not directed toward change and moderation, but rather toward a hard line against the United States and the minority of Cubans who may welcome the broadcasts.

If you find my assertion heretical, please let me remind you of the events in Cuba during the Mariel exodus. While it is true that tens of thousands wished to emigrate, it is also true that there was a much larger popular outpouring of rejection and disdain toward them. Yes, some of it was officially orchestrated, but most was genuine.

We cannot blind ourselves to the reality that the Cuban Government is legitimized and enjoys substantial popular support, even if we may not like or understand that reality. Radio Marti will have much the same effect. It will encourage the hard-line sentiment among the Cuban people and officials alike, and it will make it more difficult to encourage any modification in Cuban domestic and international policies.

Finally, this proposal is presumably geared to make information more easily accessible to Cubans. Yet it is ironic that it is being hotly debated in the wake of an action by the administration which drastically reduces such free access. In April the Treasury Department announced a travel ban which effectively prohibits most everyday Americans, except some of Cuban origin, from traveling to the island.

I can think of very few better ways to bring diverse information and points of view to Cuba than to permit, even encourage, the contact with thousands of visiting Americans. Yet we are now forbidding it. Of course, trade and commerce would be even better ways to facilitate exchange of ideas and eventual mutual influence, as they would create a climate in which both countries might think twice before engaging in competition directly or indirectly. But that is a topic, I think, for another set of hearings.

Let me conclude by saying we consider that Radio Marti would likely bring about several serious negative consequences in radio broadcasting, immigration and the credibility of the United States in the hemisphere. *Most importantly, we must emphasize that such a station would* be wasteful and counterproductive as an instrument of policy, that its objectives of encouraging changes in Cuban policies will not be met, and that the idea should be abandoned in favor of policy approaches which can realistically achieve those objectives, starting with serious, direct, and firm dialog with Cuba on all issues.

Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Gomez.

Mr. Calzon.

## STATEMENT OF FRANK CALZON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE CUBAN-AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. CALZON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity to present my views on the issue of radio broadcasting to Cuba.

I am speaking today on behalf of the Cuban-American National Foundation, an organization which promotes an objective view of Cuba and Cubans and an objective appraisal of the Cuban Government and its policies. The Foundation supports a general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Cuban concern, to fight bigotry, protect human rights, and promote Cuban cultural interests and creative achievement.

Today I would like to outline the rationale for initiating new radio broadcasts to Cuba. First, Cuba currently is blanketed with five radio networks that extoll the regime's successes and vituperate its opponents. Every textbook, every magazine, every wall poster, and every newspaper is brought to bear in a comprehensive campaign to indoctrinate the citizenry along the lines dictated by Castro and his Soviet patrons.

Second, existing U.S. broadcasts to Cuba are inadequate. The Voice of America broadcasts less than 6 hours per day of programing intended for Latin America as a whole. These broadcasts deal with events in the United States. Radio Marti, by contrast, would serve as a substitute domestic station, broadcasting news and information about Cuba to Cubans.

Similarly, U.S. commercial stations do not address the needs of Cubans, but of their American audiences. They can be heard only on a limited basis, occasionally at night and intermittently during the day, and only in some parts of Cuba.

Third, the Soviet Union, through Radio Moscow, is the only country that operates a service specifically targeted at Cuba. It broadcasts twice a day and is an important guide for Cuban Communist Party members.

Fourth, the Castro regime's international broadcasting efforts are of a piece with its military and paramilitary efforts in Central America, the Middle East, and Africa. These initiatives, inspired, directed and financed by the Soviet Union, run true to the Soviet pattern by incorporating propaganda actions with every military move.

Fifth, the Castro regime broadcasts not only to the Spanish audiences in the hemisphere, but also in the Indian languages of Latin

America. Radio Havana cooperates with Radio Moscow with a mutual rebroadcasting pact so that Soviet programs can be heard in this hemisphere and Castro's inflammatory broadcasts can be used to further destabilize the troubled Middle Eastern area. Castro's programs consistently berate the United States, comparing the President of the United States to Hitler, while promoting violence and terror against many of its neighbors. At the present time the Soviet Union and Cuba outbroadcast the United States in Latin America by a ratio of 5 to 1 in terms of hours on the air.

Sixth, the model for radio broadcasting to Cuba should be Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. This is important in view of these international radio stations' sober and responsible policy guidelines which guarantee journalistic integrity while they prevent the raising of false hopes or the promoting of dangerous actions.

Seventh, it is evident that on a dollar per dollar basis, a well thought out effort to inform the Cuban people is the kind of expenditure that the United States cannot afford not to make, in view of Castro's belligerency throughout the world.

Eighth, these radio broadcasts would be a part of a policy of containment of Castro, projecting U.S. policy in the Caribbean. A clear U.S. policy in America's backyard would strengthen U.S. credibility in the face of Soviet encroachment in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

For these reasons, Radio Marti has attracted widespread support in Congress, the press, and other groups. The House Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce Committees have both approved the measure, by bipartisan votes of 24 to 9 and 24 to 18, respectively. The Wall Street Journal, the Miami Herald, and the Washington Post, among others, have supported the proposal.

Among the other groups supporting Radio Marti are the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association, the Inter-American Press Association, the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party in conference in Philadelphia, and the National Republican Heritage Groups Council. The Senate of the State of Florida has expressed its support of Radio Marti, as has Florida's Democratic Governor. I would like to submit these materials for the record.

[The material referred to follows:]

### SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION, MIAMI, FLA.

#### RESOLUTION

Whereas, members of the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association are uniquely suited to understand and appreciate the nature of the repressive government of Fidel Castro on the island of Cuba; and whereas the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association recognizes the need for the truth to be heard on the island of Cuba . . . be it therefore *Resolved*, That the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association does now support the concept of Radio Marti, in that Radio Marti will broadcast news and information to Cuba.

For the Association:

HERBERT M. LEVIN, *President*.

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### INTERAMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, XXXVII GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RIO DE JANEIRO, OCTOBER 1981

#### CUBA

Whereas: 1. since the rise to power of the Communist government of Fidel Castro, all media have been confiscated and consolidated into a few official organizations, giving the government absolute control of public information under conditions leading to massive indoctrination;

Whereas: 2. the journalists Fernando Rivas Porta of the newspaper Bohemia and Louis Rodríguez Rodríguez, of the newspaper El País have been imprisoned for over twenty years;

The General Assembly Resolves: 1. to request its members to continue by all means at their disposal the struggle which the Inter American Press Association has been carrying on for twenty years to obtain the freedom of all those who have been jailed in Cuba for defending the principles of freedom of expression;

2. to encourage free journalists of the continent, especially members of the Inter American Press Association, to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective.

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## DEMOCRATS '82—NATIONAL PARTY CONFERENCE, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

### RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF RADIO FREE CUBA

Whereas, the people of Cuba deserve to have an accurate, timely, and unbiased source of news and information about significant events in relation to the activities of their neighboring peoples and governments, in the Americas and the world; and,

Whereas, radio broadcasting, in a peaceful manner consistent with international law, has proven effective in furthering communications between peoples divided by political boundaries as demonstrated by the experience of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty,

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party in Conference in Philadelphia on June 25, 1982, that,

We support the establishment of a Radio Free Cuba (Radio Marti) for broadcasting to the people of Cuba.

Submitted by Luis Lauredo.

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## A RESOLUTION EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.S. RADIO STATION FOR BROADCASTING TO CUBA

Whereas, for more than 20 years, the people of Cuba have been oppressed by the Totalitarian regime of Fidel Castro, and,

Whereas, the Castro government has consistently used its monopoly over domestic and international broadcast and print media to spread anti-American propaganda on the island and throughout the world, and,

Whereas, the Soviet equipped broadcasting system of Cuba beams such propaganda, in English and Spanish, into the Southern United States in furtherance of its aims to spread Marxism and engender discord wherever it reaches, and,

Whereas, at the urging of the President of the United States legislation has been introduced in Congress for the establishment of a Radio Station, known as Radio Marti, to broadcast to Cuba in an effort to counter the aggressive propaganda directed against the United States and the Free World, and to inform the Cuban people who yearn to be free and to hear the truth, and,

Whereas, an amendment restricting Radio Marti to shortwave frequencies is under consideration by the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the United States House of Representatives, and,

Whereas, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America broadcast in a combination of shortwave and medium wave frequencies in order to reach a greater audience, and,

Whereas, the unavailability of shortwave receivers in Cuba seriously impairs the ability of the Cuban people to receive the intended broadcast, and,

Whereas, the National Republican Heritage Group's Council (N.R.H.G.C.) is a freedom-loving organization which represents the aspiration and solidarity of many Americans with the peoples who suffer under Communist rule around the world,

Now therefore, be it resolved that the National Republican Heritage Group's Council supports the President's proposal to establish Radio Marti, and urges the Congress of the United States to take all appropriate action in ensuring the expeditous approval of this proposal, and, Be it further resolved, that the N.R.H.G.C. urges the Committee on Energy and Commerce to support the President's original proposal by voting against the restrictive amendments, and,

Be it further resolved, that copies of this Resolution be dispatched to the President of The United States Senate, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, and the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.

Approved at the 12th Annual Convention of The National Republican Heritage Groups Council—July 12, 1982—Bar Harbor, Fla.

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BY SENATOR GERSTEN

(A resolution expressing support for the efforts of the United States Government to establish United States Radio Marti, in order to help the oppressed people of Cuba hear the truth and counter the interference by the Cuban Communist regime with the United States airwaves and the programming of Florida radio stations.)

Whereas, in 1959 an enemy of the United States and democracy took over the island of Cuba and set up an anti-American, anti-democratic regime, which the world has learned is a puppet of the Soviet Union, and

Whereas, for over 20 years Fidel Castro, the head of that regime and an avowed enemy of the United States, has continued to insult our government and attack the policies of our nation throughout the world, and

Whereas, the Castro regime uses its Soviet-equipped broadcasting system to beam propaganda in English and Spanish into Florida in furtherance of its anti-American aims, and

Whereas, the United States by establishing Radio Marti will be helping the oppressed people of Cuba who yearn to be free to hear the truth, and

Whereas, Cuban Communist foreign broadcasts are causing intolerable interferences with the daily programming of Florida radio stations, and

Whereas, such foreign transmissions constitute a blatant, inexcusable interference in the domestic affairs of the government and citizens of the United States and Florida, and are objected to by the South Florida radio community and listening audience; and

Whereas, at the President's urging and with his support, legislation has been introduced in Congress to establish Radio Marti, to counter aggression by the Castro regime against the free world through interference with our nation's airwaves, Now, Therefore,

Be It Resolved by the Senate of the State of Florida:

That the Congress of the United States is urged to approve the proposal by the federal administration for the creation of Radio Marti, and the President and Congress are urged to take all other appropriate measures to stop interference by the Castro regime with United States domestic radio programming.

Be it further resolved that copies of this resolution be dispatched to the President of the United States, to the President of the United States Senate, to the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, and to each member of the Florida delegation to the United States Congress.

This is a true and correct copy of Senate Resolution No. 1003, adopted by the Florida Senate on February 4, 1982.

W. D. CHILDERS,
*President of the Senate.*

Attest:
Joe Brown,
*Secretary of the Senate.*

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STATE OF FLORIDA,
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM,
*April 26, 1982.*

Hon. PAULA HAWKINS,
*U.S. Senator, Dirksen Building,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR PAULA: The proposal to establish a new radio station for broadcasting to Cuba is a matter of particular importance to both of us. We share a special responsibility on this issue, which is of great concern to many of our fellow Floridians.

Enclosed is an issue paper, "U.S. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba: Policy Implications," prepared by my friends at the Cuban American National Foundation. The study provides background on the project and outlines the salient issues surrounding it.

I urge you to review the material and to give the proposal of radio broadcasting to Cuba your careful consideration. Your comments would be welcome.

Thank you for your consideration of this issue.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

BOB GRAHAM, *Governor.*

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[From the Miami Herald, Friday, Sept. 25, 1981]

## A "RADIO FREE CUBA"? SI!

The time to plant seeds is when the ground has been prepared. Now the time is right to plant the seeds of liberation in Fidel Castro's Cuba. The Reagan Administration evidently plans to do so.

Clearly there is discontent on the Communist-controlled island. That was apparent in last year's frantic exodus of Cubans during the Mariel Sealift.

The discontent arises from many causes. The economy is in shambles and heavily dependent on Soviet aid. After 20 years of Communist rule, the Castro government has run out of excuses for the revolution's economic failures.

Moreover, word of the true extent of Cuban casualties in Africa has filtered back to the island and has spread among the people. This has opened the eyes of many Cubans as to the real price of being Moscow's surrogate in foreign military adventures.

Meanwhile, word sent back to individual Cubans from relatives living in exile—not only in the United States, but in other nations as well—has made many Cubans realize that conditions abroad are not the way they've been portrayed by Cuba's government-run media.

So there is already discontent. If the truth were more widely disseminated among Cubans, however, this discontent might grow into full-fledged efforts to throw off the yoke of repression. If it can happen in Poland under the guns of the Soviet Union, why not in Cuba?

The basic problem now is to disseminate information more widely among the Cuban people. Toward that goal, the Reagan Administration has announced plans to beam AM-radio broadcasts to Cuba starting Jan. 1.

Cubans already can receive some South Florida stations. The newly American station, however, would cover a larger area with a stronger signal and with a greater emphasis on news of interest to persons inside Cuba.

If history is any guide, Mr. Castro will rant and rave about the station. He did so back in 1960 when the United States began beaming broadcasts to Cuba from a powerful transmitter on Swan Island.

Radio Swan operated from May 1960 until May 1968, when it became the apparent victim of Federal budget cuts. During the Bay of Pigs invasion, it broadcast coded messages. The station frequently was the target of Mr. Castro's denunciations.

As the Cuban Freedom Committee commented when Radio Swan began, however, "The Cuban people have been brainwashed by Castro * * * without hearing his lies publicly challenged."

That was said 20 years ago. It was true then. It remains largely true today. There is no freedom of expression in Cuba. The flow of information is tightly controlled by the Communist dictatorship. As long as that remains true, the U.S. Government has a right—even a duty—to fill the void by broadcasting the truth to Mr. Castro's captives.

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[From the Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, Oct. 27, 1981]

## TALKING TO THE CUBANS

Work is finally getting under way to establish a U.S.-based Radio Free Cuba. The administration has announced that it wants such a station to give the Cuban people the news their "own government suppresses about Cuba's foreign and domestic situation." This is much the same role that our Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty now play toward the people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The administration is setting up a commission to come to some kind of consensus on what the structure of the new enterprise should be, and private funding has been found to keep all the wheels in motion until the day when Congress will begin delivering appropriations.

But already the worries and little controversies are beginning to surface over what the character and effects of the new station are going to be.

From some quarters comes the suggestion that the station will be a somehow illegitimate U.S. propaganda exercise; one newspaper headline announcing plans for it spoke of a "New Radio to 'Tell the Truth' to Cuba," putting the idea in slightly sneering quotation marks. From similar places comes the caution that we shouldn't risk further harming our relations with the Castroite paradise in this way: Some are warning gravely that if we try to sneak our subversive radio waves into Cuba, Mr. Castro could well respond by using his facilities to jam broadcasts in the whole Southeastern U.S.

Then there are friends of the enterprise who worry about which group of Cuban emigres is going to dominate the outfit and what kind of broadcasts they will produce: We could end up out-foxing ourselves, these friends say, if we give the Cubans a program so anti-Castroite that it insults their country and leaves feeling loyally protective about their regime.

Finally, all these doubts will probably contribute to a tussle within the coming presidential commission over who is to get actual, direct control over the new radio. Its models, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, are run by a private corporation that channels the congressional appropriations involved. But the argument may well be made that the State Department or another government agency should have more direct authority over the new station, if only to keep the fringies from running away with American foreign policy in this area.

These emerging worries and puzzles all reflect a single fact: Waging the war of ideas in the world is something that fills us with pervasive discomfort. We are afraid of offending our own standards of fair and sober discourse in the process, afraid of the consequences of seeming unreasonable and afraid of unleashing the energies of people whose natural tendency is to go too far. These are not anxieties to be ashamed of. But we shouldn't let them stand in the way of getting something like the Cuban enterprise off the ground.

The rearmament that the Reagan administration came to office advocating is necessary enough when it comes to hardware or military manpower, but it is just as crucial in the realm of arguments. It is no secret that for some years now the U.S. and the West in general have been doing a poor job of making the American case to the world. But the problem has grown considerably more acute recently, as our traditional allies abroad have weakened in their old World War II commitments to us, and as parts of opinion at home have in turn become newly dubious about our old attachments.

The country needs projects like Radio Free Cuba to try to fight the drift. It has to keep them from direct supervision by any government agency, even if it means the loss of a certain amount of bureaucratic control. It should be ready to tolerate the infighting that often marks an enterprise where passions run so high. And it will have to avoid the budget-cutting temptation to starve the radios inadvertently of the small sums that make the difference in their performance; they are, after all, as integral a part as any of the national defense.

We hope the presidential commission about to begin isn't allowed to lose sight of these necessities in all the pulling and hauling over operational details.

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[From the Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1982]

## A NEW RADIO TO CUBA?

The Reagan administration's proposal for a new radio station to broadcast news of Cuba to Cuba—not just news of the United States, as the Voice of America already does—has a good deal of merit: One of the purposes behind it is to serve a general policy of making it harder for Fidel Castro to run his country. Whatever one thinks of that, "Radio Marti" could give Cubans, as Radio Free Europe and Liberty gives East Europeans and Soviets, the chance to hear news kept from them by their government's controlled media. That seems to us the central consideration. Listening is entirely the listener's choice.

Mr. Castro, who knows something about foreign broadcasting, says he would regard Radio Marti as hostile and subversive. But the station, if properly run, would be hostile and subversive only to the extent that truth is hostile and subversive—the truth, for instance, about the scope and costs of Cuba's foreign adventures. Here at home, some worry that Radio Marti might provoke Cubans to revolt or, more plausibly, to emigrate in uncontrolled Mariel style. Careful policy guidance presumably would keep broadcasts on the information level.

There is concern that a new station would undercut the Reagan administration's diplomatic outreach to Cuba. The Reagan initiative apparently amounted to an all-or-nothing proposition to switch sides. Mr. Castro rejected it, as you might have expected. He had already rejected, however, the previous administration's very differently pitched effort to reach an accommodation by more gradual and conventional means. An impartial observer would have to conclude that he puts a higher value on his commitment to sustaining and exporting revolution. On general principle it is wise to keep on trying to talk. But that is no reason not to try something—like Radio Marti—that should have been tried years ago.

One practical problem, however, must be disposed of first: the interference of Cuban and American radio signals. There is a history of Cuban interference with American (and other hemispheric) radio broadcasting on the sensitive and crowded AM band. Cuba has its own complaints, not least that Radio Marti would entail an American violation of a treaty obligation to confine AM broadcasts to one's own country.

Within the Reagan administration, there is a strong tendency to handle Cuban radio interference, existing and prospective, as a raw political challenge and not to yield to it. Many American commercial broadcasters, however, are inclined to go slow on Radio Marti so as not to add what they regard as an extraneous issue, and a hot one, to a radio negotiating circuit already groaning under its load.

Radio Marti could make a useful addition to the news available to Cubans. But the administration will have to do better in explaining to Congress how it proposes to keep American radio listeners from paying unduly for it.

Mr. CALZON. Finally, I would like to mention a problem which has arisen with regard to the Senate's consideration of Radio Marti's legislation. With the aim of clarifying the issues surrounding this legislation, the Foreign Relations Committee requested a study from the Congressional Research Service. Unfortunately, the CRS study is rife with biased arguments, specious reasoning, and unfair presentation of the facts concerning Radio Marti.

I urge the committee to take into consideration the biased nature of the report in considering its contents.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Calzon's prepared statement follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK CALZON

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity to present my views on the issue of radio broadcasting to Cuba.

I am speaking today on behalf of the Cuban American National Foundation, an organization which promotes an objective view of Cuba and Cubans, and an objective appraisal of the Cuban government and its policies. The foundation supports a general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Cuban concern, to fight bigotry, protect human rights, and promote Cuban cultural interests and creative achievement.

Today I would like to outline the rationale for initiating new radio broadcasts to Cuba, and address some of the issues which have arisen in the public debate on this question.

First, Cuba is currently blanketed with five radio networks that extoll the regime's successes and vituperate its opponents. Every textbook, every magazine, every wall poster and every newspaper is brought to bear in a comprehensive campaign to indoctrinate the citizenry along the lines dictated by Castro and his Soviet patrons.

Second, existing U.S. broadcasts to Cuba and inadequate. The Voice of America broadcasts less than 6 hours of programming per day, intended for Latin America as a whole. These broadcasts focus on events in the United States. Radio Marti, by contrast, would serve as a substitute domestic station, broadcasting news and information about Cuba to Cubans. Similarly, U.S. commercial stations which can be heard in parts of Cuba on a sporadic basis do not address the needs of Cubans, but of their American audiences. They can be heard only on a limited basis, occasionally at night and intermittently during the day, and only in some parts of Cuba.

Third, the Soviet Union, through Radio Moscow, is the only country that operates a service specifically targeted at Cuba. It broadcasts twice a day and is an important guide for Cuban Communist Party members who must keep up with daily shifts in Soviet foreign policy.

Fourth, it is crucial to understand that the Castro regime's international broadcasting efforts are of a piece with its military and paramilitary efforts in Central America, the Middle East, and Africa. These initiatives, inspired, directed, and financed by the Soviet Union, run true to the Soviet pattern by incorporating propaganda actions with every military move.

Fifth, the Castro regime broadcasts not only to the Spanish audiences in the hemisphere but also in the Indian languages of Latin America. Radio Havana cooperates with Radio Moscow with a mutual rebroadcasting pact so that Soviet programs can be heard in this hemisphere and Castro's inflammatory broadcasts can be used to further destabilize the troubled Middle Eastern Area. The Cuban government's programs consistently berate the United States, comparing the president of the United States to Hitler, while promoting violence and terror against many of its neighbors. At the present time, the Soviet Union and Cuba outbroadcast the United States in Latin America by a radio of 5 to 1 in terms of hours on the air.

Sixth, the model for radio broadcasting to Cuba in terms of its editorial content should be Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. This is particularly important in view of these international radio stations' sober and responsible policy guidelines which guarantee journalistic integrity while they prevent the raising of false hopes or the promoting of dangerous actions.

Seventh, it is evident that on a dollar per dollar basis, a well thought out effort to inform the Cuban people is the kind of expenditure that the United States cannot afford not to make in view of Castro's belligerency throughout the world.

Eighth, these radio broadcasts would be a part of a policy of containment of Castro, projecting U.S. policy in the Caribbean. A clear U.S. policy in America's backyard would strengthen U.S. credibility in the face of Soviet encroachment in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

For these reasons, Radio Marti has attracted widespread support in Congress, the press, and other groups. The House Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce Committees have both approved the measure, by bipartisan votes of 24 to 9 and 24 to 18 respectively. The Wall Street Journal, The Miami Herald, and the Washington Post, among others, have supported the proposal. Among the other groups supporting Radio Marti are the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association, the Inter-American Press Association, the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party in Conference in Philadelphia, and the National Republican Heritage Groups Council. The Senate of the State of Florida has expressed its support of Radio Marti, as has Governor Bob Graham. I would like to submit these materials for the record.

One of the most controversial aspects of the Radio Marti issue is the question of interference caused by Cuban government radio stations to U.S. broadcasters. It is clear that Cuban radio interference has become a serious problem, but it is by no means a new problem. Broadcasters in Florida report that they have suffered interference from Cuban stations for as long as 13 years. This form of economic warfare by Cuba operates in contravention of the law of international broadcasting as it is established in the treaties of the International Telecommunications Union. The Cuban American National Foundation is gratified that the process of establishing Radio Marti has afforded an opportunity for the U.S. Government to address this problem.

However, the interference problem should not stand in the way of the Radio Marti project. In fact, the establishment of Radio Marti could give the U.S. Government additional negotiating leverage with regard to the interference problem. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has taken constructive steps to deal with the problem, by amending the bill to establish Radio Marti so as to provide compensation for U.S. radio stations injured by Cuban interference, and establishing a task force to deal with the political and technical issues raised by Cuban interference.

One of the proposed approaches to the potential jamming of Radio Marti is to restrict the station to broadcasting on shortwave frequencies only. This alternative would, in effect, render Radio Marti useless. Very few Cubans own shortwave receivers, so the potential audience of the station would be limited to an insignificant proportion of the population.

The House Energy and Commerce Committee forged an effective, bipartisan compromise on the question of the frequency for Radio Marti. Under the House version of the legislation, the frequency is to be chosen by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, in consultation with the Federal Communications Commission, and after receiving public comment. This procedure will afford the appropriate protection for U.S. radio stations, in the atmosphere of administrative deliberation which will allow a hearing for all parties, conducted by an agency with special expertise in government broadcasting.

Finally, I would like to address a problem which has arisen with regard to the Senate's consideration of the Radio Marti legislation. With the aim of clarifying the issues surrounding this legislation, the Foreign Relations Committee requested a study from the Congressional Research Service. Unfortunately, the CRS study is rife with biased arguments, specious reasoning, and unfair presentation of the facts concerning Radio Marti.

I urge the Committee to take into consideration the biased nature of the report in considering its contents.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

# U.S. RADIO BROADCASTING
# to
# CUBA

## Policy Implications

The Cuban-American National Foundation, Inc.

# PREFACE

During the last five years the Caribbean has grown increasingly important to the United States both economically and philosophically. As the U.S. promoted political democracy and economic development to stabilize the region, Fidel Castro invested propaganda and military aid hoping to bring about the opposite.

The long arm of Castro's influence has reached beyond the Western Hemisphere to trouble spots in the Middle East and Africa. With Russia as his patron, Fidel Castro has emerged on the international scene as a far more destructive force than the U.S. had anticipated.

Naturally, the U.S.'s primary concern remains closest to home, Central America and the Caribbean Basin. One method currently under debate for countering Castro's propaganda offensive in this hemisphere is the creation of Radio Marti, a radio station similar in content and structure to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Because the Castro regime has a stranglehold on all media communication within Cuba and with the latest satellite technology can beam programs all over the world, the Cuban American National Foundation believes Radio Marti to be a necessary tool in countering Castro/Soviet influence.

The Cuban American National Foundation has chosen to examine this issue in the first of a series of occasional papers about Cuba, its politics and society, and its relations with the U.S. and the world.

This study examines the proposal for Radio Marti in light of the public information climate in Cuba, the role of Radio Havana, and Soviet and U.S. transmissions to the island.

***Jorge L. Mas,***
*Chairman, Cuban American*
*National Foundation*

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# INTRODUCTION

Six U.S. Presidents have served since 1959 when Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba. U.S. policy since then has fluctuated between rapprochement and amateurish attempts to overthrow the Cuban government. Cuban government policy, by contrast, reflects the consistency one might expect from a regime which has been completely controlled by one man. The Cuban government has progressed steadily from a consolidated communist power at home to support of revolutions abroad.

Castro's regime's military efforts have progressed from Che Guevara's abortive guerrilla expedition in Bolivia, to the commitment of regular troops to wars in the Middle East and Africa. Facts of Castro's military intervention go undisputed: a Cuban artillery brigade operated with Syrian forces in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; Cuban units fought in the conflicts between South and North Yemen; tens of thousands of troops are stationed in Ethiopia and Angola; and Cuban advisers are involved in civil wars in Central America. In addition, Cuban diplomats were recalled or expelled from France and England after their involvement with "Carlos", the international terrorist, was disclosed. And recently, charges of Cuban support for U.S. terrorists have surfaced.

Castro's military and paramilitary efforts have been supplemented by a propaganda offensive which includes an effective U.S. lobbying effort and an equally effective program for international radio broadcasting. One sympathetic analysis for the success of the Cuban government's media efforts predicts "Radio Havana Cuba will maintain its audience and will continue to influence progressive thinkers in the region. In the face of stepped up ideological adversity from its northern neighbor, RHC will become even more strident in its defense of socialism . . ."[1]

Against a background of Castro's aggression, the idea of U.S. radio broadcasts to Cuba presents itself as an attractive opportunity to counteract the effects of the Cuban regime. As this study describes, the option of U.S. radio broadcasts to Cuba is an effective, and low-risk alternative to passive acceptance of Castro's international aggrandizement. The current trend to isolate Cuba diplomatically, as shown by the recent severing of diplomatic ties with Havana by Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica, represents a momentum which new radio broadcasts to Cuba could accelerate. Further, the long-term interests of both the U.S. government and the Cuban people coincide with the need to establish a dialogue on Cuban communism and options for the development of a democratic Cuba.

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[1] Howard Fredericks, "Cuban American Radio Wars: International Broadcasting and International Confrontation in the Americas," *The Diplomatic Pouch* American University, Washington, D.C. (October 1981), p. 31.

## Congressional and Media Response

The United States recently announced plans to establish Radio Marti,[2] a new radio station for broadcasting to Cuba. The concept of radio broadcasts to Cuba has been supported by groups as diverse as the Heritage Foundation and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. The Inter-American Press Association as its 37th General Assembly in Rio de Janeiro in October, passed a resolution "to encourage free journalists of the continent, especially members of the Inter-American Press Association, to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, *and support any means that would help achieve that objective.*"[3]

Radio broadcasts to Cuba have been supported explicitly by Senators Paula Hawkins and Jesse Helms, former Senator Richard Stone, and implicitly by Senators Henry M. Jackson and Daniel P. Moyhihan, whose Coalition for a Democratic Majority published a study advocating "a Radio Free Cuba of the intelligence, imagination, and skill of Radio Free Europe."[4] The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank, published "Removing Soviet Influence from Cuba," which suggested 24-hour direct radio broadcasts to Cuba.[5]

Radio Marti has also been advocated by prestigious voices among the media. *The Miami Herald* stated in a lead editorial: "There is no freedom of expression in Cuba. The flow of information is tightly controlled by the Communist dictatorship. As long as that remains true, the U.S. government has a right – even a duty – to fill the void by broadcasting to Mr. Castro's captives."[6]An opinion article published in the *Christian Science Monitor* put the case even more strongly: "It is astonishing that after 22 years of Castro, the U.S. still has not set up for Cuba the kind of hard-hitting, objective, round-the-clock broadcasting operation that Radio Free Europe has provided for Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe since 1950. It is still not too late to do so. Broadcasts to Cuba could be supplemented by English and Spanish services for the entire Caribbean and Central American region. The U.S: looks inept when it does nothing to counter the Soviet broadcasts which are now relaying out of Havana to Latin America as well as to the U.S. and Canada."[7]

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[2] Executive Order 12323, dated September 24, 1981. The station is to be named after Jose Marti (1853-1895), Cuba's national hero and leader of its War of Independence.

[3] *Resolutions*, IAPA XXXVII General Assembly (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; October 1981). IAPA is the prestigious organization of editors and publishers of newspapers and magazines in the Western Hemisphere. Emphasis added.

[4] Hugh Thomas, *Coping with Cuba* (Washington, D.C.: Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 1980) p. 13.

[5] "Removing Soviet Influence from Cuba," *National Security Record* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1981), p. 3.

[6] "A 'Radio Free Cuba'? Si! ," *The Miami Herald* (October 6, 1981) p. 6A.

Objections to Radio Marti range from disagreement on the proposed name for the station, which was voiced on the editorial page of the *New York Times*[8], to complaints from U.S. sympathizers of the Castro regime. Colman McCarthy, in an opinion column summarized the latter view point: "The Reagan Cuba policy functions on smallness. Its plans to tell Cubans what's wrong with Cuba – make 'em mad enough and maybe they'll ship Fidel to Moscow – was announced. . . The Reagan Administration appears obsessed by the cheap thrill of bullying Cuba . . . we are inept bullies. We punch Cuba and all we do is hurt our own hand."[9]

Another source of concern about the founding of Radio Marti is that it would provoke retaliation from the Castro regime in the form of jamming of both Radio Marti and existing commercial broadcasts in South Florida.[10] Two facts rebut these arguments. First, the organization of the radio broadcasters who would be most strongly affected by Cuban government jamming – the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association – has gone on record to support the founding of Radio Marti. In a letter to President Reagan, Mr. William L. Viands, president of the SFRBA, offered to help the Administration with its plans for Radio Marti and affirmed his support of the move to "keep Castro in his place. It's time somebody did."[11]

Secondly, it is clear that the Cuban government has long-laid plans to initiate jamming on a broad scale whether or not Radio Marti is established. Months before the executive order establishing Radio Marti was issued on September 24, 1981, large radio facilities that could be used for jamming were under construction on the island. In March, 1981, the Cuban government announced plans to build 180 new radio stations, "including two 500 kw (kilowatt), one 200 kw, and two 150 kw stations."[12] The new stations are much more powerful than is necessary to provide service to Cuba, according to the National Association of Broadcasters: "Such Cuban stations could interfere with U.S. stations as far away as 1900 miles. Even a 10 kw station could produce interference at 975 miles."[13] The Cuban government's intention to use these new facilities to interfere with transmissions by U.S. and Latin American stations is borne out by the fact that they are to use 'nondirectional' antennas, which will needlessly propagate radio signals far beyond the limits of Cuban territory.[14]

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[7] Paul B. Henze, "Put the U.S. Back in Government Information," *The Christian Science Monitor* (July 2, 1981).

[8] *The New York Times,* (September 27, 1981) p. 18E.

[9] *The Washington Post* (October 18, 1981), p. 32.

[10] *U.S. News & World Report,* (October 5, 1981) "Washington Whispers" column cites unnamed 'Executives of American radio stations' as sources of this concern. In a similarly unattributed story, *The New York Times* on 10/29/81 referred to anonymous U.S. diplomats' objections along the same lines.

[11] "Florida Broadcasters offer help with Radio Marti plan," *Broadcasting* (October 5, 1981), p. 30.

[12] NAB Radio/TV Highlights, Vo. VII, No. 11, March 16, 1981, p. 1, "Cuban Frequency Grab Focus of Geneva Meeting."

[13] NAB Highlights, op. cit.

Yet, as *The Wall Street Journal* perceptively explained, "These emerging worries and puzzles all reflect a single fact: Waging the war of ideas in the world is something that fills us with pervasive discomfort. We are afraid of offending our own standards of fair and sober discussion in the process, afraid of the consequences of seeming unreasonable . . . These are not anxieties to be ashamed of. But we shouldn't let them stand in the way of getting something like the Cuba enterprise off the ground."[15]

Other voices in the media have noted how the questions raised during the organization of Radio Marti can be answered by studying the history of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Syndicated columnist Cord Meyer points out: "By citing RFE as the model on which they plan to build a new radio station, to appeal over Castro's head to the long-suffering Cuban people, Reagan officials indicate that they intend to apply the lessons RFE learned the hard way. If they do in fact draw on this rich fund of experience, there is real hope that Radio Marti . . . can gradually win the trust of the large majority of Cubans."[16] This study shows how that experience can be used.

Fidel Castro voiced his personal reaction to Radio Marti in a speech to the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference held in Havana: "The Yankee imperialists . . . speak barefacedly of setting up official radio transmissions from the U.S. Government, to promote destabilization and counterrevolution in Cuba."[17] Cuba, however, has operated an extensive and sophisticated international broadcasting effort since the early days of the revolution. These operations recently have been increased through the construction of new broadcasting facilities.

In light of these diverse reactions to the Radio Marti proposal, a review of the facts underlying the project is in order. We hope that the following pages will clarify some of these issues.

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[14] The technical means for limiting the geographic coverage of radio signals, even those of the high power to be generated by these new facilities, are well understood. According to *Broadcasting* magazine (October 24, 1981), U.S. officials plan to raise this fact in upcoming negotiations with the Cuban government: "We want to show the Cubans how, by an economic shifting around of stations, they can cover the island adequately without clobbering stations in the U.S. and other countries', one of those who will meet with the Cubans said . . . But what about the 500kw stations? They are not needed to serve the island. When Americans raise that question, Cubans refer to the Voice of America's 50kw station on Florida's Marathon Key, which broadcasts into Cuba. Therefore, said one of those preparing for the talks, the 500 kw stations pose 'a political question.'"

[15] *Wall Street Journal* (October 28, 1981), p. 32.

[16] Cord Meyer, "High Hopes for Radio Marti," *The New Orleans Times-Picayune,* (October 12, 1981).

[17] Speech monitored by Foreign Broadcast Information Service on September 15, 1981; reported in FBIS Daily Report, Vol. II, No. 180, p. Q11 (September 17, 1981).

# THE BROADCASTING ENVIRONMENT IN CUBA

Cuba has one of the most extensive radio networks in Latin America. Perceiving the usefulness of the mass media in social control, the Castro regime built the network on a relatively advanced infrastructure it found in 1959. In the late 1950's, there was one radio for every 6.5 Cubans, the third highest rate in Latin America.[18] Castro had raised the total to 1.5 million receivers by 1975, about one for every six persons.[19] In addition, the government introduced radio "repeaters" to bring broadcasts to isolated rural areas. Since its takeover of radio and television in 1961, the regime has monopolized the airwaves.

## Domestic Broadcasting

Five major national networks now blanket the country with cultural, educational, and news programs which extoll the government's ostensible successes and excoriate its foes. Educational programs are seen as part of the overall effort to politicize the masses according to Communist aims. For example, the most powerful station in the country, Radio Rebelde, offers a Russian language course.

Despite the efforts of the Cuban Radio Institute (ICR) to control the information available to the public, significant demand for non-governmental information continues. This is due in part, to the monotony and perceptively biased content of ICR programming, which includes verbatim transmission of Castro's four-hour-long speeches.

It is important to understand that the Cuban government not only censors coverage of international affairs but also important domestic developments, such as the state of the economy, airplane crashes, and the effects of natural disasters. Even when such events are covered, they are often distorted or delayed for days while the ICR propagandists devise an interpretation. A striking example of this time-lag effect is the regime's treatment of the current dengue fever outbreak in Cuba. The government media ignored the story for months. When it finally acknowledged the epidemic, it alleged the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had infected Cubans with dengue fever. In reality, the dengue fever contagion had been brought to the island by Cuban soldiers returning from Africa.

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[18] Included in Levi Marrero's *Geography of Cuba,* quoted in *Secret Report on the Cuban Revolution,* Carlos Alberto Montaner (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1981), p. 154.

[19] Jan Knippers Black, ed., *Area Handbook for Cuba* 2nd edition, (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1976. Published by Superintendant of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), p. 333.

ICR stations' lack of candor concerning basic current events is mirrored in its cultural and educational broadcasting. Many of Cuba's most distinguished literary and artistic figures have been erased from Cuban history books, anthologies, cultural outlets, and, of course, radio broadcasts. This is particularly apparent in the field of poetry, a genre which has had an established role in the formation of Cuban radio broadcasting.

Because of this domestic radio broadcast system, Cubans hunger for outside sources of information. Some of this is met by foreign radio broadcasts picked up in Cuba in a spotty and ineffectual fashion. As the noted British historian Hugh Thomas pointed out, what is needed is a radio program directed at the Cuban people "of the intelligence, imagination, and skill of a Radio Free Europe . . . Some of the programs concerned might emphasize such things as the human cost of Castro's African adventure [and] other subjects not usually discussed by the censored Cuban media.[20]

### Castro's Foreign Broadcasts

The comprehensive domestic radio service of Cuba is also accompanied by a vigorous foreign broadcast service. Radio Havana Cuba (RHC), which transmits a total of 48 hours and 30 minutes of programming every day broadcasts programs in English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and the Indian tongues spoken by indigenous populations of Paraguay, the Andean languages, and those of the Caribbean.[21]

The tone and content of RHC's broadcasts can be judged from a resolution passed at the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in 1975:

> Overseas radio broadcasts are highly important to our revolution. As the ideological struggle against imperialism sharpens, they represent a powerful weapon against every campaign and diversionist effort in the international arena.[22]

In the past, this mission was expressed through "Radio Free Dixie," an English-language program carried by Radio Progreso in the early sixties which exploited racial tensions in the southern U.S. states by urging blacks to revolt against the U.S. government.[23] More recent Radio Havana Cuba efforts have focused on revolutionary movements in Central America and the Caribbean.

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[20] Hugh Thomas, op. cit.

[21] Howard Fredericks, "Cuban-American Radio Wars: International Broadcasting and International Confrontation in the Americas," *The Diplomatic Pouch,* American University, Washington, D.C. (October, 1981), p. 31

[22] Isidro Malmierca, *XV Anniversary of Radio Havana Cuba* (Havana: Department of Revolutionary Orientation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, 1977) p. 16, quoted in Fredericks, op. cit.

[23] "Radio Free Dixie Praises 'Negro Revolt' in South", *New York Times,* (October 8, 1962), p. 1.

The Castro regime has also recognized the value of using cooperative foreign electronic media as outlets for *Prensa Latina* (Cuban news and propaganda agency) information. The voice-recorded reports of Prensa Latina correspondents and contributors are relayed to a central facility in Havana, and then rebroadcast to radio and television stations in Latin America and the Caribbean. Modern equipment installed in August, 1980, can handle several calls from correspondents at a time, and rebroadcast them to several customers simultaneously.[24]

The Cuban radio services also cooperate directly with Soviet propaganda services through a mutual rebroadcasting pact. Since May, 1980, Havana International Service programs have been rebroadcast from the Soviet Union on at least four shortwave bands beamed at the Middle East, Africa, and Europe for eight hours daily. Cuba reciprocates by broadcasting Moscow "World Service" in English and Moscow International Service, also in English, to North America for twelve hours daily using one AM transmitter and at least one shortwave station.

## Foreign Broadcasts to Cuba

Foreign broadcasts to Cuba take three forms: 1) programming by the Soviet Union and other Communist countries; 2) service provided by the U.S. Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and stations run by the Vatican, and other Latin American countries; and 3) U.S. commercial stations which can be received by radios in Cuba but which are not specifically targeted at the Cuban listeners.

The Soviet Union, through Radio Moscow, is the only country that operates a service specifically targeted at Cuba. It operates twice daily and is an important guide for Cuban Communist Party members and ICR propagandists who must keep up with daily shifts in Soviet policy.

The Voice of America operates a Latin American service which broadcasts five and a half hours a day, seven days a week,[25] but does not meet the needs of its Cuban audience because it is directed at the entire Latin American audience. Although the Voice of America has transmitted programs tailored to the Cuban audience in the past, these services were cancelled in 1974 in an effort to accommodate the Castro regime. There are no plans to renew them.

Though the VOA does not conduct listener surveys for Cuba comparable to those conducted by RFE/RL for its Eastern European and Soviet audience there is evidence that Cuban listeners of VOA's Latin American service are both numerous and influential. Even the Director of Radio Rebelde [part of the ICR domestic network] admits many Cuban leaders start their day by listening to the news on The Voice of America. Letters which reach the VOA from Cuba also indicate high interest in its programs, particularly in consideration of the penalties imposed by the government on Cubans who are caught listening to the VOA. According to VOA's Spanish Branch, letters from Cuba run at a rate of 40 or 50 per month.[26]

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[24] "PRELA Opens New Radio, TV Information Service," *FBIS Daily Report*, Vol. VI, No. 158.

[25] The *Congressional Record* U.S. Senate, June 17, 1981, p. s56388.

Broadcasts by U.S. commercial stations in Florida can be received in Cuba on a limited basis, occasionally at night and sporadically during the day. These signals do not cover the entire island. Because the U.S. commercial stations tailor their programs to the listening tastes of the U.S. audience who form the rate base for their advertising revenues, their content does not address the needs of Cuban listeners. They do, however, provide a tenuous link with the exile community in south Florida, as shown by the popularity of Christmastime "call in" shows during which Cubans in the U.S. can try to send brief messages to their friends or relatives who may be listening on the island.

Despite the small scale and unfocused nature of the U.S. commercial broadcasts, the Castro regime regards them as a serious threat and has taken vigorous steps to counteract their influence. The management of WQBA, a Spanish language station in Miami, claims its broadcasts are intentionally jammed. This station uses a 10 kilowatt transmitter to reach its Florida audience; the Cuban government operates as many as five 250-kw transmitters to jam its signal.[27]

The popularity of music programs broadcast by Miami stations was acknowledged, in a backhanded way, by the Castro regime in 1973. In that year the ICR stations ceased broadcasting North American and European "pop" music, possibly in an effort to compel young listeners (the majority of the Cuban population is under 25 years of age) to develop a greater liking for Latin American, and particularly Cuban, music. Though there was no official explanation of this ban, it apparently failed, and "pop" music was restored to ICR playlists later in the year. The continuing availability of "pop" music from Florida stations may have been a deciding factor in this policy change.

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[26] Telephone conversation with Olga Sanz, Deputy Director, Spanish Branch, Voice of America, October 30, 1981.

[27] "Cuban Radio Invades the U.S.," *Business Week*, (September 21, 1981), p. 42.

# RADIO MARTI

Establishment of Radio Marti, as a new radio station providing service specifically targeted at Cuban listeners, presents many advantages to both the United States and the Cuban People.

## Radio Marti and the Voice of America

The founding of Radio Marti is not envisioned as a replacement for existing VOA service to Cuba. Continuation of VOA's traditional role as the official outlet for U.S. government views is an essential function of U.S. policy in Latin America. Rather, Radio Marti is envisioned as meeting special needs and interests of the Cuban audience and, thereby, supplementing VOA's output.

The mission statement of the Board of International Broadcasting describes the important differences between the VOA and RFE/RL:

> While the Voice of America concentrates on presenting U.S. Government policy and projecting American society and institutions, RFE and RL reflect and project a diverse international awareness. Under American management and the statutory oversight of the Presidentially-appointed Board for International Broadcasting, the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty staff is composed of citizens of the United States, citizens of friendly European and other nations and former Together, they seek to create neither "American radio," in the narrow national sense, nor "exile radio," sense of organized political opposition, but an international radio. It is international in the breadth of its coverage, its freedom from national or sectarian bias, its dedication to the open communication of accurate information and a broad range of democratic ideas. At the same time, it is "local" in the sense that broadcast content is focused on the interest of the audiences.[28]

## The Impact of Radio Marti

Three particular factors demonstrate the need for Radio Marti at this time. First, the brutal suppression of essential human rights by the Castro regime imposes a responsibility for protest on behalf of the U.S. government and freedom-loving people everywhere. This study is not the place to review the extent of the human rights abuses perpetrated by Castro. It suffices to note that in comparable situations in other countries ranging from the Soviet Union to South Africa, continuing exposure of and pressure against tyranny has had an effect of limiting its excesses.

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[28] The Board of International Broadcasting, *Seventh Annual Report*, (Washington, D.C.: BIB, 1981).

Second, the destabilizing effects of the Castro regime's intervention in "wars of national liberation" in Latin America and Africa must be made clear to the Cuban population. For Cubans in the U.S. and Cuba, Castro's adventures have produced gruesome casualties among their relatives and friends. The exorbitant cost of the expanded Cuban military represents a direct withdrawal of resources available for civilian consumption, plus temporary or permanent loss of the productive efforts of Cuban youth involved in the military. Castro justifies these sacrifices by continually emphasizing the threat of invasion from the U.S., and by parroting world-revolutionary slogans dictated by the Soviet Union. Castro recently announced the "inevitability of total war" and is planning to enlist more than 10% of the population into the army or militia. This exceeds the relative proportion of the U.S. population in military service during the Second World War.

Cubans' reaction to Castro's Marxist jingoism may be seen in rising opposition to serve in his army. More information on the costs of Castro's foreign adventures could have far-reaching effects on the Cubans on the island. The elites in the bureaucracy, industry, education, and even the military are largely uninformed of the costs of this aspect of Soviet imperialism. Cuba's long history of resistance to foreign domination strikes a deep chord in the Cuban psyche. Resistance to Soviet expansionism through Cuban, Vietnamese or East German proxies is a key goal of U.S. foreign policy. Radio Marti could play a significant role in this effort.

Third, and finally, the unique nature of the Cuban exile community in the U.S. could be of assistance to the establishment of Radio Marti. The experience of Cuban Americans differs in key respects from other immigrant groups. Though many groups of Americans can cite political repression as a factor in their history, the proximity of Cuba to the United States, the continuing flow of political refugees from the island, and the size of the exodus in relation to Cuba's population distinguish the Cuban community from other groups.

## Radio Broadcasts and the Refugee Problem

Coverage of issues surrounding the refugee process itself is of vital interest to Cubans in Cuba. Basic facts about the fate of their friends and relatives who have left the island are censored by the Havana media, raising fears for their loved ones.

Radio Marti itself need neither favor nor oppose leaving Cuba. In fact, by promoting the possibility of a non-communist regime some time in the future, it could serve to discourage further mass emigration. In this context, it is instructive to note that RFE/RL have a strict and explicit policy on the question of encouraging defections: "Avoidance of any programming that could be construed as encouraging defections. No information on 'how to defect' will be broadcast, and programs on defectors living in the West will carefully avoid any suggestion that others should follow their example."[29]

In Cuba, the potential for peaceful resistance is present, though Castro's systematic repression cannot be underestimated. Fostering a realistic view of the opposition's opportunities for action and hopes for future improvement would be an important function of Radio Marti.

Under Castro's regime, Cuban history has been misconstrued on the Procrustean bed of Marxist dialectic: the only imaginable future is an infinite progression of Communism. Radio Marti could serve as a forum for various interpretations of Cuban history, thus providing a range of speculation about Cuba's future. Awareness of a feasible political structure in which there are alternatives to blind obedience, or bleak and cynical resignation to oppression could be promoted by the operation of Radio Marti.

Another political function of Radio Marti could be preservation of the unity in the Cuban nation. As Cuba develops during many years of Castro's rule, and after his passing, there will be a critical role for an informed body of politically active Cubans, both in Cuba and abroad. Radio Marti, by fostering political diversity, could play a crucial role in the nation's development.

## Criteria for the Organization of Radio Marti

With the decision to establish broadcasting Cuba, it is necessary to determine an organizational structure which will implement this goal.

Four criteria are paramount in its organization:

1. Assurance of its accountability to the U.S. Government.
2. Establishment of its credibility and Cuban identity.
3. Maintenance of its flexibility in response to changing conditions in Cuba and shifts in U.S. policy.
4. Performance at a high technical standard to assure the widest possible audience.

First, there is an initial and continuing need for accountability to the U.S. Government. Radio Marti could be one of several initiatives aimed at containment of the Cuban regime. This does not mean that every broadcast would have to be reviewed by the Cuban desk of the Department of State. Rather, the stations' charters and operations would preserve its autonomy within the framework of U.S. policy. One illuminating analogy is the operation of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty which exercises broad discretion within a structure which is responsive to its Congressional mandate. RFE/RL's operations are administered by the Board of International Broadcasting. Members of the BIB are appointed by the President of the United States and subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate. This organizational framework could be expanded to accommodate Radio Marti.

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[29] BIB, Ibid., p. 36.

Establishment of credibility and Cuban identity of Radio Marti is absolutely necessary to the effectiveness of the station. It is also one of the most challenging tasks of the station's directors and management. A distinguished and broadbased directorship and advisory mechanism is crucial in establishing an authoritative reputation among the Cuban audience. The organization's prestige hinges on assembly of a management which is responsive to the entire spectrum of Cuban political life, without being dominated by one narrow group or another. In this way, it can preserve an image of being "above the battle, " and earn a reputation for impartiality which will assure its credibility and encourage a wide audience.

The Executive Order establishing Radio Marti mandated an eleven-member commission that will prepare guidelines for the station's operation. The commission's effectiveness would be enhanced if its membership included, in addition to those with an expertise on the Cuban situation, some of the following:

1) a former cabinet member or a well-known ambassador, or both;
2) a media person such as a distinguished syndicated columnist, or TV commentator;
3) an academician preferably with a background in Latin American affairs or international communications.

The administrative framework of Radio Marti must be designed to maintain its topicality and flexibility.

Flexibility in response to changing conditions is one key advantage of an independent entity. The management of the station should establish an alert network of links to the Cuban community so as to respond quickly to new developments. In contrast, VOA deals with a much wider spectrum. Radio Marti could speedily respond to developments in Cuba, and even act as an early-warning system for upcoming events. The information vacuum that exists under Castro's censorship provides many opportunities for an adept editorial staff to "scoop" the various official media.

One example of Radio Marti's possible flexibility could be its coverage of the current situation in Poland. Cord Meyer has written ". . . there is hard evidence that the successful assertion by Polish workers of their trade union rights has sent a shiver of apprehension through Castro's top command. Virtual silence by the Cuban media on this first real worker's revolution has created a void that the radio can fill with reminders that Cuban workers do not have to fear the Red Army on their borders."[32]

High technical performance is important to the station's operation. Careful study of the best propagating means, of the widest and clearest signal, and anticipation of potential jamming must not be overlooked.

## Commitment to Democracy and Human Rights

Commitment of Radio Marti to the principles of democracy and human rights may seem to be taken for granted in this country because of America's

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[30] Cord Meyer, op. cit

longstanding dedication to these principles. However, the Castro regime's hypocritical manipulation of human rights slogans in its defense of Communist repression in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean presents a special challenge in this area.

If the Castro regime's misrepresentations about human rights are not challenged individually, specifically and in detail, the Cuban citizenry will have no standard by which to judge them. Similarly, discrepancies between the Castro government's espousal of "the institutionalization" of the revolution and its practical disregard for application of legal procedures in its day-to day functioning must be illustrated by Radio Marti programming. As Cord Meyer wrote:

> It will be the radio's priority task to point out in detail to an uninformed Cuban public just how Castro has squandered massive amounts of Soviet aid in foreign military adventures while allowing living standards to deteriorate at home.
>
> Another target of opportunity for the radio is the true situation of Cuban troops fighting a dirty colonial war in distant Angola. A number of Cuban soldiers have already defected to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas, and the broadcast to Cuba of their first hand testimony could have dramatic repercussions.[31]

The mission statement of RFE/RL points the way to Radio Marti's political posture: "RFE and RL do not identify themselves with any opposition group, political party or organization located inside or outside the broadcast area. They expouse no single specific political, economic, or religious creed. They are, however, committed to respect for human rights and to the principles of democracy, including freedom of opinion, the rule of law and non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or nationality. They, likewise, are committed to free movement of people, goods and ideas between nations, and to peaceful negotiation of international conflicts. By observing high standards of accuracy, objectivity, and timeliness, RFE and RL programs should earn the respect, if not the agreement, of present and potential listeners from all social and political groups."[32]

## Reaching the Cubans

Radio Marti could go beyond the general effort to reach the people of Cuba to programming aimed at special audiences in Cuba like the youth sector, the labor movement, the bureaucracy, and the military.

Achievement of this goal would be facilitated by developing a comprehensive listener profile of the Cuban audience. This study would determine the interests and radio listening habits of the audience on the island according to characteristics such as age, sex, income and occupation. The information could be obtained by interviewing a sample of the most recent refugees from Cuba and adjusting the data to conform to the known demographic characteristics of the population now living in Cuba. Because of the huge size of the boatlift of refugees from Mariel harbor—almost 1.3% of the country's total population left the island last year—this technique could generate a reliable statistical evaluation of Radio Marti's audience. The fact that the persons to be interviewed in this study have emigrated so recently is crucial to the authenticity of the results.

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[31] Cord Meyer, op. cit.

[32] BIB op. cit.

The listener profile would be used to determine the best allocation of Radio Marti's funds among various types of programs, and to formulate transmission schedules that would assure that these programs would be heard by their intended audiences.

The information from the listener profile should be evaluated in light of what is already known about the Cuban audience, such as the crucial fact that half of Cuba's population is under 25 years old. Over their entire lives, these young Cubans have been subjected to a constant barrage of indoctrination through the mass media, proclaiming the victories of Castroism and the horrors of the moribund capitalist system. However, because little of their personal experience verifies this worldview, they have resorted to cynical resignation or skeptical mockery of the official line behind a facade of support for the regime.

As one commentator has written,[33] if Radio Marti is to reach the Cuban youth, it will not be enough to offer the information which is censored or distorted by the official media. To develop a broad audience, it would be appropriate to consider programs on humorous topics, music, poetry, sports news, women's issues, religion, and science. The programming policy of RFE/RL includes issues of concern to all mankind, such as environmental pollution, population growth, natural resource management, and the changing patterns of family life.

The station ought to operate on a non-political format because political slogans and exhortations have had a negative effect. Factual information with a minimum of rethoric should be the foundation of the political emphasis of the station. Policy guidelines for RFE/RL specifically prohibit ". . . emotionalism, vituperation, vindictiveness, stridency, belligerency, arrogance, pomposity, pretentiousness or condescension." These restraints also prescribe "Avoidance of sweeping generalization, propagandistic argumentations, gratuitious value judgments, unsupported criticism of the Communist system or its representatives"[34]

If Radio Marti were to become a highly politicized forum for anti-Castro polemics, its efforts would be counterproductive. Such a tone and format would remind the Cubans of the Cuban government's own Radio Progreso or Radio Liberacion. Such slogans and long political speeches would only provoke resentment from the Cuban audience.

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[33] Radio Marti: a Voice of Hope, Miguel Sales, *El Miami Herald* October 6, 1981

[34] BIB, op. cit., p. 36.

# CONCLUSION

In summary the policy implications of U.S. broadcasts to Cuba can be reduced to the following principles:

First, the creation of Radio Marti establishes that the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress have taken an affirmative step to contain the Cuban government's foreign adventures, and instituted a policy of opposition to domestic repression in Cuba.

As the experience of RFE-RL in the recent Polish crisis has shown, radio broadcasting can exert an important influence on domestic affairs in Communist countries at crucial stages in their development. The sudden inauguration of ad-hoc radio programs during international crises, as in the case of expanded VOA service to Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis, is no substitute for a continuing radio information presence. Radio listening habits must be built up over a period of time, and a reputation for credibility can only be earned after the audience has had an opportunity to assess the truthfulness of the broadcasts over the long run. Radio Marti will demonstrate that U.S. opposition to the Castro regime is not a sporadic response to occasional provocations but a principal feature of U.S. policy resulting from longstanding American ideals.

Second, through the dangers to the Cuban government of a freer flow or ideas is well known to officials of the Castro regime, it is not well understood in this country even in official circles. Radio Marti will serve as a forum for exchange of ideas about Cuban issues abroad and on the island.

The Cuban government's plan to build extensive jamming facilities, in response to the limited efforts of the VOA, demonstrates its fear of the political consequences of competition in the marketplace of ideas.

Third, Radio Marti serves as a response to Radio Moscow, which is now the only international radio service that prepares and broadcasts programs specifically directed to the Cuban audience.

Radio Marti's role as a counterweight to Radio Moscow's broadcast assumes additional importance in light of the volatile situation in Central America.

Fourth and finally, the method chosen to effect these ends is consistent with international law and accepted practice for the conduct of affairs between nations. The contrast between the fostering of political change through rational debate of the alternatives, advanced by Radio Marti, and the technique of coercion favored by the Cuban government at home and abroad is one that the Cubans will draw for themselves.

The issues surrounding the formation of Radio Marti will attract comment from many sectors. These responses must be reviewed from the standpoint of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean basin, and the role of Caribbean policy in the overall U.S. foreign affairs posture.

Radio Marti would be a moderate, efficient, and cost-effective tool in America's effort to oppose the growing belligerency of totalitarianism.

# CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION

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## A Commentary by Frank Calzon on the Report by the Congressional Research Service on Radio Marti

The proposal to establish a radio station (Radio Marti) to broadast to Cuba has sparked widespread interest and comment from diverse sectors of the foreign policy community, the broadcasting industry, and the press since its initial proposal by the Administration in September 1981. The legislation to establish the radio station has come under the jurisdiction or review of at least seven committees and subcommittees of Congress so far, and has raised important political, technical, and administrative issues. Because of the complexity of the issues involved, and the range of conflicting views on them, an objective study of the matter is necessary. With a view to supplying that need, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested a study by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) on Radio Marti.

Unfortunately, a close reading of the CRS report on Radio Marti indicates that it is nothing less than a lengthy polemic against the proposal disguised as a scholarly paper. The techniques used by the authors include:

(1) Selective use of quotations and sources to promote premises which undermine the rationale for the station;

(2) Specious arguments to the effect that the Castro regime enjoys wide popular support in Cuba, which is unlikely to be affected by the radio station;

(3) Techniques of citation calculated to impune the objectivity of supporters of the proposal; and

(4) Weighting of the arguments to present an overall impression that the station will be an ineffective means for influencing the Cuban people.

### BIAS IN REPORT'S SUMMARY

The imbalance of the perspective presented in the report is particularly glaring in the summary provided at the beginning, which devotes one half page to the rationale for the establishment of the station, and two full pages to arguments against the project. In the summary—which is the part most likely to be read by busy decisionmakers—the authors refer condescendingly to the goal of the station as that of "broadcasting information which is allegedly not provided through Cuba's state-controlled media." [1] In reality, the distortion and censorship of the information provided by the Cuban Government's media are established facts. For example, the last State Department report on human rights prepared under the Carter Administration notes that "Under the 1976 [Cuban] constitution, the government may restrict any right or freedom when exercised in opposition to the state . . . The press and other media are owned and controlled by the party-state apparatus." [2] The same document cites a report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to the effect that "the legal system in Cuba prevents free expression and any expression of disagreement with the socialist system. There are individuals who are in prison for the mere fact of having expressed their opposition to the system." [3]

This finding is corroborated by an interview published in Granma, Cuba's official newspaper, on October 29, 1978, which says that there is no censorship in Cuba because ". . . Only attacks on the revolution are censored." [4]

The conditions of press freedom in Cuba, which are described by the CRS report as "greater than Radio Marti proponents indicate," [5] have been denounced by the prestigious Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), a hemispheric grouping of newspaper editors and publishers. The IAPA passed a resolution at its 1981 General Assembly which recognized the Cuban Government's "absolute control of public information under conditions leading to massive indoctrination" and the imprisonment in Cuba of certain journalists for over 20 years.[6]

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[1] Nina M. Serafino, Marcia S. Smith, and David R. Siddall, Radio Marti, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1982, p. 1.

[2] U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 397.

[3] Ibid., p. 404.

[4] Interview, Granma, Oct. 29, 1970.

[5] Serafino, et al., op. cit., p. 30.

[6] Inter-American Press Association, XXVIII General Assembly, Rio de Janeiro, October 1981.

## DISSATISFACTION IN CUBA DOWNPLAYED

The CRS report's list of objections to the Radio Marti project begins with the statement that "Doubts have been raised concerning the degree of dissatisfaction with the Castro regime [in Cuba]." [7] The most striking evidence against this statement is the fact that more than 10 percent of the Cuban people have chosen to leave the island since the 1959 revolution. The CRS report confronts this fact with a startling piece of specious reasoning. The report notes that:

"Various U.S. press estimates of those who are so disaffected with life in Cuba that they wish to leave range from one to twenty percent of Cuba's ten million inhabitants. This would tend to indicate that at the least, *most of the people on the island actively or passively accept the government, or its ideology, or both* [emphasis added]." [8]

The CRS researchers thus ignore the substantial risks and penalties of attempting to emigrate from Cuba. Among the consequences of applying for an exit visa are loss of employment, expulsion from the university, and compulsory assignment to farm labor or menial work. A comprehensive inventory of all the applicant's possessions down to the last or smallest item, is made in preparation for total confiscation of the applicant's money and goods. Applicants are subjected to ostracism by their neighbors and colleagues at the behest of Communist Party and "mass" organization members.

The government sponsored local block committee holds an "Assembly of Repulsion" in front of the applicant's home, which can range from a stepped-up pep rally during which insults are hurled at the applicant and his family, to extreme cases in which the house is raided and vandalized. During the lengthy application process, the prospective emigrant's identity papers are marked with his outcast status, which can lead to restricted ration privileges and other forms of discrimination. These sanctions apply for as long as the applicant remains in Cuba, a period that can stretch on indefinitely. Cubans who attempt to leave the island without visas are jailed if caught, and often risk their lives in the treacherous Straits of Florida. Cubans who arrive in the United States, having undergone the anguish of leaving their homeland, friends, and family, face an uncertain future in a strange country with a different language.

Furthermore, the unwillingness to emigrate is not usually accepted as a measure of a government's support. If it were, tyrannical regimes would be considered to enjoy strong support by the peoples they oppress. If as many as 20 percent of Cuba's population is willing to suffer the rigors of emigration, how many Cubans would have to leave Cuba to satisfy the authors who point out that "doubts have been raised concerning the degree of dissatisfaction with the Castro regime * * *"? [CRS, p. 1]

## EMIGRATION FROM CUBA

The report also opposes the establishment of Radio Marti on the grounds that "the broadcasts could spark more waves of emigration." This reasoning ignores both the fact that emigration from Cuba is rigorously controlled by the Cuban Government, and the fact that the policies of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)—the models for Radio Marti—specifically ban broadcasts which would encourage defection or revolt.

According to the CRS report

"Castro may use the station to consolidate his backing. If perceived as politically threatening, the broadcasts could cause the Castro government to tighten its security apparatus. Or, stricter accountability might strengthen the system, if Cuban media respond by sharpening their own coverage and the central Havana government responds by correcting reported malpractices and corruption by local government." [9]

Here the researchers appear to have forgotten their initial inference about "doubts" as to "the degree of dissatisfaction with the Castro regime." Furthermore, any effort to publicize repression anywhere, whether in the Soviet Union or South Africa, could be said to have potentially the same effect: the regimes could tighten their security apparatus or "could respond by correcting reported malpractices. * * *"

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[7] Serafino, et al., op. cit., p. 1.
[8] Ibid., pp. 32ff.
[9] Ibid., p. 2.

The fundamental cause of Cuba's political problems is not the malfeasances of petty officials but the oppressive nature of the Cuban Government, which the Carter Administration's human rights report describes as "a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist state." [10]

### HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF BROADCASTING TO CUBA DISTORTED

In presenting the history of U.S. radio broadcasting to Cuba, the CRS report dwells on the deficiencies of other U.S. Government radio efforts, such as RFE/RL, which are described as "irritants in U.S.-Soviet relations." [11] This statement in a sense validates the effectiveness of these radio stations as a force for change in European Communist states.

The CRS report describes the history of CIA-funded radio stations in the early 1960's, at the time of the abortive U.S. attempts to overthrow Castro. Whatever the merits of the U.S. Government's policies toward Cuba more than 20 years ago, the report fails to put them in the context of U.S.-Cuban and U.S.-Soviet relations at the time, which were characterized by extreme tension as a result of the missile crisis and of Castro's training and financing of guerrilla action in Latin America.[12]

In its discussion and current Cuban military efforts in Central America and Africa, the report downplays the opposition of the Cuban public to these efforts, citing low casualty rates among Cuban troops stationed in Angola and Ethiopia.[13]

The CRS report completely ignores Cuban and Soviet international radio broadcasts, which are on an ambitious scale and of an inflammatory nature. Radio Havana Cuba transmits a total of 48 hours and 30 minutes per day of broadcasting in seven languages. Cuban programs in Arabic are rebroadcast by Radio Moscow to the Middle East, where they support extreme Arab factions and misrepresent U.S. peace efforts in this troubled region. The Cubans and Soviets together outbroadcast the United States by a ratio of 5 to 1 in terms of hours on the air. VOA broadcasts less than 6 hours per day to all of Latin America. The Soviet Union currently operates the only international radio service specifically targeted at Cuba. In the context of its discussion of Radio Swan (a discontinued CIA station which beamed to Cuba in the early 1960's), the report fails to mention comparable Cuban Government efforts, such as Radio Dixie, which encouraged blacks in the United States to revolt against the U.S. Government.

### FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF OPPONENTS OF RADIO MARTI

The passages in the CRS report from the testimony of the most frequently quoted opponent [14] of Radio Marti compose an overall apology for the Castro regime, and cover areas not germane to the central issue of the paper. For example, one passage advocates improved U.S.-Cuban relations because of the possible beneficial effect on Cuban journalism.[15] This argument is in itself questionable, as six decades of full diplomatic relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. have not noticeably improved the Soviet press.

The CRS report downplays the potential effectiveness of Radio Marti by citing a patronizing report on the interests of the Cuban people:

"* * * general Cuban audiences are not particularly sophisticated and are not particularly concerned about international geopolitics or national economic policy. Cubans, like most people of the world, are concerned about potholes in their street, availability of certain commodities in their neighborhood store, local social events and other day-to-day concerns." [16]

This passage ignores the fact that in 1959, before Castro came to power. "* * * Cuba had between sixty and seventy newspapers—eighteen well-established dailies in Havana alone—some of which were read daily (because of the good railways) throughout the island. The twenty-eight main newspapers claimed a circulation of 580,000." [17] However, by the end of 1960, Castro's government had already taken over Cuba's entire media. Due to the manner in which international affairs are presented in the government-controlled press, there is a hunger for the kind of information that both RFE/RL now provide to Eastern Europe.

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[10] U.S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 397.

[11] Serafino, et al., op. cit., p. 17.

[12] Ibid., p. 20.

[13] Ibid., p. 40.

[14] William M. Leogrande, director of political science at American University, in Serafino, et al., Radio Marti, op. cit., pp. 36, 40, 41, and 47.

[15] Serafino, et al., op. cit. p. 47.

[16] John Nichols, Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at the Pennsylvania State University School of Journalism, in Serafino, et al., op. cit., p. 29.

[17] Hugh Thomas, "The Cuban Revolution," New York, NY: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1977, pp. 354, 355.

### UNFAVORABLE TREATMENT OF RADIO MARTI SUPPORTERS

A particularly insidious aspect of the CRS report is its attempt to discredit proponents of Radio Marti by omitting their professional credentials. While opponents of the project and apologists for the Castro government are cited as a "noted scholar," [18] "Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Studies," [19] and "Director of political science," [20] the only academician who is quoted in a context favorable to Radio Marti is referred to simply as "a Cuban exile." [21] The scholar in question, Dr. Carlos Ripoll, is a Professor of Romance Languages and Literature at Queens College, holds four degrees, and is the author of many books and scholarly articles. A quote by Professor Ripoll in the CRS report was taken from an essay published in the prestigous Partisan Review. The CRS report cites instead only a reprint of the Partisan Review essay by the Cuban American National Foundation.

The imbalance of the CRS report is especially blatant where it identifies those cited in the report. The CRS report identifies Professor Jorge Domínguez as "a noted scholar" whose views raised questions about the feasibility of Radio Marti. Carlos Ripoll, who has written about censorship and intellectual repression in Cuba, is identified as "a Cuban exile." Both professors Domínguez and Ripoll are Cuban emigres who now teach at American universities.

### FAVORABLE PRESS COMMENT OMITTED

The authors of the CRS report limit arguments in favor of Radio Marti by omitting evidence of press support for the project. For example, selections from the Miami Herald are chosen to emphasize possible difficulties Radio Marti could encounter. Conspicuously absent from the citations of the Herald's coverage is a lead editorial titled "A Radio Free Cuba? Si!" which stated that "There is no freedom of expression in Cuba * * * the U.S. Government has a right—even a duty—to fill the void by broadcasting to Castro's captives." [22] Citations in the CRS paper of an editorial from the Wall Street Journal dwell on the potential difficulties the station could face, which the *Journal* termed "little controversies * * * which shouldn't * * * stand in the way of getting something like the Cuban enterprise off the ground * * * [t]he country needs something like Radio Free Cuba." [23] Favorable comments go unmentioned; like those on the op-ed pages of the Christian Science Monitor:

"It is astonishing that after 22 years of Castro, the U.S. still has not set up for Cuba the kind of hard-hitting, objective, round-the-clock broadcasting operation that Radio Free Europe has provided for Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe since 1950. It is still not too late to do so. Broadcasts to Cuba could be supplemented by English and Spanish services for the entire Caribbean and Central American region. The U.S. looks inept when it does nothing to counter the Soviet broadcasts which are now relaying out of Havana to Latin America as well as to the U.S. and Canada." [24]

Also neglected were views published in the New Orleans Times-Picayune which stated that "A serious effort to challenge Castro's manipulation of Cuban opinion through his control of the mass media is long overdue." [25]

### BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR RADIO MARTI IGNORED

The CRS report misrepresents the extent of support for Radio Marti by limiting its citations of backing for Radio Marti to Administration witnesses, conservative groups, and the Cuban American community. Favorable comments by Congressional leaders are either minimized or omitted altogether. The Radio Marti issue has united Congressmen of such diverse political persuasions as Mr.

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[18] Serafino, et al., op. cit., p. 28.

[19] Ibid., p. 29.

[20] Ibid., p. 36.

[21] Ibid., p. 32.

[22] "A Radio Free Cuba? Si!," the Miami Herald, Sept. 25, 1981.

[23] "Talking to the Cubans," the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 27, 1981.

[24] Paul B. Henze, "Put the U.S. Back in Government Information," the Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 1981

[25] Cord Meyer, "High Hopes for Radio Marti," Times-Picayune, New Orleans, Oct. 2, 1981.

Jack Kemp of New York (conservative Republican) and Mr. Tom Lantos of California (liberal Democrat), who joined in urging their colleagues "to vote for (Radio Marti) * * * Radio Marti is a project badly needed and long overdue."[26] Also voting to establish Radio Marti are liberal Democrats such as Congressman Michael D. Barnes, Chairman of the House Subcommittee for Inter-American Affairs (who stated during hearings on Radio Marti that it would be unwise to deny the Administration this peaceful option in dealing with the current crisis in the Caribbean).

Congressman Dante Fascell of Florida wrote to his fellow Congressmen that "the need for such a new broadcasting effort is clear."[27]

### SUPPORT FOR RADIO MARTI OMITTED

Expressions of support for Radio Marti by non-governmental organizations are also virtually absent from the report. Among the examples of such statements in favor of the project are a study commissioned by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority [an organization led by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) and Henry M. Jackson (D-WA)], which called for "a Radio Free Cuba of the intelligence, imagination, and skill of Radio Free Europe."[28] The South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association passed a resolution stating that "whereas the * * * Association recognizes the need for the truth to be heard on the island of Cuba * * * the Association does now support the concept of Radio Marti * * *."[29] Additionally, the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party in Conference at the recent Democratic "miniconvention" in Philadelphia passed a resolution endorsing the Radio Marti project, stating: "We support the establishment of a Radio Free Cuba (Radio Marti) for broadcasting to the people of Cuba."[30]

Also available to the CRS, and unmentioned in the report, was a resolution by the Inter-American Press Association, which stated the Association's determination "to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective."[31]

### CONCLUSION

This pattern of biased analysis of the Radio Marti issue is extremely inappropriate, considering its source and the role of the Congressional Research Service. The U.S. Congress relies on the CRS for factual, even-handed research on legislative affairs. Because of its record for scholarly objectivity, the CRS has earned a reputation for impartiality in Congress. For this reason, its reports are not subject to the critical examination which testimony by other U.S. government agencies or private persons and organizations undergo in the legislative process. It is at the least very disappointing to see this good reputation abused by the biased advocacy presented by the authors of this report.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, sir.

Senator Pressler, I commented, I think before you arrived, that these are probably the most eloquent witnesses, the two panels that we have had the privilege of hearing today, that I have heard since I have been in the Senate. Not only do they have divergent opinions, but each has stated his or her opinion in a concise and cogent way. It has been very helpful to me.

We welcome you here today, Senator, and if you have questions we would be happy to receive them.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you. I will briefly ask one question and will leave it at that, if I may.

Senator HELMS. Fine.

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[26] Congressmen Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Jack Kemp (R-NY), letter to members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, June 11, 1982.

[27] Congressman Dante B. Fascell, letter to members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mar. 23, 1982.

[28] Prof. Hugh Thomas, "Coping With Cuba," Washington, D.C.: Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 1981, p. 13.

[29] South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association Resolution, 1981.

[30] Resolution in support of Radio Free Cuba, Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party in Conference in Philadelphia, June 25, 1982.

[31] Inter-American Press Association, op. cit.

Senator **Pressler**. I would like some comments from the panel, and I agree with what Senator Helms has said here. I did not hear all of the witnesses, but I read some of the testimony. And I thank the witnesses very much.

Mr. Nicolaides, during your tenure at VOA you wrote a memorandum that advocated that VOA should strive to destabilize the Soviet Union and its satellites by promoting disaffection between peoples and rulers. That is according to the quote that I have.

Should the mission of Radio Marti be to destabilize the present Cuban Government? I would ask that not necessarily in relationship to your memo, but would that be one of our missions or would that be one of the natural results, and should it be?

Mr. **Nicolaides**. Senator, I would be very happy to answer that. The word "destabilization," like the word "propaganda," is subject to many different interpretations. The Washington Post was alarmed when I used the word "propaganda" in a private memo which they somehow obtained. But their style manual defines the ICA as "the propaganda machine of the United States." Apparently when they use it in their style manual it is OK.

Yes; I hope we can destabilize, that is to say dislodge from the Cuban people, the incubus of a totalitarian dictator. I do not think America, which was born in a revolution against an oppressive rule, should fail to encourage people who seek freedom to seek it by whatever means they can, whether it is a palace coup or a gradual pushing back of oppression—an evolution, as some people call it. However they can strive for freedom, we should encourage them.

I might add that the Soviet Union has always proclaimed, during periods when it was talking about détente and relaxation of tensions, that this never included any abating of their assistance to what they call wars of national liberation. In other words, they seek to win. They have never given up the goal which Khrushchev put so bluntly: "We will bury you and your grandchildren will live under the red flag of communism."

I submit the Nicolaides law of struggle is that in any struggle between two parties, if one side seeks above all else peace and the other side seeks above all else victory, regardless of the relative power of the two, the side that seeks victory will eventually win.

Yes; I hope and pray that we can be instrumental in helping the Cuban people to liberate themselves from the alien puppet, brutal, ruthless yoke, of Fidel Castro, who has more political prisoners in Cuba than all the rest of Latin America combined. I hope that we can assist the Cuban people by the sword of truth to break that stranglehold on their island.

Senator **Pressler**. Does anybody else have a comment on that question? Dr. Dillon, is this consistent with USIA and USICA missions today or previously?

Dr. **Dillon**. Did you want me to comment on that?

Senator **Pressler**. Yes.

Dr. **Dillon**. I would like to remind the committee that in 1956, when the Hungarian uprising took place, we found, much to our dismay, that the Hungarians had thought that the Voice of America and other radio broadcasting to Eastern Europe had encouraged them to rise against their Government, and also, with this encouragement along would come help.

Now, we did not help the Hungarians in 1956. I see no evidence that we are prepared to help the Cubans in 1982. Therefore, I would not see that the role of Radio Marti would be to encourage the Cubans to die on the streets to no avail, because so long as the military and the party are firmly in control of things in Cuba I don't think that this kind of uprising would really produce anything that would be effective.

Also, as far as I can see from the Commission's report, it specifically denied that it was the purpose of Radio Marti to engage in this kind of destabilization. It denied that it was trying to incite the Cubans to insurrection. It simply wanted them to become better informed about their own problems.

Mr. CALZON. Senator, I would like to comment on that. I think that the model for Radio Marti is not radio broadcasts by the United States back in 1956, because we have learned by that experience. The model is the current Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

I assume that most people agree that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have done a good job in broadcasting to Poland during the Polish crisis, for instance. So going back to 1956 I don't think makes a lot of sense.

Colonel DICKENS. I think there is a difference, a clear difference between providing the truth, that people do not have an opportunity to receive, and another thing giving them false hopes that somehow the United States is going to launch an invasion and give them support. I think that that was one of the differences that came up in 1956 in Hungary. I do not know just what was said, but I do remember the period. I think it was giving them false hopes.

But if the truth gives hope to people, certainly the United States ought to be in the business of giving hope to people that they can liberate themselves from the yoke of communism.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Are there further questions? Senator Hawkins?

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you.

I have a question for Mr. Nichols. Speaking as a journalist, do you believe in the impact of ideas, that it is ideas that provide the motivation for people's actions?

Mr. NICHOLS. No, Senator; I believe it is people who provide the motivation. They go out and search out the ideas.

The point of my testimony was that the true source of communication effects is in the audience and not in the communicator, that the communicator and the content of the message are nearly irrelevant compared to the power of the audience to make of that what they want.

Senator HAWKINS. Well, in your testimony you said that the audience, not the broadcaster, determines what is listened to.

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes.

Senator HAWKINS. This would seem to fly in the face of some testimony that we have heard. I do not know of a single person who listens to the radio in order to hear advertisements, ads, for instance. Yet hundreds of millions of dollars are spent by U.S. advertisers. That must make some kind of testimony to the fact that someone is absorbing information out there in this advertising time, even though that is not the prime reason that you would turn that radio on.

How do you explain that?

Mr. Nichols. As I say in my testimony, the research indicates that there is some potential. But, to the extent that there are communication effects, they are for very low involvement things, such as nearly identical brands of laundry soap, for example, where it does not make any difference whether you buy Ajax or Tide. They are both the same price and they both do the same thing. And communications research has found some effect in that area, very small but some effect.

But for high involvement things, such as family values, culture, ideology, and nationalism, there is no research that I know of that will establish a main line direct effect.

Senator Hawkins. With the small amount of information that the Cubans have had in the past, I would say that we have had over 125,000 Marielitos, as has been testified here today, come to Florida within a matter of months before Castro decided to cut off the flow. How many people do you think would have come had Castro not cut it off?

Mr. Nichols. I have no way of knowing what that would be. I have no way of making a judgment. I have done no personal research on that and I do not know anybody who has even ventured an estimate. I have seen some estimates to the effect that the political marginals in Cuba may number 1 million out of a population of 10 million. But I am simply reporting what I have heard from scholars, such as Jorge Dominguez at Harvard, and so on.

Senator Hawkins. Thank you.

Senator Helms. Thank you, Senator Hawkins.

I do have a question also, but first let me mention that during our earlier hearings this month on this subject of Radio Marti the distinguished chairman of this committee referred to a report which all of us had just received from the Library of Congress on the issues involved in Radio Marti. I saw it the first time when I came in shortly after the meeting began, and the chairman was praising it highly. In a general sort of way, he said it was expertly done, as I recall, and he referred to the scholars involved in the preparation of the report and its objective quality.

Well, I opened the report, and fortunately I took a speedreading course a few years ago and I was able to scan the first 8 or 10 pages. And I've got to say that the adjective "objective" did not seem to me to apply. I was reminded of a mythical book that somebody referred to many years ago in North Carolina, a book that he said he would like to read sometime, entitled "An Objective History of the War Between the States from a Southern Point of View."

So this report by the Library of Congress, with all due respect to the good people who work there, is in my judgment—this is purely subjective, I acknowledge—is not all that objective. I have some concern about that kind of thing being conveyed to the committee, and I at least think that there ought to be a dialog and examine whether it is in fact an objective treatment of the subject.

So I have written a letter to Mr. Boorstin at the Library of Congress and I want it to be made a matter of record in this hearing report, and without objection it will be.

[The material referred to follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
*Washington, D.C., July 27, 1982.*

Hon. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN,
*The Librarian of Congress,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR DR. BOORSTIN: In a recent report prepared in response to an inquiry from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Radio Marti, three analysts from the Library of Congress, Nina M. Serafino, Marcia S. Smith, and David R. Siddall, submitted a lengthy document dealing with various considerations and questions concerning Radio Marti.

We are writing this letter because we feel obligated to bring to your attention several instances of what we consider to be an unhappy departure from the norms of objectivity and professional scholarship which we in Congress have come to expect from the Library of Congress.

In fact, the Library of Congress' report frequently borders on "advocacy journalism," a tendency which we find most unwelcome and which ill serves the needs of Senators of all persuasions to understand the factual and objective bases on which any discussion of Radio Marti should be based.

We are enclosing some comments which have been drawn up at our request—for your information and comment. We hope that you will take the time to look at the passages in question yourself, because we have long regarded you as one of America's finest scholars, whose standards for objective work are impeccable.

Once you have the opportunity to consider these comments, we would certainly welcome your own observations, and promise you that we will take them into account in our future consideration of the topic.

We are sorry that we have to write this letter, but we think you will agree that the situation demanded it. We look forward to your response, and remain

Sincerely,

JESSE HELMS.
RICHARD G. LUGAR.

Enclosure.

Comments on Sections IV, V, and VI, of the CRS Report Radio Marti.

### *Section IV, "Political Considerations and Possible Consequences"*

Two of the premises on which Radio Marti are based are not accurately stated (page 24).

Premise no. 1 states "that there is significant potential discontent in Cuba that has few or no outlets for expression * * *" It is not the limited outlets for expression that make Radio Marti relevant, but the fact that this discontent could be brought to bear more effectively on the Cuban government if more information were available to the Cuban people. Radio Marti will not provide additional outlets for expression. A criterion for judging Radio Marti should not be whether the Cubans lack, or are dissatisfied with, "channels to express dissent" (page 27). Radio Marti has nothing to do with this.

Premise no. 2 states "that the legitimacy of the Castro government and the revolution is now or would be widely questioned if full information were available to the Cuban people." The legitimacy of the Castro government is not at issue. It is not the intent of Radio Marti to raise the question of legitimacy but to try to influence the Cuban government by making more information available to the Cuban people. Since the assumption is that the Castro government will remain in power, the intent is to try to moderate it. The intent is not to overthrow it. Assistant Secretary Enders indicated this in his March 3 testimony (page 3). His comment that the Cuban government "rules not for the people but for itself" does not question the legitimacy of the Castro government, as asserted on page 25. Whether Radio Marti's purpose is realistic or not does not depend on whether Cubans regard their government and system as legitimate (page 27) but rather on whether they regard their way of life as satisfactory.

By relating Radio Marti to "channels of dissent" and by introducing the question of legitimacy, the CRS report subjects the Radio Marti proposal to judgmental criteria which are inaccurate, irrelevant and pejorative.

Section 3, "The Media" (pp. 30–31), appears to be self-contradictory.

Section F, "Possible Unstated Goals of Radio Marti" on page 41, should be left out, if this report is to be considered really impartial.

Likewise, paragraph No. 4, "Ambiguous Consequences," on page 46 is not only ambiguous but also pejorative.

The Report repeats the assertion on p. 45 that if the Cuban government uses coercive measures to block Cubans from listening to Radio Marti, this would make the USG " 'responsible' for raising the level of repression in Cuba." This assertion is particularly gratuitous and unfounded (page 45).

The real domestic costs of Cuban adventurism abroad, suggested by Professor LeoGrande to be minimal (page 40), could probably be more accurately determined by State or any other agency.

Section V, p. 54 first full paragraph: Bilateral talks were held in *September 1980 and* April and August 1981.

Section VI of the study quotes extensively from the 1959 ITU Convention and Annexed Radio Regulations. The Radio Regulations were extensively modified at a world conference in 1979 and are before the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The ITU Convention is a separate document which has been revised twice since 1959–1965 at Montreux, Switzerland and in 1973 at Malaga-Torremolines, Spain. The quotes in the study are of fundamental principles underlying the activities of the Union which have changed very little since 1959, but there have been minor word changes to the provisions quoted.

On pages 70–71, the ITU Convention and Radio Regulations and the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement are cited as the two treaties which apply to the AM radio band. Since 1968 the United States has had an AM agreement with Mexico entitled "Radio Broadcasting in Standard Band and Pre-Sunrise and Post-Sunset Operations."

I would recommend that the statement on page 74 regarding Radio Regulation No. 423 be mitigated using information previously assembled.

### *Section VI, "Legal Provisions"*

With regard to Section VI and the reference to Annexed Radio Regulation No. 423 on page 74, it should be made clear that while this Regulation states that "in principle" the AM band is for domestic service, in practice it is well established that this band is also used for international broadcasting. The BBC, Deutsche Welle (West Germany), RFE, VOA, Radio Moscow and Radio Havana all use the AM band in addition to shortwave for their international broadcasts. Radio Marti's use of 1040 kHz would be entirely legal. It would not violate any U.S. treaty obligations, as asserted by the *Washington Post*. In fact, U.S. use of 1040 has already been accepted by the ITU as part of the frequency assignment plan.

### THE REPORT BY THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ON RADIO MARTI

The proposal to establish a radio station (Radio Marti) to broadcast to Cuba has sparked widespread interest and comment from diverse sectors of the foreign policy community, the broadcasting industry, and the press since its initial proposal by the Administration in September 1981. The legislation to establish the radio station has come under the jurisdiction or review of at least seven committees and subcommittees of Congress so far, and has raised important political, technical, and administrative issues. Because of the complexity of the issues involved, and the range of conflicting views on them, an objective study of the matter is necessary. With a view to supplying that need, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested a study by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) on Radio Marti.

Unfortunately, a close reading of the CRS report on Radio Marti indicates that it is nothing less than a lengthy polemic against the proposal disguised as a scholarly paper. The techniques used by the authors include:

(1) Selective use of quotations and sources to promote premises which undermine the rationale for the station.

(2) Specious arguments to the effect that the Castro regime enjoys wide popular support in Cuba, which is unlikely to be affected by the radio station.

(3) Techniques of citation calculated to impugn the objectively of supporters of the proposal.

(4) Weighing of the arguments to present an overall impression that the station will be an ineffective means for influencing the Cuban people.

The imbalance of the perspective presented in the report is particularly glaring in the summary provided at the beginning, which devotes one half page to the rationale for the establishment of the station, and two full pages of arguments against the project. In the summary—which is the part most likely to be read by busy decisionmakers—the authors refer condescendingly to the goal of the station as that of "broadcasting information which is *allegedly* not provided through Cuba's state-controlled media [emphasis added]." [1] In reality, the distortion and censorship of the information provided by the Cuban government's media are established facts. For example, the last State Department report on human rights prepared under the Carter Administration notes that "Under the 1976 [Cuban] constitution, the government may restrict any right or freedom when exercised in opposition to the state. * * * The press and other media are owned and controlled by the party-state apparatus." [2] The same document cites a report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to the effect that "the legal system in Cuba prevents free expression and any expression of disagreement with the socialist system. There are individuals who are in prison for the mere fact of having expressed their opposition to the system." [3] This finding is corroborated by an interview published in *Granma*, Cuba's official newspaper, on October 29, 1978, which says that there is no censorship in Cuba because "* * * Only attacks on the revolution are censored." [4]

The conditions of press freedom in Cuba, which are described by the CRS report as "greater than Radio Marti proponents indicate," [5] have been denounced by the prestigious Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), a hemispheric grouping of newspaper editors and publishers. The IAPA passed a resolution at its 1981 General Assembly which recognized the Cuban government's "absolute control of public information under conditions leading to massive indoctrination" and the imprisonment in Cuba of certain journalists for over 20 years.[6]

The CRS report's list of objections to the Radio Marti project begins with the statement that "Doubts have been raised concerning the degree of dissatisfaction with the Castro regime [in Cuba]." [7] The most striking evidence against this statement is the fact that more than 10% of the Cuban people have chosen to leave the island since the 1959 revolution. The CRS report confronts this fact with a startling piece of specious reasoning. The report notes that:

"Various U.S. press estimates of those who are so disaffected with life in Cuba that they wish to leave range from one to twenty percent of Cuba's ten million inhabitants. This would tend to indicate that at the least, *most of the people on the island actively or passively accept the government, or its ideology, or both* [emphasis added]." [8]

The CRS researchers thus ignore the substantial risks and penalties of attempting to emigrate from Cuba. Among the consequences of applying for an exit visa are loss of employment, expulsion from the university, and compulsory assignment to farm labor or menial work. A comprehensive inventory of all the applicant's possessions down to the last or smallest item, is made in preparation for total confiscation of the applicant's money and goods. Applicants are subjected to ostracism by their neighbors and colleagues at the behest of Communist party and "mass" organization members.

The government sponsored local block committee holds an "Assembly of Repulsion" in front of the applicant's home, which can range from a stepped-up pep rally during which insults are hurled at the applicant and his family, to extreme cases in which the house is raided and vandalized. During the lengthy application process, the prospective emigrant's identity papers are marked with his outcast status, which can lead to restricted ration privileges and other forms of discrimination. These sanctions apply for as long as the applicant remains in Cuba, a period that can stretch on indefinitely. Cubans who attempt to leave the island without visas are jailed if caught, and often risk their lives in the treacherous Straits of Florida. Cubans who arrive in the U.S., having undergone the anguish of leaving their homeland, friends, and family, face an uncertain future in a strange country with a different language.

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[1] Nina M. Serafino, Marcia S. Smith, and David R. Siddall, Radio Marti, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1982, p. 1.

[2] U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 397.

[3] Ibid, p. 404.

[4] Interview, *Granma*, October 29, 1970.

[5] Serafino, et al, op. cit., p. 30.

[6] Inter-American Press Association, XXVIII General Assembly, Rio de Janeiro, October 1981.

[7] Serafino, et al, op. cit., p. 1.

[8] Ibid, pp. 32 ff.

Furthermore, the unwillingness to emigrate is not usually accepted as a measure of a government's support. If it were, tyrannical regimes would be considered to enjoy strong support by the peoples they oppress. If as many as 20% of Cuba's population is willing to suffer the rigors of emigration, how many Cubans would have to leave Cuba to satisfy the authors who point out that "doubts have been raised concerning the degree of dissatisfaction with the Castro regime * * *"? [CRS, p. 1]

The report also opposes the establishment of Radio Marti on the grounds that "the broadcasts could spark more waves of emigration." [8] This reasoning ignores both the fact that emigration from Cuba is rigorously controlled by the Cuban government, and the fact that the policies of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)—the models for Radio Marti—specifically ban broadcasts which would encourage defection or revolt.

According to the CRS report:

"Castro may use the station to consolidate his backing. If perceived as politically threatening, the broadcasts could cause the Castro government to tighten its security apparatus. Or, stricter accountability might strengthen the system, if Cuban media respond by sharpening their own coverage and the central Havana government responds by correcting reported malpractices and corruption by local government." [9]

Here the researchers appear to have forgotten their initial inference about "doubts" as to "the degree of dissatisfaction with the Castro regime." Furthermore, any effort to publicize repression anywhere, whether in the Soviet Union or South Africa, could be said to have potentially the same effect: the regimes could tighten their security apparatus or "could respond by correcting reported malpractices * * *"

The fundamental cause of Cuba's political problems is not the malfeasances of petty officials but the oppressive nature of the Cuban government, which the Carter Administration's human rights report describes as "a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist state." [10]

In presenting the history of U.S. radio broadcasting to Cuba, the CRS report dwells on the deficiencies of other U.S. government radio efforts, such as RFE/RL, which are described as "irritants in U.S.-Soviet relations." [11] This statement in a sense validates the effectiveness of these radio stations as a force for change in European Communist states.

The CRS report describes the history of CIA-funded radio stations in the early 1960's, at the time of the abortive U.S. attempts to overthrow Castro. Whatever the merits of the U.S. government's policies toward Cuba more than 20 years ago, the report fails to put them in the context of U.S.-Cuban and U.S.-Soviet relations at the time, which were characterized by extreme tension as a result of the missile crisis and of Castro's training and financing of guerrilla action in Latin America.[12]

In its discussion of current Cuban military efforts in Central America and Africa, the report downplays the opposition of the Cuban public to these efforts, citing low casualty rates among Cuban troops stationed in Angola and Ethiopia.[13]

The CRS report completely ignores Cuban and Soviet international radio broadcasts, which are on an ambitious scale and of an inflammatory nature. Radio Havana Cuba transmits a total of 48 hours and 30 minutes per day of broadcasting in seven languages. Cuban programs in Arabic are rebroadcast by Radio Moscow to the Middle East, where they support extreme Arab factions and misrepresent U.S. peace efforts in this troubled region. The Cubans and Soviets together outbroadcast the U.S. by a ratio of 5 to 1 in terms of hours on the air. VOA broadcasts less than 6 hours per day to *all of Latin America*. The Soviet Union currently operates the only international radio service specifically targeted at Cuba. In the context of is discussion of Radio Swan (a discontinued CIA station which beamed to Cuba in the early 1960's), the report fails to mention comparable Cuban government efforts, such as Radio Dixie, which encouraged blacks in the U.S. to revolt against the U.S. Government.

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[9] Ibid, p. 2.
[10] U.S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 397.
[11] Serafino, et al, op. cit., p. 17.
[12] Ibid, p. 20.
[13] Ibid, p. 40.

The passages in the CRS report from the testimony of the most frequently quoted opponent[14] of Radio Marti compose an overall apology for the Castro regime, and cover areas not germane to the central issue of the paper. For example, one passage advocates improved U.S.-Cuban relations because of the possible beneficial effect on Cuban journalism.[15] This argument is in itself questionable, as six decades of full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have not noticeably improved the Soviet press.

The CRS report downplays the potential effectiveness of Radio Marti by citing a patronizing report on the interests of the Cuban people:

"* * * general Cuban audiences are not particularly sophisticated and are not particularly concerned about international geopolitics or national economic policy. Cubans, like most people of the world, are concerned about potholes in their street, availability of certain commodities in their neighborhood store, local social events and other day-to-day concerns."[16]

This passage ignores the fact that in 1959, before Castro came to power, "* * * Cuba had between sixty and seventy newspapers—eighteen well-established dailies in Havana alone—some of which were read daily (because of the good railways) throughout the island. The twenty-eight main newspapers claimed a circulation of 580,000."[17] However, by the end of 1960, Castro's government had already taken over Cuba's entire media. Due to the manner in which international affairs are presented in the government-controlled press, there is a hunger for the kind of information that both RFE/RL now provide to Eastern Europe.

A particularly insiduous aspect of the CRS report is its attempt to discredit proponents of Radio Marti by omitting their professional credentials. While opponents of the project and apologists for the Castro government are cited as a "noted scholar,"[18] "Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Studies,"[19] and "Director of political science,"[20] the only academician who is quoted in a context favorable to Radio Marti is referred to simply as "a Cuban exile."[21] The scholar in question, Dr. Carlos Ripoll, is a Professor of Romance Languages and Literature at Queens College, holds four degrees, and is the author of many books and scholarly articles. A quote by Professor Ripoll in the CRS report was taken from an essay published in the prestigious *Partisan Review*. The CRS report cites instead only a reprint of the *Partisan Review* essay by the Cuban American National Foundation.

The imbalance of the CRS report is especially blatant where it identifies those cited in the report. The CRS report identifies Professor Jorge Dominguez as "a noted scholar" whose views raised questions about the feasibility of Radio Marti. Carlos Ripoll, who has written about censorship and intellectual repression in Cuba, is identified as "a Cuban exile." Both professors Dominguez and Ripoll are Cuban emigres who now teach at American universities.

The authors of the CRS report limit arguments in favor of Radio Marti by omitting evidence of press support for the project. For example, selections from *The Miami Herald* are chosen to emphasize possible difficulties Radio Marti could encounter. Conspicuously absent from the citations of *The Herald's* coverage is a lead editorial titled "A Radio Free Cuba? Si!" which stated that "There is no freedom of expression in Cuba * * * the U.S. government has a right—even a duty—to fill the void by broadcasting to Castro's captives."[22] Citations in the CRS paper of an editorial from *The Wall Street Journal* dwell on the potential difficulties the station could face, which the *Journal* termed "little controversies * * * which shouldn't * * * stand in the way of getting something like the Cuban enterprise off the ground * * * [t]he country needs something like Radio Free Cuba."[23] Favorable comments go unmentioned; like those on the op-ed pages of *The Christian Science Monitor*:

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[14] William M. LeoGrande, director of political science at American University, in Serafino, et al, *Radio Marti*, op. cit., pp. 36, 40, 41, and 47.

[15] Serafino, et al, op. cit., p. 47.

[16] John Nichols, Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at the Pennsylvania State University School of Journalism, in Serafino, et al, op. cit., p. 29.

[17] Hugh Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, New York, N.Y.: Harper and Rowe, Publishers, 1977, pp. 354, 355.

[18] Serafino, et al, op. cit., p. 28.

[19] Ibid, p. 29.

[20] Ibid, p. 36.

[21] Ibid, p. 32.

[22] "A Radio Free Cuba? Si!," *The Miami Herald*, September 25, 1981.

"It is astonishing that after 22 years of Castro, the U.S. still has not set up for Cuba the kind of hard-hitting, objective, round-the-clock broadcasting operation that Radio Free Europe has provided for Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe since 1950. It is still not too late to do so. Broadcasts to Cuba could be supplemented by English and Spanish services for the entire Caribbean and Central American region. The U.S. looks inept when it does nothing to counter the Soviet broadcasts which are now relaying out of Havana to Latin America as well as to the U.S. and Canada."[24]

Also neglected were views published in the New Orleans *Times-Picayune* which stated that "A serious effort to challenge Castro's manipulation of Cuban opinion through his control of the mass media is long overdue."[25]

The CRS report misrepresents the extent of support for Radio Marti by limiting its citations of backing for Radio Marti to Administration witnesses, conservative groups, and the Cuban American community. Favorable comments by Congressional leaders are either minimized or omitted altogether. The Radio Marti issue has united Congressmen of such diverse political persuasions as Mr. Jack Kemp of New York (conservative Republican) and Mr. Tom Lantos of California (liberal Democrat), who joined in urging their colleagues "to vote for (Radio Marti) * * * Radio Marti is a project badly needed and long overdue."[26] Also voting to establish Radio Marti are liberal Democrats such as Congressman Michael D. Barnes, Chairman of the House Subcommittee for Inter-American Affairs (who stated during hearings on Radio Marti that it would be unwise to deny the Administration this peaceful option in dealing with the current crisis in the Caribbean).

Congressman Dante Fascell of Florida wrote to his fellow Congressmen that "the need for such a new broadcasting effort is clear."[27]

Expressions of support for Radio Marti by non-governmental organizations are also virtually absent from the report. Among the examples of such statements in favor of the project are a study commissioned by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority [an organization led by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY) and Henry M. Jackson (D-WA)], which called for "a Radio Free Cuba of the intelligence, imagination, and skill of Radio Free Europe."[28] The South Florida Broadcasters Association passed a resolution stating that "whereas the . . . Association recognizes the need for the truth to be heard on the island of Cuba . . . the Association does now support the concept of Radio Marti. . . ."[29] Additionally, the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party in Conference at the recent Democratic "miniconvention" in Philadelphia passed a resolution endorsing the Radio Marti project, stating: "We support the establishment of a Radio Free Cuba (Radio Marti) for broadcasting to the people of Cuba."[30]

Also available to the CRS, and unmentioned in the report, was a resolution by the Inter-American Press Association, which stated the Association's determination "to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective."[31]

This pattern of biased analysis of the Radio Marti issue is extremely inappropriate, considering its source and the role of the Congressional Research Service. The U.S. Congress relies on the CRS for factual, even-handed research on legislative affairs. Because of its record for scholarly objectivity, the CRS has earned a reputation for impartiality in Congress. For this reason, its reports are not subject to the critical examination which testimony by other U.S. government agencies or private persons and organizations undergo in the legislative process. It is at the least very disappointing to see this good reputation abused by the biased advocacy presented by the authors of this report.

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[23] "Talking to the Cubans," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 27, 1981.

[24] Paul B. Henze, "Put the U.S. Back in Government Information," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 2, 1981.

[25] Cord Meyer, "High Hopes for Radio Marti," *Times-Picayune*, New Orleans, October 2, 1981.

[26] Congressmen Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Jack Kemp (R-NY), letter to members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, June 11, 1982.

[27] Congressman Dante B. Fascell, letter to members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 23, 1982.

[28] Professor Hugh Thomas, *Coping With Cuba*, Washington, D.C.: Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 1981, p. 13.

[29] South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association Resolution, 1981.

[30] Resolution in support of Radio Free Cuba, Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party in Conference in Philadelphia, June 25, 1982.

[31] Inter-American Press Association, op. cit.

Senator **Helms**. Now, let me say a couple of things in addition. I have a friend in Florida, a former Ambassador to Cuba. As a matter of fact, he was an Ambassador at the time just prior to the fall of Batista and the takeover by Fidel Castro. His name is Earl E. T. Smith. He is an intellectually sound man and certainly his dedication to freedom is not questioned by anybody.

He has an interesting commentary on what happened at the time Cuba fell into the hands of the Marxist, Castro. I recall Herbert Matthews, Edward R. Murrow, and various others going to Cuba and coming back and reporting to the people of this country that this man is no Communist, he is no Marxist; he is an agrarian reformer.

Well, the first thing that I recall Castro having said after he took over was, "I have been a Marxist, I am now a Marxist, and I always will be a Marxist." That caused him to question the objectivity of the New York Times and CBS and the other major news media who to this good day have difficulty, it seems to me, in focusing any attention on the threat of Marxism in this world.

It happened in Vietnam. It is happening right now in Central America. The bad guys, in terms of the major news media of this country, are the people who are anti-Communist, and everything they do is wrong. You never hear a mumbling word about the Marxist terrorists in El Salvador, who are slaughtering literally thousands of people.

We passed a resolution in the Senate of the United States just this afternoon which was totally deficient in terms of balance, on the requirement of certification by the President of the United States with respect to the Government of El Salvador.

Now, I wish that Ambassador Smith were here so that he could testify as to the validity of the concept of Radio Marti, because he has been there, he saw what happened. And furthermore, I will say for the record, as Ambassador Smith has said himself, that he was circumvented, as Ambassador to Cuba from the United States, in even getting information to the President of the United States, who was his good friend. It ended up in some file cabinet in the U.S. State Department at the time.

So that is what we are dealing with.

Now, let me say that I do not mind opinions that are contrary to my own. But I will say to those assembled here and for the record that if we do not wake up pretty quickly to note the possibility of a Marxist takeover in Central America, but the probability of it, then we will do so at our own peril.

Professor Nichols, you testified, I believe, on April 2 before the House Appropriations Committee. Is that correct?

Mr. **Nichols**. Yes, sir, I believe so.

Senator **Helms**. Let me read you a few sentences to see if you can identify the author. And I am quoting:

> When Cuban revolutionaries, Fidel Castro and Ernesto Guevara discussed Guevara's proposal for establishing a rebel radio station, the guerrilla movement was faltering. The purchase of even a small dilapidated radio transmitter would be a major investment.

Then I will skip on down:

> But on February 24, 1958, most of the technical problems had been solved. Radio Rebelde officially went on the air. Before the end of the year, Radio Rebelde could be heard throughout the country and much of the Caribbean.

**Each night, eager to hear something uncensored by the incumbent government of Batista, a growing number of Cubans would listen to a barrage of bulletins. Not only was Radio Rebelde an effective news and propaganda medium, but it eventually became one of the most important operation tools and integrating forces of the guerrilla movement.**

Do you recognize those words?

Mr. NICHOLS. They are mine, Senator.

Senator HELMS. You wrote them?

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. So one time a radio facility is effective, and the other time it is not?

Mr. NICHOLS. That is my opinion, yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Nicolaides, you addressed yourself to Radio Liberty, VOA, and others. How do you respond to the misgivings of those who think that the funds for Radio Marti could be better spent elsewhere?

Mr. NICOLAIDES. Well, I would say that there could be no higher priority in terms of communication than communicating to those societies in which information is controlled and controlled by a hostile power.

I speculated in a memorandum, which has become public knowledge, that if the world was made up of countries that were basically friendly and peaceloving—even though they occasionally had a squabble about fishing rights or riparian rights or this sort of thing, but basically friendly nations—that I would seriously entertain the elimination altogether of federally funded international informational or propaganda programs.

I do not see any need for Canada, for example, to be broadcasting to us or for us to be broadcasting to Canada. We have our little differences from time to time, but we are basically friendly, and there is a free flow of private-sector information over the borders back and forth. There are millions of people who visit the United States every year and millions of Americans who go overseas, and they can come back with first-hand accounts, with books and other publications; we can watch the movies of other countries, they can watch ours.

The principal reason for having a communications agency is the danger that a closed hostile society poses. There can be closed societies which are not particularly hostile. There can be some little island somewhere where the government is very oppressive, but which has no hostile designs on us or on anybody else. It is deplorable, but I do not know that we should feel any obligation to undertake to ask the taxpayers to subsidize communicating with them. At least that seems to me a very reasonable theory.

Cuba, on the other hand, represents a clear and present danger to the United States. It is the closest salient of our unremitting foe, the Soviet Union. I use the word that President Kennedy used, "foe." I do not use the word, the detentized word, "potential adversaries." Indeed, that is a ludicrous word. Every nation in the world is a "potential" adversary. Canada is a potential adversary if a Castro-type government took over there.

But we have some not potential but very real adversaries that work tirelessly to accomplish our ruin. If we do not understand that and take what steps we can, in the areas we are strongest, we are simply fools, and we will deserve the defeat that will come to us. We are ideologically stronger, and our economic system is stronger. We should use our economic weapon to the fullest.

We believe in truth, open discourse and discussion, free access to information. We should try to enable the populations in oppressed societies to participate in that. That is the reason—and I believe there is an adequate justification, in fact, an urgency about communicating effectively with the people of Cuba. We have a tremendous advantage.

I might add, someone on the panel made, I think, a ludicrous analogy to the Tokyo Rose broadcasts to the Americans. The Americans had high morale. They were convinced that they were involved in a very just war, and therefore, obviously, they rejected propaganda. Anyone who knows the elements of psychology—and I taught it once, although I am not going to use any academic buzz-words like "bullet" theory to dazzle anybody—knows to put it quite simply, that when people have a strong morale, it is very hard to reach them with propaganda. They will tend to reject it.

But when people have a weak morale, when as, for example, in Batista Cuba there was a great deal of dissatisfaction, not, of course, comparable to that under Castro—we never had massive emigration of people from Cuba and it was much easier to get out under Batista than it is under Castro—but, in fact, when the people of our enemies are our allies, we should surely capitalize on this opportunity.

In World War II, the Japanese people and the German people, until close to the end, by and large were very enthusiastic or at least loyal to their rulers. We know from overwhelming evidence—the evidence that Lenin himself pointed out when he said that refugees are people who vote with their feet—we know that there is very low morale, very great dissatisfaction in the countries which are our enemies, which have declared themselves to be our enemies and which have been acting as our enemies consistently despite our efforts to delude ourselves into thinking that we can charm them.

I interviewed Lin Yu-tang in Taiwan only a few months before he died, and he told me a Chinese proverb. He said, "There is a Chinese proverb that it is a mistake to think that if you feed the hungry tiger meat he will soon become a vegetarian." [General laughter.]

Senator Hawkins, do you have any further questions?

Senator HAWKINS. Yes; I have several questions I may submit for the record, because I know we are operating under time constraints. But there is one I must ask Mr. Gomez.

How many people are in your organization? Do you have a membership?

Mr. GOMEZ. Well, we are not very well organized membership organization. But I think I could say fairly that there are several hundred Cuban Americans—that is, people of Cuban origin—who support our organization, have supported it over the last 5 or 6 years. I would say further that if we had the means and, I suppose, the inclination, which we have not had—we are a very modest citizens group—if we had those means and if we asserted them, I think there would be many thousands of Cubans in our community, Cuban Americans, who would also support, in general, the scope of the ideas that I presented here with regard to normalization of relations with Cuba.

Senator HAWKINS. Do you have meetings, noticed meetings, and invite people to your meetings?

Mr. GOMEZ. I am not sure what you mean. Do you mean public meetings or membership meetings?

Senator HAWKINS. Membership meetings.

Mr. GOMEZ. No; not in that formal sense. We are a loose network that operates largely in response and as a response to issues that arise concerning Cuba. We do have public meetings, activities in which we try to bring some of our ideas to larger segments of the public.

Senator HAWKINS. Then in answer to my question about how many members you have or people in your organization, you said hundreds?

Mr. GOMEZ. We have several hundred supporters, yes, Senator, active supporters.

Senator HAWKINS. Active supporters.

Mr. GOMEZ. We have a much larger mailing list. But I do not think that I should include that.

Senator HAWKINS. Do they pay dues? Do they pay to belnog?

Mr. GOMEZ. The much larger mailing list, no.

Senator HAWKINS. Does your organization take positions on matters that deal with U.S. policy?

Mr. GOMEZ. In relation to Cuba, yes.

Senator HAWKINS. You did today, of course, in your statement on the radio broadcasting to Cuba. I understand also you have taken a position on normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. Had your committee ever taken a position such as human rights violations in Cuba?

Mr. GOMEZ. Not as a group, Senator.

Senator HAWKINS. A position on Castro's foreign military activities in Africa?

Mr. GOMEZ. No; not as a group. It might divide our group if we attempted to take a number of positions on issues like that.

Senator HELMS. Would you repeat that, please?

Mr. GOMEZ. There is a wide diversity of opinion within our committee.

Senator HELMS. I did not understand your answer, sir.

Mr. GOMEZ. I said there is a wide diversity of opinion within our committee and its supporters. If we attempted to take positions on issues such as Cuban activities in Africa, it might divide the efforts of our committee in favor of normalization, which we think can be separated from the Africa issue and a number of other issues as well, including human rights.

Senator HELMS. If the Senator would yield. And I ask this not in any adversarial way at all. But have you ever taken a position against Castro on any issue?

Mr. GOMEZ. Yes, Senator, I am a Cuban exile. I came here because of Castro.

Senator HELMS. I am sorry, I did not understand?

Mr. GOMEZ. I said I came here because of Castro, because of the change in regime. I am a Cuban exile.

Senator HELMS. I understand. But has your committee taken any position against any action by Castro with reference to—well, she mentioned Angola, for example—have you been critical of Mr. Castro in any position that you have taken before Congress or elsewhere?

Mr. GOMEZ. Well, I think that I should probably correct what I said earlier. No; we have not taken positions advocating the overthrow of the Castro regime.

However, we have very actively and, to some extent, successfully since our formation, advocated the release of political prisoners, advocated emigration and visits to Cuba and a number of the issues that directly affected our community. And at one point, that, of course, was understood to be opposition to the Castro regime, particularly advocating the release of political prisoners, which we did. I am not sure if that answers your question more precisely.

Senator HELMS. Is that the only one?

Mr. GOMEZ. That is correct.

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. Well, let me apologize for having kept you here so long, but the testimony by each member of both panels has been most helpful to me and, I am sure, to other Senators. And the transcript will be available to all Senators who are members of the committee. I thank you all for coming, and I very much appreciate your help.

This committee will stand adjourned.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

### MR. SUMMERS' RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1.* Can you describe the problem of interference between United States and Cuban radio broadcasting in the region? What is the extent of interference? What stations are affected?

Answer. The problem and extent of Cuban interference to U.S. AM broadcasting is exhaustively considered in the NAB March 1 study, "Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcasting," a copy of which is attached for your information. The study details existing interference as well as proposed interference. Specific radio stations are identified.

Existing interference is particularly difficult to document. The best way is to identify Cuban radio station operating parameters and predict resulting interference accordingly. If it is not possible to identify Cuban operations, direct measurement of interference would be the logical alternative. Unfortunately, direct measurement of nighttime interference is not technically feasible and is in general quite difficult; primarily because of variations inherent in radio skywave propagation.

*Question 2.* The Cuban Government claims it was in the process of approaching the United States to discuss a resolution to the interference problem when the United States announced its intention to create Radio Marti. Would you please recount your impression of Cuba's willingness to negotiate in relation to the U.S. decision to create Radio Marti?

Answer. Bi-lateral discussions with Cuba took place in Washington August 24 thru 28, 1981. The State Department announced consideration of Radio Broadcasting to Cuba on August 26, precisely in the middle of the discussions. Attached is the press report of that announcement which appeared in the *New York Times* on August 27, 1981. While NAB was not directly involved with the discussions, we did support the U.S. negotiating team with technical assistance—specifically directional antenna design and advice on AM allocations. NAB understands that the Cuban engineers expressed interest and appreciation for the constructive suggestions offered by the United States on how to resolve our mutual radio "incompatibilities," provide for the legitimate radio coverage needs of Cuba, and minimize the interference experienced by all of Region 2.

The announcement of the concept of Radio Marti in August and its continuing press attention through November 1981, the start of the Rio conference, appeared to hinder the communication efforts of the U.S. delegation to resolve interference and incompatibilities with Cuba.

[The New York Times, Aug. 27, 1981]

## UNITED STATES CONSIDERING SPECIAL RADIO BROADCASTS TO CUBA

(By Bernard Gwertzman)

WASHINGTON, Aug. 26.—The Reagan Administration is giving consideration to creating a radio station that would broadcast to Cuba about its internal developments, Administration officials said today.

The plan for the broadcasts, which would be similar to those of Radio Free Europe to Eastern Europe and Radio Liberty to the Soviet Union, is one of the priority projects under study to demonstrate firmness toward Cuban activities in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere. Along with Libya, the Administration has accused Cuba of interfering in the affairs of other nations.

Officials said other steps being taken against Cuba include a pending request for legislation that would allow the Navy and Coast Guard to stop any effort by Cuba to repeat last year's refugee flow from the port of Mariel that brought 125,000 people to the United States, including many deemed undesirable by the Americans.

The Administration also intends to stiffen a 20-year-old trade embargo against Cuba to prevent what one official called "leakage" from American companies and foreign affiliates of those companies.

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. has called for both long-term and short-range studies on what to do about Cuba. He has been upset over Cuban support for insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala and by Cuba's influence in Nicaragua.

He has said that the United States would "go to the source" of the problem of Cuban-led subversion and would not repeat the Vietnam experience. This has suggested some kind of military confrontation, but officials have said that this was not likely and that other steps could be taken first.

In a related development, the State Department said today that four more UH-1H troop-carrying helicopters were being sent to El Salvador to help combat the guerrillas. The Administration is considering additional economic and military assistance to the Salvadoran Government, which already has 10 of these helicopters.

Dean Fischer, the department spokesman, said that the insurgents in El Salvador seem "bent on paralyzing the Salvadorean economy through a systematic attack on the electrical communications and transportation systems."

He said the insurgents had been resupplied with arms and munitions. Another official said the arms were coming from Cuba.

The insurgent strategy has caused problems in maintaining the flow of water, light and power to hospitals and other institutions, Mr. Fischer said.

Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, who is chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, introduced an amendment in June that called for all broadcasts by the Voice of America to be designated "Radio Free Cuba."

The Voice of America, which is an arm of the United States Government, regularly beams broadcasts in Spanish to Cuba and other Latin American countries, with emphasis on world news and developments in the United States.

The concept now under study, as explained by officials, would be to create a separate agency for broadcasts to Cuba about internal developments and other news being censored in the Cuban press.

A tentative name for the station would be "Radio Broadcasting to Cuba," officials said. Legislation would be needed to provide funds for the operation. Private foundations and individuals may be invited to contribute, and transmission facilities may be rented in Florida or on some island to reduce the costs.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the models for the proposed station, were originally financed clandestinely by the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1973, Congress established a Board for International Broadcasting to oversee the operations of these stations.

*Question 3.* Why was the 1040 frequency chosen for broadcasting to Cuba? To your knowledge, what was the FCC's role in this decision? What hearings or procedures were followed in arriving at the decision to use the 1040 frequency? What efforts did the National Association of Broadcasters make to influence that decision?

Answer. The FCC's role in selecting a frequency for Radio Marti is unclear. According to a USICA "Radio Free Cuba Study," dated July 15, 1981 and obtained under a FOIA request by the attorneys for WHO, Inc., the FCC seems to have identified two frequencies, 640 and 1580 kHz suitable for Radio Free Cuba. The Congressional Research Service, however, in their study of June 28, 1982 indicates (at page 59) that the U.S. choice was made in September, 1981, "after consultation with the FCC and NTIA."

There were no public hearings on the suitability of 1040 kHz for Radio broadcasting to Cuba. NAB is not aware of the specific procedures the government used to arrive at that choice of frequency. NAB played no role whatsoever in the choice or evaluation of 1040 kHz.

*Question 4.* You have urged the U.S. Government to seek a "lasting diplomatic resolution of the Cuban interference problem." How would you see the negotiations proceeding? How has the administration responded to you?

Answer. As mentioned above, NAB would see negotiations proceeding along the lines of the Cuban bilateral discussions of the past. There have been two meetings—the August 1981 bilateral here in Washington and a similar meeting in Havana in April 1981, about which a press release was issued by the FCC (attached). At times, it would be in the best interest of both parties to sometimes include other countries in the discussions. It is unclear how Radio Marti would be treated, if at all, within the discussions. A key basis for the discussions might be that sound engineering of AM radio allocations is in the best interests of Cuba, in terms of increased radio service, lessened interference, and nominal increases in new station authorizations. Whatever Cuba realistically desires in the way of AM radio stations, submitted, for example, in some kind of "statement of need," can probably be accommodated through simple and not necessarily expensive engineering.

NAB has met often with representatives of the State Department and FCC. The State Department has assured us that "when and if Cuba and the United States sit down and talk," resolution of Cuban interference to U.S. broadcasters will be on the agenda.

[PUBLIC NOTICE]

Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C., *April 10, 1981.*

### U.S. HOLDS BILATERAL MEETING WITH GOVERNMENT OF CUBA

The United States and the Government of Cuba conducted bilateral discussions during April 6 and 7, 1981. The purpose of the discussions was to exchange views on channel separation which will be addressed at the upcoming Region 2 Administrative Conference on FM Broadcasting, the upcoming meeting of the Panel of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland and to discuss incompatibilities that exist between Cuban and U.S. inventories of AM stations previously notified to the IFRB.

The U.S. presented the results of computer studies on the impact of Cuban notified stations upon U.S. stations and expressed deep concern about the indicated large numbers of Cuban stations, some of which have been notified with high transmitter power levels. These include two 500 kW stations.

Cuba is insistent upon use of its notified high power stations and also indicates that it cannot utilize directional antennas for resolution of incompatibilities except in rare cases, because of economic reasons and scarcity of land for large antenna sites. Cuba takes the position that the only way to resolve major incompatibilities is to adopt 9 kHz channel separation and to use the additional channels for this purpose.

Discussions concerning resolution of specific instances of incompatibilities were not held. Both countries agreed to consider holding another bilateral meeting during this summer to discuss resolution of specific incompatibilities.

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### MR. LEIBOWITZ' RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1.* Is it not true that the Florida Association of Broadcasters was opposed to the concept of Radio Marti, but has subsequently changed its position? What reason did you have for opposing Radio Marti and what has caused you to change your position?

Answer. The Florida Association of Broadcasters ("FAB") and the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association ("SFRBA") have never been opposed to the concept of Radio Marti. The SFRBA went on record early supporting Radio Marti. The FAB initially adopted the position that as a policy issue, the association lacked expertise with respect to foreign affairs and, therefore, was restrained from commenting on the concept of Radio Marti. However, the FAB did go on record stating that Radio Marti and Cuban radio interference were separate and distinct issues. Furthermore, the FAB stated that the belief that Cuban radio interference existed in the past and would continue to exist even, at an increased level, without regard to Radio Marti.

The FAB subsequently modified its position and endorsed H.R. 5427 after that bill was amended to include compensation for radio broadcasters for expenses incurred in mitigating effects of Cuban radio interference and was amended to include a sense of Congress that a Presidential Task Force should be established to seek practical political and technical solutions to the problem of Cuban radio interference.

*Question 2.* Has Cuba ever broadcast program material aimed at the United States? What were the circumstances? How did it affect American broadcasting? Was it legal?

Answer. Cuban AM radio stations have, in the past, aired program material, in English, aimed at the United States.

In the early and mid-1960's, Radio Free Dixie was aired by Cuba on 690 kHz. The programming was aimed at Black-Americans during this critical period of the civil rights movement.

More recently, Radio Moscow was re-broadcast over Radio Havana, Cuba. Initially, this station was aired on 600 kHz and subsequently operated on 1160 kHz. This operation ceased for a period of time. However, there are some reports which indicate that the station is back on the air on 1160 kHz. From several sources, it appears that while on the air, this station was operating with power of at least 125 kW.

Both of the above radio operations did cause interference to American broadcasters who operated on the same frequencies and, in some cases, adjacent frequencies.

The North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement ("NARBA") specifically provided that AM radio operations were to be employed for domestic use. Since both the United States and Cuba were signatories to this Agreement, it is concluded that these radio operations were in violation of that Agreement and, therefore, they were illegal.

However, it should be noted that in November 1980 Cuba notified Canada that it would abrogate NARBA the following year.[1]

## MR. NICOLAIDES' RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1.* What is the impact of Voice of America Broadcasting on Cuba today? What role do you see for VOA broadcasting in general as a vehicle for communicating to Latin America?

Answer. At the present time the Voice of America broadcasts in Spanish to all of Latin America 5½ hours each day: from 7:30 to 10 in the morning, and from 8 to 11 in the evening. Short wave is the primary mode of transmission, but we do also transmit to the Caribbean (including, of course, Cuba) in medium wave.

There are 36 people on the Spanish desk—translaters, writers, editors, secretaries, and on-air personalities—including eight of Cuban background.

One of the problems with these broadcasts is that they are not targeted to the particular cultural, political, and historical situations of the 19 independent nations (plus Puerto Rico, which is, of course, a Commonwealth of the United States). It is hardly an overstatement to say that the only thing they have in common is the Spanish Language and the Catholic Religion. Even on that score, it should be noted, Latin America is not homogeneous: the Spanish accent used in Cuba is similar to the way the language is spoken in Nicaragua, but very different from the way it is spoken in Mexico; Argentina has a distinctive accent as different from the accent found in Bolivia—say—as Australian speech is from Middle American.

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[1] The Final Acts of The Regional Administrative Radio Conference, Rio de Janeiro, 1981, do not contain any restriction with respect to domestic use of AM broadcast stations.

This need to address 20 widely different audiences with the same words in the same accent imposes a great pressure toward a kind of common-denominator blandness, not only in accent but in content.

I believe this situation should be remedied. For much too long we have tended to regard all of Latin America—especially Hispanic (as distinct from Lusitanian) Latin America—as a unit, underrating the profound differences between these 19 Republics and the concerns of their respective populations.

Cuba represents a very special case. Under Fidel Castro it has become one of the most dependent and complaisant satellites of the Soviet Union. The Castro regime has wrenched Cuba not only from its traditional ties to the United States but even from its broader cultural ties to Hispanic America. Its mismanaged economy has brought unprecedented hardships to the Cuban people, despite the infusion of vast sums through Soviet subsidies. Castro's *quid pro quo* is to supply the Soviet Union with tens of thousands of Cuban young men to fight the Kremlin's wars around the world and to assist revolutionary and terrorist groups in Latin America and elsewhere.

If any nation deserves special, custom-tailored, individualized attention in terms of our international information efforts it is Cuba.

Cubans do listen to VOA broadcasts, and their continuing interest is evidenced by the 50-or-so letters from Cuban listeners the VOA receives every month. It is impossible to come up with more than educated guesses as to how many Cubans listen to current VOA programming, but it is evident from interviews with the recent Mariel arrivals that many Cubans suffer from enormous information gaps. Hardly any, for example, were aware of the extent to which Cuban troops have been committed overseas to fight in Moscow's expansionist wars, or to keep other Soviet puppet regimes like the one in Luanda propped up.

*Question 2.* Would increasing the broadcast time of the Voice of America be a more feasible and less costly operation than Marti? Do you see any problems with increasing VOA time?

Answer. A mere increase in VOA broadcasting time would *not* be the solution. As I have already indicated, the fact that our Spanish language broadcasts to Latin America have to address some 20 distinct and differing populations means that they are perforce *general* in tone. Simply more of that kind of programming will *not* supply the special needs of the Cuban people, any more than adding sugar to a protein-poor diet would correct a nutritional problem.

*Question 3.* There seems to be a question regarding VOA's charter and its ability to broadcast certain types of programming to Cuba. I believe, however, that the VOA did in fact broadcast programs similar to that contemplated for Radio Marti. Please comment on the advisability of VOA programming being expanded to provide broader service to Cuba.

Answer. This raises an important point. The VOA is intended to be what its name indicates, the official Voice of America, addressing foreign populations with accurate, reliable, objective, and comprehensive news of the world; commentary and analysis presenting a rationale for American policies; and features to create a better understanding of American society. Within the constraints of its charter VOA cannot at the same time be a *surrogate radio* for the Cuban people.

The surrogate radio concept is embodied in the missions of *Radio Liberty* and *Radio Free Europe*. These broadcast operations are designed to provide people behind the Iron Curtain with the kind of radio they might be able to listen to domestically *if* they were not closed societies where totalitarian regimes censor and distort broadcast content in order to manipulate the population. *Radio Marti* has been conceived of as an analog to *Radio Liberty* and *Radio Free Europe*.

From 1961 until 1967 the Voice of America did make an effort to supply the very special needs of the Cuban people: the program *Cita con Cuba*. This, at first, broadcast an hour in the morning and an hour in the afternoon. Later it was cut to two half-hour broadcasts before being discontinued altogether. Even this half-hearted effort was appreciated by the Cuban people. After its discontinuance the Voice received a flood of mail complaining that it had been taken off the air.

The time has come for more than the revival of half-measures. The time has come for us to do at least as much for the Cuban people as we do for the people of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the other captive nations of Eastern Europe. Cuba is no less free, no less a Soviet satellite; its people are no less in need of a surrogate radio: *Radio Marti*.

## MR. NICHOLS' RESPONSE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1.* Why do you think the Cuban audience would not be receptive to Radio Marti when Eastern European and Soviet audiences apparently are receptive to Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe? What differences do you see in the European and Cuban cases?

Answer. The effectiveness of international propaganda is largely the product of the needs and motivations of the audience and very little of the intent and methods of the communicator. Consequently, audiences in different political, socioeconomic and cultural conditions will respond to essentially the same type of message from the same source in entirely different ways.[1]

Cuban and East European audiences are in different communication contexts and, therefore, should be expected to respond differently to Radio Marti and Radio Free Europe, despite a similar intent and format of the two stations. One of the major ingredients in the differential effectiveness is the source credibility of the United States Government in Cuba and Eastern Europe. It is axiomatic in communication research that credibility is not an attribute of the communication source but is a judgment of the audience.[2]

Communism came to Eastern Europe at the point of a Soviet bayonet.[3] As a direct result, the vast majority of East Europeans are opposed to the Soviet-imposed form of government and frequently direct nationalistic hatred toward the U.S.S.R. At the same time, most East Europeans have a strongly positive attitude toward the geographically-distant United States.

On the other hand, communism came to Cuba by a social revolution. Due in part to these revolutionary roots and the charisma of President Fidel Castro, the Cuban Government initially enjoyed immense popular support.[4] Although support for the government has waned as the Cuban people confront harsh political and economic realities, Castro remains personally popular and his government is regarded as legitimate with the majority of the Cuban people, according to estimates by U.S. media, scholars and intelligence analysts. However, regardless of the level of support for the Castro government, most Cubans are highly nationalistic and dislike the U.S. Government.[5]

In sum, Cuban and East European audiences will make their radio listening decisions under different conditions and will attach different levels of source credibility to the U.S. Government. As a result, different levels of listenership and types of response to Radio Marti and Radio Free Europe should be anticipated. Under these conditions, the East European listenership to Radio Moscow, instead of Radio Free Europe, would seem to be a better predictor of potential listenership to Radio Marti in Cuba. For example, before recently intensified jamming, 3.5 percent of adults living in urban Poland listened to Radio Moscow at least once per week, while 40.2 percent listened to Radio Free Europe.[6]

Soviet listenership to Radio Liberty is somewhat more analogous to potential Cuban listenership to Radio Marti. Despite wide differences in political, socioeconomic, geographic and cultural conditions, the majority of both the Soviet and Cuban audiences consider the U.S. Government a hostile source of communication.[7] Consequently, it would be within the realm of possibilities that Radio Marti could achieve the same level of listenership in Cuba as Radio Liberty achieves in the Soviet Union.

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[1] L. John Martin, "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," in Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John C. Merrill, eds., *International and Intercultural Communication* (New York: Hastings House, Publishers, 1976), pp. 262–272.

[2] Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif and Roger E. Nebergall, *Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach* (Philadelphia and London: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), p. 201.

[3] This discussion was originally presented by Dr. William M. LeoGrande, Director of Political Science at the American University. See his testimony before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and States, the Judiciary and Related Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations, unpublished, April 21, 1982.

[4] Jorge I. Dominguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 218–219.

[5] See footnotes 51 and 52 in my written testimony.

[6] Elaine El Assal, "VOA and Western Radio Listening in Urban Poland: 1977," Research Report, Office of Research, U.S. International Communication Agency, October 26, 1980, p. 13.

[7] Ralph K. White, "Images in the Context of International Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 238–276.

An estimated 7 percent of Soviet adults listen to Radio Liberty once or more per month, according to the Board for International Broadcasting.[8] Even if Radio Martí, with the advantage of medium-wave broadcasting and different technical and geographic conditions, was able to reach an audience several times greater than Radio Liberty, the Cuban audience still will be far smaller than the majority of the Cuban people that the Reagan Administration claims that it can reach.

It is also important to note that Soviet listenership to the Voice of America is more than double (during some years, more than triple) that of Radio Liberty.[9] The greater listenership to VOA can be attributed to its less confrontational format and to less intense jamming of its signal. VOA broadcasts in Russian and other languages indigenous to the Soviet Union and covers some Soviet domestic news and issues, although not as much as Radio Liberty. In the case of Eastern Europe, the listenership pattern is the exact opposite indicating the importance of source credibility with different audiences. In most East European countries, listenership to Radio Free Europe is two or three times greater than to Voice of America.[10]

These statistics indicate that radio audiences are not indiscriminate in their foreign media use. Even in cases when Soviet, East European or Cuban people become seriously disaffected with their governments or distrustful of their domestic media, they do not automatically tune in the U.S. radio service targeted at their country. Rather they tend to choose the most credible and accessible sources. Oftentimes, those sources are the ones without political motives or are not jammed. For many East European and Soviet audiences, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are the only alternatives to the media controlled by their respective governments. However, in cases where audiences have other alternatives, listenership to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty drop. For example, in Czechoslovakia, where audiences have access to slop-over signals from radio and TV stations in West Germany and Austria, listenership to Radio Free Europe is lower than most other East European countries.[11] In the Soviet Union, listenership to Radio Liberty declined significantly during years that the Soviet Government eased jamming of other Western broadcasters.[12]

Cuban radio listeners have easy access to alternative sources of news and entertainment, such as commercial radio stations in the United States, and other nations in the Caribbean and government stations, including Voice of America. Many of these stations broadcast in Spanish and carry Cuban news. Therefore, it seems probable that Cubans who seek alternative sources of news will avoid Radio Martí, a station with low source credibility and difficult to hear due to likely Cuban jamming, in favor of a more credible and accessible radio station carrying less politicized and confrontational content.

## MR. GOMEZ' RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1.* What role do you see for Cuban-Americans in Radio Marti?

Answer. Unfortunately, it is almost inevitable that Cuban-American organizations and individuals of very narrow right-wing persuasion will be the bridge between Radio Marti—if it is established—and the Cuban-American community. As such, their influence on the station would be significant, even predominant. When using the expression "right-wing" I do so pointedly. Our community is conservative almost by definition, its right-wing sectors are often part of, or on the fringe of, illegal activities, such as terrorism. Hence the consequences of this relationship between ultraconservative groups in our community and the radio station are not very promising. At best, the radio station will be under enormous pressures to become an unreliable and partisan propaganda voice.

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[8] Board for International Broadcasting, *Eighth Annual Report,* Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 17. Respondents are counted as listeners if they report listening to any amount of Radio Liberty programming at least once per month, regardless of how short or infrequent the exposure. Also, regardless of the extent of Soviet listenership, the reasons for their listenership are unknown. See Ellen Propper Michiewicz, *Media and the Russian Public* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp 137–142. Similarly, in Cuba, a significant number of government officials and party cadre regularly listen to VOA not out of dissatisfaction with the Cuban government, but as a source of information about U.S. policy and for counterarguing in their organizations and media. Hence, listenership to foreign radio does not automatically translate into political dissent or agreement with the foreign broadcast message.

[9] Board for International Broadcasting, *Eighth Annual Report,* p. 15. Also see previous annual reports.

[10] *Ibid.* In addition to source credibility, differences in programming and level of jamming account for differences in listenership to VOA and RFE. Percent of population above 14 years who listen to RFE once or more a month is listed by country as follows: Poland, 55; Romania, 54; Hungary, 51; Czechoslovakia, 37; and Bulgaria, 37. See Board International Broadcasting, *Seventh Annual Report.* Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 16–17.

[11] Board for International Broadcasting, *Eighth Annual Report,* p. 17.

[12] Board for International Broadcasting, *Sixth Annual Report.* Washington: U.S. Government Office, 1980, p. 15.

*Question 2.* How to respond to the concern that Radio Marti could create discontent that might produce another Mariel-like exodus or an uprising like Hungary's in 1956?

Answer. As our testimony before the Committee stated, a radio station broadcasting directly and intensively to Cuba will be inevitably understood by those with a potential desire to emigrate from Cuba as an invitation, regardless of the intentions or the editorial policy of the station. In many aspects, Cuba is just like any other poor and developing country in the region where the lure of a higher standard of living in the United States is strong. The presence of a large and well-established Cuban-American community here, and many other historical ties also make emigration an attractive possibility. The proposed radio station and the lack of comprehensive cooperation by the two governments on the question of emigration, can only make matters worse. The Mariel exodus was a result of the use of emigration issues as political weapons. Radio Marti sets the stage for more of the same.

With regard to a Hungary-like uprising in Cuba, the possibilities are nearly nonexistent. In fact, the parallels between Cuba and Eastern Europe advanced by advocates of Radio Marti are a glaring failure of their foreign policy premises. The Cuban Government—born of a largely popular revolution in a developing society—enjoys substantial popular support and legitimacy. This is unlike the situation in Eastern Europe where governments from substantially different societies arose following the victories of the Soviet Army in World War II. Cuba is not Poland, and a radio station will not make it so. Our foreign policy should reflect these complexities, not try to avoid them.

*Question 3.* You have contact with relatives of Cuban exiles and other persons in Cuba. Can you tell us anything about the impact of VOA programing and broadcasts from Florida on the understanding and knowledge Cubans have of domestic Cuban or international events?

Answer. No comment.

*Question 4.* Is Radio Marti a desirable political tool of U.S. foreign policy? Cuba definitely considers Radio Marti a provocative act. Do you believe that the political climate which it creates is in the best interests of the United States?

Answer. Radio Marti is not in the interests of the United States or a desirable political tool of our foreign policy. The station will make it more difficult for moderation to play a growing role in shaping Cuban policy. Perceived as a hostile act by both Cuban officials and sizable sectors of the population, the radio station will encourage a hardening of positions and will only help to isolate sectors in Cuba who favor moderation.

## MR. CALZON'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1.* What role do you see for Cuban-Americans in Radio Marti?

Answer. The primary role of Cuban Americans in the operations of Radio Marti will be in the provision of program materials for the station. For example, Cuban American academicians could contribute their knowledge of Cuban history (which has been systematically distorted by the Castro government), and other subjects such as economics, political science, and sociology. Another contribution of the Cuban American community could be in the form of radio correspondents with a knowledge of Cuban affairs and interests. The Cuban American community should be represented at the highest level of the management of the station, to assure that its operations will reflect the Cuban character of its mission. Such participation by the Cuban American community should be broad based, so that the station will produce objective, non-partisan programming. Radio Marti is not intended to be an exile radio station but an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

*Question 2.* How do you respond to the concern that Radio Marti could create discontent that might produce another Mariel-like exodus or an uprising like Hungary's in 1956?

Answer. The suggestion that Radio Marti's operations would lead to rebellion within, or emigration from, Cuba displays a misunderstanding of the situation in *Cuba and the operations of U.S. international* radio broadcasting. In the first case, emigration from Cuba is tightly controlled by the Cuban Government. The process of applying for an exit visa involves the confiscation of all the applicant's property, assignment to compulsory labor, and officially directed ostracism of the applicant and his or her family. Those who attempt to leave Cuba without visas are subjected to the harshest means of repression. In fact, Radio Marti could ease pressures for emigration, because it would raise the prospect of change in Cuba itself. The possibility of Radio Marti sparking an uprising in Cuba is extremely unlikely. The policy guidelines of the Board for International Broadcasting, the agency which is proposed to oversee Radio Marti by the House-passed version of the legislation to establish Radio Marti, specifically bar broadcasts which would inspire revolt or defection. Comparisons with the 1956 Hungarian situation are not applicable to the current situation, in light of the sober and responsible way in which RFE/RL handled the Czechoslovakian experience in 1968 and the Polish crisis last year.

*Question 3.* You have contact with relatives of Cuban exiles and other persons in Cuba. Can you tell us anything about the impact of VOA programing and broadcasts from Florida on the understanding and knowledge Cubans have of domestic Cuban or international events?

Answer. Existing broadcasts to Cuba by the VOA and Spanish language stations in Florida do not serve the needs of their Cuban audience. VOA broadcasts report events in the United States and so do not focus on issues of concern to Cubans. Spanish language broadcasts of U.S. stations must, according to their FCC licenses, prepare news and commentary of interest to their U.S. audiences. Their broadcasts cannot be heard dependably in Cuba, and do not reach the densely populated eastern end of the island.

*Question 4.* Is Radio Marti a desirable political tool of U.S. foreign policy? Cuba definitely considers Radio Marti a provocative act. Do you believe that the political climate which it creates is in the best interests of the United States?

Answer. Radio Marti will have important political benefits for the United States. The response of the Cuban Government validates the proposition that they have much to fear from their own people hearing the truth. By informing the people of Cuba of the pacific intentions of the U.S. Government, it will serve to defuse the tensions which the Castro regime promotes through its virulently anti-American propaganda. It will increase the cost to the Cuban Government of mounting international military efforts. It is a peaceful, progressive response to Cuba's Soviet-inspired expansionism in Latin America. Radio Marti will be no more "provocative" to Cuba than Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have been to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe over the last 30 years.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

# RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA

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THURSDAY, AUGUST 19, 1982

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, Biden, and Zorinsky.

The Chairman. Today the committee will be hearing final testimony on H.R. 5427, a bill to provide for the broadcasting of accurate information to the people of Cuba. These hearings will be followed by a markup of this legislation.

[Text of H.R. 5427 follows:]

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

# H. R. 5427

To provide for the broadcasting of accurate information to the people of Cuba, and for other purposes.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 12 (legislative day, JULY 12), 1982

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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# AN ACT

To provide for the broadcasting of accurate information to the people of Cuba, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

## SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act".

## DECLARATION OF ADDITIONAL PURPOSES

SEC. 2. Section 2 of the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2871) is amended—

(1) by inserting "(a)" immediately after "SEC. 2."; and

(2) by adding at the end of the section the following:

"(b) The Congress further finds and declares—

"(1) that it is the policy of the United States to support the right of the people of Cuba 'to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers', in accordance with article 19 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

"(2) that, consonant with this policy, radio broadcasting to Cuba may be effective in furthering the open communication of accurate information and ideas to the people of Cuba, in particular information about Cuba; and

"(3) that such broadcasting to Cuba, operated in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy of the United States and in accordance with high professional standards, would be in the national interest.

"(c) Therefore, in addition to furthering the open communication of information and ideas in Eastern Europe and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is the purpose of this Act to further the open communication of accurate information and ideas to the people of Cuba, in particular information about Cuba.".

### ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD

SEC. 3. Section 4 of the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2873) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(c) In order to carry out the purposes set forth in section 2 of this Act, the Board is authorized to provide for the open communication of information and ideas through the use of radio broadcasting. Radio broadcasting to Cuba under this Act shall serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news. The Board may carry out this subsection by means of grants, contracts (subject to the availability of appropriations), or such other means as the Board determines will most effectively carry out the purposes set forth in section 2 of this Act.

"(d)(1) For purposes of providing for radio broadcasting in accordance with subsection (c)—

"(A) the broadcasting facilities located at Marathon, Florida that were used by the Voice of America before the date of the enactment of the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act may be used for radio broadcasting to Cuba under this Act; and

"(B) a frequency identified under paragraph (2) shall be the frequency which is used for radio broadcasting to Cuba under this Act.

"(2) The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in consultation with the Federal Communications Commission, shall identify, after receiving public comment, an appropriate frequency or frequencies for radio broadcasting to Cuba under this Act—

"(A) which will provide protection to non-Government radio broadcasting in the United States as prescribed in the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission;

"(B) which will produce the least interference to non-Government radio broadcasting from any countermeasure taken by the Government of Cuba with respect to such radio broadcasting to Cuba;

"(C) which will ensure, to the extent possible, that no non-Government radio station will suffer significant loss of listening area or substantial economic harm due to any such countermeasure; and

"(D) which is consistent with the interests of the United States with respect to any international telecommunications conferences in which it participates.

"(3) In carrying out paragraph (2), the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information shall consider all possible radio frequencies and bands.

"(4) The Federal Communications Commission shall provide to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information such data and technical information as the Assistant Secretary finds to be necessary in carrying out paragraph (2).

"(5) For purposes of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (2), the Secretary of State shall notify the Assistant

Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information and the Federal Communications Commission of any measure by the Government of Cuba which violates international law and which may interfere with radio or television broadcasts in the United States.".

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 4. Section 8 of the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2877) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(c) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Board to carry out the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act $7,500,000 for the fiscal year 1983. Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to be made available until expended.".

ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

SEC. 5. The Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

"SEC. 11. In order to assist the Board in carrying out the purposes set forth in section 2 of this Act, any agency or instrumentality of the United States may sell, loan, lease, or grant property (including interests therein) and may perform administrative and technical support and services at the request of the Board. Support and services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis or, at the direction of the President, without reimbursement. Any reimbursement shall be credited to the appropriation from which the property, support, or service was derived.".

### CUBAN INTERFERENCE WITH BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES

SEC. 6. (a) The Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, as amended by section 5 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

### "CUBAN INTERFERENCE WITH BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES

"SEC. 12. (a) It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State should seek prompt and full settlement of United States claims against the Government of Cuba arising from Cuban interference with broadcasting in the United States. Pending the settlement of these claims, it is appropriate to provide some interim assistance for United States broadcasters adversely affected by Cuban interference.

"(b) Accordingly, the Federal Communications Commission is authorized to instruct the Board to make payments to United States radio and television broadcasting station licensees to compensate them for expenses which they incur in mitigating the effects of activities by the Government of Cuba which interfere with the transmission or reception of the broadcasts of those licensees.

"(c) The Federal Communications Commission may issue such regulations and establish such procedures for carrying out this section as the Commission finds appropriate. In issuing such regulations and establishing such procedures, the Commission may establish criteria to evaluate the financial claims of affected licensees. Such criteria may include (but shall not be limited to) the duration, stability, and extent of alleged Cuban interference, including the establishment of a threshold loss of service prior to any compensation recommendation. The Commission may also establish limits on the type and extent of reimbursable expenses, prorate Cuba's share in situations involving multiple interference sources, and require affected licensees to revert to original station parameters without further compensation whenever Cuban interference ceases.".

(b) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should establish a task force to analyze the level of interference from the operation of Cuban radio stations experienced by broadcasters in the United States and to seek a practical political and technical solution to this problem.

Passed the House of Representatives August 10, 1982.

Attest: EDMUND L. HENSHAW, JR.,

*Clerk.*

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to say that at 11:30 I will turn the gavel over to someone else. I hope that someone would be present to continue the hearing at that point. I will be gone for about 20 minutes with Secretary Watt and several members of my Illinois delegation on an Illinois problem. We will be down the hall, so I will be available on a moment's notice. That will be the only interruption that I will have to make.

We are honored to have with us two of our distinguished colleagues. I am going to call on Senator Jepsen first because he has another appointment at 10:30.

I think we have all been strong supporters through the years of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. There is not any equivocation about our feelings that the people of Cuba, just as the people of Eastern Europe have a right to know the truth. The question is what is the best way to do this and accomplish our objectives and our goals.

We have a final report of the Presidential Commission. We also have two distinguished Senators who are deeply concerned about a constituent of theirs, station WHO, a station that the President is familiar with because he worked for it early in his career. It is the voice out of Iowa that covers a great many States, and is an important station to everyone in the agricultural and farming community.

We welcome you this morning. We look forward with interest to hearing your proposals for how we can preserve the principle of a Radio Marti but at the same time minimize the damage that might be done to domestic broadcasting.

Senator Jepsen.

## STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER W. JEPSEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear again before the committee to discuss the proposed establishment of Radio Marti.

At this time I want to restate my strong support for the concept of Radio Marti. And I ask at this point, Mr. Chairman, that my written remarks be entered into the record, because I want to drastically abbreviate my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. The full text will be incorporated into the record.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I want to reiterate my strong support for the concept of Radio Marti. The Cuban people must hear the truth. They have the right to hear the cultural and, educational programs and all the other things that Radio Marti proposes to broadcast. However, I continue to state that the national interests of our country are not served when a government seeks to use a commercial frequency for this purpose while other viable options go ignored.

Even more specifically, Mr. Chairman, I support the concept of Radio Marti, but not at the expense of any American's right to operate or to listen to a commercial broadcast station in this country. We do not provide education about freedom to other peoples of the world by stripping the economic rights and freedom of American people or American business, whether it be personal or corporate.

Those of us in the Midwest, in my State of Iowa, have had a lot of experience with this. We are suffering the consequences today. The farm community, as you well know, Mr. Chairman—your State is a neighboring State—is on its knees economically due to the unilateral tinkering with the economy involved in the failed grain embargo. This is an example of how the State Department, in all of its insensitivity, has singled out a segment of our economy to implement foreign policy, and it has been absolutely devastating economically.

Today, ironically enough, we are talking about a bill that proposes again to single out a specific business, a 58-year-old going concern, to implement foreign policy and in the process to devastate it, as well. The insensitivity of the bureaucracy in even suggesting this is, frankly, something that the people across this Nation voted against in 1980. And I would hope and respectfully request that every consideration be given so that the concept of Radio Marti can go forward, but not at the expense, not at the expense, Mr. Chairman, of the freedom of our people in this Nation.

Thank you.

[Senator Jepsen's prepared statement follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER W. JEPSEN

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear again before the Committee to discuss the proposed establishment of Radio Marti. At this time I want to restate my concerns about the current proposal, as well as discuss an amendment introduced by my colleague from Iowa, Senator Charles Grassley, and me to S. 1853. This amendment reconciles the need to broadcast the truth to the Cuban people with the necessity of protecting commercial AM broadcasting in this country.

From the beginning, I have expressed strong support for the concept of Radio Marti. The Cuban people must hear the truth. However, I have continued to state that the national interests of our country are not served when government seeks to use a commercial frequency while other viable options go ignored.

Senator Grassley and I have offered an amendment which offers a wide range of options to the government and protects the interests of commercial AM broadcasting. Under our proposal, Radio Marti could be broadcast by the use of:

Shortwave transmissions;
Private sector facilities under a voluntary lease arrangement;
The Voice of America's marathon transmitter; and/or
Off-band frequencies below 535 kilohertz and above 1650 kilohertz.

Mr. Chairman, our proposal provides the essential flexibility to meet Radio Marti's foreign policy goals on a long term basis. By using a combination of the options offered in our amendment, the Cuban Government will be faced with a variety of targets if it wishes to retaliate by jamming.

Fidel Castro currently has broadcasting plans that will adversely affect the broadcasting operations of over 200 commercial American radio stations. Implementation of our amendment would hamper his ability to direct his transmitters against United States' commercial radio stations.

Let us send the message of freedom and truth to the Cuban people. Let us also protect the commercial radio services that are so important to the American farm and city audiences.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Jepsen.

The latest editorial on this subject is this morning's Washington Post. It concludes, "Radio Marti is a modest and potentially useful step to make available to interested Cubans a flow of information and opinion that Americans have routinely provided to other Communist-controlled countries for decades, and that Americans rightly take for granted for themselves."

I take it that you concur with the principle of that editorial, and you do support the concept of Radio Marti. What you would like to do is to find a way to accomplish that without evoking retaliation upon WHO, which for 58 years has served the agricultural communities not only of the Midwest but the whole country.

Senator JEPSEN. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for allowing me again to restate—I cannot restate it often enough—that I concur with the editorial about providing the truth and talking about freedom to Cuba, but not at the expense of the economic freedom or rights of Americans to operate or listen to commercial broadcast stations in this country. That is not what this country is all about.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Grassley, we will now turn to you to give the details of the legislation that you and Senator Jepsen have introduced.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, before Senator Jepsen leaves, are you for or against the legislation before us? I am not quite sure I understand. Do you want us to vote against it as we have it before us, or do you want us to vote for it?

Senator JEPSEN. The legislation that is before you now must be amended.

Senator BIDEN. And you all have an amendment to do that?

Senator JEPSEN. We do have an amendment, and Senator Grassley will elaborate on it.

Senator BIDEN. OK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for the clarification.

Senator Grassley.

Thank you, Senator Jepsen.

## STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA, ACCOMPANIED BY KENNETH D. SALOMAN, ESQ., DOW, LOHNES AND ALBERTSON, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND KENNETH CUNNINGHAM, STAFF OF SENATOR GRASSLEY

Senator GRASSLEY. Unlike my colleague from Iowa, my statement is prepared and written, and I would like to give it because it does go into detail about our amendment.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate your past consideration of my serious concerns with regard to the problems posed by the establishment and operation of Radio Marti as presently planned. I appeared before your committee in July, and I appreciate particularly your graciousness in allowing me to return to discuss some additional points regarding the final report of the President's Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. So some of my remarks are on the amendment, and some of them on the President's Commission report.

As I have stated in the past, I support the concept and goals of Radio Marti. Cubans need to learn the facts about Castro's mismanagement of their economy and about his military adventures throughout the world aimed at carrying out the Soviet Union's designs and desires. For too long Castro has held a monopoly over this information, and thus has been able to mold the thinking and opinions of Cuba through his propaganda.

Radio Marti holds the key to opening these realities to the eyes of the Cuban people, and therefore represents a very worthy foreign policy initiative. As with every foreign policy initiative, however, it is essential that the potential impact on our domestic interests be carefully analyzed and weighed during the development of this initiative. Considerable effort must be expended to assure that the benefits outweigh the costs and that these costs be minimized to the greatest degree possible.

Moreover, it is best to determine the most effective approach that will avoid possible costs to our country's private interests. Unfortunately, the formulation of the proposed operation of Radio Marti did not include a proper analysis of these domestic implications. Specifically, I am referring to the broadcasting frequency selection process.

The FCC was ordered to select a frequency that would: one, minimize Radio Marti's interference with domestic broadcasters; two, minimize interference of foreign broadcasters; and three, maximize broadcasting coverage of Cuba. The FCC gave no consideration to the very important issue of the impact of possible countermeasures on domestic broadcasters. Moreover, it is ironic that no consideration was given to the fact that Cuba had announced its plans to broadcast one of its 500-kilowatt stations on 1040, the frequency ultimately recommended. In light of this, it is clear that the third criteria was not met, for there would be little chance that any 50-kilowatt signal could penetrate the field of a 500-kilowatt Cuban station.

As you know, my immediate concern is the very real potential that the use of 1040 kilohertz will jeopardize WHO radio in Des Moines, Iowa, and the essential news service that it provides to its Midwest city and farm audiences. I have made the point before that Midwest farmers have come to rely upon the excellent early morning farm news broadcasts to make their production and marketing decisions. Be assured, the issue of Radio Marti is no minor matter to these people. Moreover, it is a major concern to the broadcasters and listening audiences throughout the United States, including those in your home States.

Today, WHO and its Midwest audience are placed in jeopardy. Tomorrow it may be one of a number of broadcasting concerns. In response to the questions regarding the possibility of Cuban counterbroadcasting by using a 50-kilowatt station at 1040 kilohertz Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders replied by stating that, "We are considering the possible use of additional frequencies in order to make Cuban jamming of Radio Marti broadcasts more difficult." As you can see, the broadcasting concerns of your State may be next in line.

This does not need to be the case. There are several viable alternatives available that will as effectively produce the positive foreign policy objectives envisioned by the Radio Marti proposal while at the same time protect our Nation's broadcasting interests.

Consequently, Senator Jepsen and I offered an amendment to H.R. 5427 that accomplishes this very goal. It maximizes the protection for American broadcasters and establishes a wide range of viable frequency options. This comprehensive approach will not only assure the success of Radio Marti's foreign policy objectives, but also will authorize new flexibility that will be essential in sustaining these broadcasting efforts in the face of likely Cuban countermeasures.

Under our proposal Radio Marti could be broadcast through the use of: one, shortwave transmissions; two, private-sector facilities on a voluntary lease arrangement; three, the Voice of America's Marathon broadcasting station; and/or, four, off-band frequencies below 530 kilohertz and above 1605 kilohertz. This amendment allows the utilization of any one or a combination of these alternatives.

To say the least, I was dismayed with the presentation of these various options by the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba in its final report released Tuesday of this week. From my analysis, the arguments in favor of these proposals not only outnumber those against them, but also outweigh them. I would like to discuss these four alternatives or combinations.

Under the shortwave alternative only, three transmitters would be needed to cover the entire island of Cuba. Maximum effectiveness would be reached by using bands 9, 11, and 15 megahertz during the day and 6, 9, and 11 megahertz during the night. Transmission power could range between 50 and 500 kilowatts depending upon the facilities used. Transmission equipment is presently available at the VOA stations in Greenville, N.C., Bethany, Ohio, and Delano, Calif.

This alternative would present no legal or regulatory problems, for shortwave is already designed specifically for international broadcasting. Cuba would be saturated with strong signals during the day and the night. In fact, shortwave broadcasts are the only certain way that strong signals can be delivered during the day. It is highly unlikely that jamming could occur because shortwave enjoys a considerable advantage over jamming transmitters. And the integrity of the VOA [Voice of America], would not be jeopardized, for its transmitters are already available to the United Nations, to the OAS, and the BBC for broadcasts to Latin America.

Furthermore, there definitely would be a large audience for shortwave broadcasts. As revealed during the recent House debate, over 500,000 shortwave radio sets have been manufactured in Cuba for domestic use since 1978 alone. Commonsense would tell us that the total number of existing shortwave radios would therefore be greater. Also, it is difficult to argue that a significant audience does not exist, for those operating illegal, clandestine broadcasts with shortwaves are not doing so just for their health. In summary, it certainly is better to use shortwave and assure a significant audience rather than place an operation on 1040 kilohertz that will probably be blocked immediately.

Now I would like to speak about the voluntary leasing of private-sector AM facilities. This alternative encompasses many of the arguments presently being used for utilization of commercial frequencies, but it adds the very important element of voluntarism, voluntarism that is so fundamental to our great Nation and a part of the efforts of this administration in so many areas. It invites our private sector, as well as broadcasting interests from other countries, to join and be a significant part of the Radio Marti effort.

The Department of Defense, utilizing the resources of the Coast Guard and the Navy, could conduct a study or survey of broadcast reception to Cuba by listening at safe distances off the Cuban coast.

Once the most effective broadcasts are identified, the Government could negotiate for broadcast time during priority times. These stations would be compensated for the use of the facilities and perhaps for the risks they took for exposing their operations to interference.

Only a few stations would be necessary, but the more used, the less likely that Castro's resources would be available for effective jamming. I want to repeat that. The more used, the less likely that Castro's resources would be available for effective jamming and the greater the possibility for reception in Cuba. Clearly not all commercial broadcasters would be interested, but I am certain that many would welcome this opportunity.

Now I would like to speak about Voice of America Marathon station. For some time I have felt that this was one of the better options. Since this is a Government facility already operating, costs associated with the establishment of Radio Marti would be reduced. Radio Marathon has been operating for over 20 years and has developed a significant Cuban listening audience. Thus, the time necessary to develop an audience for Radio Marti would be shortened, if not eliminated. Prime operating times could be equally allocated and shared. The ability of the listener to distinguish between the two broadcasts would present no problem, for one broadcasts news about the United States and the other about Cuba.

Since the list of frequencies that Cuba announced it would broadcast at highpower does not include 1180 kilohertz, which is Radio Marathon, Radio Marti would be subject to no more interference than presently experienced by Radio Marathon. Regulatory and legal problems would be minimal, for 1180 kilohertz already appears in the region 2 mediumwave frequency plan.

Granted, this alternative does raise the issue that, in fact, a commercial station may be affected if Castro were to increase interference. It is time to set the record straight on that question. During the Cuban missile crisis, WHAM in Rochester, N.Y., agreed to allow the Government to use its frequency of 1180 kilohertz to assist during the limited crisis period. WHAM agreed for stated patriotic reasons. Once it was demonstrated that the VOA facility would not interfere with WHAM, further authorizations were obtained.

I would not suggest that relations between the Government and WHAM have been problem-free during the last 20 years. In fact, it appears that WHAM would prefer to remove Radio Marathon. Nevertheless, it is interesting to point to a comment made by Mr. William F. Rust, Jr., owner of WHAM, in his letter to Mr. Sol Taishoff, editor of Broadcasting Publications, Inc. He stated that "President Reagan's budget balancers could save the taxpayers some money by either using the Marathon installation for 'Radio Marti' or by closing it down."

I happen to be one of those "budget balancers" to which he referred, and I think he makes a good point. If we are going to have Radio Marti, the use of the Marathon station makes good commonsense.

Now I would like to address the off-band frequency alternative. This presents an excellent option for Radio Marti, particularly if 1610 kilohertz is used. This portion of the radio spectrum is experiencing a significant transition that opens the door for Radio Marti. Mobile stations that have traditionally utilized this area are shifting to other parts of the spectrum, and this area will become part of the medium wave broadcasting band later this decade.

Most radio receivers can tune in this frequency and should have little difficulty receiving 1610 kilohertz. It takes only a simple adjustment for those few radios that cannot presently receive this frequency. It is worth noting that an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the Cuban radios could receive 1610 kilohertz without adjustment.

This frequency is presently being used successfully by an American-owned station located on the Caribbean island of Anguilla. There is no other station in the United States, in the entire Western Hemisphere using this frequency.

This frequency is easy to locate on the radio, for it is at the extreme top end of the dial, and it would reach a very large audience. No legal or regulatory problems should interfere with this option, because it is not covered by the Region 2 Medium Wave Plan, and is permitted under article 115 of the ITU radio regulations.

The station on Anguilla can provide coverage of the eastern part of Cuba. If an additional 50-kilowatt station was established on Grand Turk Island, coverage of almost all of Cuba would be assured. Other locations, of course, could be studied. The attractive part of this proposal is that if Cuba did try to interfere or jam these broadcasts, no other station in the Western Hemisphere would be harmed.

As you can see, there are many good alternatives available. And as much as I respect the efforts and opinions of the Presidential Commission, it is clear that the entire story was not presented.

I hope that you share my view; therefore, that the last word on the issue of Radio Marti has not been spoken by the Commission; and that the amendment that Senator Jepsen and I have offered should be given very serious consideration.

One final point needs to be addressed. I have heard rumors that some people are of the opinion that this amendment undermines the Radio Marti proposal and that, if passed, could be interpreted as somehow backing down to the threats of Cuba. Surely, my discussion of the merits of our amendment dismisses any opinion that it would undermine Radio Marti. Quite the contrary, the amendment strengthens the viability of Radio Marti by broadening our options and by providing necessary flexibility to respond to countermeasures.

But beyond this, there is no way that this proposal represents submission to the whims of Castro. This amendment would, in fact, make life much harder for that puppet dictator. If he really intends to jam or interfere with Radio Marti's broadcasts, he would have to divert his limited resources to that effort. He may ultimately have some success, but he would not be able to score a double victory with that single effort, not only by knocking out Radio Marti but also by harming our commercial broadcasters. Frankly, the present legislation would make things too easy for Castro.

There is considerable merit to the contention that Cuban radio interference is a separate issue from that of Radio Marti, and that has been raised many times. Indeed, Castro may interfere with our broadcasters regardless of whether or not Radio Marti is established. But if that is the case, it is a far better strategy on our part to force Castro to utilize his planned 180-station inventory to interfere with noncommercial frequencies rather than extend an open invitation to harm our broadcasters.

Under Castro's plan, approximately 200 American radio operations could be damaged. Over 50 of those stations are located in States represented by the membership of this committee. It very well might be one of your broadcast concerns that is saved because we force Castro to divert a portion of his inventory. Your support for our amendment will be greatly appreciated and welcomed by the broadcasters and their audiences throughout the United States, and will help accomplish the goals that the administration desires through the creation of Radio Marti.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley.

Just a few questions, and I am sure other committee members have questions.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, could I have my staff sit with me?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course.

Senator GRASSLEY. Could I also have Mr. Ken Saloman? He is with WHO.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. If both of you would join Senator Grassley, and if you would be good enough to identify yourselves at this point.

Senator GRASSLEY. This is Ken Cunningham, a member of my staff who has been working on this for a considerable length of time; and on my left is Ken Saloman, an attorney here in town employed by WHO radio, or Palmer Broadcasting Company, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Thank you very much.

The current commercial AM radio band extends from 540 to 1605 kilohertz. Your amendment will restrict Radio Marti to a frequency just outside the present AM medium wave band. Your testimony suggests that an ideal frequency would be 1610 kilohertz.

What, in your opinion, are the advantages of using an off-band AM frequency such as 1610 kilohertz? Are you aware of any other stations in the United States or in the entire Western Hemisphere using this frequency?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes. I have already referred to the 1610 kilohertz radio station on the Caribbean island of Anguilla. It would solve the problem of potential interference from Cuba. Counter broadcasting could affect no other radio stations in the United States or the entire Western Hemisphere. This is important.

Mr. Kitchen, who is the owner of that station, has indicated that he is willing to sell. I think that is important. And I have already stated the fact that 1610 kilohertz is easy to locate on the radio. We have had varying testimony of whether 80 percent of the radios or 90 percent of the radios in Cuba could receive 1610 kilohertz without any change; but I think either figure is significantly high. There is no legal or regulatory problem, since it is not covered by the Region 2 Medium Wave Plan, and it is permitted, as I have said in my testimony, under article 115 of the ITU regulations.

Does that answer your question, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Your answer raises another question that has been referred to by the administration: the point that Soviet and Eastern bloc-produced radios may not have an off-band capability. What would your response be to that, or are you able to supply for the record a factual statement of that?

Has the ITU authorized, for instance, a world conference to expand the AM band; and if Radio Marti were to go on the 1610 kilohertz would this frequency then be on the AM band after 1984? And if you do not have the information now, perhaps your technical consultants can prepare that.

Senator GRASSLEY. I can answer yes to that and then I could present you with the pages where that information is already available in the House of Representatives' debate of that very question.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Could you review for the committee the present reach of WHO, both daylight hours and in the evening, and the kind of information that WHO does provide to essentially the rural agricultural community?

Senator GRASSLEY. First of all, if there was counterbroadcasting by Castro, using a 500 kilowatt station at 1040 kilohertz, it would probably reduce coverage from 800 miles to 45 miles.

WHO Radio is a clear channel station, 24 hours a day, and it is only in the evenings under the FCC rules that they go out to the 800 miles. But on occasion, I can get WHO out here, particularly more easy in the District than my home in Mount Vernon, but occasionally I can get it. If I had a better radio, I am sure I could get it all the time at night. So it covers, obviously, several States in that big circle at night.

But I think the most important aspect of it for rural and agricultural America, Iowa, and surrounding States, would be the hours of 5:30 until probably 7 in the morning when there is a great deal of broadcast time programed just for agriculture. They focus on market news as well as general agricultural news, and provides a valuable source of information. Additionally with regard to emergency news, if WHO radio were harmed, it could affect the transmission of information during times of emergency. WHO's commercial facilities are used not only to transmit emergency information related to weather, but also it is intertwined with our whole defense emergency setup.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The cost of your amendment would be about the same, there would be no less or no more cost than the administration's proposal, is that correct?

Senator GRASSLEY. The answer to that would be yes, except, if they were to opt for the case of Radio Marathon, there would be significant savings.

Senator PELL. Now, this brings up another thought to which I have been giving some attention; that is, the idea which you have that Radio Marathon-VOA should handle the whole responsibility, and they could do that by expanding their program. The cost would be very much less. I think 8 additional hours, for example, would be about $4 million, whereas on a separate station, as they are proposing, it would be, according to the administration I think it is $10 million, and according to the House-passed bill $7½ million.

What would be your reaction, Senator, to the thought of an amendment to your amendment, in a sense, that would restrict it entirely to

VOA which is presently engaged in this operation under its charter as of now?

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. I would distinguish between the use of VOA facilities, which is what I am advocating, and the management of it by Voice of America. I do not know whether you distinguished the two, or are you just talking about the use of the facilities? If you are talking about the use of the facilities, I think that is very reasonable, and that would be high on my list of alternatives.

Senator PELL. No. I am talking about the management, too, where you would have the same high level of news as opposed to propaganda, and where you would have an enlargement of their personnel and operation, which is doing an excellent job at this time.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Senator Pell, I have not thought about the point of management and the actual control, but I would surely be willing to give it consideration. But our amendment would give that sort of flexibility in effectiveness. It would offer that.

Senator PELL. Good. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I could follow on, Senator Grassley, with that a bit, because in your advocating the use of the facilities of VOA, is this in conflict at any time of day with the VOA operation itself? Would there be a conflict in the use of the facilities?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes. I believe they broadcast 5½ or 6½ hours now, and of course, if we felt that Radio Marti should be broadcast at those hours, it would take some sort of turf negotiation within the administration to make that decision.

My guess is that it could be worked out very smoothly. But let us just suppose that it was decided that the top priority ought to be allowing Radio Marathon to continue broadcasting at the hours that they presently operate. Just think, without any increased cost, or at least no increased capital investment, you would have the other 18½ hours with which you could broadcast Radio Marti.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Have you done any research with VOA and explored this idea with them to see if it would be feasible?

Senator GRASSLEY. No.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Not specifically.

One thing that I believe is in your amendment would be that the FCC could not further explore any other perhaps frequencies. Is that right? The House legislation as it has been passed does offer that option. Would you preclude that in any way?

Senator GRASSLEY. It would not prevent the FCC from exploring other alternatives, but the point of the amendment is to keep them off existing commercial frequencies.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am just curious what the role of the FCC has been in this. And I realize that they were asked to evidently recommend something that under some sort of rather unspecific guidelines might meet the requests of the guidelines they were given. I would be curious if with more specific guidelines the FCC perhaps could find a better frequency that would not be in conflict with any other commercial stations.

As a broadcaster myself, I find it rather unusual that we are granting a station here in this country for broadcasting that has not gone through the really very specific guidelines that FCC requires all other stations to go through.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, let me answer your question. I did not have a printed portion of my remarks to give out to you in advance, but we ought to get you a copy of them. But let me repeat that initially the Federal Communications Commission was supposed to do these things as your question suggests that you felt that they should do. And I guess I would have to say that they did—well, their three criteria were to minimize Radio Marti's interference with domestic broadcasters; minimize interference of foreign broadcasters; and maximize broadcasting coverage to Cuba.

It seems to me like they did everything fairly thoroughly except for the first part.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But it is my understanding that they were not given exact location of the antenna and so forth, which a normal application, of course, would require. And I see here where all 107 channels in the AM were reviewed to assess usability, but certainly with, I would think, very imprecise guidelines.

Senator GRASSLEY. That does not take into consideration the study of what we call countermeasures, counterbroadcasting. The FCC should take into consideration the jamming.

Then let me say in regard to the second part of your original question, the bill would permit—even the passage of the bill as it is now before the Senate committee without my amendment—some of those questions to remain unanswered. I suppose those would be——

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yes. I do not mean to put you on the spot regarding the FCC, but I did not know if there was anybody here who could answer those questions.

Senator GRASSLEY. Could I say also in regard to the study of the FCC that WHO was not contacted by the FCC and given a chance to respond to the use of 1040 kilohertz as a normal FCC process would require.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler, please.

Senator PRESSLER. Senator Grassley, as I understand it then, WHO did not have a chance to respond, and it provides the Iowa State emergency broadcast system for one thing, does it not? I mean it is a part of that system.

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes, that is correct. WHO is the key input station for my State and part of the upper Midwest.

Senator PRESSLER. Now, if this were another station that applied for a license, as Senator Kassebaum has pointed out so well, if they had to apply under the normal FCC procedure or consult with the FCC what would have happened?

Senator GRASSLEY. In other words, what would have been WHO's response if they had been consulted? Is that your question?

Senator PRESSLER. Yes. What probably would have happened if Radio Marti had to apply through the normal procedure for a frequency? Maybe your lawyer could tell. What probably would have happened?

Senator GRASSLEY. If you were not here, Senator Pressler, this is Ken Saloman.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes; I was here.

**Mr. Saloman.** Senator, WHO is a clear channel radio station. As such, it is entitled to and is licensed to provide an interference-free signal during presunrise and nighttime hours of approximately an 800-mile radius. There are three stations on 1040 kilohertz that have been authorized, I believe, to be constructed in Florida which would not interfere with WHO.

**Senator Pressler.** Because they are daytime stations?

**Mr. Saloman.** Those are daytime stations.

**Senator Pressler.** All right.

**Mr. Saloman.** And Radio Marti is proposed to be a fulltime station. Depending on the type of antenna array that the station would have, it might not be permissible under FCC rules.

**Senator Pressler.** But let us say that Radio Marti would have applied for this channel that clashes with WHO. What would the normal outcome of that be?

**Mr. Saloman.** Its application would not have been accepted for filing. It would have violated the rules.

**Senator Pressler.** Do we have any other precedents where a radio station created by the Government has not been run through the FCC, that is independent of the normal rules? I mean is this the first time this has been done?

**Mr. Saloman.** The only similar situation is the establishment of Radio Marathon on 1180 during the Cuban missile crisis, but that in itself was a unique situation.

**Senator Pressler.** And who did they clash with?

**Mr. Saloman.** Well, it clashed with WHAM in Rochester, N.Y., and that station fought at the FCC and in court, the continued operation after the missile crisis had abated, and did not prevail, but it lost on a very narrow, I think, technical ground. And they simply gave up the fight, as Mr. Rust's letter that the Senator alluded to demonstrate.

**Senator Pressler.** Senator Grassley, you have proposed an alternative plan. What would you say, if you had to, would be the disadvantages of your alternative plan as compared to the administration's plan?

**Senator Grassley.** There would not be any disadvantage except for the fact that no existing commercial AM frequency, other than 1180 kilohertz could be used. I mean it does do away with that alternative. But it has so many other alternatives, and it does not limit us just to one. I would think, except for the stated fact of the AM frequency being limited, that it would be much better than the existing bill because it gives the administration all those alternatives, not only in procedure and substance, but also in cost as well. And by using more than one approach, you would probably be more effective in what you are trying to do.

But the bottom line of it is that when there is a jamming effort, if you are coming from just one point, or even AM by itself, all of AM by itself, it is less of a guessing game for Castro. And it seems to me, what we would want our foreign policy to be, is that since Castro knows with certainty our objectives, he does not know how we are going to get there.

**Senator Pressler.** Now, when this was first proposed and floating around were you consulted? Did you go over to—I guess it was Allen who worked on this or headed the task force in the White House—did you go over and propose your alternative plan?

Senator **Grassley**. Yes.

Senator **Pressler**. It seems to me that your alternative plan is a very good one. I cannot understand why we do not go with that.

Senator **Grassley**. Well, I did not have a detailed alternative plan at that point, but I did appear before the President's Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba on March 30, 1982, and I presented alternatives; but I was not as specific as I am in this amendment. And I also had occasion to visit with one of the members of the President's Commission in my office. I had an opportunity to have Under Secretary of Defense, Fred Ikle come to my office and visit with me about it. And these meetings go back even before the March 30 testimony on one occasion, and probably 2 months ago when I visited with Secretary Ikle on it.

Senator **Pressler**. Now, would a shift toward shortwave significantly reduce the Marti radio audience?

Senator **Grassley**. A shift to what?

Senator **Pressler**. Toward shortwave.

Senator **Grassley**. The answer to that is there would be less access as a result of shortwave than by the other alternatives, but it does have other benefits. And if it were part of a combination approach to Radio Marti, then, of course, it would fill in a vacuum that would otherwise not be filled.

Also, could we have Mr. Saloman comment on this?

Mr. **Saloman**. Senator, there is one other point about shortwave being used as a complementary service, and that is that it is much more difficult, infinitely more difficult to jam. And while there are undoubtedly fewer shortwave receivers in Cuba than AM receivers, you are sure to reach more Cubans on an unjammed shortwave service than you are on a single jammed AM station.

Senator **Grassley**. See, you are putting all your eggs in one basket, and, you know, whether you are playing the stock market or whether you are actually gathering eggs from the chickens, that is not a very good practice.

Senator **Pressler**. It seems strange to me that we cannot reach a compromise on this with something like you have proposed. The administration has really dug in. The Vice President called me this morning and said how important this was and so forth.

But why is there not an alternative? It sounds like your alternative is a reasonable one, although you can argue, I guess, about which audience you reach. But how did we get into this impasse—have you tried to negotiate this with the administration?

Senator **Grassley**. We are in the process of doing that and have been for a little while.

Senator, I guess I would simply suggest that you and I are elected to an independent policymaking branch of Government. The purpose of a 6-year term for the Senate is that we serve as a cooling force in the whole process of making policy in this country. We are involved in that process right now, and you know you are a part of that process and I am a part of that process. I would expect that we would not be rubberstamps, but that we would be policymakers.

Senator **Pressler**. I agree, I agree.

I have no further questions at this time.

The **Chairman**. Senator Zorinsky.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. May I for the guidance of the committee indicate that I would like to continue the hearing until, say 12:45, when we would recess for lunch. It would be my intention to then pick up again at 2 to continue and then begin the markup. That is the plan unless there is an objection raised to the committee meeting 2 hours after the opening of the Senate.

Thank you.

Senator Zorinsky.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to put on notice the members here that I have already registered an objection to the committee meeting further than 2 hours after the Senate convened. We went into session at 10 this morning, and therefore, I feel that we will not be in session past noon.

Senator Grassley, I would like to ask you about——

The **Chairman**. For clarification, Senator Zorinsky, the Senate came in at 10 this morning?

Senator **Zorinsky**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. It requires unanimous consent for committees to meet 2 hours after it has begun. So that unanimous consent not having been granted, we would have to adjourn then at 12 noon and would not be able to meet any further today.

Senator **Zorinsky**. That is correct.

The **Chairman**. Then if Senators would check their schedules to see if we can meet tomorrow morning at 9 or 10.

I am just advised that the Senate may go into recess at 12, in which event we would be able to continue then. It depends on how long that recess lasts. But we would go here until 12:45 and pick up again at 2. I do not imagine they will recess longer than 2.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Well, I can talk all day long until they do come back.

The **Chairman**. Thank you. If you would just continue your questioning then.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. But we will proceed just as expeditiously as we can here with the responsibilities of the committee subject to the rules of the Senate.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Senator Grassley, what are your views generally with respect to Radio Marti, and specifically, what is your understanding about Radio Marti being subject to the normal rules of licensing procedure in applying for a radio license.

Senator **Grassley**. Well, first of all, in the opening paragraphs of my statement, I did refer to my general support for the concept of Radio Marti. With regard to it being exempt, it was specifically exempted from certain areas before the FCC. There was an important vote on that in the House of Representatives where one of the members tried to have them applicable to that licensing procedure so that the hearing process could be carried out. That was defeated and the bill—I assume the House bill and the Senate bill is the same in that regard—would not require that process.

And, of course, as I stated to Senator Kassebaum, even when the FCC in its ad hoc function of exploring possibilities for Radio Marti, they did not even ask WHO in Des Moines to give their reaction.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Did you believe it a little strange that the Government in no way had any contact with WHO with respect to choosing the 1040 frequency?

Senator **Grassley**. I would even be broader in my condemnation and say that I would think that every station that is going to be affected in any way ought to at least have the opportunity to present their case and have their opinion heard. This is part of their right to know that the interests of commercial broadcasters are considered by Washington.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Could you in any way support an amendment that would subject Radio Marti to the normal process of applying to the FCC for a license?

Senator **Grassley**. Well, I would say that if there can be an effort here to accommodate the concerns of broadcasters generally—and I point out that this potentially is not just a WHO problem but a problem for broadcasters in the States affecting the membership of this committee—that those considerations have got to be paramount, and obviously I would consider supporting such an amendment like that.

Senator **Zorinsky**. You just hit the nail on the head. I certainly concur with your statement earlier when you indicated that we are elected to represent a constituency, with the bottom line being what is in the best interests of the United States of America.

I would like to read into the record a telegram I received last week. It says,

> This resolution because of the development of the Radio Marti concept, would create a state of great difficulty for radio reception in the United States; and inasmuch as the funding for such a project would come at a time when the world economic structure is depressed; and, further, the Marti concept is such that it will make massive retaliation by the Cuban Government a reality in our broadcasting spectrum; therefore, be it resolved that the Nebraska Broadcasters Association opposes the passage of H.R. 5427 and S. 1853, and that we as broadcasters make our individual and collective positions known to our legislators in the Federal capital, and a copy of this resolution be placed in the United States Postal Service to our three Congresspersons and the two United States Senators, respectfully submitted, Nebraska Broadcasters Association, Cal Coleman, President.

I would assume there exists a like attitude within the Iowa Broadcasters Association and numerous other associations throughout the country.

Senator **Grassley**. Let me also say, in regard to your question about the FCC process, that my amendment would get Radio Marti on the air sooner than allowed by the FCC process, and yet would offer more protection for broadcasters. So, I think that those in the administration and in the Senate, who want to get Radio Marti functioning very quickly, want to give some protection to our broadcasters and yet do not want to face the elongated process of FCC, would support favorable consideration of my amendment.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Zorinsky.

Senator Hawkins, we are pleased to have you with us, and I know that you have some concerns in the State of Florida. Is there any comment that you would like to make or questions that you would like to ask?

## STATEMENT OF HON. PAULA HAWKINS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

Senator HAWKINS. I have no questions, but I do have a short statement that I would like to make.

We in Florida are very familiar with interference, and I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for extending to me the courtesy of participating in this hearing because I believe this is an issue of national importance, and not limited to just one great State.

The President's proposal to establish a radio station to broadcast to the people of Cuba was an important foreign policy initiative. The bill creating Radio Marti was approved by the House of Representatives on August 20 by an almost 2 to 1 margin, 250 to 134. I believe that vote made it clear that radio broadcasting to Cuba is not a partisan issue.

As Congressman Kemp and Tom Lantos have said, Radio Marti is an idea long overdue. If it is weakened or defeated, the people of Cuba will have no alternative to the government-controlled broadcasts of the Castro regime.

Radio Marti's purpose is to tell the Cuban people what is happening in their country and about their government's activities around the world. Currently the Cubans depend on Fidel Castro's propaganda for their knowledge of events. The only country that currently broadcasts programs specifically designed for the Cuban audience is the Soviet Union.

The inspiration for Radio Marti developed as a result of the success model provided by Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. The United States decided many years ago that the Voice of America broadcasts needed to be supplemented by a specialized radio service which could take into account the special needs of the nations subjugated by the Soviet Union.

Radio Marti is not a departure from established practice. The need for this new radio station is very clear. Through Radio Free Europe we attempt to reach the Poles, the Romanians, the Czechs, the Russians. Why not the Cubans?

Today the Soviet Union outspends the United States about 7 to 1 in their broadcasting and information efforts worldwide. Castro's 20 some years of anti-American diatribes and support for violence and terrorism at our doorstep is of great concern to all Americans. It is imperative that we in the U.S. Senate approve this measure which is, in the words of National Security Adviser William P. Clark, and I quote him, "represents one of the few peaceful options available to the United States in this very sensitive and vital area."

I am aware of the seriousness of Castro's radio interference. The people of south Florida have lived with such interference for the past 13 years. Castro announced the creation of over 200 new radio stations and has threatened to build two half-million-watt transmitters long before Radio Marti was announced.

For 13 years the people and the broadcasters of Florida suffered Castro's interference. Until President Reagan decided to build a Radio Free Europe type station to broadcast to Cuba, no one had come to the U.S. Senate to raise the issue of radio interference. As long as the problem was limited to Florida, no one seemed to care.

Mr. Chairman, Radio Marti is not the cause of Castro's interference. Radio Marti is only an excuse for Castro to try to blackmail the United States.

Yesterday morning the Washington Post reported that Castro's Deputy Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon threatened to declare a radio war against the United States. In his word, "If Radio Havana is blocked, nothing happens, but if a show sponsored by General Electric gets blocked, then General Electric will pull its advertisement off the air."

I believe Castro's spokesman is mistaken. The U.S. Senate has never allowed itself to be blackmailed. Many Floridians who have suffered Castro's unprovoked interference for many years have committed their support to the President's proposal. The Florida Broadcasters Association has committed their support to the President's proposal. The South Florida Broadcasters Association supports the concept of Radio Marti. And as Judge Clark, the President's National Security Adviser, said, "Basing U.S. policy on presumed threats from a foreign power is in any event an unacceptable precedent."

Radio Marti is an unrelated issue to Castro's radio interference. It has been going on for 13 years, and it will continue to go on with or without Radio Marti.

Do we have any assurances that if we drop Radio Marti Castro will cease his interference? Certainly none that I have heard of. Castro does not need any excuse to continue his campaign against the United States and against our broadcasting industry. We have a right as a nation to decide our own foreign policy without the fears raised by a foreign dictator. We also have a right to expand our international radio programing which has been neglected for many years, and Radio Marti will help to fill that gap. Radio Marti is a just and necessary extension of our international radio programing.

Some opponents of Radio Marti would limit the new radio station to short wave. We have been listening to that a lot today. Unlike Eastern Europeans, Cubans own few short wave receivers, and short wave broadcasts will reach only a minute audience consisting probably of the Communist political elite.

I would like to cite a paragraph of a letter written to Congressman Dante Fascell by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Mr. William C. Simon, on August 12. "As to Radio Marti, short wave will not accomplish the purpose. All information available to me indicates that few Cubans have short wave receivers. Only AM can reach Radio Marti's intended audience, the Cuban people."

Another issue has been raised is to substitute the 1040 frequency for leased broadcast time on commercial radio stations. This is an unworkable proposal. Only three Florida radio stations are heard in Cuba; two of them broadcast in the English language. They only reach a very small area of the western section of Cuba. Furthermore, they are only heard sporadically during daytime and occasionally at night depending on atmospheric conditions. Their programing is tailored to please their audience that forms the basis of their advertising revenues—the Hispanic population of south Florida, not the Cubans living on the island. It would be poor judgment to place an important foreign policy initiative in the hands of commercial radio operators.

Others have proposed that we use the Voice of America rather than an independent Radio Marti for broadcasting accurate and relevant news to the Cuban people. However, this proposal ignores the distinction between the VOA and the type of radio service which Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and now Radio Marti will provide.

VOA's Spanish programs are designed to appeal to the general Latin American public. The Voice of America's charter precludes service to only one country.

Fidel Castro objects to the message, Mr. Chairman, not the medium. Moving the problem to another frequency is not a solution; it is just a new problem. Some critics want to put Radio Marti on VOA Marathon key frequency. However, if Castro were to interfere with this frequency, that would result in many more U.S. stations being interfered with because there are more U.S. stations in the Marathon key frequency than on 1040.

Fidel Castro threatens to block not only 1040 but also 1060, a frequency where no broadcasts to Cuba is planned. This is, of course, part of Castro's blackmailing strategy. Some have suggested that another AM frequency be chosen even though the above objections still apply. But it should be clear to everyone that if an off-band AM frequency were chosen, it would be tantamount to a rejection of the concept of Radio Marti.

Broadcasts on off-band frequencies are difficult to hear without a good AM receiver. This means that a substantial part of the Cuban audience would be denied by Radio Marti. Most receivers in Cuba are old sets from pre-Castro days, unable to tune in under 630 or above 610.

In addition, in order to jam 1040 Castro would have to interfere also with stations in Nicaragua and other countries with which Castro wishes to maintain good relations. Broadcasts out of band would allow Castro to use a crude, high-powered jammer without jeopardizing Cuba's relations with Nicaragua and other countries. Also, the frequencies are not internationally regulated, which means that the United States would have no legal basis for objections to Cuba's interference.

Mr. Chairman, let me close my remarks by urging my colleagues to support this effort to broadcast truthful information to the people of Cuba. This initiative deserves a chance.

I urge the committee to reject any proposals that would dilute the effectiveness of Radio Marti. These proposals you have heard. They are flawed and were overwhelmingly rejected by our colleagues in the House.

I hope that the committee will, as a recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal said, "* * * give the alternative a decent chance."

Thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I assure you that my own feeling is very strong that, no foreign national will dictate our policy and that we will move expeditiously on this bill. However, we will want to be certain that everyone has been heard. We will move as promptly as we possibly can on this issue.

Senator HAWKINS. We really appreciate the leadership you have given.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for a very fine statement.

Senator Grassley, your full statement will be incorporated in the record together with Senator Jepsen's. We appreciate it very much indeed. I made a commitment to you that, at an appropriate point, at your request, I will submit your amendment to an up or down vote by this committee.

Senator GRASSLEY. I am very appreciative of that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Our next and final witnesses this morning, please come forward at this time. We are pleased to have a former colleague, Senator Stone, who we had the pleasure of hearing from once before, and we are happy to have you back again, and we also have a witness, Wayne Smith, former head of the U.S. Interest Section of Cuba. I believe, Mr. Smith, it would be appropriate to hear from you first, and then we will hear, as anchorman, our former colleague. We will suspend for just one moment.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. If you don't mind, please proceed, Mr. Smith.

## STATEMENT OF WAYNE SMITH, FORMER HEAD, U.S. INTERESTS SECTION, HAVANA, CUBA

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the invitation to appear before the committee. I will have to read my statement, since I only had time last night to jot down some remarks on the back of an envelope, as it were.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Do you have copies of your statement for us?

Mr. SMITH. I do not have copies; I will have to read it; I have only written it out.

Mr. Chairman, as Americans, we are all committed to the free flow of ideas across borders, and the argument against Radio Marti, at least my argument does not flow from some objection to providing more information to the Cuban people. There are, however, serious doubts that Radio Marti is the best way to go about it.

The consideration of U.S. interests must come first. What is the United States going to get out of this? What are the costs and risks? Do the possible gains outweigh the possible losses? I have seen no evidence of such calculations. Indeed, it seems to me that the administration's most glaring failure is to explain exactly what the United States hopes to achieve by spending $17 million to establish Radio Marti, a new station.

It has been suggested that Radio Marti will raise the cost to Castro and force him to abandon his interventionist policies in Central America and Africa. Past experience, however, indicates Castro is likely to react by becoming more rather than less aggressive. On the other hand, he has already offered several times to begin serious negotiations, and has emphasized that he is willing to discuss all issues, including Cuban activities in Central America and Africa.

The United States has so far not taken him up on this offer. The question must therefore be asked why set up Radio Marti to work toward an objective we may have a better chance of achieving through negotiations? If we set up Radio Marti, we may close off the option of negotiations without really having explored it. What then will we have gained?

We must also ask ourselves, is this the best way to provide more reliable information to the Cuban people? Several witnesses have tended to phrase the choice as an absolute. In other words, either we establish Radio Marti or we leave the Cuban people in ignorance, with no alternative to their own government's news services. But this is not the case. There are other alternatives and better choices. Castro does not even now have a monopoly.

VOA, for example, is already heard clearly all over Cuba, and has a wide listenership. For years it had a special program for Cuba, the Cita Con Cuba program, which provided essentially the same fare the administration now says it wants to broadcast over Radio Marti. There is no objective reason VOA could not resume such broadcasts. There would then be no need to build new transmission towers or other facilities. VOA already has them.

Further, since VOA's credentials for accuracy and responsibility are well established, expanded broadcasting would have an immediate credibility and listenership. The administration, however, has chosen the most expensive option, that of creating an entirely new station. One must ask why. The administration insists it simply wants to provide more objective news, a concept we would all support, but that is precisely what the VOA's charter calls on it to do.

The administration may be perfectly sincere in its position, but its insistence on a brand new station, it seems to me, when it has other options has raised harmful doubts as to the motives behind this project, but even if the administration does not intend that Radio Marti phase into strident propaganda and or a destabilization campaign, the pressures on it to move in that direction will be tremendous. It might not end up repeating every wild rumor on Flagro Street, but it would be more likely to do so than would VOA, with the latter's years of experience and its time tested ground rules.

Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt at all as to how Cuba will react to Radio Marti. I certainly do not defend that reaction. On the contrary, objectively considered, it could only be seen as a bit irrational. But whatever we may think of it, it will be no less real. The Cubans see Radio Marti against a background of past events, the Bay of Pigs, assassination attempts against Cuban leaders, clandestine CIA radio stations, and so forth. Hence the strength of their response, which they see as a matter of self-defense. Incorrectly, in my view, but that is the way they see it. They will jam Radio Marti, but they will also deliberately interfere with our commercial channels on a massive scale. Radio broadcasting in the southeastern States and to a lesser extent in the country as a whole could be seriously disrupted.

We are talking then about a full-scale radio war, if not worse. Pentagon officials say we would consider such Cuban interference a hostile act. Does that mean we would then begin a shooting war with Cuba? Senior State Department officials have insisted that Radio Marti and the problems of interference are unrelated, but in fact there is a clear relationship. Yes, interference is a long-standing problem. As Senator Hawkins said, Florida has suffered from it for years. Some Cuban stations interfere with United States broadcasts and vice versa, because some United States broadcasts do interfere with Cuban stations.

However, negotiations have begun, and there were high hopes that ways could be found to neutralize the problem. On September 1, 1981, at the end of the last round of bilateral talks held on the subject, the United States and Cuban delegations issued a communique expressing satisfaction over the progress made up to that point. Cuba had also indicated its interest in participating in a new regional broadcasting agreement. However, a few days after the communique, the United States announced its intention to build Radio Marti. Cuba then in effect pulled out of the bilateral talks and subsequently announced it would not respect any regional agreement.

This attitude is directly related to Radio Marti. The Cuban position is that were it not for Radio Marti, they would wish to resume negotiations, and would pledge a full effort to solve once and for all the problem of interference in one another's channels. It seems to me that all sides, the United States, Cuba, and our Latin American neighbors could gain a great deal from the resumption of these negotiations. Cuba should be brought into the regional agreement and made to respect it.

But, as I have said elsewhere, Mr. Chairman, our decision in this matter should not be conditioned by Cuba's likely reaction to it. If this proposal as it now stands were really a good idea, with significant benefits to the United States, then we should do it and Havana be damned, but that is not the case. Rather, it seems to me this proposal has not carefully been thought through. The proposal, as it stands, is likely to produce results exactly the opposite of those we should rationally wish to see. It is more likely to compound than to reduce our Cuban problem. This is certainly not an equation in which the possible gains outweigh the losses.

Now, the broad concept is good. I think everyone is in agreement with that. But the proposal is not. There are better, more cost effective alternatives. I would simply add that whatever we do, let's not call it Radio Marti, which simply displays our insensitivity to the subtleties of history. Marti, while he admired our constitutional system, was one who warned the rest of Latin America about the domination of the United States, about the coming domination of the United States, a fact which our adversaries could turn to their advantage and against ours.

Thank you very much.

Senator KASSEBAUM [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Shall we proceed ahead with questioning of you? I would like to ask a couple of questions, if I might, Mr. Smith, because, of course, you have been the head of the office in Havana, and have observed the situation there for some time. You mentioned the negotiations that have been going on with the FCC regarding interference and believed, evidently, that they were positively moving forward. I wonder if you have any details as far as what the Cubans, what terms the Cubans might be requesting in order to make some technical changes that would stop the interference that they have been engaging in. Are you familiar with the negotiating details?

Mr. SMITH. Not with the negotiating details, Senator. I can say that the Cubans on a number of occasions have indicated not only a willingness but a desire to resume negotiations were it not for Radio Marti. Now, I think interference is a long-standing problem, and given the atmosphere of hostility which has long existed and still exists between the two countries, there had not been much interest on the Cuban side in solving it, but negotiations did get started a few years back. There were prospects for a solution, and the Cubans have emphasized on a number of occasions since the negotiations broke down or since they pulled out as a result of Radio Marti, I would say, a new sensitivity to the need, to the need to reach agreement on this, or to neutralize this problem.

I must say I had thought that Radio Marti, the proposal, that is, might be a useful bargaining chip in such negotiations, but apparently that was not the purpose.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I believe if this is correct that you have had reservations about the concept of Radio Marti for some time. Did you convey to the State Department your reservations?

Mr. SMITH. Yes; I did, Senator, on a number of occasions. I might say I conveyed those reservations, I think, after the idea was almost in concrete, because I did not hear about it until that point.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you believe that VOA was reaching an audience and conveying a message that is important and that Radio Marti would ultimately be doing? Was this your objection?

Mr. SMITH. Yes; it is, Senator. The idea that Voice of America cannot broadcast to one country I don't quite understand, since it did broadcast to Cuba.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Why isn't it now?

Mr. SMITH. As I understand it, the program Cita Con Cuba was dropped some years back, 1976 or 1977, not because of any charter problem, but because we were moving into a period of negotiations or efforts to reduce tensions between the United States and Cuba, and it was dropped on that basis. I see no objective reason that it could not be resuscitated. I have studied that charter carefully. I see nothing in the VOA charter that would prevent it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Is there anyone here that can answer that with any sense of authortiy, or why it was dropped, or why it could not be started again?

I just was given a message that Senator Stone, perhaps you would wish to testify, and then we can ask questions to both. Does anyone else have any questions for Mr. Smith?

Senator PELL. I do have questions for Wayne Smith. I am willing to postpone them. I will do whatever is most convenient. If you would rather have Senator Stone testify first, and then have questions, that is up to you.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Senator Stone, why don't you go ahead, and then we will ask questions to both?

Senator STONE. All right, Madame Chairman.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Do you have printed testimony, Senator?

Senator STONE. No, I have not.

## STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD B. STONE, A FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA, AND MEMBER, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

Senator STONE. The announced lineup of witnesses at the last minute showed three witnesses that were going to testify against this bill, and only one, myself, that was going to testify in favor of this bill, and therefore I requested the privilege of speaking last and trying to clarify and rebut any assertions that the opponents made here, and that is what I propose to do.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I knew when I asked you if you wished to comment that you said go ahead.

Senator STONE. The reason I said go ahead was that I could also then rebut the answers that I felt to be inaccurate, and I still think that is the right way to do it, but it is up to you, Madame Chairman. I would be perfectly happy to go ahead.

Senator KASSEBAUM. It would be useful if you went ahead with your opening remarks, and then we could share. I think it would be helpful to have you respond to some of the same questions that were raised.

Senator STONE. That will be fine.

First of all, it is a pleasure to be back here, and I will try to be as brief as possible, because the crucial thing here is to allow the committee to get to markup and work its will on this proposal.

We all understand that this bill has been heard in two separate hearings before this committee. This is the third. It has been heard before the Subcommittee on Appropriations of the Senate. It has been heard before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications of the House. It has been heard and marked up by the full House of Representatives Committee of Commerce and Energy, and recommended favorably. It has been heard by the House Foreign Affairs Committee and then recommended favorably. And it has been passed by a vote of almost 2 to 1 by the full House of Representatives.

The Grassley amendment in substance was considered by the full House and rejected by a vote of almost 2 to 1. That was the first amendment considered by the House. So this is not something that is just coming to this committee for a lick and a promise. The committees of both Houses of Congress and the full House have considered this for almost 1 year, so any effort to describe this proposal as being premature when it has been through that many hearings, that many analyses—the Congressional Research Service has analyzed it, a rebuttal has been filed to that. This has been well considered.

Now, in substance, if an amendment such as the Grassley proposal were adopted, then all of the commercial frequencies on the band would be prohibited to this station. All that would be left on the AM band would be the possibility of outside the normal frequencies. You heard Senator Hawkins of Florida describe the actuality of radio receivers within Cuba. So what you would be doing is broadcasting to the Communist officials there who have the short wave radios or the new radios and could hear this.

We do not need to talk to them. We need to talk to the people who right now are getting a steady diet of monopoly information which is distorted.

Second, everybody here, including my friend, Wayne Smith, has assumed that we have a radio war in store, that the first thing that is going to happen is that Fidel Castro will order jamming and massive interference. That is not necessarily the case, and as evidence that this is not necessarily the case, I have the ability today to quote Fidel Castro as of yesterday, when he said to the Associated Press, "We are not going to interfere, but we are going to broadcast back. I think the Americans are going to be listening to a lot of Cuban music," Castro told the Associated Press. Or, later on in this dispatch, they discuss the possibility of setting up something called Radio Lincoln. We do not mind that at all. First of all, we all happen to like Cuban music, and we think our version of the real Cuban music will be *better than theirs, but* second, we do not mind having Americans hear competing opinions. None of us do.

But to think and assume that because it is possible that he will do this, that he will do it is not necessarily the case, and why? Because if he were to try to massively interfere with the broadcast commercial band, he would be massively interfering with the Mexican listeners, and the Venezuelan listeners, and the Nicaraguan listeners, and the Guatemalan listeners, and many, many others. Maybe he would not mind interfering with the Guatemalan listeners, but I somehow think that to create a hostility in Mexico, where he has had some openings, would not do his policy any good.

In other words, there would be quite a bit of painful cost here in the wage of Castro's efforts following the Falklands crisis in the Latin American community. We would not be alone in resisting massive radio interference, and again, I want to say, here is Fidel Castro yesterday saying that he will not do it. So, we can quote him either way, but I rather think that there are costs here that we should weigh which do not necessarily meet the eye.

Second, some of the arguments in coming from an authoritative source like Wayne Smith—who has really experienced a lot, by being down there—always carries weight, but we have considered those arguments not just once but many times in the Commission, in the State Department, in the administration, and frankly, these arguments have also been considered in our press.

Just the day before yesterday, or it was yesterday, Mr. Smith's opinions were given full play in the Washington Post. The same arguments that we have heard here, this morning, were written and presented and read in the Washington Post. And today, having weighed that as well as the Vice Foreign Minister of Cuba's own article, which the Post ran, the Washington Post rejects those arguments and says that there is nothing inconsistent with broadcasting information to Cuba, honest information of the sort that Radio Free Europe has been doing for years to the Eastern European people, and negotiating if an opportunity presents itself.

On this question of negotiation, it is not accurate to say that the Cubans were ready to cut a deal with us on frequencies and on radio problems, and then 2 weeks later Radio Marti was announced and they broke off relations.

We have one of the members of the negotiating party, Tu Rio, here in the hearing room, and I am advised that we had three massive differences of opinion, not just between Castro and Cuba and us, but between the Latin community and Cuba. (1) The two monster stations that he wants to put on the air. (2) The 48 major frequency allocations that he was claiming. And (3) this issue of the 1040. I must say that I was advised that it was those reasons which were presented by Cuba to the Rio Conference on a take it or leave it basis, and then we prevailed, because we had a reasonable, modest approach, and he was offering a take it or leave it approach to the whole Latin community, and then they walked out.

After that, they tried to blame Radio Marti as a scapegoat, but what was at stake in those negotiations were at least 48 major differences of opinion. And we thought, and the Latin community thought, rather arrogant assertions of appropriation of the air waves which they could not sell to Latin America. That is what happened.

Now, finally, everybody says we should do it, but everybody says, let George do it. We do not have any objection on the President's Commission on Radio Broadcasting to Cuba. I am satisfied that the administration and the State Department also do not have any objection to the House version of this bill in its relevant provision, which requires one more major search of all the band, a public hearing, and another opportunity for everyone to be heard. That is in the House bill that they passed. It would allow WHO and the other stations to come before the NTIA and make their case. The FCC has thoroughly reviewed this situation. They exhaustively reviewed it, and recommended to the NTIA the use of 1040, but we are not locked into that.

What we are saying to the committee is, do not lock us out of all of the commercial broadcasting bands. Some of Senator Grassley's proposals have a lot of merit. We are thinking in the Commission (and I know the administration is also thinking) about supplementing a basic frequency by the rented use of air time when we can get it, not just in this country but in other countries, that can reach the parts of Cuba that our Florida and American stations cannot reach. I think it ought to be clarified that most of those stations only reach the western part of Cuba, whereas a majority of the population is not reached by those stations.

Finally, to cite Citia Con Cuba—which was the short programing that VOA did as the alternative—a short program won't cut it. We have to broadcast to them on a reliable full-time basis, not just a few news broadcasts. Second, we have to broadcast to the Cuban people that which they cannot hear from anyone else. And, if we monopolized all of Latin America's, or a bulk of Latin America's, air time for that matter, we could not address the problems in Central America that also need addressing. I mean, Cuba, while important, is not the only problem American foreign policy confronts.

Finally, why should this committee assume when the House has not assumed and its committees have not assumed that this job will be done badly? This job will not be done badly. It will be a modest, sophisticated, careful, controlled approach, and the administration's proposal which the Commission endorses is to have the State Department, during this period of inception, closely supervise and scrutinize what is the content going out. Why should we assume that that is going to be some kind of radical irritant? It is not.

I would close by saying that just as we have a right to know here, and it is good for us to be able to get competing information, it is just as important for us for the people inside Cuba to have some competing information and opinion. Really, we do not expect to control Castro's adventures by a few radio broadcasts over 6 months, but instead by a long-term project. We do expect that, just as Radio Free Europe gave an appetite and a feeling for individual and group freedoms in Poland, we can do something which will be typically Cuban and not Polish, but something that will be just as valuable to the world and to the Cuban people as what our Radio Free Europe has been able to accomplish in Eastern Europe.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Senator Stone. I will turn the chairmanship over to Senator Helms.

*Senator HELMS. I would prefer the distinguished Senator from* Kansas to retain the chair, but two questions. Could I ask the television people if it is absolutely essential to have that spotlight in here? How about aiming it at Senator Pell? If you absolutely have to have it, that is fine.

[Pause.]

Senator HELMS. Thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN. I think that should go down in the record, Mr. Chairman. You are to be commended. You are one of the few Senators who would ask that the spotlight be taken off of him.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. If you don't need that one, move it.

Senator HELMS. I did not mean to set off a tandem case here, but I was a silhouette for our former colleague from Florida.

Madam Chairperson—did I say that right? May I inquire what the intent of the committee is? Will we discontinue at 12 o'clock?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Senator Percy had hoped to adjourn at 12:45. Is that not right?

Senator HELMS. Let me point out, if I may, that the Senate will be in recess from 12:15 until 1:30 or 2 o'clock, or until 2:30. Just informally, could I ask the Senator from Nebraska what his intentions would be?

Senator ZORINSKY. Yes. At 12 o'clock I will indicate that we are in session in violation of the 2-hour rule, and I will register my objection to continuing.

Senator HELMS. I am not questioning anything. I just want to see how the land lies.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I think Senator Percy wanted to markup this afternoon, and to move this along so that we could markup.

Senator HELMS. Let me advise the Chair——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Pardon me, Senator. Are we then going to be prevented from continuing at 12?

Senator PELL. From 12 to 12:15, it will not be in order for the committee to meet. At 12:15, the Senate being in recess, I believe, it can meet.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Since it is only 15 minutes, I would hope the Senator from Nebraska would not object.

Senator ZORINSKY. If I were not to do that, I would be reading this into the record, which is the Commission's report.

Senator HELMS. Well, now, let me say this. Ed, my friend from Nebraska, I have been on the other side, and——

Senator ZORINSKY. I watched you do this.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. If you would yield, Senator, I have never been in a committee where there has been an effort to prevent the committee from moving forward. I have never been in a committee where there was a filibuster. Personally, I would find that to be inappropriate. We need one another, and we should extend some courtesies to one another certainly in committee. On the floor, there are somewhat different rules of procedure, so I would ask the Senator from Nebraska to allow this to go forward.

Senator HELMS. Well, if the Chair would let me continue, let us not have any words before we fall out, Senator. I want to say that I am hearing on the floor now that if for whatever reason, with merit or without merit, as the judgments may be, this is not reported, then Senators will feel free to offer the House language on the debt ceiling bill. So it will not be the end all and be all. And I respect the Senator's rights, and I will fight to protect them. I would hope that he would not, but I know that there are times when he would hope that I would cease and desist, but that is the way the machinery works around here, and he knows my respect for him and respect for his rights, but I did think it was essential to bring the point that if the committee is blocked from acting, there is an alternative to get this back to the House on a piece of legislation. I thank the Chair.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Senator Helms. Do you have any questions? Why don't you start the questioning?

Senator HELMS. I beg your pardon?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Why don't you start the questioning, as chairman?

Senator HELMS. No, thank you.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Senator Stone, I certainly do think that you gave a very persuasive argument for Radio Marti, and I do not believe there is any disagreement here about the concept of the importance for that type of broadcasting.

Senator STONE. I am most gratified.

Senator KASSEBAUM. The thing we have been trying to explore is how best to do it, and I think this has been very informative and is important.

Senator STONE. If I might respond, I think the best way to do it is the way the House finally completed it—after wrestling with it, not only for just those committee meetings that I described, but also several floor sessions—it went up to the floor several times and ended up requiring what amounts to a very exhaustive re-review with public hearings and the rest, and that is in the bill. We do not object to that, because if there is a less controversial, or a less risky, way to accomplish this, we certainly want to do it that way. We have nothing at all against the Midwest broadcasters, and if there is, we will do it, but if there is not, then we might have to seek some way of compensating them, if, contrary to what Fidel Castro has just said, they do nevertheless try to interfere.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Smith, I have several questions for you, but first, when did you leave Havana, and how long were you there as head of the American Interests Section?

Mr. SMITH. I had been in Havana, Senator Pell, for 3 years, from July 1979, until last month. Before that, I had been 2 years as director of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State.

Senator PELL. And how many years have you been in the Foreign Service?

Mr. SMITH. Twenty-five years.

Senator PELL. And you are an FSO?

Mr. SMITH. I am retired, Senator Pell. I retired last week.

Senator PELL. Why did you retire?

Mr. SMITH. Well, Senator Pell, I am not sure that that is something we should go into here. I retired because of my disagreements with the administration's policies.

Senator PELL. I just wanted to bring that fact out. I admire you very much. I know some of your views. I think the record should be clear. Did you let your disagreement be known through the normal channels of dissent?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, I did.

Senator PELL. And when you resigned, did you feel you were being pushed out, or did you resign because of aggravation with the administration?

Mr. SMITH. I resigned, Senator Pell, because I thought that was the honest thing to do. I disagreed. No; I was not hounded out of the Service by any means. I think I was fairly treated, but I disagreed with policy. I think one should make one's recommendations known through channels. When those with the constitutional authority to do so make other decisions, one must either get behind them and support them or leave, and I felt that the honest thing to do was to leave.

Senator PELL. Well, as a former Foreign Service Officer, I agree with you and admire you for what you did. Many FSO's have disagreed, and for one reason or another not resigned.

Now, from the viewpoint of the broad question of policy, I have been quite concerned because I think our policy has been counterproductive, that while Castro has been outrageous in his actions and his words and rhetoric, we have done nothing to seek to bring an element of calm or reason to the situation, but we have responded by isolating him, forcing him to remain the arm of the Soviet Union. We have mounted one major invasion, the Bay of Pigs, Lord knows how many minor invasions of two or three people courtesy of the CIA, attempted to assassinate their chief of government or chief of state, and then wondered why Cuba is the most virulent exporter of anti-Americanism and communism going.

I am sorry, my time has expired. It is 12 o'clock. I have to stop talking. But we will resume with you at 12:15. I guess I am presiding at this point, and in accordance with the rules of the Senate, a recess—no, I am sorry. You are presiding. You have to recess it.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You can continue to question. Are you done with your questioning, Senator?

Senator PELL. No, I am not. My point is, it is 12 o'clock, and we cannot meet. I have questions I intend to ask.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Why don't you continue your questioning?

Senator ZORINSKY. Senator Boschwitz, I would like to point out that under rule 36, notwithstanding any other provision of the rules, when the Senate is in session, no committee of the Senate or any subcommittee thereof may meet without special leave after the conclusion of the first 2 hours after the meeting of the Senate. We have been in session since 10, I do not feel a 15-minute intermission is that unusual. I have seen it happen even without these circumstances. If there happened to be a vote, there would be a 15-minute intermission during the time we went to vote. I have watched you walk out on Senator Helms in the Agriculture Committee in order to deprive it of a quorum and to prevent the committee from conducting business. So I do not think this is out of the ordinary at all, to take a 15-minute recess and then come back and conclude our business.

Senator **Boschwitz**. The Senator makes an interesting point. First of all, let me tell the Senator that I believe his activities are dilatory. I also think that to make a comparison between this particular proceeding and the proceeding in the Agriculture Committee that was started without notice and to which I objected, is not fair. However, if the Senator insists that we have a recess, I suppose I will not object inasmuch as the recess will just be for a very few minutes. Then we will reconvene.

However, I do want to note to the chairman and also to the Senator from Nebraska that this is unique in my recollection. I have not been here as long as the Senator from Nebraska, but I have never seen an effort to hold a hearing from proceeding, particularly for only 15 minutes and particularly in view of the fact that the business on the floor is a filibuster about abortion.

So, I consider, Mr. Chairman, as I have indicated to the Senator from Nebraska, that his act is dilatory and not meaningful. We want to proceed along with this inquiry. We have had two hearings on Radio Marti before in this committee. I am surprised at the actions of my friend from Nebraska.

Senator **Zorinsky**. Mr. Chairman, I have been here for 5½ years, and I have seen every legal parliamentary maneuver and connivance used in the U.S. Senate.

Senator **Pell**. And I have been here for 22 years, and I also have seen those.

Senator **Zorinsky**. When you strongly believe in something, not to utilize those tools to represent the people that sent you here, I think, is a malfeasance of office. I intend to use all of those tools, as everybody else in the Senate has.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I certainly have not characterized the Senator's activities as a connivance, and I am surprised to hear him say so, but nevertheless, I am going to object. I have never seen those things done in committee.

Senator **Pell**. I have seen whole meetings postponed, not just suspending for 15 minutes, as a matter of courtesy and comity time and time again in this committee. We have not considered something at a committee meeting out of comity for one individual to another who could not be here.

Senator **Boschwitz**. This is not a matter of comity or courtesy, Mr. Chairman. This is just imposition of the rules on a technical basis that is more or less meaningless.

Senator **Zorinsky**. If it was not for the fact that the Senate was out of session, we would not be meeting, period. So I did not anticipate that the Senate would be recessed at 12:15 providing for an interim period of 15 minutes. I do not control the floor.

The **Chairman** [presiding]. Let me say this. There is a possibility that an amendment is being developed right now which is designed to take care of the problems, most of the problems of the U.S. radio stations? This amendment might remove the current objections. I would hope that we could continue to proceed on this matter. You are within your legal rights, but so long as there are useful things that can be said and progress made, I would hope that we could continue discussing the issue, so that when we do get to the point where we are ready for a markup, we could proceed.

The Chair will certainly do everything it can, to accommodate every member of the minority—as it has for 18 months—on issues of importance to them, to see that it is brought to a head in the committee. Then it is a question for the floor. That is where the parliamentary procedures are used and have been used by both sides on many occasions. We are trying to get the committee work cleaned up and out on the floor.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Chairman, I am going to do more for you than you did for me when you gave me your word yesterday that we would not conclude this hearing today. Your soft words have lured me as the sirens have. I have no objection to continuing.

The CHAIRMAN. It was my feeling when I spoke to you, that there was enough involved in the Jepsen-Grassley concerns to warrant a meeting with Judge Clark. That meeting could not take place today, and therefore I did not feel that the hearing would be finished today. I still do not feel that the hearing will be finished today, because we have some work to do on this other compromise amendment. However, I would like to proceed and accomplish just as much as we can and go as far as we can.

Senator ZORINSKY. I thought you had given me a firm commitment. You did not mention Bill Clark or that Senators were going to meet with him. That did not have anything to do with what you were informing me of, but I have no objection. You can continue the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Senator ZORINSKY. I have no objection to continuing the hearing. I apologize to the Senator from Minnesota.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, let me say in turn that I have been informed by the committee staff that when this committee was marking up SALT II, and I attended some of those markups, though I was not a member of the committee, that there was a standing objection by Senator Helms about the committee meeting beyond 2 hours, and that considerably prolonged that markup. So I do not have any recollection of that happening as long as I have been here, but apparently it has happened on this committee within recent years before, and I thank the Senator for his courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate very much your consideration. Why don't we proceed with our witnesses until 12:45, and then come back at 1:30? I understand that the Senate is still going to recess.

Senator PELL. There is a Democratic caucus at 1:30.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have to go to that? [General laughter.]

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Why don't we continue a little longer in that case?

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't we continue and see how far we can go. You were in the middle of being questioned, Senator Stone, were you not?

Senator PELL. I was talking with Mr. Smith.

I was just curious, getting to the fundamental question of policy vis-a-vis Cuba which underlies the decision we must make in connection with the so-called Radio Marti, whether you felt that our policy in general was counterproductive and resulting in the continuous fanning of Cuba dislike, hatred of the American Government and its export of virulent anti-Americanism and communism.

Mr. **Smith**. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. I do believe our policy is counterproductive. I certainly am no apologist for Fidel Castro. I think we have to——

The **Chairman**. Excuse me. I cannot hear. Now, are you disturbed by the conversation next to you?

Mr. **Smith**. No. I am certainly no apologist for Fidel Castro. He can behave outrageously, and certainly I think we have to recognize that he has a different world view, other interests which often are in direct conflict with ours. That is a fact of life we are going to have to live with. But it does seem to me that what we are simply doing now, we are simply pursuing the same course that we have pursued essentially for the past 20 years, and it has not gotten us anywhere. It seems to me that at some time we do have to begin to talk in a serious way, not simply meetings that are futile in nature, but to begin to talk and try to reduce the areas of disagreement, something which we do with many other adversaries around the world.

Senator **Pell**. What we are doing here is raising the ratchet of actions taken against the Cuban regime one more degree. It is not going to be the end of the world if Radio Marti comes into being, but it will be harmful to the eventual rapprochment or warming of relations, whichever way you want to put it, between our two countries.

Mr. **Smith**. Yes, it might well be, Senator Pell. Again, it is a matter of perception. I do not think anyone in the room objects to the idea of trying to get more accurate information to the Cuban people. It is a matter of how it is done and the perception of us around the world, not only by the Cubans, but by others.

Senator **Pell**. There I think you are right. We would all agree that we would like the Cubans to have better knowledge not only of what is going on around the world through the VOA, but also what is going on in Cuba, and also what is going on with their young men who are fighting and being killed in Africa, but in that regard, as you pointed out earlier in your testimony, VOA under its charter could handle this very much as it did in the years 1964 to 1971, when you had the program—I forget its name for the moment—Cita Con Cuba, going on. I gather that was your view, too.

Mr. **Smith**. Yes, Senator Pell, it was. I am not suggesting simply a short newscast. I think the Cita Con Cuba program, if I remember correctly, was at least 1 hour or 2 hours a day. I see no reason that a similar program could not run even longer if we wished it to, several hours a day, without interfering with VOA, which only broadcasts—without interfering with the other VOA broadcasts, which only go for 5½ hours a day anyway.

Senator **Pell**. My understanding is that VOA to Cuba is down to about 5½ hours, but that they could add 8 additional hours, which is what Radio Marti is talking about, for a total of about $4 million, or approximately half the cost that is suggested, and for the life of me I cannot see why that is not a pretty good idea to do.

Mr. **Smith**. If I might add, Senator Pell, I served also in the Soviet Union. I spent 6 years in Soviet Affairs. I am very much aware of the benefits of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, but United States-Cuban relations, I think, have a dynamic history of their own, and the perception would be quite different. Radio Marti, and again, I would appeal not to call it Radio Marti, but as a shorthand expression, Radio Marti, I think, would be perceived, as someone put it, as Son of Swan. Whether it were or not, that would be the perception, at least the initial perception, and that would be the perception people would be reacting to.

Senator PELL. Incidentally, touching on Radio Marti, it would be just as if the Soviets broadcast a program to us under the name Radio John Foster Dulles. It just does not make sense for them to use that name, and I would hope they would change that if it goes through.

Now, based on your conversations with Cuban officials, what do you think would be the Cuban reception to the enlargement of a VOA program?

Mr. SMITH. Senator Pell, based on my conversations with Cuban officials, I think that the Voice of America is viewed as part of the long-established rules of the game, as some Cubans have put it. They have Radio Havana. We have the Voice of America. The British have BBC. The Soviets have Radio Moscow, and so forth. And it is not my impression, certainly I did not receive the impression from Cuban officials that their reaction to an expansion of Voice of America broadcasting would—that they would react strongly. I did not receive the impression they they would react strongly to that, certainly not with a radio war, deliberate jamming and so forth. They have had long experience with the Voice of America, and while they may not like it, and object to some of its programs, they generally regard it as responsible.

Senator PELL. If this radio program was done the way the administration is proposing, do you think that it would have—what would the impact be on the Cuban people, not just the officials?

Mr. SMITH. Well, I think if the broadcasting were done in the way the administration proposes, the impact would be the same whether it were done by the VOA or Radio Marti. I think the problem is the perception of what Radio Marti is likely to turn into, the perception. The Cuban people, I think, are not likely to have a chance to head Radio Marti, because the Cuban Government would very quickly begin to jam it, and whatever Castro may have said to Associated Press, other Cuban officials and Castro himself have said on previous occasions that they will begin deliberate interference on our channels.

Senator PELL. That is all for the moment. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Boschwitz, do you have any questions?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Pardon me just a moment. I do, Mr. Chairman.

[Pause.]

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Are either one of you familiar with Radio Free Europe in Europe? Senator Stone?

Senator STONE. Familiar enough to answer a question, and there are staffers here that can help.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. My question is, Is Radio Free Europe effective in Europe?

Senator STONE. Yes. I do not think there is any question about that, and I do not think that is challenged by anybody, including witnesses in opposition.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Radio Free Europe's mandate. so to speak, in Europe is somewhat similar to the Radio Marti approach.

Senator STONE. That is correct.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. And again Mr. Smith, you would agree that Radio Free Europe is effective in Europe?

Mr. SMITH. Yes; Senator I agree that Radio Free Europe is effective in Europe.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It has been effective in Europe? What would be the impact of jamming Radio Free Europe? As I understand it, one jams the receivers more than one jams the station itself. What would the impact of trying to jam the receivers in Europe be on Radio Free Europe?

Mr. SMITH. I cannot answer that, Senator. I do not know.

Senator STONE. The testimony our Commission had, because we covered it, is that efforts to jam it over the years have only focused renewed credibility and attention on it. The Russians have, and the other Communist governments there have on frequent occasions tried to jam, but they have not been uniformly successful when they try this, it only heightens the curiosity of listeners to hear what is being said and the credibility then of what is being said, particularly if you are careful about your facts, and that is what this station will be.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Is it fair then to say that Radio Free Europe listenership probably has benefited from jamming attempts? Has it been given added credibility?

Senator STONE. It certainly has not been harmed, according to the information we have received.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Is there any evidence the Russians or any East European countries have attempted to counteract the activities of Radio Free Europe by setting up 500-megawatt stations that would interfere with German stations or French stations or English stations? They are all a little bit closer than WHO.

Senator STONE. I think that they have not tried to do that.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I do not know exactly why. I am not an Iowan, but as it happens, I have some business interests in Iowa, and we have been advertisers on WHO for some time, as a matter of fact, and so I am very familiar with this station. Its rates are a little high, but other than that, I have a great familiarity with it. I do not understand. The impact of trying to jam Radio Marti, I imagine, would do just what we are seeking to achieve, and that is to give credibility to it. Did you have an answer to my preceding question, Senator?

Senator STONE. The preceding one was what?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You consulted with somebody.

Senator STONE. Yes; I gave the correct answer, that although the Russians have stations that are capable of broadcasting up to 1 million, they have not used them to interfere willfully in, for example, German commercial broadcasting, or French, or the like. They do have that capability.

Right now, Castro is building very large stations—10 times the size of our largest stations—but he himself is cautious about actually trying to wreck our commercial bands as a retaliation for what we know will be a responsible information source, according tc his latest statement as of yesterday.

May I also, though, add that Castro has given this committee his own advice about how he would like it to be done when he was quoted yesterday as saying about this bill, he called the proposal unintelligent and not subtle, and said it would have been wiser for the United States to use the facilities of the Voice of America. Well, I really think we should write our own bill, and not let him write the bill.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. As I understand the charter of the Voice of America, we would have some trouble in utilizing it in the same way that Radio Free Europe is utilized.

Senator STONE. That is correct. One of our Commission members is Mr. Charles Wick, who heads the Voice of America, and he made it clear to us in our own meetings that their charter is to tell Latin America about America. Their charter is not primarily to tell Cuba about Cuba or Cuban adventures overseas.

Now, there is nothing that would prevent us from packaging a program that they might use if it fit within their charter, but to try to put all of this on George, will not work. This has to be Radio Free Europe directed at people who have no other such access.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. So we find in Europe that a similar type of station or operation as Radio Marti—and I think we should look into the name. Maybe the name should be Radio Free Cuba or something. I am not sure about the name, but that is something that we can look at independently—but it is interesting to note that there has not been a record of jamming on the part of the Russians or the Eastern Europeans.

Incidentally, it would seem to me that jamming is very much a two-way street. Are you familiar with the technicalities?

Senator STONE. We had quite a bit of testimony about what can happen, not only in front, if they start broadcasting and interfering with the signal out in front, but what happens in the other areas, out to the other Caribbean countries, and I mentioned in my direct testimony to the committee that one of the main victims of any massive interference would be the people of Mexico, which I think would sour relations that Castro values rather highly. I just do not think it is a cost-free operation for him, to become an outlaw, a total outlaw in terms of the international control of frequencies.

Now, this particular frequency at stake was assigned to the U.S. Government internationally; 1040 is assigned to the U.S. Government, not just by a recommendation of the FCC and the NITA here, but by the Rio group and by the international broadcasters. I am not saying that this is an absolute must, that it has to be 1040, but I am appealing to the committee not to prohibit what a reexamination would show to be the best possible way to broadcast. As I said, the Commission is most anxious not only to use one frequency, but to use commercial frequencies where we can obtain them, and maybe to supplement possibly with short wave as well.

But what we have to keep in mind is that the radio receivers that we want to beam into are old American ones or new Russian ones, and we have to beam into the frequencies they can pick up. We are not trying to broadcast to Castro or officials. We know what they think. We are trying to broadcast to the people that only get the officialese.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Senator, I am trying to think if there ever has been such a radio war, because that would have very, very broad implications indeed. I am not familiar that there ever has been such a radio war. I know that we have had problems with our friends in

Mexico and other places where they have put up very large stations, as stations in the Middle West have told me, but has there ever been such a thing?

Senator **Stone**. Not on the order that is being threatened and predicted by opponents of this effort. That is a very good reason why this is a very sensitive shared spectrum of the air in which, if one outlaw wants to, he can interfere with the whole world's reception of their own broadcast. However we wouldn't be starting a war like that and we would be operating legally if we used 1040, but if he, if Castro used either 1040 or willfully interfered with other commercial signals, he would be starting a war. That war would be impinging not only on U.S. listeners but on Latin listeners, and it would be the kind of precedent that the Russians themselves have not wanted to set.

I just do not see that kind of thing happening. If it does, I think the penalties to Castro's Cuba would far outweigh whatever benefits he gets, and focusing additional attention on the message of Radio Marti.

One word about the name of Radio Marti. I addressed that in my testimony here last before the committee, and I closed my testimony with a quote from Jose Marti which typifies what we are trying to get across, which is that to penetrate with information is the most valuable type of assistance to a person who is locked into some kind of a closed system, and while it is true that on some occasions Castro warned that the big United States could become a bully, he also said many fine things about the United States. More importantly, it would not be a John Foster Dulles analogy. It would be a George Washington analogy, and may I say that Jose Marti said not once but on many occasions how he admired George Washington.

So, really, what we are trying to do is remind the Cubans about what freedom of information really is. Now, mind you, we do not mind reviewing names again by the time this thing comes out, but to yield the ground to Castro just because he claims Marti as a spiritual forebearer of his betrayed revolution would be ridiculous. If anyone has betrayed the revolution against the system they have there, it is the boys that are in power down there now, and the witnesses to that are hundreds of thousands of Cubans who will do anything to get out of there.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I do not have a great knowledge of Cuban history. I wonder if Mr. Smith has some comment on that.

Mr. **Smith**. Yes, Senator. Thank you. I think it is quite true that Jose Marti was a great Democrat who believed in a free exchange of ideas, and he did have some fine things to say about the United States, and especially about our constitutional system. However, he did warn, as I say, he did warn of the possible domination, and he even made remarks about having lived, I think it was in the entrails of the monster. This sort of thing—I do not suggest we not call it Radio Marti because it might offend Castro. I suggest we not call it Radio Marti because that might be used against us. I think there are certainly better things to call it than Radio Marti.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Senator, do you have anything?

Senator **Pell**. I have a couple of questions, but I do not know about Senator Zorinsky.

Senator Boschwitz. Senator Zorinsky? And I have a few more questions also. I do not want to monopolize the time, if you want to ask questions.

Senator Zorinsky. Go ahead; you can conclude yours.

The Chairman. I would like to say, Senator Boschwitz, that we have arranged for a meeting with Secretary Enders, Senator Zorinsky, Senator Jepsen, and Senator Grassley at 1 o'clock in S–116. We have just that half hour. I know Senator Zorinsky has a question or two, so possibly if we could get to him just as quickly as possible.

Senator Boschwitz. Who are we going to meet with?

The Chairman. You would be very welcome there.

Senator Boschwitz. Who?

The Chairman. Secretary Enders. They have a suggestion to make which they hope will help resolve the problem. So, we will move to Senator Zorinsky's questions as quickly as possible. I wonder if you would mind chairing the hearing. I have a couple of other things. If you would not mind taking the Chair right now.

Senator Boschwitz. Not at all.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Senator Pell. Also, when you have the opportunity, I do have a couple of questions for Senator Stone.

Senator Boschwitz [presiding]. Fine, fine. This is my first round of questioning, and I would like to continue it, but why don't we go to you, Senator?

Senator Pell. Thank you very much.

Senator Stone, when you were a member of our committee, my recollection is, you sponsored an amendment which I supported to designate VOA broadcasts to Cuba as Radio Free Cuba. Personally, I like the idea of using, as you know, the VOA broadcast to Cuba, and I have an amendment suggesting this, doing this rather than supporting a separate Radio Marti. Would you no longer be in support of the original suggestion of yours for a VOA role?

Senator Stone. That is correct. That was a quickie, a way to get started broadcasting to Cuba, and it was offered in that sense, and it was rejected when we got to the House. It was, I think, a spiritual forebearer of this. The idea is, those people have a right to know, and they are not getting the information they need. The problem with VOA is that it is beamed at all of Latin America, and to divert that nation into this specialized nation, I think, detracts from its overall task, and also, the thrust of VOA is to tell the listener about the world and about the United States, but not necessarily about internal conditions in the country of the listener, whereas this does that just as Radio Free Europe would do that.

Senator Pell. Well, in the first place, under the VOA charter, and I am reading the law, the VOA will serve as a consistently reliable authoritative source of views. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensible. It would not take too much to feel that this should also be the charter or is the charter of the Radio Marti.

Senator Stone. Senator Pell, that is correct, but there is a difference. VOA's news would not be primarily about, for example, Venezuela. It would not be primarily about, for example, Mexico, whereas Radio Marti's news would primarily be about Cuba and Cubans, both in Cuba and around the world, and to dominate the VOA's broadcast with even this important broadcast would be objected to. I believe, not only by the VOA people, and they have told us that they prefer theirs, but also by the listeners.

Senator **Pell**. But VOA now, as you know, broadcasts somewhere around 5 or 6 hours a day exclusively to Cuba.

Senator **Stone**. That is not correct, Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. I was informed by staff that it is.

Senator **Stone**. Staff is not correct.

Senator **Pell**. They do not have a separate schedule?

Senator **Stone**. No; they do not.

Senator **Pell**. I am informed, and if I am incorrect, please tell me, that the transmitter, Radio Marathon, can only reach Cuba, and that it broadcasts 5½ hours a day at this time just to Cuba. It does not go to Venezuela. It does not go to Argentina.

Senator **Stone**. I believe that is not accurate.

Senator **Pell**. Is there someone in the audience who would know, a technician? I see someone. Would you identify yourself, please?

Mr. **Newman**. Senator, my name is Yale Newman. I am currently working with the Presidential commission, but prior to that I was the division chief of the Voice of America for Latin America. The Marathon transmitter is purely a relay station for our short wave broadcasts to the hemisphere. That is to say, it carries the same broadcasts that are designed for 18 countries of the hemisphere, of which Cuba is just one.

Senator **Stone**. There is no special program for Cuba.

Mr. **Newman**. No special program, and it is the same program heard in Buenos Aires at the same time.

Senator **Pell**. But isn't it correct that broadcasts from that particular relay can only reach Cuba? That is the only country it can reach?

Mr. **Newman**. That is correct, because Cuba does not have a sufficient number of short wave receivers, and the only way to effectively reach the Cuban audience by the VOA was to establish the continued ues of the Marathon transmitter.

Senator **Pell**. And it covers the whole of Cuba?

Mr. **Newman**. No; it only reaches Havana and the western part during the day. During the evening, there is spotted reception throughout the other parts of the island, but consistently and with a good signal, as far as VOA engineers are concerned, it only effectively reaches Havana and the western part of the island.

Senator **Pell**. The charts that have been submitted to the Public Advisory Commission do show that VOA reaches the whole of Cuba, so there is a conflict here between your view——

Mr. **Newman**. Over the Marathon transmitter?

Senator **Pell**. The transmission.

Mr. **Newman**. It does reach the whole island through short wave receivers and medium wave, but not through the Marathon transmitter alone.

Senator **Pell**. Well, this we can straighten out. It is a question of fact, but I am informed that is not what the VOA charts show. Maybe staff can resolve this with you so we will know the facts. In any case, there is no reason in the world why that same station which is primarily reaching only Cuba should not be enlarged to have the political broadcasts of Radio Marti which do fall within the charter, in my view, reading from the charter right here.

Now, Senator Stone, are there any other governments in Latin America or anywhere which support the idea of Radio Marti?

Senator STONE. Yes; the Inter-American Press Association supports it.

Senator PELL. Any other governments?

Senator STONE. We are not trying to associate other governments with our VOA or with our Radio Free Europe or with this proposed Radio Marti. This is a U.S. Government effort. I do not believe that you will find other governments participating or endorsing or supporting Radio Free Europe. It is strictly a U.S. effort. But they all have their own national stations, and many of them do reach further than their own borders.

Senator PELL. You would not support an amendment that requires that some contribution be made by other governments?

Senator STONE. I think if you wanted to try to offer that to Radio Free Europe first and see how that goes, that might be worth experimenting with, but to choke the baby before we get it out of the bassinet, I think that would be wrong.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Senator Zorinsky?

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Is it correct that the report of the Commission cost the U.S. taxpayers $100,000?

Senator STONE. I do not think so. I really do not. But we have a good staff at the State Department, and they have been working exhaustively on this issue. The Commission members operate without pay other than their expenses.

Senator ZORINSKY. I was informed that there was a $100,000 cost to the taxpayers incurred in the preparation of this report. Have all 11 members of the Commission read the report, or do you know?

Senator STONE. Yes; they have. It was delivered by courier, and we have had 9 out of the 11 affirmative responses. Two Commission members have not responded back yet, but the information was put on their desks, so we have not only an approval of the executive committee but of 9 out of the 11 Commission members.

Senator ZORINSKY. On a final?

Senator STONE. On this one you have here, the final.

Senator ZORINSKY. And how long ago was that taken, just recently?

Senator STONE. Yes, a few days ago, because that was the request of the ranking minority member of the committee, that we not go into markup until the Commission gives a final report.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Smith, can you assess Cuba's willingness or unwillingness to negotiate a resolution of the longstanding interference problems? Do you have any insight as to their willingness to sit down and negotiate, assuming good-faith efforts on both sides?

Mr. SMITH. Senator, they have said that they are. As I say, I think there is a new sensitivity on the part of the Cubans to this question. They say they are willing to do so, and while it is true, I might add, that they walked out of the Rio conference, that had been practically predetermined by our announcement in September, not in December, but in September of our intention to build Radio Marti, and the Cubans very shortly after that made it clear that if that were the case, they would be no longer willing to participate in bilateral negotiations with us, and that this would change their whole view of entering into and respecting a regional agreement.

It seems to me that we could benefit tremendously by trying to resuscitate such negotiations, both bilateral negotiations and by trying to bring the Cubans into a regional agreement which they would have to respect, and thus overcoming the general problem of interference in one another's broadcasts, and the Cubans have indicated a full willingness to do this.

I, of course, cannot prejudge whether such negotiations would be successful. All I can say is that the Cubans have indicated they would welcome the opportunity to resume the negotiations, but not if Radio Marti is going on the air.

Senator ZORINSKY. If Radio Marti is not jammed, what effect do you foresee it having on the Cuban refugee problem?

Mr. SMITH. Senator, my own reading of that is that if we raise the level of discontent in Cuba, that is likely to manifest itself in increased pressures for emigration rather than significantly weakening Castro. In other words, we might simply be creating the conditions for a new Mariel. Now, I certainly sympathize with the proposition that we should never permit another Mariel, but at best, this would present us with some very painful choices. I am sure that if we could avoid it, we would not wish to place ourselves in the position of having to blow refugees out of the water or take some other such drastic or equally drastic measures.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Blow refugees out of the water?

Mr. SMITH. Well, if another Mariel started and people started going down to the beach and heading to the United States, we have said that we would not permit that, we would turn them back. How we would do it, I am not certain. All I am suggesting is, I think that Cubans by and large tend to manifest their discontent, their disgruntlement by heading for Miami rather than by putting pressure on the Cuban Government, and the Cuban people—after all, it has been suggested that the objective is evolutionary change, that mobilization of public opinion will lead to changes in Cuban policies. I would hope that would be the case, but I am not sure how that will work since, as the administration itself emphasizes, and it is perfectly true, the Cuban people have practically no input in their government's decisionmaking process.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Would you yield for 10 seconds?

Senator ZORINSKY. Sure.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. There just are so many options other than blowing people in boats out of the water, that I just want to be sure that that does not go unmentioned. Certainly, there are many reasonable options other than that.

Senator ZORINSKY. You indicated previously that our American stations are heard throughout the island of Cuba. As a matter of fact, yesterday in the Washington Post there was an article reporting that WTOP is picked up now and then in Cuba. I would imagine, based on atmospheric conditions, frequencies come in and out. A great deal of the programing of Radio Marti will result in the transmission of narrated baseball games and music and filler type already being broadcast to Cuba by existing stations.

When you indicated that currently a great majority of the people in Cuba can avail themselves of American news broadcasts through conventional AM radio stations, I saw some heads shaking in the audience in disagreement.

I have never been to Cuba. Is there someone, objective, reliable, that I could contact during these hearings with respect to whether such broadcasts are being received or are not being received? During these hearings a great deal has been made of the availability of information currently existing.

Mr. SMITH. Senator, I can only say that I have listened to the Voice of America at Santiago de Cuba, which is at the eastern end of the island. I do not know whether that was being transmitted from Marathon or somewhere else, but I have certainly heard it in the morning hours in Santiago de Cuba, and I have heard other American stations as far east as Santiago and Alhene. It is not true that there are only three American stations received in Cuba. Certainly in the evening as you go across the dial in Havana about 50 percent of the stations that you pick up are American stations. One in particular, a Fort Lauderdale station, is widely listened to. People joke about the traffic reports from Lauderdale, music, and ball scores, and that sort of thing.

Most of these, however, are in English, but Voice of America in Spanish is heard. Santiago is about 150 miles from the eastern tip of the island. I have never been to the eastern tip, but as far east as Santiago, Voice of America is heard, and as far as I know, it is heard all over the island on medium wave.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Apparently, Mr. Smith, we have lost Senator Stone, and we will adjourn in just a few minutes, so I can also attend the meeting with Mr. Enders.

Apparently, you must feel that that Radio Marti would have some impact on the Cuban people.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Senator, I have some reservations about Radio Marti. I am not against getting more information, accurate, balanced information to the Cuban people. I am not sure that it would have the impact that some of the other witnesses seem to think it will have, but in principal I think it is a good idea. I am simply not convinced that Radio Marti is the way to do it. The Voice of America is already doing that, and while people keep saying that there is no specific program for Cuba, it is true that there is not now, but there was, and I see no reason why there could not be again.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. But the charter, as I understand it, if you were to take the Radio Free Europe format and put it into Voice of America, you would be violating its charter, and I think that is the objection, but as you pointed out, if we were to get accurate and comprehensive—the words you used—news over Radio Marti or over Voice of America, it would have some impact on the Cubans, is that what you are saying?

Mr. SMITH. Senator, it would have some impact. I think it is a good thing to do in principle. I think we all believe in the free flow of ideas. I do not think it will have an impact that some of the other witnesses believe it will have. I do not, for example, think that it will significantly weaken Castro. I think it may have exactly the opposite effect. I do not think that it will force Castro, even over a long period of time, to pull in his horns in Central America and Africa. Again, I think it is likely to have exactly the opposite effect.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. But apparently it would have enough impact on the Cuban people that they may get into boats and start north, from what you say. It is my understanding that the negotiations in general in Cuba by the Ford administration, by the Carter administration, and by this administration have floundered because Cuba will not consider our agenda, and our agenda is discussing and negotiating the Cuban adventures around the world. You stated in your article that they were ready to negotiate anything.

Mr. SMITH. Ready to discuss, Senator.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Not to negotiate?

Mr. SMITH. To discuss. I do not think we can sit down, for example, with the Cubans and negotiate the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. There are many other governments that have all done that, but we can discuss it.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It is my understanding, and I am sure that you must have a similar understanding, that those discussions have not gone well. The Cubans do not want to engage in those discussions, in meaningful discussions, or whatever the adjective should be. After reading your article, I looked into that a little with the State Department, and it is my understanding that over many years these discussions have not been fruitful.

Mr. SMITH. I can only say, Senator, that they have indicated as recently as 2 months ago a willingness to do so, indicated a basis on which we could begin negotiations which included a discussion of those activities.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Has there been contact between the two governments to undertake such discussions?

Mr. SMITH. No; there have not been contacts to undertake such discussions, so far as I know.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Have there been such discussions between the two governments?

Mr. SMITH. No; there have not.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I would disagree with that answer, Mr. Smith. As for negotiations on radio interference, I am also told by negotiators that they were not going well, which is contrary to what you have stated here in the course of your appearance before this committee. It is not clear to our negotiators either that Radio Marti would make such negotiations any worse. How would you respond to that question?

Mr. SMITH. I would respond to that, Senator, by saying I talked to some of the negotiators, to some of the FCC members at one point in Havana. They seem to feel that negotiations were worthwhile, were productive, and I would refer you to the September 1st, 1981 statement, the communique issued by the two delegations expressing satisfaction over the way the negotiations were going.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Even at that time, the Cubans had erected a couple of radio stations which would interfere with a station out in Utah, and Station WHO in Iowa. Even at that time those stations had been erected. Is that correct?

Mr. SMITH. I think they were in the process of construction. They were being constructed at that point. So far as I know, Senator, neither of those stations is now in operation at full power.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I believe that the stations in Utah have been interrupted to some degree.

Mr. SMITH. But the station which interferes is not going at full power.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Pardon?

Mr. SMITH. The Cuban station which was interfering, it is my understanding, with the station in Utah was not operating at full power, and I thought that interference had stopped in July.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I do not have any specific knowledge of that. Well, in any case, it would be my hope that the bill would be passed out of this committee and adopted on the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Mr. Smith, for your testimony.

We have a nomination before the committee that we want to move, and it is James Buckley, to be State Department counselor, and I would move that nomination at the present time. I ask the committee staff to poll the rest of the committee with respect to that, and by doing so we will be able to confirm him prior to our recess.

At this time, I will adjourn this hearing, and I also announce that the markup will continue either later this afternoon, if an accommodation is possible, and if there is not an accommodation possible, we will begin the markup again at 10 a.m. tomorrow morning.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

## STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1.* We have copies of reports from a Congressional Committee and from the CIA which state that Cuba will definitely jam Radio Marti. In November 1981, Armando Hart, Cuban Minister of Culture, said in Paris that Cuba "should easily be able to jam two-thirds of (Radio Marti's) broadcasts." Finally, in a December 22, 1981 memorandum to you, Myles Frechette reported that the NAB "fully recognizes the problems RBC may cause and is sensitive to the dangers of promiscuous jamming or interference from Cuba." In light of these reports, do you still maintain that Cuba will not jam Radio Marti's broadcasts?

Answer. No one can say with absolute certainty what Cuba will do. Cuba can do several things: nothing, counter-broadcasting, jamming on island, high-powered jamming that would also reach the United States and possibly neighboring countries or increase its interference with United States and other broadcasters. We have reviewed each of these options carefully.

President Castro in an April 4, 1982 speech, stated "* * * if there is to be a dialectic confrontation between us, they with their subversive station and we with our response in kind * * *" so be it. Based on Castro's statement and other available information, counterbroadcasting seems the most likely response.

We are aware of Cuban Minister of Culture Armando Hart's reported statement to *Le Monde* in Paris in early November of last year that Cuba should easily be able to jam two-thirds of Radio Marti's broadcasts. That would suggest partially effective low-powered jamming on island which should have little or no impact in the United States. However just this month (August), Cuba supported actively a U.S.-sponsored resolution on Freedom of Mass Media at the UNESCO World Conference on Cultural Policies in Mexico City which, among its provisions, urged "all states to strengthen * * * the free flow of ideas * * * and the freedom of mass media."

*Question 2.* You have made the case for the connection between Radio Marti and *increased* Cuban interference. Your June 14 letter to Chairman Percy rejects the use of Radio Marathon, in part, because of the increased risk of Cuban interference if Radio Marti operated on that frequency. You also told the House Telecommunications Subcommittee on May 10 that Cuba's most likely retaliation will be *increased* counter broadcasts to the United States. I assume increased counter broadcasts will cause increased interference in the United States. Would you care to clarify this matter for us?

Answer. Should Cuba counter-broadcast to the United States, whether or not such broadcasts might cause interference in the United States would depend on the frequency used and the power of the signal.

*Question 3.* If you believe that Cuba's most likely retaliation to Radio Marti will be increased counter programming to this country rather than jamming, why do you, in part, reject using Radio Marathon on the grounds such use "would only increase the risk of Cuban interference to * * * VOA * * *"?

Answer. We have opposed any association of the VOA with Radio Marti for the same reasons that it has been U.S. policy to keep VOA separate from such stations as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, whose mission is to broadcast a specialized program to specific countries. This was explained in the letter of June 14 from Assistant Secretary Enders to Chairman Percy providing answers to questions from Senator Grassley.

The June 14 letter contained the following sentence: "Furthermore, utilizing 1180 kHz, the frequency of VOA's Marathon transmitter, would only increase the risk of Cuban interference to both VOA and WHAM, the clear channel station in Rochester assigned this frequency." We do not know what Cuba will do in response to Radio Marti. Should Cuba choose to interfere with Radio Marti, however, we would not want to have such interference affect either the VOA or WHAM in Rochester, New York.

*Question 4.* If you reject the use of Radio Marathon and its frequency for Radio Marti because you fear that Cuba will interfere with the VOA station, doesn't that mean there is an increased risk of interference to WHO if Radio Marti operates on 1040 kHz or to any commercial station if you use its frequency? If so, doesn't that reflect a decision by the government that it's more important to provide entertainment and information to the people of Cuba than it is to continue to provide the free information and entertainment to the people of our country?

Answer. The Administration recognizes that there is some risk from Cuban interference on any frequency selected for Radio Marti, but going forward with this plan does not imply that the Administration is not concerned about the interests of U.S. broadcasters or the American public. It reflects the fact that we do not know for certain what Cuba will do in response to Radio Marti. The decision to proceed is not related to any judgment on the relative priority of domestic or foreign broadcasts but to the recognition that Radio Marti is an important foreign policy initiative which should not be abandoned because of Cuban threats.

*Question 5.* Based on your expressed concern for protecting Radio Marathon from the increased risk of interference from Cuba, is it fair to say that the operation of Radio Marti will result in more interference to U.S. broadcasters than would have occurred but for Radio Marti?

Answer. No. Cuban interference with American broadcasts has been going on for at least 15 years. New Cuban plans to increase significantly the number and power of its AM radio stations to meet both internal and external requirements were announced in 1979 as part of a 5-year plan and were submitted to the International Frequency Registration Board of the ITU in May 1980. Were Cuba's plans to be implemented, its stations would cause greatly increased interference to U.S. broadcasters.

Cuba's broadcasting plans were made known well before the U.S. announcement in September 1981 that it intended to establish Radio Marti. They cannot be considered, therefore, as retaliation against Radio Marti. Increased Cuban interference will occur if Cuba implements its announced plan. The problem of increasing Cuban interference is a separate and distinct issue which will remain whether Radio Marti goes on the air or not.

*Question 6.* How will interference to commercial broadcasters from increased Cuban counter programming to Radio Marti differ from, or be less serious than, interference caused by Cuban jamming of Radio Marti? Won't a stepped up campaign of broadcasting to the United States by Cuba to counter Radio Marti increase interference in this country?

Answer. Cuban jamming of Radio Marti's signal in Cuba would probably have little, if any, effect on broadcasters in the United States, including stations using the same frequency as Radio Marti. Whether or not Cuban counter-broadcasting might cause interference in the United States would depend on the frequency used and the power of the signal.

*Question 7.* Do you agree with the NAB that the only real solution to the interference problem is a negotiated settlement with Cuba? If so, how will Radio Marti contribute to a solution? Didn't the August 1981 Cuban-U.S. radio negotiations reflect for the first time a positive Cuban effort to negotiate a settlement? How did August press reports of Radio Marti affect the session?

Answer. The real solution to the problem is for Cuba to cooperate with the rest of the nations in the Hemisphere by making every effort to comply with internationally accepted norms of behavior regarding radio broadcasting. Any negotiations would presumably be based on the premise that Cuba should do so, as we do now. Cuba so far has not been willing to accept this premise sufficiently to permit serious negotiations.

As to the August 1981 meetings, there is no indication that press speculations had any influence on them. Since it was at these meetings that Cuba said it would put its two planned 500 kW transmitters on 1040 and 1160 kHz, it is arguable whether this reflected a positive Cuban attitude. Only by our refusing to accept the Cuban proposal, and by winning support for this refusal at the subsequent Rio Conference were we able to protect the interests of threatened U.S. broadcasters—at least within the ITU context. We do not believe Cuba's subsequent decision to disregard the decision of the Rio Conference should be blamed on Radio Marti.

*Question 8.* The House Appropriations Committee has a report indicating that Cuba will, in fact, jam Radio Marti. That is also the CIA's analysis. The report quotes a government representative saying that satellite photographs show increased construction of new radio broadcast towers around Havana. Some of the new towers appear to be directional antenna aimed at the United States. In the face of this evidence, why continue with a project that cannot succeed in the face of an overriding Cuban station?

Answer. Until a transmitter actually goes on the air, there is no way of knowing the exact use to which it will be put. We do *not* have confirmation that Cuba will jam Radio Marti, although we have said this is one possible response.

*Question 9.* What consideration did the State and Defense Departments give to Radio Marti's impact on AM broadcasting? The October 20, 1981 memo of the Interagency Group on Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, which you chaired, reports a conscious decision not to consider the impact of interference on three proposed Florida stations on 1040 kHz. Why was that decision made? Did the government propose to allow these stations to be built, at great cost to U.S. citizens, in the face of actions taken by the government that will, to use your words, "increase the risk of Cuban interference * * *" to those stations?

Answer. The selection of a frequency for Radio Marti was made by the NTIA in accord with a recommendation of the FCC. The FCC based its recommendation on the need to have a frequency that would cause the least possible interference with U.S. broadcasters while giving the best possible coverage of Cuba.

*Question 10.* At the May 10 House Subcommittee on Telecommunications hearing there was testimony that Cuban jamming of or interference to Radio Marti on 1040 kHz will destroy the Iowa State Emergency Broadcast System, since WHO is the key input station for the network. Was this, in part, anticipated or considered prior to selecting 1040 kHz? If so, how did the government strike the balance between depriving Iowans of their EBS network and providing entertainment to Cuba? In the light of the uncontradicted EBS testimony, what steps has and will the government take to protect the integrity of the Iowa EBS network?

Answer. Questions on the Emergency Broadcast System should be directed to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other appropriate technical agencies. We understand, however, that no EBS system is totally dependent on only one radio station. There are FM and TV networks, and means to contact other EBS stations should key stations have difficulties.

*Question 11.* If Cuba used one of its two 500 kW stations on 1040 kHz to broadcast counter programming to the United States, would that operation cause massive interference to both WHO and Radio Marti operating on 1040 kHz? If so, and if there is a significant likelihood of Cuba operating a super station on 1040 kHz, isn't the construction of a specialized radio facility at Saddlebunch Key for 1040 kHz for Radio Marti a waste of taxpayers money?

Answer. If Cuba broadcasts on 1040 kHz at 500 kW as it told us in August, 1981 it planned to do, this will of course cause serious interference to stations on the same frequency that are on the broadcast path of the Cuban station. Were Cuba to use high power and an omni-directional antenna on 1040 kHz, it would interfere not only with Radio Marti and WHO but also with radios on that frequency in neighboring countries, including Mexico, Nicaragua and Grenada, with whom Cuba would like to maintain good relations. If Cuba were to use a highly directional antenna on 1040 kHz, Radio Marti might still be heard in Cuba depending on where the Cuban antenna is placed and targetted.

*Question 12.* Why can't one or more of the proposed new ICA stations to be built in the Caribbean be used for Radio Marti? Two of those stations are proposed for Grand Cayman and Antigua. Is the U.S. planning on using one of those ICA stations as Radio Marti's second transmitter or is the U.S. planning on building additional transmitters on those islands? Are those governments aware of those plans?

Answer. The United States has no plans to use any ICA transmitter for broadcasting Radio Marti programs. Nor do we plan to build additional transmitters on these islands. The above answers the final question.

*Question 13.* What pressing need is there for the United States to provide pop music, baseball games and two soap operas to the Cuban people at a cost of $17.7 million?

Answer. Radio Marti is being designed as a surrogate "home service" for the people of Cuba. In order to attract all segments of the population and appeal to all tastes, it is vital that there be variety within the daily program format. We know very well that music is exceedingly popular throughout all segments of Cuban society, but especially among the young. Additionally, baseball is virtually a national passion. Radio Marti has been offered the use of major league baseball game coverage in Spanish gratis. At very minor cost, we have the means of attracting a massive audience. All the information available to us about Cuban listening tastes suggests that popular programs will help build a faithful following for much of the rest of the programming on Radio Marti. These features will be blended into the newscasts, commentaries and news analyses which will form the core of our programming each day.

*Question 14.* Would you please describe the communications research conducted by or for the government prior to the Radio Marti decision regarding the listening habits and preferences of the Cuban people, and the likelihood of Cubans listening only to the soap operas, sports and music portions of the broadcasts? Were any studies done concerning whether or not Cubans listen to the news portions of Miami broadcasts received on the Island? In a November 10, 1980 memorandum on this project, Jorge L. Mas, a member of the Presidential Commission, said that Cubans are "fascinated upon listening to advertisements for foods and latest-fashion 'jeans' * * *" on U.S. commercial stations. Isn't that an endorsement for leasing time on those stations?

Answer. Information available when the decision was made to establish Radio Marti indicated that Cubans listen to broadcasts of both the VOA and commercial stations in southern Florida, particularly those which broadcast in Spanish. The Western diplomatic community in Havana reports that Cuban government and party officials listen to VOA news because they find its news broadcasts to be credible and reliable. Commercial station programming from Florida is geared primarily to the listening tastes of local audiences which form the rate base for advertising revenues. The program content of these broadcasts does not address the real needs of listeners in Cuba. In addition, private stations are often identified with positions that are too partisan to serve U.S. Government interests, whereas Radio Marti would be non-partisan.

There are a variety of disadvantages to leasing time for Radio Marti on commercial stations. Because of their distance from Cuba, insufficient power, and antennae which are not designed for broadcasting to Cuba, these stations can be heard in only limited areas of Cuba and cannot provide blanket coverage, as envisaged for Radio Marti. Radio Marti's transmitter will be located in the Florida Keys and will have a directional antenna. Even then Radio Marti will need a separate transmitter to reach Eastern Cuba. Also, private stations might be reluctant to give up prime time for Radio Marti, since this might affect their own commercial viability. The cost to Radio Marti, therefore, for leasing this prime time might be quite high.

Thus, private stations do not offer a real alternative. The South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association, in testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 3, stated that "commercial operations are a poor substitute for the proposed Radio Marti."

*Question 15.* What is the average education level in Cuba? Will political commentary and news reports broadcast on Radio Marti be too sophisticated for the average Cuban to understand?

Answer. The Cuban Government claims to have made great improvements in education since the Revolution. Regardless of the validity of this claim, we know that the Cuban Government relies on radio to reach its own people. By monitoring, we know the level of sophistication of these broadcasts. Radio Marti will be designed to reach the same audience.

*Question 16.* Why is 1040 kHz at Saddlebunch Key, Florida on list B of the Region 2 plan? Which Region 2 countries objected to 1040 kHz at Saddlebunch Key and on what grounds?

Answer. We understand that 1040 kHz was automatically placed at the Region 2 Conference on list B because it was known that Cuba at least would refuse to waive its rights to claim potential interference. Under Conference rules unanimous consent was required to do otherwise. Any further inquiries should be directed to the FCC.

*Question 17.* Why wasn't WHO consulted by the government prior to selection of 1040 kHz in order to mutually agree on the design and operation of the station to minimize interference to WHO? You have said that the United States should not be deterred from operating Radio Marti because of Cuba's threat to retaliate against the station. However, haven't the Administration's actions created a situation in which Cuba will retaliate to what it considers to be a provocative project? If so, isn't your concern about not backing down putting the cart before the horse?

Answer. The selection of a frequency for Radio Marti was made by the NTIA with assistance from the FCC, and the antenna planned for its use is designed to give all possible protection to WHO. Cuba told us in August of its plans to put 500 kW stations on 1160 and 1040 kHz. Radio Marti was not announced until a month later, and 1040 kHz was not formally identified for its use until late October, two months later. This chronology does not support the argument that Radio Marti is to blame for Cuba's decision to put 500 kW transmitters on 1040 and 1160 kHz.

We were not prepared to accept these Cubans plans to put 500 kW stations on 1160 and 1040 kHz, nor to accept Cuban plans revealed at the Rio Conference in November to make numerous additional changes that would have endangered many other U.S. stations. At the Rio Conference, we defended successfully the rights of U.S. broadcasters to 1160, 1040 and many other frequencies. Shortly after, Cuba began broadcasting at high power an 1160 kHz. Cuba's refusal to accept the decisions made in Rio should not be blamed on Radio Marti.

*Question 18.* You have been quoted in the press as saying that the Navy's facility at Saddlebunch Key is not for Radio Marti, but, rather is to meet a military requirement. Isn't it a little hard to accept that explanation, leaving aside the fact that the Navy claims that the facility is being built for Radio Marti, when the facility is being built in accordance with the A.D. Ring engineering plan for Radio Marti, a four tower directional antenna array designed for 1040 kHz is being constructed so as to minimize interference to WHO, and the facility is being erected at the Radio Marti coordinates?

Answer. When the Radio Marti project began to be developed, it became clear that a separate transmitting facility being planned by the Department of Defense on the U.S. Navy installation at Saddlebunch Key might eventually serve both civilian and military requirements, offering substantial savings of taxpayers' money. DOD's need to pre-empt the facility whenever required would be compatible with normal Radio Marti broadcasting. Accordingly, designs were drawn up early this year for joint use once Radio Marti received Congressional authorization. In late March 1982 it was determined that the DOD requirement had become sufficiently important to warrant immediate procurement under DOD funding. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ikle testified along these lines before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 1.

*Question 19.* Would you care to comment on the fact that you wrote to FCC Chairman Fowler on October 16, 1981, to "thank the Federal Communications Commission on behalf of President Reagan for its assistance in identifying an AM frequency, 1040 kHz," for Radio Marti, but that on October 29, 1981, Mr. Fowler wrote to NTIA saying that "since the Executive Branch has selected 1040 kHz, events have mooted your request for the concurrence of the FCC"? Isn't FCC concurrence a prerequisite to the government's use of non-government radio spectrum?

Answer. We understand that FCC concurrence is not required for Executive Branch operation of a broadcast facility. The NTIA assigns frequencies for government use under authority of Section 305 of the Telecommunications Act of 1934. The NTIA asked for and received FCC assistance and recommendations when selecting a frequency for Radio Marti. We understand that the exchange of letters is consistent with the responsibilities of the FCC and NTIA under that Act. Also, private stations might be reluctant to give up prime time for Radio Marti, since this might affect their own commercial viability. The cost to Radio Marti, therefore, for leasing this prime time might be quite high.

Thus, private stations do not offer a real alternative. The South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association, in testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 3, stated that "commercial operations are a poor substitute for the proposed Radio Marti."

[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

# APPENDIX

Kirkland & Ellis,
*Washington, D.C., July 9, 1982.*

Hon. Charles H. Percy,
*Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,*
*U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C.*

Dear Chairman Percy: On behalf of the Clear Channel Broadcasting Service ("CCBS"), an association which represents the interests of Class I Clear Channel radio broadcasting stations I am enclosing a copy of the statement my partner, R. Russell Eagan, presented before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committe on Energy and Commerce on May 10, 1982. Mr. Eagan's testimony related to H.R. 5427 concerning Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., popularly known as "Radio Marti".

I understand that the Committee on Foreign Relations has held hearings on S. 1853 concerning Radio Marti and may be conducting further hearings on this bill. Because Mr. Eagan's statement on H.R. 5427 is also highly relevant to S. 1853, I am requesting that it be included in the record associated with hearings on S. 1853.

CCBS is most concerned with the problem of existing and potential interference to U.S. stations from stations in Cuba. Any consideration of legislation to authorize Radio Marti should recognize the current interference situation and the possible effects of Radio Marti on the resolution of these problems.

Should you have any questions, Mr. Eagan or I would be pleased to respond.

Respectfully,

David E. Hilliard.

## Prepared Statement of R. Russell Eagan, Legal Counsel, Clear Channel Broadcasting Service [CCBS]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am R. Russell Eagan, a partner in the law firm of Kirkland and Ellis, legal counsel for the Clear Channel Broadcasting Service (CCBS). I am accompanied by my partner, David E. Hilliard. As explained in Appendix A, CCBS is an association of Class I Clear Channel stations.

In considering whether to fund a government directed station broadcasting to Cuba, CCBS urges the Committee to weigh the domestic implications of such a proposed facility. In so doing, the current AM broadcasting interference being received by U.S. stations from Cuban stations and the likely response of Cuba to an additional United States station directing programming to that country should be evaluated.

If Congress concludes that it is in the national interests to proceed with this project, any station authorized to broadcasts to Cuba should be directed to minimize interference to stations in this country. The FCC and the Department of State should also set as a high priority the negotiation of an agreemnt between the United States and Cuba concerning the mutual use of the AM broadcast band so that the service areas of all classes of U.S. AM stations can be preserved. Until such diplomatic efforts succeed, the United States should authorize increased power for those U.S. stations which have lost service because of Cuban interference in order to recover, to the extent practicable, their lost coverage areas. If this requires the use of power greater than 50 kW for domestic stations, such additional power should be permitted.

As has been documented to this Committee by others, the current operations of Cuban radio stations are now causing destructive interference during the daytime in Florida and at night throughout much of the United States.

In addition, the exhibits presented to the Committee by the National Association of Broadcasters illustrate the fact that Cuba's proposed stations will severely impair the wide-area service of over 40 Clear Channel stations. In fact, substantial interference already exists to some Clear Channel stations. The significance of this loss of service is best illustrated by the fact that over half of the land area of the conterminous United States receives no acceptable AM groundwave broadcast service at night. The over 26 million persons who live in this vast underserved area and the additional millions who travel through it depend on the wide-area skywave service of the Clear Channel stations for their *only* source of AM nighttime service. Additional millions rely on Clear Channel skywave service for their only choice of nighttime AM programs. Even if the coverage of FM stations is considered, over one-third of the land area of the conterminous United States must rely on Clear Channel skywave coverage for its *only* nighttime radio service.

Because of the dispursed population in these underserved areas and the limited number (107) of radio frequencies, Clear Channel stations have always been and continue to be the only practical means for providing nighttime radio service to these vast regions and populations. For this reason, the Federal Communications Commission has long set aside certain of the AM broadcast frequencies, referred to as Clear Channels, on which Class I stations provide both skywave and groundwave service.[1]

Every AM radio station emits two types of signals: groundwaves and skywaves. During both the day and the night, groundwaves follow the curvature of the earth and gradually dissipate. Clear Channel stations which are authorized to operate with 50,000 watts typically provide groundwave service to a radius of 80 to 100 miles.

During daytime hours, the skywave signals of stations are generally lost in the upper reaches of the atmosphere. At night, however, most skywaves are refracted or bent back toward the earth. Because these skywave signals are "bounced" off the upper reaches of the atmosphere (the ionosphere), they travel distances several times greater than do the groundwave signals.[2]

On most AM channels there are several stations assigned to operate both day and night.[3] At night, the skywave signals of stations which do not operate on Clear Channels mutually destroy each other and also interfere with each other's groundwave signals, thereby limiting the coverage of such stations to a fraction of that which is provided during the daytime.[4] For example, station WMAL in Washington, D.C., operates on 630 kHz, a regional channel. During the day, WMAL can be heard easily in Leesburg, Virginia. At night, however, co-channel skywave interference from other stations on 630 kHz limits WMAL's coverage so that the station provides interference-free coverage in the direction of Leesburg only about as far as Reston, Virginia.

In contrast to the regional and local channels, only a very small number of stations are assigned to each Clear Channel (see Appendix B). The dominant stations on each Clear Channel are designed to afford interference-free service by virtue of their skywave signals to a distance of several hundred miles. On those Clear Channels designated as Class I-A, the dominant stations provide service to a distance of approximately 750 miles at night.

Clear Channel wide area service is made possible not only by the laws of physics but also the laws of man. This nation has long had agreements with both Canada and Mexico as well as other neighboring countries under which certain channels are designated as "Clear Channels" for use by the respective nations. Thus, Canada and Mexico and at one time Cuba, agreed not to cause interference to the coverage area of our stations on these channels if we would do likewise in the case of the channels which were designated by the treaties as their Clear Channels. While Canada has already notified the United States that it will aprogate the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA) later this year and Mexico is expected to abrogate our current treaty in this area, the United States, Mexico, and Canada, will in all likelihood, be able to reach further agreements which will provide for continued wide area domestic service on Clear Channels.

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[1] The Clear Channels are divided into Class I-A and Class I-B frequencies. The United States Class I stations are listed in Appendix B. Of the 107 AM frequencies, 25 are U.S. I-A; 14 are foreign I-A; 21 are I-B; 41 are Class III ("regional" channels); and 6 are Class IV ("local" channels).

[2] Because they are not usually refracted by the ionosphere, the skywave signals of FM and TV stations do not return to earth as do those of AM stations. Hence, FM and TV stations have the same interference and coverage characteristics both day and night.

[3] On both the Clears and other channels, there are daytime stations authorized which operate during daylight hours in order to minimize interference to other stations on the channel.

[4] To cause interference, the undesired signal need be only one-twentieth (1/20) as strong as the desired signal. In fact, at night, the skywaves from a one kilowatt station may cause interference up to a thousand miles away.

If Clear Channel wide area service is to continue to be provided, as the public interest requires, and, indeed, if any nighttime AM service in most of the United States is to continue, this country must also reach an accord with Cuba. Only an agreement hammered out at arms length and honored by both nations can provide a satisfactory long term resolution of the interference problems which we now experience and those which we will likely face in the future.

An operation such as that proposed in H.R. 5427 may exacerbate our current interference problems with Cuba. Obviously there are other far reaching problems with Cuba in addition to that of radio interference. Nevertheless, the station proposed by H.R. 5427 has the potential for making a bad situation worse. The question is whether the price we may pay in the loss of domestic broadcasting service caused by retaliatory Cuban interference will be worth it. Any decision to authorize a station like that called for in H.R. 5427 should be made only after the most careful and deliberate analysis of current problems with Cuba and the likely impact on the domestic radio service now provided in this country.

Until the United States is able to reach an agreement with Cuba on the use of the AM broadcast band, or in the event this proves to be impossible, CCBS urges that those stations which suffer Cuban interference be authorized to modify their facilities so as, to the extent practicable, minimize the effects of such interference. As you have heard, the FCC has authorized some stations to increase power in the direction of Cuba so long as other United States stations and those of countries with which we have agreements are protected. CCBS supports this approach. However, the Commission has been reluctant to permit stations to operate with power 50 kW. Virtually all of the Clear Channel stations currently operate at 50 kW, our domestic maximum. Thus far, the FCC has taken the position that no station can be authorized power greater than 50 kW even if that station is suffering severe reduction in its coverage area because of Cuban interference.

This approach obviously discriminates against stations which currently operate at the maximum power. While CCBS does not advocate a "power war" and believes that any large scale attempt at such an effort would be impractical, those stations which can increase power above 50 kW in order to recover coverage which has been lost due to Cuban interference should be permitted to do so if diplomatic approaches to this problem fail. To do otherwise would result in unwarranted discrimination against stations that are currently at the 50 kW power limit.

Any evaluation of the national interest in funding a radio facility to broadcast to Cuba should also involve careful consideration of alternative means of delivering the message which our government seeks to convey. For example, Radio Marathon in the Florida Keys has operated for several years as a Voice of America outlet transmitting to Cuba with 50,000 watts of power. Although the current mission of Radio Marathon may differ from that of the facilities to be operated by Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, the extent to which the goals sought to be furthered by H.R. 5427 may be met by the use of the Radio Marathon facility should be carefully examined. In addition, many Florida AM stations currently provide listenable signals throughout parts of Cuba. Even though these stations may not cover all of Cuba, they do afford one means of reaching part of that nation. The degree to which these stations could be used in conjunction with Radio Marathon should be thoroughly considered as part of any evaluation of the funding of the facility proposed in H.R. 5427.

In short, CCBS urges this Committee to consider the possible adverse domestic implications of H.R. 5427. CCBS believes that the evaluation of the overall national interest in the creation of a station such as that proposed in H.R. 5427 should include careful balancing of the current AM broadcasting interference problems with Cuba and the likely effect of such a station on the ultimate resolution of these problems. The Department of State and the Federal Communications Commission should place a high priority on the resumption of bilateral discussions with Cuba in order to reach a rational agreement over the mutual use of the AM broadcast band. Until these diplomatic efforts succeed, the United States should exercise its reservation taken in the region 2 Agreement[5] and authorize increases in power above 50 kW, if necessary in order to recover at least a portion of the coverage area lost because of Cuban interference.

Mr. Hilliard and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

## APPENDIX A

CCBS is an informal organization composed of the following licensees of Class I Clear Channel standard broadcast stations, each of which operates fulltime with power of 50 kW:

| *Call letters and location* | *Frequency (kHz)* |
|---|---|
| 1. WSM, Nashville, Tennessee | 650 |
| 2. KIRO, Seattle, Washington | 710 |
| 3. WGN, Chicago, Illinois | 720 |
| 4. WJR, Detroit, Michigan | 760 |
| 5. WBAP, Ft. Worth, Texas | 820 |
| 6. WCCO, Minneapolis, Minnesota | 830 |
| 7. WHAS, Louisville, Kentucky | 840 |
| 8. WHO, Des Moines, Iowa | 1040 |
| 9. WBT, Charlotte, North Carolina | 1110 |
| 10. KSL, Salt Lake City, Utah | 1160 |
| 11. KVOO, Tulsa, Oklahoma | 1170 |
| 12. WOAI, San Antonio, Texas | 1200 |
| 13. WKBW, Buffalo, New York | 1520 |

The origin of CCBS goes back to a meeting held in Chicago in May of 1934, which was attended by representatives of various Class I stations who shared a common concern over mounting pressures to assign additional United States and foreign fulltime stations on the 40 Clear Channel frequencies set aside by the Federal Radio Commission's November 11, 1928 allocation, on each of which only one station was authorized to operate during nighttime hours in order to provide service to rural and remote listeners.

Since 1934, the basic position of CCBS has been that it is in the public interest to preserve the wide area service provided by Class I stations in view of the fact that Clear Channel stations are the only means of affording any standard broadcast service at night to millions of Americans and are the only source of a choice of nighttime standard broadcast services to additional millions.

Class I AM stations today provide the only nighttime AM radio listening available to residents and travelers in rural and remote regions encompassing over half of the land area of the conterminous states and the only nighttime radio service (including FM) to over one-third of this area.

These areas enjoy satisfactory daytime reception from groundwave signals, but are beyond the range of any groundwave signal at night. At sunset, because of changes in the ionosphere which reduce the groundwave coverage of AM regional and local stations (due to cochannel skywave interference), they are without AM radio service except for Class I Clear Channel skywave signals.

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[5] In the recently concluded, though as yet unratified, Regional Agreement for the Medium Frequency Broadcasting Service in Region 2 (essentially North, South and Central America), the United States reserved ". . . the right to take such action as may prove necessary to assure the provision of needed services to the adversely affected areas [of this country] if its [diplomatic] efforts to eliminate such interference fail to lead to satisfactory solutions."

The term "Clear Channel" means, simply, a roadway through the sky that is used by dominant Class I stations at night, which transmit radio signals over vast areas that cannot be reached in any other way after sunset.

Clear Channel wide area coverage is possible because of radio's skywaves, one of two kinds of signals emitted by all AM radio stations. The other is the groundwave.

Skywave signals are directed toward the sky. During the daytime, few return to earth. But at night, the ionosphere changes so that it acts as a mirror and scatters skywaves back to earth over great distances. Only Class I stations provide skywave service. The skywave signals of other AM stations, as a general rule, mutually destroy each other and reduce each other's groundwave coverage.

Groundwaves, on the other hand, parallel the curvature of the earth day and night and do not travel as far as skywaves. They provide dependable service as long as the signal is strong enough to overcome static, noise and interference from other groundwave and skywave signals.

Though the number of U.S. radio (AM and FM) stations has increased from 503 in 1938 to some 4,800 today, the AM Class I Clear Channel stations still provide the only nighttime AM radio for huge rural regions and numerous small towns.

Clear Channel broadcasting, a service in the public interest since radio's infancy, provides Americans living and traveling in the nation's vast, thinly populated regions with their only source of AM radio listening after sunset.

Millions of these Americans, who enjoy daytime broadcast services would live in a radio desert at night if it were not for Class I Clear Channel skywave signals that are refracted back to the earth from the ionosphere to provide needed wide-area coverage. They depend largely and, in many cases solely, upon Class I Clear Channel stations for their news, weather, entertainment, sports, cultural, music, education, agricultural and religious programming.

Preservation of the existing service areas of the all too few remaining Class I stations is imperative as a vital link in our civil and national defense, plus providing programming excellence that enhances the daily lives of millions of Americans.

CCBS is pledged to preserve the existing wide area coverage of Class I stations so as to provide radio to all America now and in the future.

## APPENDIX B

### LIST OF U.S. CLASS I–A AND I–B STATIONS

A. Class I–A [1]

| | *Call letters and location* | *Frequency (kHz)* |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | KFI, Los Angeles, California | 640 |
| 2. | WSM, Nashville, Tennessee | 650 |
| 3. | WNBC, New York City | 660 |
| 4. | WMAQ, Chicago, Illinois | 670 |
| 5. | WLW, Cincinnati, Ohio | 700 |
| 6. | WGN, Chicago, Illinois | 720 |
| 7. | WSB, Atlanta, Georgia | 750 |
| 8. | WJR, Detroit, Michigan | 760 |
| 9. | WABC, New York City | 770 |
| 10. | WBBM, Chicago, Illinois | 780 |
| 11. | WBAP, Ft. Worth, Texas | 820 |
| 12. | WCCO, Minneapolis, Minnesota | 830 |
| 13. | WHAS, Louisville, Kentucky | 840 |
| 14. | WWL, New Orleans, Louisiana | 870 |
| 15. | WCBS, New York City | 880 |
| 16. | WLS, Chicago, Illinois | 890 |
| 17. | KDKA, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania | 1020 |
| 18. | WBZ, Boston, Massachusetts | 1030 |
| 19. | WHO, De Moines, Iowa | 1040 |
| 20. | WWWE, Cleveland, Ohio | 1100 |
| 21. | KMOX, St. Louis, Missouri | 1120 |
| 22. | KSL, Salt Lake City, Utah | 1160 |
| 23. | WHAM, Rochester, New York | 1180 |
| 24. | WOAI, San Antonio, Texas | 1200 |
| 25. | WCAU, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania | 1210 |

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[1] Most class I–A stations operate on a nondirectional basis. Only one class I–A station is assigned to a channel although class II stations also may be assigned to the channel provided they protect the wide service area of the class I–A station.

B. Class I-B[1]

| *Call letters and location* | *Frequency (kHz)* |
|---|---|
| 1. KNBR, San Francisco, California | 680 |
| 2. KIRO, Seattle, Washington | 710 |
| 3. WOR, New York City | 710 |
| 4. WGY, Schenectady, New York | 810 |
| 5. KGO, San Francisco, California | 810 |
| 6. KOA, Denver, Colorado | 850 |
| 7. WCFL, Chicago, Illinois | 1000 |
| 8. KOMO, Seattle, Washington | 1000 |
| 9. KYW, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania | 1060 |
| 10. KNX, Los Angeles, California | 1070 |
| 11. WTIC, Hartford, Connecticut | 1080 |
| 12. KRLD, Dallas, Texas | 1080 |
| 13. KAAY, Little Rock, Arkansas | 1090 |
| 14. WBAL, Baltimore, Maryland | 1090 |
| 15. KFAB, Omaha, Nebraska | 1110 |
| 16. WBT, Charlotte, North Carolina | 1110 |
| 17. KWKH, Shreveport, Louisiana | 1130 |
| 18. WNEW, New York City | 1130 |
| 19. WRVA, Richmond, Virginia | 1140 |
| 20. KVOO, Tulsa, Oklahoma | 1170 |
| 21. WWVA, Wheeling, West Virginia | 1170 |
| 22. WOWO, Fort Wayne, Indiana | 1190 |
| 23. KEX, Portland, Oregon | 1190 |
| 24. WTOP, Washington, D.C. | 1500 |
| 25. KSTP, St. Paul, Minnesota | 1500 |
| 26. WLAC, Nashville, Tennessee | 1510 |
| 27. KGA, Spokane, Washington | 1510 |
| 28. WKBK, Buffalo, New York | 1520 |
| 29. KOMA, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma | 1520 |
| 30. KFBR, Sacramento, California | 1530 |
| 31. WCKY, Cincinnati, Ohio | 1530 |
| 32. KXEL, Waterloo, Iowa | 1540 |
| 33. WQXR, New York City | 1560 |
| 34. KPMC, Bakersfield, California | 1560 |

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[1] Most class I-B clear channels have two class I-B stations assigned to them. The class I-B stations generally use directional antennas to protect each other's wide coverage areas. Class II stations also may be assigned to the channel provided they protect the wide area coverage of the class I-B stations.

## An Assessment of the Congressional Report on Radio Marti by Juan M. Clark, Ph.D., Miami-Dade Community College, and Juan A. Figueras, Ph.D.

**With the participation of Juan F. Benemelis, Esteban L. Cardenas, Enrique Morato and Leopoldo Perdomo, who have lived in Cuba recently and were either connected with the mass media or with the governmental structure and shared with us their experiences.**

**And the collaboration of Zoila Gordon, Beatriz Reed, B.A. and Rose Reque, Ph.D. who helped us in the various phases of this research paper.**

The Radio Marti report prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), has prompted us to volunteer some observations on some of the arguments put forth. We shall first present some methodological observations, and later address the four major assumptions upon which the Radio Marti project is based.

Our point of view is based on a background of social research. Since 1970 we have systematically studied the living conditions prevailing in Cuba. By replicating the methodology developed by the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System—essentially an experimental one—we have been able to gain considerable insight on living conditions at the grass roots level there.[1] We interviewed hundreds of persons that have made a living in Cuba on their neighborhood experience as they left the island. Their objectivity and reliability was satisfactorily verified.[2] We also surveyed the literature on living conditions in Cuba as well as that of other Communist societies such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We observed striking similarities in the reactions of the people of those countries to the Communist system in spite of huge cultural differences which at first set them apart.[3]

*Methodological observations.*—It should be clear to any social scientist that the methods used to measure public opinion in democratic societies or even authoritarian ones, cannot be used in the closed-totalitarian type. Surveys or public opinion polls cannot ascertain the true thinking and attitudes of the population on sensitive matters such as the degree of support of their government. In these societies, the norm is constant simulation of support of their system. Few will criticize the government in front of a stranger. This type of regime does not need the constant presence of a government official to coerce the free opinion of the people. Usually, only under conditions of the utmost confidence will someone express their true political views, if these happen to be against the system. There is too much at stake and too much to lose if one dares to criticize the government or its hierarchy to a foreigner—even if he claims to be a journalist or a social researcher.

Given this set of circumstances, in a society like Cuba today, how can Professor John Nichols, one of the sources most cited in the Congressional Research Service Report, make generalizations which he applies to "most Cubans," and further determine their lack of sophistication regarding "international geopolitics or national economic policy"? Professor Nichols unwarrantedly generalizes about the entire Cuban population when he condescendingly affirms that the concerns of the Cuban people lie primarily with bread and butter issues. By this he implies that such crucial issues as freedom, representative government and administrative corruption are of little or of no concern to most Cubans.

It should be remembered that reputed social scientists of the likes of Oscar Lewis and Rene Dumont were either prevented from continuing their research in Cuba or were later labeled CIA agents in spite of their sympathies for the revolution. Oscar Lewis had his recorded interviews confiscated when authorities suspected he had obtained information that was too sensitive.[4] Rene Dumont, of socialist inclinations and a definite sympathizer of the Cuban revolution, with previous extensive research in Cuba and North Vietnam, was found by the Castro regime as too critical after his long stay enabled him to observe crucial realities of that system.[5] Other social scientists such as Lowry Nelson, mentioned by Castro himself in 1959 as a source of inspiration of the revolution through his book Rural Cuba,[6] was prohibited entry into Cuba when, in the early 1970's he attempted to make an assessment of revolutionary changes. He then relied on experiential data for his book: "Cuba: The Measure of a Revolution."[7] With these realities in mind, one must be skeptical of researchers permitted into totalitarian societies and whom, after a few weeks or months return as "experts" on those countries.[8] It is evident that in some cases, especially with regard to Cuba, they have not done even passable homework on Cuba's socio-economic background.[9]

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[1] As samples of the Harvard Project see Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, "The Soviet Citizen, Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society" (Cambridge, Mass.; Atheneum, 1959); Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, "How the Soviet System Works" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[2] See Juan M. Clark "Importancia y Factibilidad de la Evaluacion Vivencial de la Realidad Social Cubana," paper presented to the III Meeting of the Institute of Cuban Studies, Washington, D.C., May 1973, p. 11. It shows that 88 percent of the respondents scored between 86 and 100 percentile of objectivity.

[3] Among them the presence of an underground, highly efficient "economy" and the development of a new elite with privileges superior to those of the old upper classes. See Hedrich Smith, "The Russians" (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976): Suzane Labin "The Anthill, The Human Conditions in Communist China" "(London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1960); William L. Parish, Martin King Whyte, "Village and Family in Contemporary China" (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978).

*Information control and dissent in Cuba.*—The CRS report questions the degree of Cuban governmental control of the media and states that "a degree of dissent and criticism is permitted, even encouraged." (CRS, p. 27). This statement shows a significant ignorance as to the extent of manipulation of information in Cuba. The reality is that all news is filtered and previously approved by the Communist party's organism in charge of news diffusion (the DOR, Departamento de Orientacion Revolucionaria).[10] But news reports are not only whitewashed for public consumption, but presented with a slant reflecting the regime's point of view, and with ideological overtones noticeable to any observer of Cuban media. Anyone who dares to publish information without proper authorization may suffer consequences.[11]

A case in point: journalist Ariel Barrera, Director of Information of the national TV News and a party member. In 1975 he allowed a news release detailing the capturing of the U.S. ship, the *Mayagüez*, off the coast of Cambodia by the Communist troops of that country. He did so without the Party's clearance. As a result, he was expelled from the ICR (Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusion), fired from his position and sent to the Escambray mountains to do agricultural work as punishment.[12]

Another documented instance of information control in Cuba occurred in 1979. Leopold Perdomo was a journalist and the coordinator of a panel-type Sunday program entitled "Temas", transmitted by Radio Rebelde. That day's program feature was cattle raising in Havana province. Perdomo made the mistake of departing from the script to ask a question to one of the panelists. This took place in one of the usual prerecorded sessions (none of these programs are "live"). His question was a highly valid one but implied negatively upon the economic performance of the revolution. The question was evaded, and the program was never aired. Perdomo was removed from his post, and the Cuban people never learned the truth of the matter.[13]

Cuban news suppression is such that the Cuban people have yet to learn through their media that Vietnam invaded Cambodia, that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, or that Somalia broke relations with Cuba. Further, even hurricane information has apparently been distorted, as with the case of Hurricane Frederick in September 1979. At that time the Summit of Non-Aligned Nations was taking place in Havana. Seemingly afraid that the delegates might leave if they learned the hurricane's probable course was close to Havana, weather forecasts were presented in such way that people were led to believe that the storm center would pass by the western tip of Cuba in the Pinar del Rio province. Journalists ignorant of this manipulation of vital weather information went to the presumably affected area, only to find no damages. (In fact the eye of the storm passed through the central part of that province, west of the city of Havana, which suffered considerable flooding and some wind-destruction.)[14]

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[4] See the Oscar Lewis, Ruth M. Lewis and Susan M. Rigdon, "Four Men, Living the Revolution, An Oral History of Contemporary Cuba" (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1977) where in the Foreword the widow of Dr. Lewis explains the troubles they had with their work in spite of the permission to conduct in-depth interviewing.

[5] See Rene Dumont, "Is Cuba Socialist?" (New York: The Viking Press, 1974). Its original French version was published in 1970. The work by Lewis, op. cit. p. xvii pointed out how this work infuriated Castro.

[6] Lowry Nelson, "Rural Cuba" (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1951).

[7] Lowry Nelson, "Cuba, The Measure of a Revolution" (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972).

[8] See a good analysis of this issue by Paul Hollander "Innocents Abroad, Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba" (Cambridge, Mass.: Oxford University Press, 1979).

[9] For a typical case see Fred Ward, "Inside Cuba Today" (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1978).

[10] See the appendix to this report, "Comments About the Cuban Media," by Leopoldo Perdomo, a Cuban journalist with 14 years of experience in that country.

[11] Such were the documented cases of Perdomo himself, Acosta and Alverez, described in the appendix.

[12] According to testimony of Enrique Morato. He was officially sent to work in "broadcasting" where there was no radio or television station.

[13] See appendix by Perdomo.

The criticisms of deficiencies in the system that have appeared in the Cuban media (as part of the so-called "exigencia revolucionaria"), essentially of a local nature, cannot be interpreted as "expressions of dissent" or as a "liberalization of political discussion," (CRS, p. 28) or as if "dissent is permitted, even encouraged. Participants from within that "dissent" process which at any rate ended by 1980, have told us that those "criticisms" were conceived by the government as a sort of "safety valve" for the people to manifest what was obviously taking place and impossible to hide. These criticisms were always first cleared by Party officials and never reached the level of really questioning the regime. Further, the criticism allowed did not address the roots of the problems, even local ones. If blame were placed, it fell on some local worker or administrator, never on a Party official. In Cuba, information that might even slightly taint the Party image is prohibited. If by any chance this kind of criticism slips by the censors, the person responsible pays dearly for it.[15]

Control of information also takes place indirectly through the selection of individuals who are placed in charge of the access to the news. Very strict ideological discrimination is exercised at this level, and only those considered completely trustworthy have access to the non-Communist printers of international news agencies.

*The legitimacy of the Cuban Government.*—On the issue of the degree of dissatisfaction with the Cuban Government, the CRS report raises doubt as to its extent and, in justification, naively interprets the fact that about 10 percent of the population has left the country thereby concluding that under Castro, the other 90 percent supports the regime in one way or another. Several indicators of support of the system could be examined here: the nature of the exodus, overall apathy and public manifestations of dissatisfaction.

First of all, the 10 percent figure for emigration from Cuba is highly misleading. Although quantitatively correct, it is important to state that the Cuban exodus (since 1959) has been increasingly representative of the entire Cuban population, especially from the occupational angle.[16] The recent Mariel boatlift (1980), was over-representative of non whites, both groups traditionally considered supporters of the revolution. But this exodus was especially relevant in terms of its origins; it is totally without precedent in the annals of diplomacy that close to 11,000 people requested political asylum as happened in the limited confines of the Peruvian embassy in Havana in roughly 2 days.[17]

What has not been publicized is that many thousands more Cubans were held back or detained in the embassy's vicinity trying to approach and enter it. At the same time a human flow with that same purpose in mind was underway from the interior of the country. The Mariel exodus was also unique in the sense that the Cuban Government tried to discredit it by including common criminals taken straight out of prison, and by doing so attempted to tarnish the image of the Cuban exile community in the United States.[18]

It should be noted that every time the Castro regime has "opened the doors," as a safety valve for internal pressures, an increasingly large number demonstrate their desire to leave.[19] In 1980 this desire was so widespread and unprecedented that the government took the new step of promoting mob attacks on those that had declared their desire to leave, especially if they had been identified with the regime. It has been estimated that a total of 1.5 million people declared their intention to leave the country by the summer of 1980.[20] But exit from Cuba has always been costly, not only in terms of material loss (the person loses all material possessions), but by the rule of having first to work as semislaves in agricultural fields, as during the 1965–73 air bridge between Varadero, Cuba and Miami.[21]

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[14] Ibid. p. 5.

[15] This was the case of Felix Sautie, director of "Juventud Rebelde," the Cuban daily evening paper who lost his position in the late 1960's because he allowed the publication of a cartoon that appeared to be too critical of the Communist Party, according to testimony to this research of first hand witness Esteban Luis Cardenas.

[16] See Juan M. Clark "The Exodus from Revolutionary Cuba, (1959–74): A Sociological Analysis" (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1975) pp. 204–214.

[17] See Juan M. Clark, Jose I. Lasaga and Rose Reque. "The 1980 Mariel Exodus: An Assessment and Prospect" (Washington, D.C.: Council for Inter American Security, 1981).

[18] It appears that this has been partially accomplished according to a Gallup Poll release. It indicated that nationwide, Cuban refugees were considered, the second most undesirable neighbors. "Members of minority religious cults considered least desirable as neighbors," "The Miami Herald" January 21, 1982, p. 16A. It is interesting to point out that the vast majority of the criminals sent by Castro were young men who grew up during the revolution.

[19] By 1965, estimates of those wanting to leave reached 900,000 according to Time Magazine, "Cuba; The Freedom Flood," April 1, 1966.

Apart from authorized emigration, more than 16,000 Cubans have managed to clandestinely escape the island by the most incredible means: In unseaworthy boats, inner tubes, to one who hid in the inner wheel of a DC–8 flying from Havana to Madrid.[22] But it has been estimated that probably twice that many either died in the attempt or were captured. Their significance lies not only in the magnitude of their numbers or their dramatic means of escape; it is who they are which makes them especially relevant. The vast majority are young (in their teens or early twenties), from blue collar backgrounds, with a significant number of non-whites; precisely those the government claims to be among the main beneficiaries of the revolution, and the ones who have received the greatest amount of indoctrination. One can only surmise the degree of desperation and frustration with the system to prompt such actions and wonder about the extent that these escapees may be a representative sampling of the feelings of the entire Cuban population.

Another indicator of dissatisfaction inside Cuba is the widespread apathy toward work—obviously a problem difficult to ascertain as a foreign observer. But the Castro brothers themselves have publicly fustigated this situation, manifested in absenteeism and extremely low productivity at work.[23] To combat this apathy the government passed the "anti-vagrancy law" in 1971, designed to force people to work. This apathy may be correlated to the dissatisfaction and frustration with the socio-economic system imposed upon the population. If it were otherwise, if popular support to the regime were so prevalent, or measured by the attendance numbers to political rallies and membership in mass organizations, why has the government developed such a large repressive apparatus that ranges from the efficient "Seguridad del Estado" to the pervasive spy system of the Committees of the Defense of the Revolution on every block? Why has the political prison system held inmates for the same length of time as the existence of Castro's regime?[24]

Since 1979, Cubans have been showing more evident signs of public dissatisfaction. In spite of the huge repressive apparatus, reliable reports tell of the unprecedented painting of anti-government graffiti on walls, many directed against Castro personally. Additionally, in spite of control over the printing mechanisms, anti-government leaflets have been distributed in several parts of the country. These signs of discontent have evolved into more active expressions lately indicating the possible seeds for rebellion since they originate in the younger generation.

Incidents include acts of sabotage like arson, and the less visible sabotage of state property. Apparently extremely widespread with machinery; school vandalism is reportedly reaching alarming proportions.[25] First-hand witnesses report that the Cuban people are more openly and publicly complaining about the great inefficiencies of the system, without facing opposition even from those considered open sympathizers of the government. And, this past spring, Castro himself was personally booed as he appeared in a long film documentary in several theaters throughout the island.[26]

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[20] According to sources from the diplomatic corp in Havana and estimates of Seguridad del Estado to which we had access.

[21] See Clark, "The Exodus," pp. 92–96.

[22] For this dramatic case see Armando Socarras Ramirez as told to Denis Fodor and John Reddy, "Stowaway!" "The Readers Digest," January 1970, pp. 63–66. This was a 19 year old son of a plumber. For a comprehensive analysis of the escape process from Cuba, see Clark, "The Exodus," pp. 147–201.

[23] See the speech pronounced by Raul Castro in Santiago de Cuba, November 30, 1979 and by Fidel Castro at the closing of the II Session of the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular December 27, 1979. Juan F. Benemelis, a former official of the Ministry of Agriculture who surrepticiously fled through Mariel; indicated that, according to studies done in Cuba, agricultural productivity reaches only 40 percent of its potential.

[24] See the comprehensive work on this matter of Frank Calzon, "Castro's Gulag, The Politics of Terror" (Council for Inter-American Security, Washington, D.C., 1979), and Organizacion de los Estados Americanos, "Sexto Informe Sobre la Situacion de los Piliticos en Cuba" (Washington: Secretaria General, OEA, 1980) and "The Political Prisoners in Cuba" (Washington: Association of Former Political Prisoners of Cuba and of Human Rights, 1981).

[25] According to interviewing conducted since 1979.

*Acceptability of information from a U.S. source.*—The success of Radio Marti will depend on providing accurate, serious, reliable and relevant information, independent of being provided through a U.S. Government controlled radio station.

To compare the present Cuban situation and Radio Marti with imperial Japan's World War II Tokyo Rose as the report does in citing Nichols, defies the wildest imagination. Radio Marti's objective is to provide solid information about the Cuban situation, and let the Cuban people judge and act as they feel appropriate.

As to the comment included in the CRS report, that Cuba is not Poland, obviously it is not. Cuba is part of the Western Hemisphere, part of the southern U.S. border, relevant to the long and short term security of the United States. Poland is recognized by the United States as part of the irreversible Soviet sphere of influence; Cuba, so far as we know, is not. The Radio Marti report also mentions that "the Polish Government does not enjoy the same degree of legitimacy as the Cuban Government," and "popular discontent is higher in Poland than it is in Cuba." (pp. 35, 36). It should be remembered that the Communist government in Poland was established after World War II, as a consequence of the Soviet occupation after the defeat of the Nazi forces.

Castro's government came into being as a result of the Cuban insurrection and revolution against Batista's dictatorship. Indeed, Cubans were fighting for human rights and socioeconomic reforms, but within a democratic, not a totalitarian framework which were also Castro's promises to his people. After the triumph, Castro through deception betrayed the revolutionary ideals and kept himself in power not by periodic democratic elections, not by a public referendum naming him dictator for life, but by pure repression, jailing any person, leader or potential leader, who dared to dissent his rule publicly, aided by a substantial Soviet infusion of economic subsidies, arms and technical assistance.[27]

How did the authors of the Radio Marti report find that "popular discontent is higher in Poland than it is in Cuba"? What do they mean by the statement that a greater percentage of people oppose the system in Poland than in Cuba, or that those who reject the system do more intensively in Poland than those in Cuba? Do they base this assertion on the superficially observed fact that the leadership of the Polish regime has changed hands several times in the last 20 years while Castro remains the sole ruler of Cuba for over two decades? Or do they base their opinion in the creation of the Solidarity labor movement and its challenge to the Polish Government, while no such challenge has publicly taken place in Cuba? Will it be possible for the authors of CRS report to consider that maybe those events have not taken place in Cuba because the Castro government is more repressive, less considerate of basic human rights than is the Pole leadership?

The authors appear to fully support the assertion attributed to Mr. Nichols that "while the Polish regime responded to popular disaffection with empty promises, the Cuban regime has acted pragmatically to diffuse discontent with real reforms." Please inform us what reforms have taken place in Cuba in the last 10–15 years. The pragmatic measures used by Castro to face the discontent of the Cuban people has been the continuous repression of the population and the massive "open/close" emigration policies, which have allowed him in the past to dictate not only who, but how many, when and how Cubans can emigrate, as well as where they can be accepted as immigrants.

In reference to programming, the report accepts Nichols' finding that "conducting a 'classic audience survey' of recent Cuban arrivals to ascertain the preferences" of Cubans is erroneous, because the preferences expressed will not be representative of the Cuban population, since recent exiles are "not a randomly selected group, and they are being interviewed outside their normal habitat." But is there any alternative suggested by Mr. Nichols? Do the authors suggest doing a random survey with the Cuban population in Cuba?

Similarly, we may ask how the authors and their cited "scholars" have found out about Cubans' real feelings in reference to Cuba's participation in the African wars. That some have complained about being turned down for duty in Africa it does not follow that they support those wars. Perhaps they were really complaining for different reasons: seeing enlistment as a possible way to defect overseas, a change from the monotony of totalitarian Cuba, or a chance to obtain privileges by being part of Cuba's occupation forces in Africa.

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[26] According to interviews of May–June 1982.

[27] The Spanish economist Alberto Recarte "Cuba: Economia y Sociedad" (Madrid: Alianza Editorial 1980) p. 153 estimated in $7 million per day the Soviet subsidy to Cuba by 1979.

Mr. Leo Grande states that Cuba's "support for the revolutionary movements abroad generally takes the form of advice and some shipments of arms, neither of which entails any significant domestic cost * * * the costs are not great and the potential for opposition is limited." Although the financial transfers of significant funds from Cuba to the revolutionary movements overseas may not take place, there are substantial costs involved for the Cuban people. Less funds are available to build factories to produce consumer goods, to build badly needed housing. Because opposition is not openly expressed, due to the repression, this does not mean that opposition does not exist.

Radio Marti does not have to be "less accurate * * *, more vulnerable to rumor" than the Voice of America (VOA). On the contrary, it should be even more accurate and uphold the principles of professional journalism at the highest possible level. The main difference with the VOA should be in the continuous and wider coverage specifically oriented toward Cuba. It should not in any case be a Radio Swan-type of operation, which was CIA-controlled, and which provided false information, to the point of being laughable.

Research conducted with arrivals from Cuba may shed significant light over the possible receptivity of the Cuban population to Radio Marti. A total of 89.5 percent of the respondents interviewed in 1971 whom as a whole came from more than half of the Cuban territory, indicated that "many" or a "great amount" of their neighbors regularly listened to the Voice of America.[28] More recent research using in-depth interviewing techniques indicated that this proportion of listeners may even be greater today. Many complained about the neglect of Cuba in the Voice of America broadcasts. A common statement among Cuban emigres as to the Cuban people's acceptance of the Voice of America was the expression that "if the 'Voice' says it, it must be true." Indeed, in 1980, many waited for verification from the Voice of America on whether it was true that the custody of the Peruvian Embassy had in fact been withdrawn in order to decide whether to make a run for it or not. They suspected that the official statement of withdrawal of the custody was a trick to catch naive dissidents.[29]

*Possible unstated goals of Radio Marti.*—The authors fear "that the true intent of Radio Marti is to destabilize the Cuban government." Do the authors think that the United States Government should act in support of the Cuban Government? The main and direct objectives of Radio Marti should to be to provide factual information to the Cuban people to let them judge, and act accordingly, if they so desire. Indeed, we agree with the authors in that "Radio Marti will no doubt add another irritant to United States-Cuban relations * * * Radio Marti is political harassment * * * Castro considers broadcasting to Cuba as more sinister than the United States trade embargo or sabotage." Any totalitarian regime knows that knowledge is power * * *. If it can control what the population knows, it can control the people. Providing unauthorized information to the people, stimulating them to think for themselves, is obviously an act of subversion, according to Castro's or any totalitarian regime.

The statement that a possible negative political consequence of Radio Marti may be to stimulate immigration from Cuba to the United States must be analized. First, any emigration from Cuba to the United States will depend both on the Cuban and the U.S. Governments. Cuba does not allow any emigration without their express approval; the U.S. Government must have complete control of its immigration. Radio Marti's purpose should not be to stress the higher standards of living in this country, but to inform about the political, human rights and economic conditions in Cuba, as well as the rest of the world. In addition, Radio Marti may be used to discourage emigration to the United States by way of informing the Cuban people of the present stricter immigration laws and regulations in effect.

Radio Marti will be administered by a corporation created and funded, and whose members will be named by the U.S. Government. Therefore, Radio Marti will be at any moment under the direct or indirect control of this government, and will reflect its official policy. Unfortunately for the Cubans who oppose Castro and who hope to have a better Cuba in the future, Radio Marti will not be part of their movement as Radio Free France was a part of de Gaulle's during World War II. U.S. officials and their policies have changed frequently during the last 20 years; Radio Marti may be approved this year, and cancelled the next.

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[28] See n. 2 for the study generating that information.

[29] This was verified by us through the interviewing of persons that had been in the Peruvian Embassy. According to them, approximately 90 percent of those who managed to enter that embassy did so after "the voice" indicated that this was happening.

The final comment and quotation of the authors about the possible alternatives to Radio Marti begs serious analysis. To state that "the Cuban press may change when relations with the United States improve, and Cuban journalists could study here, thus Cuban newspapers could timidly assert their function as providers of information" implies the utmost lack of knowledge about the nature of totalitarianism. Bureaus of United States and international news agencies have existed in the U.S.S.R., Poland and other Communist countries for several decades; those countries have correspondents in the United States and in other democracies. But have they changed the type of information provided by their newspapers to their captive readers?

*Possible consequence of Radio Marti.*—Under this subtitle the authors of the report state that Radio Marti may promote greater accountability of the Cuban Government to its people which "may in the end strengthen Castro's revolutionary system," (CRS, p. 46) if "the central Havana government response (sic) by correcting reported malpractice and corruption by local government," (CRS, p. 2). These statements seem to imply that the maladies of the Cuban socioeconomic system are originated at the local level. If this interpretation is correct, it is another example of ignorance of the Cuban reality. In that case, the CRS researchers ignore that the origin of Cuba's troubles is primarily at the very top, within the oligarchic elite headed by the "maximo lider" and implicit "president for life," Fidel Castro.[30] That elite constitutes a replica of the "new class" described by the classic works of Djilas and more recently by Nomenklatura of Michael Voslensky.[31] They have imposed a system that not only has eliminated freedoms and the right to self determination from the Cuban people, but has also been utterly inefficient economically.

As a result of this rule Cubans have had to suffer an unprecedented degree of material hardship, including basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter, all strictly rationed now for the past two dacades. As many interviewees told us, "you have to experience it in order to understand it." [32] Constant queuing and the resulting waste of time and energy is a pervasive reality in Cuba as it is in the Soviet Union. And this is also true for housing, where practically all new marriages have higher cohabitate with their parents (about 80 to 90 percent) or live totally separated from each other, being forced also to line up to be able to have some marital intimacy in the "posadas" (motel-like arrangements for sexual intimacy since pre-Castro times) with what this implies in terms of human degradation.[33]

The meager ration that Cubans are allowed to buy from the government usually lasts only about 15 days. The rest of the month the people must buy in the expensive black market, the expensive restaurants (or pizzerias) or equally expensive peasant free markets, seriously curtailed as of mid-1982.[34] Members of the "new class" are exempt of all those hardships and humiliations; but their privileges hinge on their political allegiance and not on their administrative efficiency. There is no food rationing for them; their children enjoy special educational opportunities and probably a house or apartment when they marry. These privileges also apply to their mistresses, a very generalized practice starting at the very top of this elite corroborating Lord Acton's statement that "absolute power corrupts absolutely." These less visible privileges and abuses of power should also be a concern to Radio Marti, since the people may only be aware of a small fraction that vital reality.

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[30] There is consensus among our interviewees that the repressive elite managing Cuba's affairs today is the main cause of the island's unprecedented economic problems.

[31] Milovan Djilas, "The New Class" (New York: Praeger Publishers, 25th Ed., 1971) and Michael Voslensky "Nomenklatura," (Vienna: Verlag Fritz Molden, 1980).

[32] This expression has been present both in the 1971 survey as well as in the in-depth ones conducted since 1979.

[33] This situation was first reported in the media in 1974,"Cubans Wait in Line for Sex," "The Miami News," Oct. 3, 1974, p. 9A. This practice has continued, even expanded, in view of the acute housing shortage. As a matter of fact in 1978, 16,500 dwelling units were built while 25,000 were demolished due to lack of maintenance according to a 1979 report. See interview with Humberto Perez (Planning Director), "Bohemia" Feb. 16, 1979, pp. 59, 78. But use of this governmental facility (the "posada") is by no means limited to married couples . . .

[34] After Castro's speech to the VI Congress ANAP (National Association of Small Farmers in May 1982 there was a clamp down in the free peasants' markets and even in those legally manufacturing products as an individual or family enterprise. This resembled the 1968 "Revolutionary Offensive" in which all remaining private businesses were confiscated. It was the latest effort in the suppression of individual private initiative in Cuba. As in 1968 a Castro speech had the force of law without any further governmental action.

*Summary and conclusions.*—In view of the above mentioned facts, it seems that Cubans would welcome a change in the system imposed upon them. Like a recent arrival had stated, "to think that the Cuban population would not want a change is an insult to the intelligence of any normal human being." This is related to the obvious huge failures of the system as well as to the new perspectives of the world and their national reality brought about by the visits of the exiles to Cuba. Young people were particularly impacted by that new opening. But Cubans face not an authoritarian dictatorship, Batista-style, but a totalitarian one where even neutrality is considered offensive to the ruling class. It could be extremely naive to think that change may come about without outside help.

The United States is considered by many as a crucial factor that could promote change within the island. But a vital aspect in the process of change is information, if they only knew what is happening in the country and abroad. On the other hand, Cuba, at this point appears to have reached a crucial stage in its historical development. Now more than ever, a good instrument of information is a felt need there. If properly oriented, Radio Marti could be an instrument that may not only adequately inform the Cuban people, but may also be a crucial catalytic factor promoting social change for a better life for that population.

## COMMENTS ABOUT THE CUBAN MEDIA

(By Leopoldo Perdomo [1])

At the end of the year 1979, the host of a radio program called TEMAS, which is broadcast every Sunday on the station Radio Liberación de Cuba and is later rebroadcast on the station Radio Rebelde (both are national networks because they have transmitting towers in almost all Cuban provinces) used his program to analyze the problems in the cattle industry in Havana and invited several leaders in that field: Unions, party, etc. Using a script prepared and approved by the participants as is required, the program began and during its course the host asked the guests how it was possible that before the revolution, cattle owners sent cattle weighing at least 900 pounds and usually over 1,000 to the slaughterhouse, and that now that all cattle is state property, the maximum weight of cattle being slaughtered to feed the population is only 700 pounds.

This question was not in the script and was evaded by all members of the panel since it brought out the inefficiency in the administration of this important economic sector. The result was that this program was never put on the air and it's host was removed from the staff of the station and the general population never found out about this aspect of the issue which is forbidden in Cuban broadcasts. The host of that program was Leopoldo Perdomo who is now an exiled journalist.

In 1977, another Cuban journalist, Octavio Acosta who is still in Cuba had a 15-minute program about how the state-owned companies disregard the existing rules of public hygiene and pointed out that many companies were throwing their wastes in the street and suggested plans for action for the cleaning of public streets. Since the program affected several important enterprises in which the Party has an interest, it (the Party) prohibited the program from being aired although the journalist was allowed to keep his job but was told to "be more careful."

These two examples, and others that will be presented later, demonstrate the degree of control that exists on the information that is available from the Cuban press; including those stories in which limited criticism can be exercised.

### CONTROL MECHANISMS

Several means are used in the Cuban press to control its content. For example radio programming is for the most part prerecorded. The only exception to this rule is news broadcasting, but control is exercised here in the following way. There are two daily news shows in the Cuban radio: The 1 o'clock program,

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[1] Mr. Perdomo is a graduate of Cuba's School of Journalism who exercised his profession in that country for 14 years. He worked in practically all the media, but especially radio. In April 1980 he sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy, going to Costa Rica and later to the United States where he now resides. He is presently working as a radio journalist in Miami.

"Political Information" which is prepared in the Information Department of the Dirreción Politica of the Armed Forces (MINFAR) and the other news show, "National Radio News," goes on the air daily at 7 p.m. through all the radio stations of Cuba broadcasting in network. This is supervised by a midlevel functionary that will guarantee that the Party line is followed. The remainder of the news information is made up of press releases originated in various government agencies and the Communist Party. These notes contain data regarding the successes and accomplishments in production, the achievement of preset government goals, and exhortations to the people to support and join the economic effort as "volunteer" workers.

In Cuba, the work of a journalist is to present in a persuasive form what otherwise can be considered inaccuracies. A journalist in Cuba cannot simply write or edit information that reaches his desk; it must come from his superiors. Furthermore, the journalist has no free access to the international wire services printers. The latter are located precisely where only the censor and the director of the broadcast have access. He has free access only to the news coming from Prensa Latina, the Cuban agency, and the Soviet TASS.

With regards to the written press a similar procedure is employed. On a weekly basis there are meetings held in the Press Directorate of the Department of Revolutionary Orientation (DOR). At times these meetings are held weekly or daily, according to the news circumstances, where the supervisors of these media are given the pertinent "orientations." The DOR is directed by the Politburo of the Communist Party. The DOR has coordinators for each of the media: Radio, TV, movies-films, written press. These individuals are responsible for passing down the party line to the various media centers.

## CRITICISM IN THE CUBAN PRESS

Criticism in the Cuban press is exercised according to the directions of the Communist Party itself and it must serve the party interests. This will probably not be readily evident by foreigners. Criticism is exercised in the following manner: Criticism is practiced in the media through the following outline. Through specific sections in the printed media: One for Granma morning newspaper and another in the evening paper Juventud Rebelde, both of national circulation, and in the Latin American newscast. Not included here are radio and TV. These are oriented directly by the Party and began in 1973 after the XIII Workers' Congress.

The practice was very successful because the people were in need to hear criticism acting as "safety valves." Therefore, the Politburo recommended the expansion of this method of criticism. In still a controlled fashion, the "criticism" was broadcast via radio and TV and included in "Bohemia" magazine and the "OPINA" weekly. Literary and artistic criticism were dealt with in a different manner.

But the expansion of this method of criticism made its control more difficult and the directors of state enterprises and the party provincial secretaries prompted the halt of the criticism. Raul Castro himself subsequently said in a speech in Santiago de Cuba in the fall of 1978 that humorists were making fun of very serious problems and recommended that criticism be exercised in a "responsible manner." The next day a humorist weekly "DDT" was suspended. The director of the cinematographic Latin American news service Santiago Alvarez (a friend of Fidel and Raul Castro) was reprimanded for his involvement in the "irresponsible" criticism and asked to change its content if he (Alvarez) wanted to keep his job.

The 3d Congress of Cuban Journalists met at the end of 1978. Some guidelines for "criticism" emerged from it which could be outlined as follows:

1. It is only to be included in the few special sections designated for criticism.
2. The opinion of the Communist Party must prevail in the criticism.
3. Criticism can only be published when all points in question have been investigated—being the most important of course, the point of view of the Party.
4. Criticism should be didactic.
5. Only selected journalists will be in charge of "criticism."

This complex mechanism to control criticism in the media applies equally to information regarding the inefficiency of the administration of a toy factory or women undergarments but not political criticism. It is very important for the government for example to censor criticism of industries considered strategic such as: Cattle, sugar cane or any product destined for export. In this manner they can manipulate reality without objection.

A good example of this pattern happened when the Non-aligned Nations Summit Meeting was being held in Havana at the Palace of Conventions in the exclusive west side of Havana. At the time a hurricane was threatening Cuba. Metereologic information originates in Cuba at the Institute of Metereology. During this hurricane threat, in contrast with past performance, the bulletins were sparse and finally it was acknowledged that the Hurricane (Frederick, 1979) had hit the westernmost province of Cuba: Pinar del Rio. The manipulation of the news exercised during this natural disaster resulted in a "private" investigation launched by one unaware media which sent journalists and photographers to cover the disaster. The journalists found that the hurricane had not hit very hard the area in question in Pinar del Rio. Instead, the hurricane's eye passed through the west side of Havana. What had happened was that the government apparently did not want the foreign delegations to be threatened, and produced the manipulation of information regarding the course of the storm to the people and the press. Needless to say, many of the houses where the dignitaries were housed were innundated.

### LITERARY AND ARTISTIC CRITICISM

With regards to literary and artistic criticism, this assumes different procedures although the principle is the same: The party orientation and its service. When I say party it should be understood that I mean the Politburo in general and specifically: Fidel Castro himself.

Note this example: In the house of Raul Castro on 26 Street at the Vedado section of Havana there is a movie theater. In this theater the premieres that will be released for the public are previewed. The journalists, who view the film before their release to comment about them, should wait that "the house on 26th" actually release the prints. And occasionally, a film already advertised, even with posters is withdrawn or scenes censored, even if Raul Castro himself is not the previewer but one of his assistants. Sometimes a nationally produced film is mutilated or the entire film banned. For example: El Huesped (The Guest) a long film of the early 1960's by Eduardo Manet, a renowned moviemaker, was banned from showing. Manet was at the time the vice president of the Cuban Cinematographic Institute. Later Manet went into exile in France. Works of Cubans who have left the country are treated in that manner as well as taken out (erradicated) from artistic or literary anthologies or directories as if they never existed and these include paintings, sculptures and murals which are painted over or scraped.

Another example among many I could talk about follows. The novel written by José Cid entitled: La Ciudad. There must be only two copies of this novel. One is in the archives of "Seguridad del Estado" (Secret Police) and the other with the author—a Spanish emigré—who recently died. The security apparatus of the Cuban State stopped the printing of the novel because the "Instituto del Libro" considered that the content of the novel was not "adequate" and it had a negative message a la Kafka. The original was going to be given back to the author when it was "stolen" from the printer. The author was not persecuted.

Others have been haunted such as Eduardo Heras. This writer authored an apologetic look about the militia and the Bay of Pigs (Girón). But it was not to the liking of Fidel Castro. Subsequently there was a harsh criticism of the book in the El Caimán Barbudo, a monthly literary review. The author was expelled from the University and sent to perform agricultural work.

The theater for example is almost vacant of national writers because many playwrights are considered to have "problems." It is possible, however, to express criticism against a national theatrical work, provided that it be exercised to defend the values of the Revolution, as understood by the Party.

### INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION

The most censored material is, however, the international information. In Cuba they have not published yet that Somalia has broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. The Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina, has inaugurated a new style of information they have labeled "turning the wires" (Virar el Cable). For example: during the Vietnam war the teletype news coming from UPI and AP would say "The Vietcong had 1,200 casualties" and Prensa Latina would turn the message around and publish: "The South Vietnamese and 'Yanqui' soldiers suffered 1,200 casualties."

Granma is the authorized medium through which international information is given initially. This newspaper is the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. All other media must limit themselves to echo the story printed by Granma.

The international reports in Granma are not accurate. For example, in 1979, Granma initially pointed out that there was no Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) but an uprising in the latter country. Later on Granma acknowledged the Vietnamese's presence in Cambodia but failed to mention that there were 20 divisions involved. On the other hand, Granma claimed that the Vietnamese had been called into Cambodia. Obviously no news director or journalist would change the Granma story because that would be a sure way to either lose his job or become a prisoner.

This is what happened to Armando Fornes. This was a Cuban journalist who eventually became an exile in Venezuela. He was a newscaster at Radio Progreso, a popular radio station in Cuba. He was detained at the "Seguridad del Estado" (State Security) because he had used information obtained from his own sources. Apparently the information broadcast by Fornes mentioned the Government of the United States. But, Fornes did not add the adjective "imperialist" to modify the United States, and the journalistic exercise turned up against him the secret police. Fornes was dismissed from his job and threatened, but he was not given a jail sentence as such.

Among the international news which are systematically censored are those related to Cuban citizens, official or soldiers who ask for political asylum. Another area is the number of Cubans who become casualties in Angola or Ethiopia. We know that the cadavers are not returned to Cuba so that the people do not have to see the espectacle of the burials. This would make others think twice before going abroad as part of these contingencies.

### TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF THE BROADCASTING MEDIA

Radio is today Cuba's most popular media. It reaches all the provinces. The provincial newspapers are only a few and there are no municipal ones, since no one can publish a newspaper or even a leaflet, unless the authorized public organisms. Thus the printed media does not reach all the country. TV broadcasting stations are not as abundant as radio. Yet, the latter has old antennae that not always can rebroadcast adequately. This has forced the closing of a number of radio stations, three at least in Havana province by the end of the 1970's.

The coaxial cable now under construction will facilitate communications, including TV but not radio. The major concern with radio is that it reach the entire country. This is done to prevent people from tuning foreign stations. It can be deducted from this that it is doubtful that Castro could fulfill his threat of developing powerful stations in the near future, such as Radio Lincoln since they have not yet covered the entire country with their own radio. This implies that Castro will not be able to fully block or interfere foreign broadcasts. I think then that Castro's threats of interferences, to U.S. stations are simply bluffs.

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## PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALLACE E. JOHNSON, ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR BROADCAST ENGINEERING STANDARDS, INC.

The Association for Broadcast Engineering Standards, Inc. (ABES) respectfully submits these comments for use by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in considering S. 1853, a Bill to authorize Federal Funding for Radio Broadcasting To Cuba, Inc. ("Radio Marti").

ABES is a non-profit membership corporation. Its primary corporate purpose, as stated in its Articles of Incorporation, is to assist the Federal Communications Commission and Congress in assuring that the people of the United States receive optimum radio service. Membership in ABES is open to all classes of radio broadcast station licenses who share that objective. The current list of officers and directors of ABES is attached.

Wallace E. Johnson is the Executive Director of ABES.

For a period of 37 years—May 1942 to May 1979—he was an employee of the Federal Communications Commission and served as Chief of the Broadcast Bureau from August 1971 to May 1979.

During the past 2 years he has been an active participant in the various activities associated with the new MF Broadcasting Agreement concluded in Rio de

Janeiro in December 1981. He was a member of the U.S. Delegation at both sessions in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. He was also a U.S. member of the Panel of Experts that assisted the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) in a study comparing 9 and 10 kiloHertz channel spacing for the M.F. band.

We appreciate this opportunity to voice our concern regarding the increasing interference being experienced by AM broadcasting stations in the United States from Cuban operations and the reduction in service this represents to the American Public. If Cuba implements the assignments contained in their plan, which was considered during the second Region 2 MF Broadcasting Conference in Rio, the interference to be experienced in our country will be greatly increased.

AM broadcasting in the United States is a highly developed service with over 4,500 stations presently in operation. These stations render a very valuable aural service to the listening public. It is a service which requires adherence to technical standards which seek to assure a high quality, interference free service being rendered to the listening public.

In the AM broadcasting service advantage is taken of the radio wave propagation conditions that exist in the band. Different propagation conditions exist during daytime and nighttime hours. At night there is an ionospheric mirror that forms, which reflects the radio waves produced by the stations, resulting in skywave radiation. The result is that radio waves have an effect at much greater distances at night than in the daytime. Stations are carefully engineered during both daytime and nighttime hours to produce the service coverage desired and also to protect other operating stations, so that they can provide the service they need. During daytime hours a groundwave service is provided by all stations. Stations authorized to operate during nighttime hours also provide a groundwave service during these hours. Clear channel type of stations are allocated to provide a secondary, or skywave type of service out to distances of 750 miles. Their signals provide service to vast rural areas that have no primary service from any other stations, or provide an additional program choice to areas that have varying numbers of primary services. It should also be noted that the reflected or skywave signal, if not properly controlled, may cause devastating interference to stations located hundreds or thousands of miles away from the originating station. Therefore, it is extremely important that agreements be reached between neighboring countries, or within regions to control potential interference problems. With such agreements each participating can then enjoy the benefits of a quality AM service.

The AM service in the United States has developed under two international agreements. The North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA) among the United States, Canada, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and the Bahama Islands, and the Agreement between the United States and the United Mexican States Concerning Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcasting Band. Cuba began to cease abiding by the terms of NARBA when Castro came into power, but didn't officially withdraw from the Agreement until November 1981.

In 1975 the Countries of Regions 1 and 3 (Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia) developed agreements for their Regions. Need for an agreement for Region 2 became more apparent so plans for a regional Conference were begun. In June 1979 the International Telecommunications Council of the International Telecommunications Union decided to hold the Conference in two sessions. The first session was to establish the necessary technical basis for planning and the second session was to develop a regional agreement and a frequency assignment plan.

The first session of the conference was held during March, 1980 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The technical criteria needed for a station assignment plan was developed, except for the channel spacing to be used—9 kiloHertz or 10 kiloHertz. The channel spacing decision was left to the second session.

The second session was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil November 9, 1981 to December 19, 1981. A channel spacing decision for 10 kiloHertz was decided early in the session. The Final Acts—Agreement, technical criteria, regional plan, together with several resolutions and recommendations for post-Conference activities, were concluded and signed on December 19, 1981. The Agreement is scheduled to come into Force July 1, 1983. However, a serious dispute surfaced with Cuba during the last weeks of the Rio Session and resulted in Cuba withdrawing from the Conference and becoming a non-signatory to the Agreement.

During discussions held with Cuban representatives during the Panel of Experts meeting in Geneva for a period of 8 weeks during the spring of 1981, a bilateral meeting held in Washington, D.C. in October 1981, and during the first few weeks of the Rio Conference it appeared that the Cubans were willing to consider technical means for resolving interference problems. However, late in the Rio session Cuba presented 48 changes in its inventory of assignments which would result in very serious, totally unacceptable interference to stations in the United States. They did it in a way that reduced interference to stations operating in several other countries and proposed to assign their high powered stations on frequencies which were the most vulnerable in the United States, particularly our clear channels. The United States was successful in blocking acceptance of these changes by the Conference. Cuba used the refusal to accept these changes as one of their reasons for withdrawing from the Conference.

The other more political reason they withdrew was the Conference acceptance of U.S. stations that Cuba described as being beamed exclusively at Cuba for subversive, destabilizing purposes. They referred in their withdrawal statement to broadcasts from Swan Island and Marathon Keys as examples of operations which have taken place over the last 20 years. They also referred to the proposed Radio Marti station.

As can be seen from the station inventory presented by Cuba none of their stations will operate with directional antennas, which is an effective technique commonly used to control interference to other stations. Seven of their stations will operate with 75 to 500 kilowatts of power. This is far in excess of the power needed for them to provide a domestic service and will result in devastating interference to service presently provided by stations operating in the United States. Other stations operating with powers of 50 kilowatts or less will also result in very serious interference to U.S. stations since they will not operate with directional antennas designed to protect operating stations, or with power reduced to the level necessary to protect existing stations. The operations identified by Cuba will not only cause interference within Cuba between their own stations operating on the same frequencies, but also to neighboring countries including, of course, the United States.

Cuban operations presently cause and will cause increased daytime interference to stations at distances relatively close to Cuba, particularly in Florida.

During nighttime the Cuban operations cause, or will cause extensive interference to areas over most of the United States. For instance:

(1) 10 Clear Channel stations will have their entire secondary service area destroyed and their primary service severely limited. This includes WNBC, New York City; WCBS, New York City; WMAQ, Chicago; WLS, Chicago; WJR, Detroit; KDKA, Pittsburgh; WHO, Des Moines; WWWE, Cleveland; KSL, Salt Lake City and WHAM, Rochester, N.Y. A considerable number of additional Clear Channel stations will receive interference in varying degrees.

(2) A great many stations which operate on our regional channels will lose a considerable amount of their primary nighttime coverage. Since Florida is the closest distance to Cuba a considerable number of their stations will have their existing service areas reduced. As an example, Station WSUN, St. Petersburg, Florida will receive considerable daytime interference and at night their service area will be reduced by some 80 percent. A number of other Florida stations will suffer interference to the same, or to a greater extent. Other stations mainly in the southeastern part of the United States, such as in Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, South Carolina, and North Carolina will have their service areas reduced in varying degrees.

In an attempt to try and protect the service areas of stations in the United States from Cuba the United States took a reservation to the new Agreement which reserves the right to take such action as may prove necessary to assure the provisions of needed services to adversely affected areas. The Federal Communications Commission as a result of present interference problems has authorized several Florida stations to operate with increased power in an attempt to counter interference received from existing Cuban operations. However, U.S. stations are limited by the technical means they can employ to counter Cuban interference. For instance, increases in power by U.S. stations may cause serious new interference to other U.S. stations, or to stations in other countries, such as Canada and Mexico, contrary to existing Agreements, or the new Region 2 Agreement. Also there is no assurance that Cuba will operate with the facilities they have specified in their station inventory relative to power, or operate on the frequencies specified. We are facing a situation regarding Cuban operations where attempts to combat the interference received may not be effective in preserving existing service and can represent a considerable cost to the licensees of stations affected.

We do not quarrel with the policy of Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., to provide programming to Cuba such as contemplated by Radio Marti. However, we are concerned with the use of the M.F. (AM broadcasting) band to deliver the desired programming to Cuba and the devastating interference which may result to broadcasting service in the United States.

The M.F. (Medium Frequency) band in the Western Hemisphere is recognized as a band which is used to provide domestic broadcasting service. The H.F. (High Frequency) band is the one used for international broadcasting. Use by the United States of the M.F. band for international service does not enhance our ability to question its use by other countries for international purposes.

We have very limited information regarding all aspects of our problems and relations with Cuba. However, it is possible to assume that a major reason for Cubas withdrawal from the Conference in Rio and their determination to not become a party to the new Region 2 AM Agreement was the Marathon and Radio Marti operations.

It is a very serious matter if operation of the Marathon station and Radio Marti stations results in very extensive and serious interference to broadcast stations in the United States with the resultant loss of service to the U.S. public. Additional service to be provided Cuba at the expense of extensive loss of service within the United States warrants very serious consideration and evaluation.

We have also lost the opportunity we had before the Cuban withdrawal from the Region 2 MF Conference in Rio to consider interference problems with Cuban representatives and to seek solutions. Any possible way to reopen this avenue of communication should be explored since interference problems are normally resolved on the basis of negotiations. The AM broadcasting system in the United States is in a very vulnerable position with Cuba not a party to the new Region 2 Agreement and without any effective means available to seek resolution of interference problems.

Other means of delivering the desired programming to Cuba should be explored, which might result in less interference to broadcasting in the United States. Expansion of Voice of America operations to carry the desired programs should be considered. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of having at least some of the desired programs carried by existing Florida stations which have a Cuban audience.

We appreciate this opportunity to submit these comments.

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## PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLEN A. WILKINSON, REPRESENTING KSL, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

We understand the issues before the Committee are (1) whether Radio Marti should be authorized and constructed, and (2) whether its construction and operation would impact unfavorably on commercial AM broadcast stations in the United States.

Whether Radio Marti should be authorized and constructed involves several facets of foreign policy. We do not feel we possess the information or experience to recommend a specific course of action, but we hope that the United States Government will consider the wellbeing of broadcast radio stations in the United States, and especially people of rural areas dependent on stations now suffering from interference for entertainment, news and other programming. Given the past actions of the Cuban Government, it would seem to be not beyond the realm of possibility that it will do all it can to damage reception of U.S. stations as retribution for our country's action in building and operating Radio Marti—for the purpose of advising the Cubans of the situation within their own country, including the actions of their government.

There has already been substantial damage to U.S. commercial stations by Cuban stations, and the most substantial have occurred over the past several months, although Cuba has violated the North American Regional Agreement (NARBA) in the past 25 years or more in certain respects. Two main victims of the recent Cuban action are KSL and WHO, Des Moines, Iowa, both clear channel stations operating with the maximum power authorized in the United States—50 kilowatts—and serving substantial rural areas with programs of news, weather, market conditions and other material required by farm operators. A study done for Bonneville International Corporation, licensee of KSL, has been furnished for the file of the Committee. It shows that the nighttime skywave signal of KSL, which provides the rural areas with service from approximately 2 hours prior to sundown until approximately 2 hours following sunup, has virtually been eliminated. A study of "Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcast Stations," commissioned by the National Association of Broadcasters and dated March 1, 1982, has also been furnished to the Committee. It shows that AM stations in 32 States and the District of Columbia will experience interference and reduced listening areas if Cuba proceeds with its proposed actions. The fear in the industry is that U.S. insistence on going ahead with Radio Marti may strengthen the Cuban resolution to so proceed. This study shows that Cuban interference from its station in 1160 kHz, the KSL frequency, would reduce the existing coverage of KSL from 1,406,910 square miles to 9,439 square miles. This is unfortunate for KSL, but it is more unfortunate for its listeners, many of whom have depended on the coverage of KSL.

How can this situation be cured or alleviated? Jamming probably would be a useless gesture. The Cuban operators would need but to shift the signal of their station to a different frequency, which would damage other U.S. stations. U.S. representatives have suggested to Cubans the utilization of directional antennae. They have furnished data along this line. It is my understanding that this was done in August 1981. Whether it is being considered by the Cuban operators is not known to us. The only other method is to devise a method whereby diplomatic channels may be used to commence discussions between the United States and Cuba. Cuba takes the position that it is not now subject to an agreement involving the Western Hemisphere. It may act as it chooses. This is the situation which existed with Mexico in the 1950's after NARBA was negotiated. Mexico, like Cuba, refused to sign the agreement, but the United States and Mexico held discussions thereafter and reached a separate agreement which was very similar to the NARBA agreement. The damage inflicted by the Cuban stations is substantial. The United States could muster its technical knowledge to do substantially the same to Cuban stations. The Cubans have people with adequate technical knowledge to understand this. We think the chaotic situation now in existence must be the subject of a serious and supported effort by our Government to bring about humane treatment for the residents of both countries at this time. We ask that this Committee take such action to require that the State Department proceed along those lines.

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National Association of Broadcasters,
*Washington, D.C., August 19, 1982.*

Hon. Charles H. Percy,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,*
*U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

Dear Senator Percy: The ability of broadcasters to transmit an unimpeded signal to the public is the lifeline of the broadcast industry. As a trade association representing 4,608 radio stations and all the major commercial radio networks, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) is therefore vitally concerned about intensifying levels of Cuban interference to AM stations in the United States.

During the past few years, NAB has become aware of the magnitude of the Cuban interference problem. We recently documented actual levels of such interference, and projected the extent of interference that would result if the Cuban Government proceeds with its plans to make drastic changes in the frequencies and power of its AM stations. Our studies conclude that over 200 AM stations in 34 States would suffer the effects of Cuban interference. Millions of Americans would be deprived of the AM service provided today by those stations.

We have spoken with White House, State Department and FCC officials, and have appeared before Congressional hearings to apprise our Government of the need to solve the Cuban interference problem. Most recently, of course, these discussions have revolved around proposed legislation to authorize Radio Marti, which the Foreign Relations Committee will consider today.

As we have grappled with the Cuban interference problem, it has become clear to us that the complexity of the problem extends far beyond the parameters of the Radio Marti issue. There is a tendency to view Radio Marti as a miracle bargaining chip that can be traded for the solution to our interference problems. This view, we submit, ignores the history and complexity of the interference problem. U.S. stations were experiencing unacceptable levels of Cuban interference before Radio Marti became an issue, and destructive interference may persist in the absence of a Radio Marti. But it would be similarly naive to assert that there is no relationship between Radio Marti and the worsening interference situation. Indeed, there are recent reports that Fidel Castro is preparing a massive retaliation to Radio Marti that would greatly exacerbate our current interference problems.

Should the Foreign Relations Committee recommend the authorization of Radio Marti, we believe that it has the means, and indeed, the obligation, to adopt legislation designed to avert such retaliation, and thereby mitigate the extent to which Radio Marti may inflame an already costly interference problem. We are aware that you may consider an amendment that would place Radio Marti on 1610 kHz, outside the commercial AM radio band;[*] utilize the existing Voice of America channel on 1180 kHz; use short wave frequencies for Radio Marti; or permit government leasing of airtime on existing commercial AM stations for Radio Marti. These are certainly valid options in furtherance of this obligation.

Our ultimate goal, of course, is to work toward the elimination of all unacceptable levels of Cuban interference to U.S. stations. This goal can be realized only through agreement with the Cuban Government to mutually acceptable AM broadcast standards. NAB has demonstrated on several occasions that there are no satisfactory unilateral technical solutions to Cuban interference. Interference must be remedied at its source, not at the point of reception. This calls for a meaningful diplomatic effort to resolve the interference crisis.

In the meantime, during your consideration of legislation to authorize Radio Marti, NAB urges that you adopt all means possible to mitigate its potential to harm our domestic broadcast industry. Further, we hope that your contemplation of the possible relationship between Radio Marti and our escalating Cuban interference problems is but a starting point in earnest efforts by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to achieve a lasting diplomatic solution to the Cuban interference problem.

Sincerely yours,

VINCENT T. WASILEWSKI.

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[From the Congressional Record, Aug. 10, 1982]

## AM RECEPTION ON 1610 AND 530 KHZ

(By M. C. Rau)

### SUMMARY

The ability of an AM receiver to adequately receive a signal on 1610 kHz is a common feature. A conservative estimate is that 80 percent to 90 percent of existing AM receivers can receive 1610 with no technical problems.

### DISCUSSION

There is one representation within the CRS study of July 28, 1982 that is simply not accurate. Because this factor concerns our industry. I believe it warrants clarification. The "issue" is the extent that AM radios are able to receive 1610 kHz. Referring to frequencies at either end of the AM broadcast band, CRS states: "The argument against using these frequencies is that most radio sets are not designed to receive them, since there are no commercial AM stations in those bands."[1]

While it is true there are no commercial stations on 1610 kHz it is manifestly inaccurate to claim that AM receivers are, in general, unable to receive this frequency. In fact, according to Magnavox, it is a "general practice" to design manually-tuned radios (the most common form of receiver) for reception through 1620 kHz.[2]

In a test of 20 different receiver models, including 10 competitors, conducted by Delco electronics, only 5 were found to be unable to receive 1620 kHz.[3]

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[*] Attached is a study prepared by Michael Rau, NAB staff engineer, discussing the technical feasibility of utilizing 1610 kHz for Radio Marti. Mr. Rau's study appeared in the Congressional Record on Aug. 10, 1982.

[1] CRS study, p. 60.

[2] Conversation with Mr. Bud McDowell. See p. 4. Magnavox, at its height of production, produced 500,000 radios per year.

[3] Conversation with Mr. Tom Prewitt. See p. 4. Delco manufactures between 3 and 6 million automobile radios per year.

This particular test involved a radio design employing "frequency synthesis"—electronic tuning, rather than manual—which is a design increasing in popularity. Delco estimates that 1 out of every 6 radios "in the field" currently uses electronic tuning, and that the number is increasing. Delco maintains that 100 percent of manual tuned radios can receive 1610 kHz with no technical problems whatsoever.

The ability to receive 1610 kHz, or 530 kHz has been helped by FCC establishment of the Traveler's Information Service (TIS). These stations began operation several years ago.[4] While I am not aware of how many TIS stations have been built. Delco stated specifically that when the TIS service was established, radio design within Delco changed to insure TIS reception, i.e., before TIS was established, reception of 1610 and 530 was possible and likely, but only as a happenstance of design. After TIS, reception of 1610 and 530 became a Delco criteria for design.

In speaking with Panasonics, a worldwide manufacturer of AM radios, I again found that "the vast majority of AM radios can receive 1610 kHz." [5]

Reception of 1610 kHz is common. On the basis of the discussions mentioned herein, I conservatively estimate that 80 to 90 percent of existing AM receivers can receive 1610 kHz with no technical problems.

This estimate has apparently been arrived at elsewhere. On May 1, 1978, the Williams Sound Corporation ("Williams") filed a Petition for Rulemaking with the FCC (RM-3126) requesting, among other things, the authorization to operate "auditory training devices" on 530 and 1610 kHz.[6] The FCC responded with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking deferring consideration of this particular aspect of the Williams petition.[7] Two points of interest are here:

(1) Williams assumed 1610 kHz can be received by public AM radios. Without such reception, clearly, his proposal would fail.

(2) The FCC assumed 1610 kHz can be received by public AM radios. In fact, the FCC used this property as one of its reasons for deferring the Williams proposal: "Williams reliance on standard AM radio receivers as an important feature in its proposal may be more of a deterrent than an advantage, because there is a distinct possibility that the easy availability of AM receivers would increase the likelihood of Williams' system being employed for purposes contrary to Commission policy." (emphasis added)—the FCC was concerned that the Williams system might be used for broadcasting on 1610.

Attached is a list of contacts employed in the preparation of this memo. While all discussions have not been incorporated herein, there has been no objections or inconsistency raised with any of the representations.

The reception of 530 kHz at the lower end of the band is equally likely, as the design of AM radios will be symmetrical about the AM band.

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AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS,
*Washington, D.C., December 6, 1982.*

Hon. CHARLES PERCY,
*Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,*
*United States Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CHAIRMAN PERCY: I am writing to indicate the AFL-CIO's support for H.R. 5427, authorizing funds for the creation of Radio Marti.

In the same way that Radio Free Europe supplies information about the Solidarity movement in Poland to the Polish people—information which is withheld from them by the Polish Government—we believe Radio Marti should be created to help break the Cuban Government's control of information in Cuba.

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[4] The TIS is a base station in the Local Government Radio Service that is used to transmit noncommercial voice information pertaining to local traffic and road conditions, points of interest, and other public information for travelers. See, 47 C.F.R. Sec. 90.242; FCC Rules and Regulations.

[5] Conversation with Mr. John Marchetti. See p. 4, Panasonics is a worldwide manufacturer of AM radios. Although it is not known exactly how many radios Panasonics manufactures each year, estimates are on the order of tens of millions per year.

[6] An auditory training device is a transmitter or receiver used for instruction by sound of persons having speech or hearing handicaps. See, 47 C.F.R. Sec. 15.4(1).

[7] "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking." ("Notice"), Gen. Docket 81-786, adopted Nov. 12, 1981, FCC 81-525, 47 Fed. Reg. 216 (Jan. 5, 1982), paragraphs 9 through 12. A "Report and Order" has been recently issued in this Docket, action by the FCC July 22, 1982, FCC 82-831. The text has not yet been issued.

I hope you will make the AFL–CIO's support part of the record of debate when the Radio Marti legislation comes to the Senate floor for consideration.

We appreciate your leadership on this important issue.

Sincerely,

RAY DENISON,
*Director, Department of Legislation.*

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WILLIAM E. DULIN, P.E.,
CONSULTING ENGINEER,
*Alexandria, Va., August 24, 1982.*

Senator CHARLES H. PERCY,
*Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,*
*Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: It is my understanding that the frequency and power chosen for the Radio Marti project is 1040 kHz and 50 kW. The transmitter would feed into a high gain directional antenna designed to provide coverage of Cuba from a location in south Florida.

As I am sure you are aware, the Voice of America operates a 50 kW transmitter on 1180 kHz from Marathon Key, Florida. VOA Marathon was designed specifically to provide and operates daily to provide exactly what Radio Marti proposes to do.

Both Marathon and Marti involve operation in the medium frequency or Standard Broadcast band. In this band the only way useful signals can be delivered to Cuba from Florida is by sky-wave propagation during the nighttime hours because of the distances involved. The maximum signal strengths in Cuba would be of the order of 2.0 millivolts/meter in the Havana area and 1.0 millivolts/meter in eastern Cuba. Sky-wave signals of this order are quite susceptible to low power local jamming or being rendered ineffective by stations already occupying the channel. Jamming can be done cheaply with off the shelf transmitters of from 0.1 to 0.5 kW power modified to operate in the Standard Broadcast band together with a vertical wire antenna. Such a jammer can easily take out the incoming signal in the local area and suburbs of major cities with modest cost. It so happens both 1040 kHz and 1180 kHz have other occupants of the channel in the area as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Radio Marti: | |
| La Fe Isle of Pines, Cuba | 75 kW |
| Puerto Padre, Cuba | 1 kW |
| Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic | 5 kW |
| Radio Marathon: | |
| Isle of Pines, Cuba | 1 kW |
| Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic | 10 kW |
| Jammer, Havana area (estimated) | 1 kW |

Monitoring made at sea along the entire northern coast of Cuba has shown that the jammer exists that coverage is spotty in the at best in both the eastern and western portions of Cuba with the possibility of a few holes in the Central portion. The same situation would exist with Radio Marti but more so as the station on the Isle of Pines has 10 times the power on 1040 kHz as it does on 1180 kHz and perhaps a jammer would not be needed in the Havana area on 1040 kHz. Also, the station at Puerto Padre plus the Santo Domingo station would tend to negate the coverage in the eastern portion of Cuba. There could be a hole in the Santa Clara area which could quite readily be jammed or taken out by simply moving a lower power onto the same channel as Marti.

At a time when overall budgetary savings are trying to be effected and there is wide spread unemployment, up to 13 percent in some areas, it appears that Radio Marti would be a colossal waste of money besides being quite ineffective. I also understand the program content would be like that of RFE and RLN. I cannot fathom how the United States should speak with three voices. We already have a Voice of America and there should be a one and only "Voice" of America. Every effort should be made to enhance its credibility so that the BBC can be dislodged from its reportedly top spot as far as credibility is concerned. United States prestige would be strengthened internationally if there were but one solid, highly credible voice of America. RFE and RLN have always been among the lowest in credibility from my knowledge. In fact, the funds to support them could be better used to improve the facilities of the Voice of America.

The subject has been brought up about other ways to reach Cuba than by using the Standard Broadcast band. What about short wave? Yes, quite true and in fact the Voice of America sends programs there from its complex at Greenville, N.C. using up to 500 kW transmitters. Unfortunately, however, Cuba has apparently shifted more to FM and TV and only the hobbyists and ham radio operators would have or be interested in operating a short wave receiver. How many people even own a short wave receiver in the United States and listen to foreign broadcasts? I'm sure a miniscule audience. FM sets are so cheap now and so noise resistant as to greatly overshadow Standard Band receivers. Why not broadcast FM or even TV to Cuba then? Fine, if you could get close enough. But the distances from Florida are over the horizon and FM and TV signals have virtually no chance of making it. Yes; it could be done by ship or several of them at tremendous cost for maintenance of ship, crew and equipment. Also it would be in complete violation of international treaty and radio regulations prohibiting broadcasting from ships or aircraft at sea, as the State Dept. or the FCC will confirm on a moment's notice, FM and TV are also easily jammable.

I think I can express myself from my personal knowledge and experience as well as from the standpoint of a citizen and taxpayer. For your information, I have over 32 years of engineering experience including 18 years as Supervisory Electronics Engineer and Deputy Chief, Frequency Division, Office of the Engineering Manager (Voice of America). During those years I had a large part in the selection of the frequency, the antenna array design and computing of the coverage potentials of Radio Marathon vis a vis Cuba. I did the same for Radio Hue in Viet-Nam to beam signals to Hanoi with 50 kW on 760 kHz; Radio Bangkok with 1000 kW for coverage of Southeast Asia; a station in Kavala, Greece to cover Central Europe using 500 kW. On the short wave or high frequency (HF) side I did the radio propagation studies and devised the antenna complements and wrote the specifications for their number, kind, and required technical characteristics for all major projects including the computing of their coverages in the proposed and projected target cities and areas. These projects included the complexes at Greenville, N.C.; Monrovia, Liberia; Tinang, Philippines; and Kavala, Greece. Also there were many many other projects both medium and short wave that were not built that I did the same for but which were never built but set aside for political, negotiating problems with the host countries involved, logistic problems or lack of funds.

Besides the Voice of America, where I spent over half my career, my experience covers 3 years as a Lieutenant in the Navy Electronics Division, BUSHIPS; 1 year with Radar and Air Comm. Branch, Office of the Chief Signal Officer; 6 years as Supervisory Radio Electronics Engineer and Chief, Technical Branch, Marine Div. FCC; 1 year as contract engineer with the Naval Research Laboratory plus 4 years with NPA; and 2½ years as Engineer with the National Security Agency. I am a Registered Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia.

Any assistance I may be able to provide I will be glad to obligate with at your request. I will be glad to answer any questions you may pose within my capabilities.

Sincerely yours,

William E. Dulin.

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